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Popular Music and Public Diplomacy  
An Introduction 
Mario Dunkel and Sina A. Nitzsche 
 
 
Every year since 30 April 2013, the official date of UNESCO’s International 
Jazz Day, the event’s so-called global concert has ended with a jam. After about 
two hours of live performances by individual artists, all of the musicians in-
volved in the event share the stage for a ritualistic, final performance of John 
Lennon’s “Imagine.” The global concert’s version of this song builds on Herbie 
Hancock’s 2010 adaptation on his record The Imagine Project. While some 
musicians keep playing throughout the performance of “Imagine,” others sing 
individual fragments of the piece. Some instrumentalists are assigned short 
sections for solos, while others provide backings toward the end of the perfor-
mance. “Imagine” ends on a scat riff, which is again based on Hancock’s earlier 
version. Sung by several musicians on the syllables “ba” and “dap,” the final 
unisono motif draws on the shared practice of imitating musical instruments, 
reaffirming the event’s central rhetoric that frames jazz as a “universal lan-
guage.” Launched in 2011, Jazz Day officially celebrates the “diplomatic role” 
of jazz in uniting people around the world (“About”). It has been hosted by the 
US (2012 and 2016), Turkey (2013), Japan (2014), France (2015), Cuba (2017), 
and Russia (2018). The 2019 event will take place in Australia. Barack Obama 
hosted Jazz Day at the White House in 2016 while the Russian Ministry of 
Culture supported the global concert in 2018 when it took place at the Mariinsky 
Theater in St. Petersburg, Vladimir Putin’s home town. In addition to this 
involvement of several national governments, International Jazz Day has been 
funded by large corporations such as United Airlines and Toyota.  
That an event such as Jazz Day has become significant for some of the best-
known jazz musicians as well as for state leaders, large corporations, and audi-
ences testifies to the significance of this volume on the interaction between 
popular music and public diplomacy. Undoubtedly, jazz and its mediations hold 
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significant cultural capital both for governments and corporations. Over the last 
two decades, questions concerning this political significance of music in interna-
tional relations have been raised in different disciplines. Political scientists and 
historians, such as Andrew F. Cooper, Lisa Davenport, Penny von Eschen, 
Jessica Gienow-Hecht, Simo Mikkonen, Frédéric Ramèl, among others, have 
tended to emphasize the significance of different types of cultural practices, 
including music, in international relations by looking at the manifold ways in 
which these practices and their mediations contribute to public diplomacy and 
become politically effective (Eschen; Gienow-Hecht, Sound Diplomacy; Daven-
port; Cooper; Ramel and Prévost-Thomas; Mikkonen and Suutari).  
At the same time, musicologists, literary scholars, art historians, and other 
academics interested in the study of cultures have begun to inquire about the 
ways in which the diplomatic politicization of music and musicians reverberates 
in the cultural sphere (see Fosler-Lussier, Music; Ahrendt, Ferraguto, and 
Mahiet; Bauer; Street; Kemper et al.). The politicization of music can have a 
great array of resonances and repercussions, ranging from the marketing of 
musicians to the branding of genres and the transformation of musical practices 
and aesthetics. Integrating perspectives from history, political science, but also 
musicology and popular music studies, the present volume therefore understands 
the relationship between popular music and diplomacy as multidirectional rather 
than unidirectional or reciprocal, raising questions that are relevant for cultural, 
musical, social, economic, and political developments in a globalized world.  
 
 
POPULAR MUSIC AND MUSIC DIPLOMACY RESEARCH 
 
This book illuminates the interconnectivity of popular music and public diplo-
macy from transnational and transdisciplinary perspectives. Fourteen scholars 
with diverse national and disciplinary backgrounds provide individual chapters, 
guaranteeing a wide range of perspectives on the topic. Except for the first 
chapter, which provides the historical background to the topic, the chapters 
assembled in this volume take a focused look at one specific aspect and time 
period in music diplomacy. By concentrating on popular music after World War 
II, they provide additions and amendments to individual debates on music 
diplomacy. The book’s narrow focus regarding time period and musical practic-
es, then, facilitates an otherwise vast approach to the topic. 
The authors’ focus on popular music rather than music per se results from 
several considerations. First, popular music has tended to be sidelined in the 
study of music diplomacy, as initial studies of the role of the arts in propaganda 
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focused mostly on European concert music. Only recently have researchers 
begun to dedicate more attention to diplomatic practices that include popular 
music. The work of Penny von Eschen on the US jazz ambassadors programs 
may be regarded as a door opener for studies exploring musical practices and 
genres beyond the canon of European art music that have emerged over the last 
fifteen years (Eschen). This anthology contributes to closing this gap in music 
diplomacy research.  
Second, the inclusion of popular practices and genres in public diplomacy is 
closely associated with questions of cultural representation, participation, and 
power. Looking at processes by which different musical practices have been 
included and excluded in public diplomacy raises questions about larger phe-
nomena, such as social, cultural, and political participation. Music diplomacy 
has a unique power to reaffirm, maintain, and intervene in what Stuart Hall calls 
“regimes of representation” (232). One example of exclusion in music diploma-
cy is the negligence of popular music in music diplomacy programs of the 
1950s, for instance, when the period’s most successful music, rock ’n’ roll, 
played only a marginal role in official music diplomacy programs. While the 
diplomatic use of popular music was initially limited to such “semi-popular”1 
practices as jazz, the second half of the twentieth century saw a growing pres-
ence of various popular genres in diplomatic contexts, including country, blue-
grass, rock, punk, reggae, and hip-hop. Two events indicate how understandings 
of national representation and popular culture were changing fundamentally in 
the 1950s: Dizzy Gillespie’s 1956 tour to the Middle East, Turkey and the 
Balkans on behalf of the US State Department; and the launching of the Euro-
vision Song Contest (ESC) in the same year. As Dean Vuletic details, the ESC 
has redefined what popular culture means for the forging of European identities 
(Vuletic; see Vuletic in this volume). In a way, both events fundamentally 
questioned the politics of representation in music diplomacy, suggesting a more 
participatory and democratic practice of musical representation. 
Third, the reliance on political archives in the field of public and cultural di-
plomacy entails a tendency to de-emphasize the perspectives of audiences—the 
ostensible recipients of public diplomacy—and musicians while overemphasiz-
ing the views of government officials. This tendency has been critically interro-
gated by ethnographic studies that have emerged over the last ten years (see 
                                                           
1  According to Danielle Fosler-Lussier, the term “semi-popular music” was actually 
employed by United States Information Agency (USIA) officials who defined it as 
“music that ‘has achieved a degree of permanence,’ including band and glee club mu-
sic” (“‘The State’s Canon’”).  
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Aidi; Bayles; Fosler-Lussier, “Cultural Diplomacy”; Salois). Despite these 
efforts, the inclusion of audiences’ perspectives in public diplomacy research 
remains one of the great challenges within the field. By focusing on popular 
music and popularization processes, this volume seeks to decenter exclusively 
government-oriented perspectives. The participatory orientation of popular 
music and popular culture in general encourages academics to ask questions 
about reception processes and the manifold cultural repercussions of music 
diplomacy rather than reducing the field to the study of cultural policies. 
The inclusion of popular music is thus more than a question of genre. In fact, 
attempts to define popular music as a genre have failed repeatedly (Shuker). 
Within the framework of this book, the “popular” in popular music is less about 
the nature or essence of music than about the particular ways in which music is 
practiced and mediated. Consequently, this volume is concerned with ways in 
which music can help—and, indeed, has helped—to popularize by rendering 
complex messages accessible, appealing, and enjoyable. In the case of Jazz Day, 
for instance, the shared participatory performance of an extraordinarily popular 
song such as “Imagine” can make jazz accessible to audiences beyond jazz’s 
otherwise limited circles of devoted listeners. It is this interest in popularization, 
then, that ties together highly diverse kinds of music, ranging from the Hungari-
an light popular music discussed by Ádám Ignácz to the Turkish pop music 
investigated by Nevin Şahin and the US hip-hop performances analyzed by 
Kendra Salois in this volume. This use of music in order to popularize always 
works both ways: If music diplomacy musicalizes the political, it also politicizes 
the musical. The use of popular music practices in public diplomacy, conse-
quently, impacts popular music and the understanding of cultural frames as 
much as it shapes diplomatic practices. If diplomacy has to do with branding and 
re-branding (Dinnie), then this re-branding affects musical brands as well as 
national and corporate ones. 
In addition to being culturally powerful, music diplomacy is never dissociat-
ed from the social world. Popular music diplomacy, from its beginnings, has 
been about social as well as cultural participation. The first US jazz diplomacy 
tours occurred in the midst of the Civil Rights Movement, and the representation 
of the US by African American jazz ambassadors cannot be separated from the 
movement’s call for equal civil rights and social justice (Eschen; Monson). This 
underlying presence of a larger social reality within music diplomacy is obvious 
at Jazz Day, too. When he hosted the event at the White House in 2016, Barack 
Obama drew on the historical association of jazz diplomacy with the Civil 
Rights Movement. In 2016, Jazz Day’s global concert at the White House 
framed jazz as an African American cultural and artistic contribution to the 
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world’s cultural heritage. If African American music was a “gift” to the United 
States, as the sociologist and civil rights activist W. E. B. DuBois claimed in 
1903, then this gift could be used in order to demand social equality (see Ra-
dano). In this way, an event such as Jazz Day not only functions in an interna-
tional arena, but it also negotiates the social and cultural position of social 
groups within a respective society. As the contributions to this volume by Nevin 
Şahin, Gesa zur Nieden, and Kendra Salois demonstrate, contemporary musical 
ambassadors likewise use popular music in various countries in order to draw 
attention to similar questions regarding the participation of minorities in the 
representation of culture. 
 
 
POPULAR MUSIC AND DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE 
 
As the range of musical practices included in music diplomacy has expanded, so 
has the understanding of the practice of diplomacy itself. Over the last fifteen 
years a number of studies have dealt with various sorts of cultural practices and 
their diplomatic significance. Researchers have begun to consider the role not 
only of popular musical practices in public diplomacy, but they have also looked 
at the ways in which larger popular phenomena impact diplomatic practices. 
Cooper’s studies of celebrity diplomacy, for instance, investigate the symbiosis 
between popular icons and diplomatic activities, ranging from Audrey Hepburn 
to Bob Geldof and Bono (Cooper). Other studies have investigated the roles and 
experiences of non-professional musicians and their musical practices in music 
diplomacy programs (Fosler-Lussier, “Cultural Diplomacy”).  
At the same time, the understanding of what constitutes diplomacy has 
changed. International Jazz Day, in fact, exemplifies this. Although it is a 
UNESCO event, Jazz Day is organized by a US institution: the Thelonious 
Monk Institute of Jazz. A nonprofit organization based in Washington, DC and 
Los Angeles, the Monk Institute had already been involved in US jazz diploma-
cy initiatives before becoming the chief organizer of Jazz Day. In the 2000s, the 
US State Department directly funded the institute in order to launch several 
international jazz diplomacy programs. As von Eschen, Davenport, Fosler-
Lussier, and others have demonstrated, the practice of US jazz diplomacy goes 
back to the 1950s, and is intimately interwoven with the history of the Cold War, 
or the cultural Cold War (Mikkonen and Suutari; Gienow-Hecht, “Culture”). As 
tensions between East and West were increasing in the 1950s, the US State 
Department sent jazz ambassadors abroad in order to gain the goodwill of 
foreign populaces. Many of the most famous US jazz musicians participated in 
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these programs. From a US-government perspective, Jazz Day is an attempt to 
build on the success of these tours. 
While the US State Department used to directly fund the Monk Institute to 
conduct jazz diplomacy programs, private donors have taken on the role in 
recent years that used to belong to the US government. One of the institute’s 
main sponsors, for instance, is the military contractor Northrop Grumman. 
Although it is a private corporation, Northrop Grumman is closely tied to the US 
administration as the company derives more than 83 percent of its business from 
contracts with the government alone (Dunkel). While Northrop Grumman is 
interested in creating goodwill with the US government, the government, in turn, 
has an interest in promoting US culture throughout the world. Even though the 
multiplicity of stakeholders at work here obscures political and corporate in-
vestments in the event, Jazz Day still functions in a way that is not entirely 
dissimilar to jazz diplomacy programs of the 1950s, promoting African Ameri-
can music in order to ameliorate the global image of the US. 
This complex structural set-up of Jazz Day has to do with one of the major 
changes in the development of music diplomacy in the twenty-first century: It 
has become increasingly difficult to identify the actors who are invested in 
diplomatic initiatives. Funding is distributed in ways that are highly elusive. If 
US jazz diplomacy during the Cold War was clearly framed as a US initiative, 
organized by the US State Department, stakeholders are now much less transpar-
ent. One of the key concepts for understanding this shift in music diplomacy is 
the “new public diplomacy” as political scientist Jan Melissen described it in 
2005: 
 
The new public diplomacy is no longer confined to messaging, promotion campaigns, or 
even direct governmental contacts with foreign publics serving foreign policy purposes. It 
is also about building relationships with civil society actors in other countries and about 
facilitating networks between non-governmental parties at home and abroad. Tomorrow’s 
diplomats will become increasingly familiar with this kind of work, and in order to do it 
much better they will increasingly have to piggyback on non-governmental initiatives, 
collaborate with non-official agents and benefit from local expertise inside and outside the 
embassy. (New Public Diplomacy 22)  
 
This expansive definition of public diplomacy entails a stronger focus on the 
ways in which cultural and artistic practices function within international rela-
tions, including their use by non-government organizations. In the context of this 
volume, it has the advantage of allowing us to raise questions that concern the 
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complex interplay of politics, culture, media, commerce, and music in diplo-
matic practices.  
Melissen further argued that this type of public diplomacy had become glob-
ally dominant:  
 
Public diplomacy is becoming less national, not only in terms of the actors involved but 
even when considering the themes that states pick to tell ‘their story.’ National govern-
ments always have their own interests in mind but, when practicing public diplomacy, 
they increasingly emphasize common interests as well as global public goods. (Beyond 21) 
 
It seems that the resurgence of nationalism and the emergence of such terms as 
“Twitter diplomacy,” “undiplomatic diplomacy,” and “me-first diplomacy” since 
2016 once again provide challenges to understanding how diplomatic practices 
are transforming. With its focus on polylateralism and non-government actors, 
however, the concept of a new public diplomacy remains significant as an 
analytical approach, as it accounts for the continuing multidimensional complex-
ity of diplomacy.  
As the exercise of power through digital and algorithmic diplomacy is be-
coming increasingly significant (Melissen, “Fake News”), this recent shift also 
affects music diplomacy. In fact, Jazz Day illustrates how techniques of digital 
control have amended more traditional communication strategies in music 
diplomacy. Strategies of mediation range from the event’s direct framing in 
speeches by musicians, UNESCO ambassadors, celebrities, and politicians at the 
global concert, which are then re-mediated across various broadcast and trans-
mission platforms, to their negotiation in digital media and social networks.  
On the one hand, the series of performances by musicians at the global con-
cert, for instance, is framed by a number of speeches that are held in between 
musical performances. At the 2018 global concert in St. Petersburg, UNESCO 
jazz ambassador Herbie Hancock said: 
 
Now more than ever before, the world needs International Jazz Day. A vision for the 
future of humanity, International Jazz Day champions the connectedness of all people. 
And this evening, an all-star cast of culturally diverse musicians have assembled here in 
St. Petersburg and will demonstrate that jazz has the power to unite all world citizens as 
one race—the human race. (United Nations) 
 
This part of Hancock’s speech frames Jazz Day in a language of urgency (“now 
more than ever before”), global solidarity, transracial diversity, and heroic 
purpose. At the same time, Hancock’s statement is ambiguous enough to allow 
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for various readings. The first sentence alone can be read in a number of ways, 
demonstrating that music diplomacy can be a balancing act that involves the 
fabrication of ambiguous messages. Why, one wonders, does the world need jazz 
more than ever? Does this have to do with the confrontational politics of the 
Trump administration? Or is Hancock alluding to Russian military aggression? 
The answer remains unclear: either message can be read into Hancock’s state-
ment. 
Speeches by politicians involved in the event tend to me more specific. Shar-
ing a stage with Hancock, Mikhail Yefimovich Shvydkoy, special representative 
of the Russian President Vladimir Putin, for instance, emphasized the great 
national contributions of Russia to the flourishing of jazz and the arts generally: 
 
It is highly symbolic that this year the forum takes place in St. Petersburg. Russia is 
rightfully famous for a galaxy of talented artists, composers and directors, true masters of 
the jazz art who perform at the best concert venues and win over audiences with their 
original talent, virtuosity and splendid improvisation. Due to their creative energy and 
genuine commitment, our country has been doing much for the professional development 
of young musicians and implementing outstanding projects in the field of international 
humanitarian cooperation. The reputation of the Russian jazz education is growing. 
(United Nations) 
 
Clearly, the struggle over the ownership of jazz is an elementary aspect of the 
event. It exemplifies a wider debate on claiming popular music practices that has 
informed this book (Ritter on jazz; Sanz Díaz and Morales Tamaral on flamenco, 
Salois and zur Nieden on hip-hop, Şahin on dervish performances). This struggle 
over ownership does not end with the speeches, but it continues in the wider 
mediation of popular music performance. Jazz Day may appear to be something 
quite different to the few thousand viewers who actually attend global concerts 
than to jazz enthusiasts who follow live streams of the event. It also reaches 
audiences differently who search appearances of individual artists at the global 
concert on YouTube than viewers of abridged versions of the original stream on 
jazzday.com, the event’s official website. Other jazz aficionados may have 
participated simply by registering their own Jazz Day event on jazzday.com, 
where a map of the world indicates locations and venues that host Jazz Day 
events (“2018 International Jazz Day”). 
Considering the mediation of music diplomacy, then, means investigating 
how actors seek to control this large variety of ways in which audiences and 
participants experience a musical event such as Jazz Day. Although Hancock 
frames Jazz Day as a celebration of peace, harmony, and global solidarity, a 
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closer look at the global concert’s mediation in fact reveals an underlying level 
of competition between different stakeholders. For the 2018 Jazz Day in St. 
Petersburg, the Russian Ministry of Culture created its own website (jazzdayrus-
sia.com)—despite the fact that Jazz Day has always had one general website 
representing the event. Jazzdayrussia.com is clearly modeled after the original 
website—its structure and design are almost identical. Yet, its contents differ 
fundamentally from the original. The original website, jazzday.com, which is run 
by the Thelonious Monk Institute of Jazz, portrayed the 2018 celebrations as a 
double event that simultaneously took place in St. Petersburg and New Orleans 
(jazzday.com). The website’s main page featured two videos, inviting visitors to 
“watch the International Jazz Day 2018 concerts from St. Petersburg and New 
Orleans.” In previous years, the website had only featured the global concert that 
took place in the event’s respective host city, which in 2018 would have been St. 
Petersburg. By emphasizing a simultaneous jazz day event in New Orleans, the 
website thus reasserts US ownership of jazz while downplaying the significance 
of St. Petersburg as the host city. By contrast, jazzdayrussia.com does not 
mention the New Orleans concert, inviting viewers to watch the St. Petersburg 
global concert only (“International Jazz Day”). Obviously, US and Russian 
stakeholders mediate the event in different ways, with each side emphasizing 
their own achievements and sidelining the contributions of the other. These 
differences in the mediation of Jazz Day testify to the digital competition for 
musical ownership between different actors invested in the event. 
 
 
STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK 
 
Both in the digital and non-digital realm, the interconnection between popular 
music and public diplomacy, then, is characterized by several continuing ten-
sions. It is “pushed and pulled,” as Danielle Fosler-Lussier puts it, and has the 
power to push and pull (“Music Pushed”). This volume, therefore, is separated 
into four parts dealing with different tensions that have shaped the practice of 
popular music diplomacy. The chapters of Part I, “Competition and Collabora-
tion,” investigate the ways in which tensions between competition and collabora-
tion impact music diplomacy. According to Klaus Nathaus, competition has been 
a key factor in the historical development of music diplomacy in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. The studies included in this part illuminate the extent to 
which popular music diplomacy can be understood as a practice that oscillates 
between international competition, on the one hand, and transnational collabora-
tion, on the other, in various cultural settings and political contexts. 
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In “Music in Transnational Transfers and International Competitions. Ger-
many, Britain, and the US in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” historian 
Klaus Nathaus emphasizes competition as one of the major forces behind the 
development of music diplomacy in the Western world. He claims that while the 
transfer of culture in general and music in particular has attracted increasing 
attention among historians in the last 25 years, studies discussing imperialism, 
resistance, and appropriation commonly frame cultural relations between nations 
as cooperative and bilateral. Nathaus’s chapter suggests a slightly different 
interpretative angle as it understands these relations as competitive and prestige-
oriented. His approach raises questions of how such diplomatic and cultural 
relations can be studied, understood, and evaluated. Analyzing both classical and 
popular music performances, practices, and discursive strategies by musicians 
and music critics, Nathaus identifies continuities in the institutionalization of 
transnational musical competition since the early nineteenth century. 
Alessandro Mazzola argues that Belgium’s musical diplomacy cannot be un-
derstood without taking into consideration the country’s historical, political, 
linguistic, and cultural divisions. Unlike federal states whose self-governing 
components adopt policies that converge and cooperate at an international level, 
Flanders and Wallonia—the Dutch- and French-speaking communities of 
Belgium—do not seem to coordinate on this matter. According to Mazzola, 
popular music is the principal field where the two communities adopt very 
different approaches and end up competing for resources and international 
visibility. “The Paradoxes of Cultural and Music Diplomacy in a Federal Coun-
try: A Case Study from Flanders, Belgium” showcases how Flanders, in particu-
lar, supports self-representation strategies that produce and circulate images of a 
singular and homogeneous “Flemish nation.” Cultural institutions seem to focus 
on an autonomous nation-building project rather than situating the community in 
the larger national—Belgian—context.  
Closing out the first section, Nevin Şahin’s chapter, “Dervish on the Euro-
vision Stage: Popular Music and the Heterogeneity of Power Interests in Con-
temporary Turkey,” unravels the diplomatic and power struggles behind Tur-
key’s performances at the ESC. In 2004, the popular singer Sertab Erener 
merged popular music with traditional dance when she performed amidst a group 
of whirling dervishes, triggering a lively debate between the Ministry of Culture 
and Tourism, Sufi organizations, and the audience over the representation of 
Mevlevi Sufism. The image of the whirling dervish at the ESC performance is 
still vividly debated and contested today. Having collected data in a 15-month 
ethnographic field research project, Şahin examines the dynamics of competition 
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and collaboration between state, commercial, and religious interests in the 
practice of music diplomacy.  
Part II, “Infiltration and Appropriation,” focuses on tensions between sender- 
and receiver-oriented approaches to the practice of music diplomacy. In Music in 
America’s Cold War Diplomacy, Danielle Fosler-Lussier describes the Eisen-
hower administration’s strategy of cultural “infiltration” as a unidirectional, top-
down process in which music served as a carrier of American ideas and values 
that could be “pour[ed] . . . into the minds of the foreign public” (4). By contrast, 
later concepts of appropriation and exchange emphasize the agency of recipients 
who defy strategies of cultural infiltration by actively developing their own 
meanings and cultural practices. While Fosler-Lussier focuses exclusively on US 
music diplomacy, this part investigates the role of infiltration and appropriation 
in various settings on both sides of the Iron Curtain.  
As Rüdiger Ritter and Maristella Feustle demonstrate, strategies of infiltra-
tion and persuasion had unexpected consequences, leading to open or hidden 
person-to-person diplomacy which often facilitated individual cooperation and 
exchange. In his chapter “Between Propaganda and Public Diplomacy. Jazz in 
the Cold War,” Rüdiger Ritter argues that scholars of music and diplomacy need 
to reconsider the similarities and differences between US and Soviet music 
diplomacy. According to Ritter, jazz was an instrument in the struggle for 
cultural supremacy not only for the US, but also for the Soviet Union and its 
satellites. US officials intended to destabilize Socialist societies by introducing 
jazz via radio broadcasts or by sending jazz musicians as jazz ambassadors while 
their adversaries in the Eastern Bloc used the music for their own purposes by 
integrating it into a Soviet-Socialist model of culture. As Ritter argues, US-
actors called their efforts cultural diplomacy, while the Eastern Bloc countries 
simply called their own activities propaganda. Both Eastern and Western actors 
used jazz to promote their values, and they both tried to benefit from the weak-
nesses of the other. Ritter concludes that the two ideological adversaries both 
succeeded and failed: Neither did the West provoke a collapse, nor did the East 
succeed in diminishing American popular music in their countries. However, as 
both Cold War opponents undertook intensive efforts to strengthen the Eastern 
Bloc jazz scenes and to promote jazz contacts, those collaborations facilitated a 
mutual jazz exchange after the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
Maristella Feustle explores Willis Conover’s famous jazz broadcast, Music 
USA, which was arguably one of the most effective uses of American “soft 
power” in the mid-twentieth century. As Feustle argues, the jazz diplomacy of 
Conover’s program depended on the integrity ensured by his independence as a 
contractor as well as his insistence that the music speak for itself. Accordingly, 
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the Voice of America radio station could talk repeatedly about a free society’s 
advantages, but jazz succeeded in showing those qualities in action, realized in 
artistic moments which could be efficiently transmitted over the airwaves. 
Feustle’s contribution “‘Liberated from Serfdom’. Willis Conover and the 
Tallinn Jazz Festival of 1967” uses primary source materials from the Willis 
Conover Collection at the University of North Texas to demonstrate the impact 
of Conover’s approach. 
Ádám Ignácz illuminates another unexpected consequence of strategies of 
infiltration during the Cold War. As he shows, the Hungarian government ended 
up appropriating and translating mechanisms of Stalinist musical diplomacy in 
the field of popular music in Hungary. “A Musical Inquisition? Soviet ‘Depu-
ties’ of Musical Entertainment in Hungary during the Early 1950s” details how 
communist elites strove to create a jazz-free Hungarian “national dance music” 
modeled after Soviet musical traditions. While American music diplomacy 
targeted the people in the Warsaw Pact states during the early Cold War through 
what the Eisenhower administration referred to as cultural “infiltration,” the 
Soviet Union created its own strategies. With the increased Sovietization of the 
occupied countries in the late 1940s, Ignácz argues, the USSR had growing 
motivation to “help” with the cultural revolutions conducted by the local com-
munist parties and to directly command, supervise, and monitor the required 
changes. Music was an important instrument in this intervention as Soviet 
musical diplomats visited Hungary to suggest how local cultures could be 
protected from Western popular infiltrations.  
Part III, “Education and Promotion,” examines the conflict between two an-
tagonistic purposes of music diplomacy. The rhetoric that surrounds state-funded 
music programs abroad often implies that music diplomacy seeks to empower 
foreign audiences by contributing to their musical and cultural education. This 
perspective on music diplomacy as a benevolent intervention is, however, 
challenged by the commercial and political interests that underlie such programs. 
This section exemplifies how the interests of interdependent actors in politics 
and entertainment industries complicate claims of neutrality and educational 
motives in the practice of music diplomacy.  
Musicians and music managers have often used the alignment of music with 
politics and politicians as a marketing device (Cooper). At the same time, 
politicians and political institutions have profited from their association with 
celebrity musicians. Martha Bayles’s chapter, “Dancing in Chains: Why Music 
Can’t Keep the World Free,” is specifically concerned with how US popular 
music becomes a force for repression. She describes how US pop and rap stars 
such as Erykah Badu, Mariah Carey, and Kanye West performed in authoritarian 
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countries, thus privileging monetary considerations over humanitarian and 
ethical ones. Bayles contextualizes what she sees as the romantic notion of music 
as a liberating force with the post-World War II jazz ambassadors program. 
Bayles explains how the political, media, and socio-cultural transformations after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall have affected public diplomacy in Europe and Asia. 
Discussing various transnational examples of jazz, rock, pop, rap, hip-hop, and 
country music, Martha Bayles demands that Western nation-states reconsider the 
relationship between politics, the music market, and the music industry in order 
to reconfigure the role of popular music in public diplomacy. 
Nicholas Alexander Brown analyzes how American singer Billy Joel staged 
himself during the performances in Moscow and Leningrad in the late 1980s. In 
his chapter, “Becoming a Blue-Collar Musical Diplomat: Billy Joel and Bridging 
the US-Soviet Divide in 1987,” Brown explores how Joel cleverly fashioned 
himself as an American working-class musician. This identity construction 
resonated well with the white male-dominated working-class ideology of the 
Soviet regime and the experience of Soviet audiences. Brown demonstrates that 
Joel’s lyrics address the concerns of the “common man” who is dissatisfied with 
his government’s politics—an issue that spoke to audiences both inside and 
outside the USSR. Brown’s chapter illuminates how Billy Joel’s blue-collar 
diplomacy was situated between American exceptionalism and Soviet glasnost 
politics while ultimately fulfilling commercial objectives. Even today, Joel 
continues to repackage and repurpose his iconic concert tour in documentaries 
and album releases by building on his legacy as an American artist who alleged-
ly helped to destroy the Iron Curtain.  
Approaching the East German record industry as a space of relative inde-
pendence from the Socialist government, historian Sven Kube also sees the 
popular music industry as a liberating force in authoritarian states. “Music Trade 
in the Slipstream of Cultural Diplomacy: Western Rock and Pop in a Fenced-In 
Record Market” argues that the constantly intensifying presence of Western 
music in the GDR heralded liberalization in the realm of culture that fueled the 
demand for political change. Based on personal interviews with former manag-
ers, executives, agents, and officials, this chapter investigates how the Deutsche 
Schallplatten, East Germany’s only record company, operated between the 
official socialist state ideology, popular tastes, and capitalist production mecha-
nisms. Ultimately, Kube interprets Deutsche Schallplatten as a space of relative 
freedom in a restricted country, but he also points out that Socialist officials 
profited from the popular music exchange by gaining foreign currency in order 
to stabilize the shaky GDR economy.  
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Carlos Sanz Díaz and José Manuel Morales Tamaral illuminate how Francis-
co Franco’s regime used flamenco diplomacy as an instrument to promote 
tourism, trade, and, ultimately, challenge Spain’s isolated position on the global 
diplomatic and economic stage. Presenting a new angle on the phenomenon of 
“national flamencoism,” which has been researched by cultural studies scholars 
and social historians mainly with regard to identities and aesthetics, the authors 
approach flamenco as a diplomatic practice which is deeply embedded in the 
Spanish economy, culture, and politics. “National Flamencoism. Flamenco as an 
Instrument of Spanish Public Diplomacy in Franco’s Regime (1939-1975)” 
presents a close reading of unique historical sources, such as embassy docu-
ments, letters, reports, and international news clippings. Discussing two case 
studies from West Germany and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Sanz 
Díaz and Morales Tamaral show convincingly how flamenco, originally a 
popular, commercial, vernacular, and transcultural art form, was homogenized 
by Spanish officials in order to promote a homogeneous national identity. The 
chapter details how flamenco diplomacy was largely organized by private 
companies, individual managers, and private actors in cooperation with official 
diplomatic institutions during the Cold War, demonstrating that the program’s 
official, educative intent was enmeshed with underlying commercial and politi-
cal motives. 
Part IV, “Representation and Participation,” finally foregrounds how the pol-
itics of participation in music diplomacy reconfigure established modes and 
mechanisms of representation. The chapters in this part investigate participation 
on both an interstate and an interpersonal level. Not only do national politics of 
participation influence how nations are represented on the global stage, but 
participatory processes in person-to-person diplomacy have also provoked a shift 
in diplomatic practices. In addition, politics of participation have impacted the 
ways in which minority groups are represented on the international stage. As 
such, they have affected discourses on the social and cultural locations of 
minorities within their respective nations. This section asks where and how 
participation becomes politically effective by intervening in the politics of 
representation, both on an interpersonal and an international level.  
Kendra Salois’s chapter, “The Ethics and Politics of Empathy in US Hip-
Hop Diplomacy: The Case of the Next Level Program,” examines the US State 
Department’s so-called Next Level program. Launched in 2014, this diplomatic 
initiative connects activists, teachers, emcees, deejays, dancers, and beatmakers. 
According to Salois, Next Level marks a turning point in the State Department’s 
longstanding promotion of American culture abroad since the jazz ambassadors 
program. It emphasizes person-to-person diplomacy guided by empathy, emo-
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tion, and mutual understanding between American teachers and foreign artists 
relabeled as students. Analyzing musical performances and interviews with 
organizers and participants, this chapter makes a case for research which recon-
siders the role of music, emotion, and affect in public diplomacy. 
In his contribution, “Popular Musicking and the Politics of Spectatorship at 
the United Nations,” James R Ball III investigates the role of subjectivity and 
emotion in the public diplomacy of the United Nations. The author shows that 
popular and folk music performances can have quite opposite effects besides the 
intended objectives of freedom, mutual understanding, and solidarity. Analyzing 
former Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s participation in the United Nations’ 
International Day of Happiness and in a concert by Serbia’s Viva Vox Choir, 
Ball III demonstrates how Ban’s involvement in these performances can create 
feelings of alienation and frustration among his intended audiences and render 
diplomatic spaces as highly contested ones. Combining feminist scholarship on 
abject theory and emotion, Ball III joins Bayles in interrogating the myth of 
popular music as an expression of freedom and humanism in diplomatic settings. 
Similar to the US hip-hop diplomacy program investigated by Salois, the 
participatory aspects of hip-hop culture have been crucial to recent developments 
in German music diplomacy. In her chapter, “From Sons of Gastarbeita to Songs 
of Gastarbeiter: Migrant and Post-Migrant Integration through Music and 
German Musical Diplomacy from the 1990s to the Present,” Gesa zur Nieden 
analyzes how migrant and post-migrant musicians have increasingly been 
included in the promotion of (West) German culture abroad over the past 30 
years. Discussing Sons of Gastarbeita, a local multi-ethnic rap group based in the 
Ruhr Area who toured Goethe Institutes across France, this chapter elaborates on 
the development of an educational concept to present German migratory hip-hop 
culture to French students of German as a foreign language. Zur Nieden’s case 
study exemplifies how musicians emphasizing experiences of migration open up 
important spaces for cultural institutions to reconsider national representation in 
an international arena.  
Dean Vuletic’s contribution on the political significance of the ESC, “Public 
Diplomacy and Decision-Making in the Eurovision Song Contest,” finally 
explores the ways in which EU and non-EU states reconfigure their public image 
by participating in this popular music spectacle. Established in 1956, the ESC is 
one of the most prominent examples of what one might call European popular 
culture. Organized by the European Broadcasting Union, this contest has en-
joyed a high popularity in many states across the political spectrum ranging from 
liberal democracies to authoritarian states since the end of World War II. The 
final chapter of this volume looks at the contest’s multifaceted history. Because 
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the event is based on reconfigurations of the nation-state, studying Eurovision 
performances and discursive strategies allows Vuletic to draw important conclu-
sions about how European nations use the ESC to promote themselves and 
attempt to gain competitive advantages over other states. As Vuletic examines 
how audiences perceive those performances, his chapter is an important contri-
bution to the formation of European identities at a time when Europe’s political 
landscape is increasingly fragmenting.  
Taken as a whole, the chapters in this volume detail the complex and multi-
faceted interrelationships between popular music and public diplomacy. The 
authors’ manifold, transnational and transdisciplinary perspectives on the topic 
demonstrate how the investigation of popular music and public diplomacy is in 
itself a political practice. The terminology we employ for understanding this 
relationship—from propaganda to cultural and public diplomacy—is loaded and 
has been subject to political struggles (see Ritter in this volume). Far from 
seeking to provide an all-encompassing account, this book highlights individual 
examples and hopes to open new pathways for research at the interface of 
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Part I:  




Music in Transnational Transfers  
and International Competitions 
Germany, Britain, and the US  




The film Fitzcarraldo (dir. Werner Herzog, 1982) tells the story of Brian 
Sweeney “Fitzcarraldo” Fitzgerald (Klaus Kinski), an Irish entrepreneur who, in 
the early twentieth century, dreams about building an opera house in the Peruvi-
an Andes. He hopes to finance his vision with profits from the rubber boom. 
With money from his brothel-operating girlfriend (Claudia Cardinale), he 
acquires a claim that the other rubber barons believe to be inaccessible. Fitzcar-
raldo’s daring plan is to avoid the rapids of the river Pongo by steering a ship up 
on a second river to a point where the two streams are only separated by a 
narrow ridge, and then transport his vessel over land to the Pongo to reach the 
rubber trees downstream. To get to this ridge, however, he needs to cross an area 
that is populated by indigenous people who are known to be extremely hostile to 
intruders. When his crew realizes what they are in for, most of them abandon 
ship. But as he is left behind by his hired hands, Fitzcarraldo establishes contact 
with the natives who seem strangely fascinated by this man in a white suit 
playing arias on his phonograph, the horn directed at the jungle. 
For mysterious reasons, the natives help Fitzcarraldo haul the massive 
steamer over the hill. A drunken celebration follows, and while the crew is 
asleep on board, the natives sever the ropes that hold the ship in place. As the 
steamer tumbles through the rapids and Fitzcarraldo desperately tries to stop it, 
the natives on board reveal that they believe the vessel had been sent to them by 
the gods to sail into a better future. With a dozen beaming Indios on board his 
battered ship, Fitzcarraldo returns to the point of his departure. To fulfill his 
opera dream at least in part, he sells the steamer and hires an ensemble that 
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performs Vincenzo Bellini’s I Puritani on board the heeling ship, to jubilant 
Peruvians lining the shore. 
Fitzcarraldo lends itself as a metaphor for cultural transfers. Defiance 
against incredible obstacles illustrates the effort required to transport culture 
across borders. The fact that Fitzcarraldo plays his arias to people who remain 
inscrutable even as they come into touching distance reveals the openness of first 
encounters for productive misunderstandings. As Fitzcarraldo’s opera treat is 
ultimately financed by profits from prostitution, the film also shows that money 
is essential to art and may come from less respectable sources. In addition, the 
film’s soundtrack blends various cultures, cumulating in an Italian opera about 
Scottish Puritans performed by a European cast in Peru. Non-diegetic music by 
the German rock band PopolVuh (a Guatemalan term) counters Caruso’s opera 
recordings. 
In the last twenty-five years, historians have become increasingly interested 
in such cultural transfers. They have explored them mostly in view of transatlan-
tic encounters and the possible Americanization of Western Europe. Focused on 
the political economy of mass media and the allure of consumer culture, some 
authors propose that the American senders effectively shaped European culture 
to a large extent (De Grazia; Malchow). While these studies look at Fitzcarral-
do’s record player and the seemingly mesmerizing effect of his broadcasts, a 
revisionist position shifts the view to the natives, pointing out that they produc-
tively “misinterpreted” arias and incorporated them into their own culture. These 
studies argue that European consumers of culture (often described as marginal-
ized and hostile, similar to Fitzcarraldo’s Indios) appropriated American popular 
culture, including jazz, rock ’n’ roll, hip-hop, and Hollywood movies, to their 
own needs (Maase; Poiger; Jackson). The debate between cultural imperialism 
and creative appropriation is echoed in more recent research on musical diplo-
macy. Again, the focus is mostly on the transatlantic relationship, and interpreta-
tions are centrally concerned with the question of the political efficacy of the 
cultural message. Such studies take music as a reflection of international rela-
tions and countries’ political aspirations and now commonly dismiss the notion 
of cultural imperialism in favor of “pull factors” and the agency of audiences 
(Gienow-Hecht, Sonic History; Eschen; Fosler-Lussier). 
All this research usually takes a transnational perspective and perceives mu-
sical transfer as a dyadic relationship between a more or less powerful sender 
and more or less active recipients abroad. The following chapter suggests a 
different approach. Drawing on sociologist Tobias Werron’s concept of global 
competitions for “soft” goods (Werron), it assumes that musical diplomacy—
defined here as the promotion of music across state borders in the name of a 
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nation, sometimes administered, but rarely initiated by government agencies—
was essentially a form of participation in an international prestige competition, 
comparable to sending a soccer team to the World Cup competition. This as-
sumption brackets the concern whether music managed to win hearts and minds 
abroad and leads to the question of how the musical tournament came to be 
established in the first place. It substitutes the dyadic model of communication 
with the triadic structure of competition, thus highlighting the genuinely interna-
tional dimension of musical diplomacy. 
In this chapter, I take a long-term view of both classical music and popular 
genres to show that musical diplomacy has followed a recurring pattern since the 
early nineteenth century: Against a backdrop of commercial, transnationally 
traded music, interested groups in one country began to mark a particular style of 
music as both intrinsically “valuable” and representative for their nation. This 
initiative was subsequently taken up in other countries by intermediaries and 
what we may call “prestige entrepreneurs” who pursued their own, not always 
musical aims. The adoption of the idea that a certain kind of music is a form of 
art led to the global proliferation of similar institutions and aesthetic standards. 
Conservatories, concert halls, awards, and music journalism in turn created an 
international structure for the comparison of musical achievements of nations, 
and musical “experts,” such as critics and musicologists, have acted as referees 
in the prestige competition. 
This chapter traces the establishment of international tournaments in music 
in two parts. The first section looks at the rise of classical music as the standard 
for musical excellence during the nineteenth century, a development that origi-
nated in Germany and was adopted in different ways in England and the US. The 
second part moves on to the twentieth century, when America and Britain took 
the lead in transforming first jazz and then rock into art, while Germany went 
through the options available to a late-comer. The conclusion will return to the 
question of music’s efficacy in transnational relations, addressing it against the 
backdrop of the prestige competitions. While I agree in principle that music can 
afford social transformation, I regard this potency to be limited in the case of 
musical diplomacy. I argue that music which is acknowledged as “valuable” by 
experts and bureaucrats shapes listeners’ responses in that it forecloses the 
openness of those first encounters in which ships may be carried over mountains. 
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NATIONALISM AND ARTISTIC EXCELLENCE: 
THE ORIGINS OF AN INTERNATIONAL MUSICAL  
COMPETITION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
 
Seen from today’s perspective, the musical landscape around 1800 lacks clear 
contours. To be sure, the terrain had been cultivated by the standards of tonality, 
tuning, and tempi; fenced in by a system of notation as well as conventions about 
instrumentation and genre. But concerts still featured heterogeneous repertoires, 
and musical taste was thought to be rooted in the general public rather than 
monopolized by expert critics (Weber). Operas were creolized to be marketed to 
diverse audiences in different countries (Sorba). Distinctions of artistic merit 
were still largely absent, and philosophers regarded music as inferior to other 
symbolic expressions such as literature. Musicians on the whole had a relatively 
low social status, and the few who received handsome returns and were adulated 
as stars—like castrati or violin virtuosos—stood outside the system of occupa-
tional and social hierarchies. 
One hundred years later, the overall picture had changed dramatically, and 
the musical landscape of the “civilized world” was fully mapped. It had a 
distinct topography of “serious” summits and “popular” lowlands and was 
segmented along national boundaries. It was populated by sharply defined 
figures like critics, composers and conductors, professionals, amateurs, and 
knowledgeable listeners. These figures moved in and out of concert halls and 
conservatoires, read music journals, studied musicology and formed musical 
societies. Such institutions gave music a history, permanence, and media for 
evaluation (Blanning; Osterhammel). 
Concomitant to the transformation of music’s meaning and value, music 
turned into a medium for an international prestige competition. Two interrelated 
developments made this possible: Firstly, music became intrinsically valuable, 
thus generating prestige (and the fear of losing it) as an incentive to compete. 
Secondly, music became associated with the nation. 
These two developments started first in the German territories, where musi-
cal nationalism was initially promoted by musicians, who at the start of the 
nineteenth century faced a collapse of their labor market. The sharp decline in 
the number of courts and the financial problems of towns under French occupa-
tion reduced job opportunities for musicians and forced them to find paid work 
elsewhere. Few were able to sustain themselves only with concerts and composi-
tions. Aggravating the situation, the commercial bourgeoisie, a class that patron-
ized the arts in other countries, was relatively poor in Germany and less inclined 
to invest in culture. As alternative income streams were narrow, forward-looking 
Music in Transnational Transfers and International Competitions  | 33 
musicians were turning to the state as their potential paymaster (Applegate, 
“German”; Bach in Berlin). 
To this end, musicians sought to rub shoulders with bureaucrats and tried to 
convince them of the spiritual value of music. Taking the lead of writers, who 
were already acknowledged as artists, musicians insisted on artistic autonomy to 
include music into the canon of the arts. They stressed “good” music’s “serious-
ness” by drawing a sharp line against music written “merely” for popular appeal, 
and they claimed that “serious” music had educational value and an integrative 
effect on the community. In this way, they made music compatible with the 
visions and aims of “the university-going, state-serving, journal-writing, associa-
tion-joining mostly men of the educated stream [who] were at the same time the 
makers and shapers of German-ness” (Applegate, “German” 287). 
Historian Celia Applegate presents Carl Friedrich Zelter as an example of a 
master mason who changed his trade for the insecurity of a musician’s life. As a 
first step to forge a career, he participated in and then led the Singakademie (an 
amateur choir), where he made contacts with Berlin’s bureaucratic elite. Subse-
quently, he befriended Goethe, who was interested in Zelter possibly because he 
thought he should be in touch with a practitioner of music, this upstart art form. 
In any case, Goethe’s friendship bestowed prestige on Zelter and, by extension, 
his music. Goethe also endorsed Zelter’s proposal to incorporate music in the 
Prussian Academy of Arts, a bold suggestion by a non-member. In subsequent 
years, Zelter’s efforts to promote the cause of “serious” music in the name of the 
German community bore fruit. He became an honorary member of the Academy 
and the first professor of music at the Humboldt University in Berlin; he was 
supported in setting up institutions such as music schools and a choral society 
(Liedertafel) that provided the model for similar amateur choirs throughout 
Germany (Applegate, “German” 289-95). 
Musicians’ calls for acknowledgement found resonance not least because 
they were amplified by a new music press that took music seriously. Financed by 
music publisher Gottfried Christoph Härtel and edited by musician-turned-writer 
Friedrich Rochlitz, the Allgemeine Musikalische Zeitung (AMZ, General Musical 
Newspaper) was launched in 1798 and became the flagship of music criticism in 
Germany during its fifty years of existence. While older journals covered con-
certs as society events, the AMZ promoted informed judgement about the music 
itself. It demanded for music a place among the established arts and promised to 
educate its readers about its value. Publishing articles from Hamburg, Berlin, 
Vienna, and other cities, the AMZ gave evidence of a coherent and lively musical 
nation. It ensured its widely dispersed readers that anonymous others were 
concerned with the same issues, offering them a sense of being part of an “imag-
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ined community,” as Applegate explains in reference to Benedict Anderson 
(Applegate, Bach in Berlin 86-104). 
The claim to produce art in the service of the nation was at first aimed at the 
domestic elite. However, given the transnational connections of the music trade 
and music journalism, by the second half of the nineteenth century the initiative 
showed effects in other countries. As German musicians formulated their claim 
to “seriousness” in opposition to the commercially successful Italian and French 
repertoire, they disregarded its popularity as superficial and demanded that 
music be judged by its artistic and spiritual value. For musicians in smaller 
European nations, the German example offered a model of how to establish their 
own successful traditions of national music. Composers like Norwegian-born 
Edvard Grieg or Czech-born Antonín Dvořák who went to Germany for educa-
tion returned home with the cachet of having been to “the land of music.” 
The transfer in both directions made use of an existing infrastructure of cul-
tural exchange that became increasingly dense and effective from the mid-
century on. The music press of numerous countries took notice of musical 
activities abroad. Correspondents reported home and articles were culled from 
foreign publications to be translated for domestic readers. Transfer routes could 
also be circuitous. The readers of London’s Musical World, for instance, got 
much of their information about German music from Dwight’s Journal of Music, 
published in Boston between 1852 and 1881. Dwight in turn received his infor-
mation from German texts that he translated for his American readers (Cohen). 
European music publishers also expanded their operations across borders by 
opening branch offices or collaborating with publishers abroad. Copyright 
reforms and new technologies of printing facilitated this expansion, as did the 
growing demand from choral movements and amateur pianists (Boorman et al. 
370). From mid-century onwards, the cultural capital generated by German 
musicians and critics became convertible into economic capital, and German 
music rose to dominate the market for orchestral works. 
The increasing integration of the transnational music trade and music jour-
nalism transformed musical nationalism into an international prestige tourna-
ment. Many small and emerging European nations were eager to take part in it, 
but the entry of England and the US into this tournament is particularly reveal-
ing. It hints at a different motivation than the expectation to win the hearts and 
minds of a global audience. 
With Scotland and Wales priding themselves on their own musical traditions, 
it was up to England alone to join the fray of competitors. England participated 
in the prestige tournament by announcing a Musical Renaissance that took until 
the 1880s to gestate. The main reason why the country was late to show interest 
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in musical nationalism was the fact that it had, with London, the most developed 
market for music, which made it less likely for musicians to turn to the state for 
recognition or support. Tellingly, the most prominent propagators of the Musical 
Renaissance were not musicians but self-appointed prestige entrepreneurs who 
gained recognition by making their country’s participation in the musical tour-
nament a matter of national pride. The project to create an English national 
music developed from the 1851 World Exhibition and was first conducted by 
Henry Cole, a civil servant and former railway administrator. After that, the 
metaphorical baton was taken up by George Grove, a gifted proselytizer, but not 
a musical practitioner (Stradling and Hughes). The basic claim of the Musical 
Renaissance was that music, while neglected in modern England, had had an 
important place in Elizabethan times. This implied that English musical excel-
lence actually preceded the blossom of German music and provided a historical 
reference point for a present generation of English composers. Grove worked 
hard to win the support of music critics, some of them of German origin, for this 
argument (Hughes). 
England’s established musicians had less reason to be enthusiastic about the 
Renaissance. It is indicative that the country’s most famous composer, Arthur 
Sullivan, who had studied in Leipzig and was regarded as the greatest musical 
talent at the time, ended up outside the Renaissance movement, blamed for 
having wasted his gift. To be sure, Sullivan wrote “serious” music throughout 
his career. But he had made his name and his money with musical comedies, and 
that ruled him out of the competition. An obituary published in The Times 
captures both the critics’ disappointment with a composer who had been 
groomed to carry the musical hopes of his country and the idea of the prestige 
competition that informed this verdict. The article bemoaned that Sullivan 
 
did not aim at consistently higher things, that he set himself to rival Offenbach and Lecocq 
instead of competing on a level of high seriousness . . . . If he had followed this path, he 
might have enrolled his name among the great composers of all time. He might have won 
a European reputation in addition to his fame at home. (qtd. in Hughes 116-17) 
 
Apparently, commercial success gained the composer domestic popularity, but 
kept him out of the international pantheon. By the turn of the nineteenth century, 
Sullivan’s versatility had become an untenable quality for a “serious” composer. 
Compared with England, the US had even greater difficulties in qualifying 
for the musical prestige tournament, but made an effort nevertheless. The 
country was generally regarded as lacking in cultural refinement, and its concert 
scene up until World War I was dominated by German Romantic repertoire and 
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German musicians. Between 1890 and 1915, over sixty percent of all music 
performed by symphonies in the US was of German origin (Gienow-Hecht, 
“Trumpeting” 599). 
German music was accepted as superior by Americans who cared. Urban 
elites in the East had financed conservatories and symphonic orchestras since the 
middle of the century, but initially with the belief that art music needed to be 
imported from Europe and Germany. So while influential figures like music 
critic John Sullivan Dwight lobbied for the acknowledgement and financial 
support of “sacred” music, they also castigated domestic composers for lacking 
“seriousness” (Levine 143; Davidson). Others eventually came to see the lack of 
homegrown art music as a cause for national embarrassment and took an im-
portant step toward a remedy when founding the National Conservatory of 
Music (initially American School of Opera) in New York in 1885, modeled on 
the Paris Conservatory and paid for by New York’s wealthy elite (Ogasapian and 
Orr 73). In 1891, the conservatory hired Antonín Dvořák with a mandate to teach 
Americans how to create their own national music. In line with earlier initiatives 
by Thomas Wentworth Higginson and William Francis Allen, the Czech com-
poser recommended that American music be based on domestic “folk” traditions, 
i.e. the music of native or African Americans. While there was some experimen-
tation in that direction (Pisani), the attempt to create a national music from 
domestic folk styles took another half century to bear fruit, and it would not be 
Native American sounds that provided the basic ingredient for it. 
Compared with the English Musical Renaissance, American attempts to cre-
ate a national music remained a private affair; state authorities were not in-
volved. Another difference is that commercially successful English composers 
had problems with the musical uplift campaign, whereas their American col-
leagues like George Whitfield Chadwick and Amy Marcy Cheney Beach had 
little to lose in terms of recognition and may have found it easier to follow the 
call for a national music (Ogasapian and Orr 67). 
An Anglo-American comparison also reveals that in the US, white middle-
class women often gained from an involvement in music. Women were not only 
among the prestige entrepreneurs; there were also female artist managers, 
indicating that the growing importance of art music in the US created career 
opportunities for women (Broyles 231). Finally, American women found that 
German concert music afforded them access to public spaces and opportunities 
to experiment with emotional display. The art music conventions gave female 
patrons the license to be overwhelmed by the passion of famed German musi-
cians. They threw flowers with concealed personal messages on the stage and 
showed admiration in ways not entirely dissimilar to the behavior of later-day 
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boy band fans, as historian Jessica Gienow-Hecht argues (“Trumpeting”; New-
man 307-08). 
The adulation from “matinee girls” was one of those forms of reception that 
ignored the conventions of art music and may remind us of Fitzcarraldo’s 
transformative encounter with the Indios. Similar occurrences happened outside 
the Eastern cities, where touring musicians experienced audiences sometimes as 
mysterious, irritating, or even threatening. Familiar with minstrel troupes, 
provincial patrons expected European musicians to give a parade and a free open 
air concert and wondered why none of them painted their face black when 
performing. Concert-goers did not always find it necessary to dress up for the 
occasion, and instead of sitting silently and listen attentively as European 
audiences had learned to do, they stamped their feet and brought barking dogs. 
Listeners demanded that quiet passages be played louder so that they could be 
properly heard, showing no understanding for conductors who insisted on the 
“pianissimo” (Gienow-Hecht “Trumpeting”; Sound Diplomacy). 
This cursory glance at the making of music into art and a marker of national 
identity shows that these processes resulted from local projects in which agents 
with different aims deployed music and its ideology as resources. In turn, 
different local constellations made for different power relations between musi-
cians, critics, prestige entrepreneurs, and listeners within the respective nations. 
Due to the scope and integration of the transnational music trade and music 
journalism, national initiatives had repercussions abroad. They led to the estab-
lishment of an international framework for competition that gave small nations 
the chance to punch above their weight and put pressure on bigger countries to 
make an effort. The contest allowed contenders to excel on merit, but also 
created the risk of failing expectations. Finally, the rise of “serious” music 
stimulated the proliferation of concert halls, conservatories, and canons, creating 
institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell). As a consequence, critics 
around the world applied similar standards of excellence and encouraged com-
posers and musicians to aspire to similar goals. Slowly but surely, audiences 
were guided to behave in similarly silent and predictable ways. 
 
 
REVERSING DIRECTIONS, BUT STILL MOVING UP: 
COMPETITIONS IN JAZZ AND ROCK  
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
 
Moving on to the twentieth century, we see striking similarities between the rise 
of classical music and the emergence of “valuable” popular genres. As in the 
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case of classical music, the development started from adverse conditions, this 
time on the other side of the Atlantic. Before the 1890s, the US had been a net 
importer of music, including popular songs. The last decade of the century saw 
the emergence of a domestic popular music trade producing inexpensive sheet 
music mainly of soppy ballads. The emerging American popular music business 
owed its success to the new pop publishers’ innovation of integrating the print-
ing of sheet music with its promotion on the vaudeville stages and its sale in 
department stores (Suisman). 
The popular repertoire was stylistically heterogeneous, did not claim to have 
artistic value and was mainly written and traded by poor recent immigrants from 
Central and Eastern Europe. Songs were either functional (dancing or marching) 
or topical (mother or disaster songs), and while part of the repertoire suggested 
ethnic specificity, the concept of popular music being “authentic” still had to be 
established. Performers were expected to be “versatile,” not “real.” “Negro,” 
“Dutch,” or “Chinese” acts were obviously masquerade, and no one thought of 
them as “fake.” Just like the creolized operas of earlier years, popular music did 
not bind performers to a fixed identity. Neither did it make any pretension to be 
more than entertainment. 
All this was beginning to change in the 1910s. As the makers of popular mu-
sic strove for respectability, certain genres became more “valuable” than others, 
and the repertoire was differentiated along national and ethnic boundaries. To 
begin with, the recording industry introduced into commercial music what music 
historian Karl Hagstrom Miller calls the “folklore paradigm,” matching sounds 
with ethnically and racially defined listeners. American and European gramo-
phone companies had been trying to sell machines and records around the globe 
since the early days of the industry. Initially, they had advertised the gramo-
phone as a serious music medium by associating it with “good” music. Like 
Fitzcarraldo, they were bringing art music to the musical periphery. Unlike the 
film character, however, they found that while classical music left their potential 
customers cold, these people could be interested in local music, recorded by 
traveling salesmen with mobile equipment. From the 1910s, American firms 
applied their insight from global promotion to the domestic market, pitching 
ethnically defined sounds to musically untrained listeners. In the process, they 
invented “authentic” popular music like blues or country (Miller). 
Meanwhile, black musicians also capitalized on the perception that music 
was hardwired in ethnic identities and racialized bodies. Banned from most 
recording studios, shunned by musicians’ unions and with only limited access to 
vaudeville theaters, black musicians concentrated on the labor market for dance 
music and used “authenticity” as an effective sales argument. In 1910, bandlead-
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er James Reese Europe founded the Clef Club of New York City as an employ-
ment agency for black musicians. The club not only provided potential custom-
ers an address to contact bands, but also showcased the skills of Clef Club 
members in concert, supporting the claim that black musicians had a special feel 
for dance rhythm. James Europe and his collaborators thereby reaffirmed the 
racist stereotype that African Americans were natural-born dance musicians in 
order to enhance their occupational status (Gilbert). 
While the concept of “authenticity” got traction in popular music, songwrit-
ers strove to escape the short-termism of the song business and its relentless 
pressure to produce hit after hit. To this end, a number of songwriters shifted 
from vaudeville to Broadway theaters, which became possible as World War I 
halted the influx of European musical comedies and operettas. Some of these 
songwriters were also involved in the foundation of the American Society of 
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) in 1914, a society that collected 
money from music users like radio stations and theaters and, by the late 1920s, 
enabled its more prominent members to bridge hit-less periods. Whereas before 
they had only received a one-time payment or a percentage from sheet music 
sales, songwriters now could receive additional performance royalties and thus 
consolidate their careers. This source of income became increasingly important, 
as sheet music sales declined and radio appeared as a new music medium. In its 
early years, ASCAP was fiercely attacked by music users as a monopoly. Both 
ASCAP’s fight for legitimacy and Tin Pan Alley’s move from Union Square up 
to Times Square reinforced the propensity of songwriters to strive for respecta-
bility (Ryan). 
Irving Berlin exemplifies the upward mobility of the American music busi-
ness. With impeccable timing, he wrote his first musical comedy in 1914 and 
was among the figureheads of ASCAP. The former singing waiter from the 
Lower East Side became part of the Algonquin circle of intellectuals and married 
the daughter of a wealthy industrialist. In 1925, Berlin’s journalist friend Alex-
ander Woolcott published the first biography of the songwriter, confirming the 
impression that Berlin, who never learned to play the piano in more than one 
key, needed to be taken seriously (Woolcott). At the same time, Berlin was also 
hailed as one of several “kings” of jazz, a musical genre whose practitioners 
tried to leave its lowly and tumultuous ragtime origins behind (Wald). 
As popular musicians aspired to respectability, they also associated their 
product with the American nation. Irving Berlin, who received American citi-
zenship and was drafted into the army in early 1918, made good use of his time 
with the military by producing the patriotic revue Yip Yip Yaphank (Magee 69-
82). The affiliation of popular music with the nation also helped to wrestle 
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syncopated dance music out of the hands of black musicians, because it substi-
tuted ethnic “roots” with American modernism. This future-oriented tradition 
provided the white denizens of Tin Pan Alley, many of them with a background 
of recent immigration, low-status occupation, and poverty, with an entry ticket 
into the American middle class. 
While by the mid-1920s jazz had gained respectability, it was not yet consid-
ered art. As in the case of classical music in Germany, it took the blessing of 
music criticism to achieve that transformation. White proselytizers of “symphon-
ic syncopation” like bandleader Paul Whiteman found radio and sound film a 
profitable environment while the music remained squarely commercial. Music 
journalists writing for new jazz periodicals like Down Beat took over the leader-
ship of the musical uplift campaign in the 1930s and 1940s. They fought over the 
credibility of jazz, both in terms of its artistic value and its social ownership. A 
consensus was formulated in the 1950s by literary professor and jazz scholar 
Marshall Stearns, who skillfully navigated the threat of McCarthyism and the 
notoriety of substance-abusing be-boppers (Dunkel, “Marshall Winslow 
Stearns”). To further the status of jazz as art, he offered his services to the State 
Department, who in turn appointed him as a special consultant to accompany 
Dizzy Gillespie’s band on a tour that the US government hoped would enhance 
America’s image around the world (Eschen 33). 
Long before state-sponsored bands won sympathies for themselves and, pos-
sibly, for the US, the transfer of jazz abroad after World War I had had transna-
tional repercussions by stimulating its institutionalization outside the US. 
Initially, the term “jazz” was taken up rather freely in Continental Europe. In 
Germany, early adopters of the American moniker embellished their perfor-
mance of frantic dance music with all sorts of gimmicks and stunts to capitalize 
on an existing expectation that American entertainment offered something 
spectacular and improvised that German musicians who rigorously stuck to their 
play lists could not muster. Just as American musicians in the nineteenth century 
had acquired German pseudonyms and honed German accents, German “jazz” 
musicians crafted their stage personas on a largely imaginary American model. 
Their bluff was called by the German musical establishment the moment the first 
American bands came to Germany in the mid-1920s. As Paul Whiteman and 
Sam Wooding introduced symphonic syncopation to Germany, the sophisticated 
style was embraced by those German musicians who had been upstaged by 
“fakers” and were now glad to see that “truly” American jazz required the skills 
of formally trained instrumentalists (Nathaus). 
The transformation of jazz from cabaret to conservatory made rapid progress 
in Germany. Already in 1928, Hoch’s Conservatory in Frankfurt offered a class 
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in jazz. The further institutionalization was interrupted by Nazi authorities who 
pushed this allegedly “degenerate” music underground, including its critical 
reception (Kater). After World War II, jazz made a quick return, as dedicated 
jazz bandleaders and instrumentalists staffed the ensembles in the West German 
regional broadcasting stations (Scharlau and Witting-Nöthen). Music journalists 
with a penchant for jazz were given opportunities to promote their favored 
music, not least over the airwaves. Dietrich Schulz-Köhn (“Dr. Jazz”) featured 
jazz music in his broadcasts for the NDR (North German Broadcasting) and the 
WDR (West German Broadcasting). In Munich, the Bayrischer Rundfunk 
(Bavarian Broadcasting) employed Hans Ger Huber, Jimmy Jungermann, and 
Werner Götze who aired jazz music and were, like Schulz-Köhn, active in the 
organization of local jazz clubs and the German Jazz Federation. The most 
prominent jazz critic was “jazz pope” Joachim-Ernst Berendt, who wrote and 
presented radio and television programs for the SWF (South-West Broadcasting) 
in Baden-Baden. He also published his influential Jazzbuch in 1952 and orga-
nized jazz concerts in Germany as well as abroad (Wright Hurley). 
State-employed, politically-minded, and scholarly critics like Berendt and 
Stearns distinguished jazz from German schlager and rock ’n’ roll, the commer-
cially popular genres of the day. In this way, they opened up alternative sources 
of funding that allowed jazz to develop outside the marketplace. They helped 
define jazz as a universal musical language, a living tradition that grew from 
African American roots in all directions where it found liberal, tolerant, and 
democratic conditions. On that conceptual basis, the West German government 
eventually sent its own jazz representatives abroad (Dunkel “Jazz—Made in 
Germany”). 
Like in classical music, the transnational proliferation of promotional publi-
cations by jazz critics and the founding of conservatories and festivals made jazz 
canonic and academic. Again, we see the emergence of an international critical 
consensus that provided a framework for competition where late-coming nations 
could punch above their weight and pioneers could be challenged. The institu-
tionalization of jazz did not lead to a homogenization of the music itself, as the 
stylistic diversity of jazz was constantly advanced by musicians. But it stabilized 
the rules of its reception and, by separating the expert from the indiscriminate 
listener, primarily addressed an educated middle-class (DeVeaux). Like classical 
music, artistic jazz silenced the audience, or, to be more precise, made it whoop 
and clap in the right moments. 
The transformation of rock from rock ’n’ roll into art followed the pattern set 
by the institutionalization of classical music and jazz. Before rock ’n’ roll 
resonated with critics who established conventions and a canon, the initiative 
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was first taken by musicians who prepared the ground for an international 
prestige competition. To cut a long story short (see Wald), the Beatles pioneered 
this uplift campaign as they used the leverage of their unexpected fame to forge 
a career that diverted from the usual pop band trajectory. They recorded their 
own material and took time to experiment with new studio technology. Like 
other early rock bands that followed them quickly, they left their cuddly appear-
ance behind for uncompromising public personas that communicated artistic 
ingenuity. Rock bands experimented with longer and more complex songs, 
unusual instruments, new sounds, and meaningful lyrics, culminating in the 
progressive rock of Genesis and others in the late 1960s. In the course of this 
experimentation, musicians found allies in other, more established branches of 
the arts. Just like Zelter benefited from his friendship with Goethe and Irving 
Berlin from his involvement with New York intellectuals, rock bands substanti-
ated their artistic aspirations by cultivating contacts with the art scene (Braun). 
Most importantly, a music press in search of a new readership turned their 
attention to the beat bands soon after the Beatles’ breakthrough in 1963/64. 
Among the first, Britain’s Melody Maker, a jazz magazine with a dwindling 
circulation, covered the aspirational sounds on musical terms. It found aesthetic 
categories to assess emerging rock bands’ achievements and separate the artistic 
wheat from the commercial chaff. Further journals followed, then books, so that 
by the end of the 1960s one could seriously study the genre (Lindberg et al.). 
As in the case of classical music and jazz, rock proliferated not only as sound 
and performance but also as ideology. Music writers and journalists took care of 
the latter and used it to further their own professional and political goals. In West 
Germany, rock ideology was imported by young writers who based their status 
on their knowledge about the Anglo-American rock scene. A growing number of 
German publications on leading bands, canonical albums, and the history of the 
genre catered to an audience of better-educated, politically-minded, university-
going, mostly male readers who went on to become the shapers of a new liberal-
democratic Germany (Rumpf). 
The position of German rock critics was stronger than that of domestic bands 
who, by conceptual default, lacked the “authenticity” of Anglo-American 
originals. This was beginning to change as British and American critics looking 
for something different and unique took notice of rock music coming from 
peripheral countries like Germany. Their discovery of so-called krautrock bands 
shows that national specificity was not exclusive, but compatible with rock as a 
universal institution. Occupying a privileged position, tastemaker-critics in the 
UK and the US opened up the field for contributions from outside the Anglo-
American core (Simmeth). Journalists in countries at the periphery of rock music 
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like Germany continued to reserve “authenticity” for British and American 
bands as it bolstered their authority. Krautrock bands had to negotiate this 
tension and found it advantageous to frame their contribution to the international 
rock repertoire in national terms. Kraftwerk’s Ralf Hütter, for instance, clad his 
music in German clichés, especially when talking to foreign critics. In 1975, he 
told American music journalist Lester Bangs: 
 
We cannot deny we are from Germany, because the German mentality, which is more 
advanced, will always be part of our behavior. We create out of the German language, the 
mother language, which is very mechanical, we use as the basic structure for our music. 
Also the machines, from the industries of Germany. (qtd. in Adelt 396) 
 
Hütter’s positioning of krautrock as the product of a German mentality presup-
posed an international critical institution, a “third party” that acknowledged 
national specificity in a global repertoire of rock. The fact that such statements 
were printed and taken seriously shows that this international institution was 
firmly in place by the mid-1970s. 
While we see in the history of jazz and rock an older pattern of musical uplift 
reoccurring, musical diplomacy at the end of the twentieth century took a 
different turn. When in 2000 Germany hosted the World Exhibition “Expo,” the 
government did not ask Kraftwerk, or a band with similar artistic standing, but 
rather the Scorpions to represent the country to the world. The band received 
official confirmation of the title “ambassadors of rock,” which MTV had be-
stowed on them in the 1980s. Opening the event, they shared the stage with the 
Berlin Philharmonic and Jon Bon Jovi, members of the aristocracy of classical 
music and a US superstar of global pop-rock. The Scorpions’ Expo performance 
can be regarded as indicative for a larger trend in which musicians became 
musical diplomats not because of their artistic reputation, but their world-wide 
popularity (see Bayles in this volume; Cooper). Apparently, there has been a 
shift in popular music diplomacy from art to celebrity at the end of the twentieth 
century, which would be worthwile studying further at another occasion. 
 
 
THE POWER OF MUSICAL PERFORMANCES 
AND INSTITUTIONS: A CONCLUSION 
 
Looking at the history of classical music, jazz, and rock in Germany, Britain, and 
the US, this chapter has tried to show how these musical genres became arenas 
where nations competed for prestige. It has identified critics and prestige entre-
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preneurs as key actors in this development and the fear of inferiority as its major 
impulse. Moreover, it has pointed to the importance of musical institutions like 
conservatoires, critical journals, and aesthetic standards for the global prestige 
tournament. 
As sociologist Motti Regev argues in view to pop-rock music and as this 
chapter confirms, these musical institutions amounted neither to cultural imperi-
alism nor were they rendered ineffective through their creative appropriation by 
recipients in the countries into which culture was imported. Instead, their prolif-
eration resulted in “expressive isomorphism,” which Regev defines as “the 
process through which expressive cultural uniqueness is constructed by adopt-
ing, adapting, adjusting, incorporating, and legitimating creative technologies, 
stylistic elements, genres, and forms of art derived from world models” (Regev 
11). This process can be illustrated with our Amazonian metaphor: At first, the 
imperialist Fitzcarraldo fails to economically and culturally colonize the natives, 
as the Indios incorporate his technology seamlessly into their own mythology. 
But the story does not end with the Indios having the last laugh, because the 
steamer really does transport them into the future, for better or worse. They 
arrive in Iquitos, the bridgehead of the Western colonizers, where they look 
skeptically at the champagne offered to them by a rubber baron. Continuing the 
fictional story of Fitzcarraldo with factual events, the Indios seem to have 
adapted quickly to their new environment. By 1938, the Peruvian National 
Symphony Orchestra premiered at the Teatro Municipal de Lima, conducted by 
the Austrian Theodor Buchwald. The ensemble performed European classics, but 
also promoted the work of domestic composers, constructing, as Regev put it, 
“cultural uniqueness with elements from world models.” For both Fitzcarraldo 
and the Indios, stepping on the ship and cutting it loose was fateful. It bound 
them to the same institutions, making them produce uniqueness and compete in 
the same tournament. 
This view on musical institutionalization implies an answer to the question of 
musical diplomacy’s efficacy. Sociologist Tia DeNora usefully describes music 
as an “affordance structure” that enables performers and listeners to “get things 
done” (DeNora 44). In this view, the transformative potency of music is not to 
be found in “the music itself,” but in the framing of its performance. Under 
certain circumstances, music can afford people to do extraordinary things. In the 
present chapter, we saw American “matinee girls” using music to expand the 
boundaries of their social world as they took license to get emotionally carried 
away. Faux Americans were jazzing the cabarets in early 1920s Germany. Four 
Liverpuddlians were taking the world by storm. Such deployment of music was 
made possible by an incongruousness of expectations among performers and 
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audiences that rendered encounters open and unpredictable. The ossification of 
conventions in the course of music genres’ institutionalization made these 
transformative moments less likely. One could argue that it is this very pre-
dictability rather than the transformative potential that made certain music 
attractive to musical diplomats, whose profession requires them to minimize as 
much as possible any imponderables when orchestrating international dialogue. 
But one may also regard it a pity that classical music, jazz, and rock so seldom 
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The Paradoxes of Cultural and Music 
Diplomacy in a Federal Country  




In Belgium, similarly to other federal systems, cultural diplomacy is not only 
aimed at representing the country in the international arena. It also plays a key 
role in the cultural, political, and economic relations between subnational 
entities, as well as between them and the central state (Michelmann). The 
different shapes and contents of Belgian cultural diplomacy, indeed, can be 
observed as the result of cooperation and arrangements to ensure the coherence 
of the country’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, cultural diplomacy is also strongly 
affected by the competition over material resources and over the space for 
subnational identity representation undertaken by the country’s federated com-
munities. In the case of Belgium, in other words, cultural diplomacy reflects the 
issues and claims involved in the conflict existing between its major language 
communities, the Flemish Dutch-speaking group in the north, and the French-
speaking group in the south.  
As a response to the political mobilization of different language groups, Bel-
gium’s institutional setting has given a high degree of autonomy to its constitu-
ent units. The country’s federalization that started in 1970 has established 
political regions and cultural communities endowed with exclusive jurisdiction 
over a number of both space- and person-related matters, including the elabora-
tion and implementation of cultural policies. In spite of this, claims for greater 
sub-national autonomy continue to characterize the country’s contemporary 
politics and, in particular, the political debate in Flanders, the country’s Dutch-
speaking northern region. In this context, so-called Flemish nationalists articu-
late a hierarchical representation of the country’s regional groups based on a 
utilitarian vision of the economic achievements, greater development, and 
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institutional efficiency of Flanders (Huysseune). Not surprisingly, the represen-
tation of Flanders’s wealthier economy and good governance, together with a 
generalized will for internationalization, are key themes in the ideology and 
discourse of the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA), the Flemish nationalist party 
that scored its most recent electoral success in the 2014 federal elections, becom-
ing the largest party in the country and reawakening the historical conflict 
between the French and Flemish language communities (De Wever and Keste-
loot). 
In such a situation, we can observe several complications for a coherent na-
tional-Belgian approach towards cultural diplomacy. The purpose of this chapter 
is to analyze one example of Flemish cultural diplomacy in the context of federal 
Belgium, and to highlight its form as a practice that both interacts with the 
pressures coming from Flemish nationalistic discourses and, at the same time, 
exists as a direct consequence of the country’s federal organization.  
The role of culture in the genesis and evolution of the conflict characterizing 
Belgium has been deeply observed and analyzed in academic literature (Martini-
ello, “Culturalisation”; Blommaert). Language and ethnicity, in particular, 
represent key elements in the study of the Belgian case and of its different 
separatist trends including the forms of Flemish nationalism. Indeed, observers 
have highlighted strong culturalizations and ethnicizations of the Belgian domes-
tic conflict that, mostly in non-violent form, have involved many different 
aspects of the sociocultural history and life of the federal state (Martiniello, 
“Culturalisation”; Blommaert). Nowadays, culture seems to be relegated to a 
marginal dimension, since political and economic elements have taken priority in 
the public debate. The aim of this paper is to reconsider the role of culture as an 
element that, based on a utilitarian vision, has great relevance in the debate as it 
can evoke ideas, principles, and attitudes involved in the competition and 
conflict between Belgium’s federated entities today.  
To this end, I will focus on cultural diplomacy. The specific use of culture 
made by institutions in a context like Belgium emerges as a means to produce 
and share forms of competition and the hierarchical representation of the federal 
state’s different political components. More specifically, my hypothesis is that 
cultural diplomacy in Flanders can be observed as producing discourses on the 
region’s economic development and structural efficiency. My chapter focuses on 
one specific case of cultural diplomacy concerning music as a cultural form, 
namely Antwerp’s conservatory and international art campus deSingel. More 
specifically, I will analyze documentary sources pertaining to deSingel’s official 
policy plan Beleidsplan 2011-2015 (DeSingel Internationale Kunstcampus) 
which includes detailed information on international activities and networks. The 
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chapter is also based on non-documentary sources including two in-depth 
interviews. The first interview was conducted with deSingel’s general and 
artistic manager Jerry Aerts. The second interviewee was Jan Peumans, leading 
member of the nationalist and conservative Flemish party New Flemish Alliance 
(N-VA) and President of the Flemish Parliament.  
It is also important to remark that my analysis will focus on the organi-
zational, structural, and financial aspects of deSingel’s music diplomacy rather 
than on purely musical dimensions, and on the ways these different dimensions 
are articulated within international and Belgian contexts. It is arguable that the 
research findings presented here are not only specific to music, and for this 
reason I will often employ the term cultural diplomacy instead of the more 
specific music diplomacy. I understand cultural diplomacy as a sector of public 
interest and policy action that is larger than music diplomacy. Nevertheless, 
deSingel is mainly recognized as a music institution, and the cases analyzed and 
examples provided in this chapter concern only cultural diplomacy projects 
involving music. 
There are several reasons for selecting deSingel as a representative case 
study. First, the institution is one of the most important actors in the country’s 
and Europe’s cultural landscape, as well as one of the most strongly supported 
by public funds in the Flemish community. Secondly, deSingel is located in 
Antwerp, the largest city in Flanders and contemporary metropolitan stronghold 
of the Flemish nationalist party Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA).1 Last but not 
less important, deSingel has great symbolic relevance in the language conflict 
for its history. It is a direct descendant of the Royal Conservatory of Antwerp 
founded in 1898 as the first full Dutch-language institute for art education in 
Belgium, an iconic place in the evolution of the historical antagonism between 
French-speaking elites and Dutch-speaking populations in the country. Nowa-
days, as I will explain, this institution, perhaps more than any other, meets the 
guiding principles of integration and internationalization that inform contempo-
rary Flemish cultural policy. 
                                                           
1  Significantly, the leader of N-VA Bart De Wever has also served as mayor of Ant-
werp since January 2013.  
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INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY CONTEXT:  
CULTURAL DIPLOMACY AS A REGIONAL TASK 
 
Belgium is a federal country whose institutional and policy structures are based 
on the right of self-determination of the French and Flemish language groups 
considered to be constitutive elements of the nation (Martiniello, “Sortir” 71). 
Since the 1970s, a step-by-step process of institutional reform was implemented 
with the aim of pacifying the long-lasting conflict opposing the political elites of 
the two major language groups: The francophones in Wallonia and the néder-
landophones in Flanders. The Flemish/francophone divide, indeed, is the central 
axis around which three political regions (Flanders, Wallonia and the Brussels-
capital region) and cultural communities (Flemish, French-speaking, and a small 
German-speaking community, which has no actual role in the conflict) have 
been established (Jacobs 4). The federal reforms were implemented on the 
principle of a multicultural state and aimed to delegate powers from the central 
state to subnational entities defined by language. However, the historical divide 
(so-called Community Cleavage) and the related claims for greater autonomy 
characterizing the two largest language communities have not ceased. Rather, in 
the last decades they have emerged with great strength within the Flemish 
political landscape in particular. This state of things occurred for essentially two 
political and economic reasons: The territorialization of national politics (with 
all the most important party families splitting into Flemish and French-speaking 
parties) and the emergence of Flanders as one of Europe’s richest regions 
(Blommaert).  
The federalization of political-institutional structures has determined a major 
upheaval in the political representation and governance of Flemish and franco-
phone parties, with all the country’s political families—the Christian-Democrat, 
the Socialist and the Liberal—splitting into Dutch- and French-speaking parties. 
As a consequence, problems of negotiation, cooperation, political legitimacy and 
stability come out each time a new executive has to be formed, dramatically 
shown by the 2010-2011 crisis when cabinet negotiations took a record time of 
353 days before a new democratic government could be formed. The split of 
party families led political analysts to criticize the process of federal reform and 
to question its effectiveness as a solution for a conflict that, largely in non-
violent forms, continues to characterize Belgium to the extent that it can be 
considered as a “federalism of disunion” (Martiniello, “Immigrant Integration” 
120). Furthermore, in the last two decades the Community Cleavage has increas-
ingly featured questions of economic efficiency and good-versus-bad govern-
ance. A process of rapid development started after World War II allowed Flan-
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ders to take over the center of economic power from the formerly dominant 
Wallonia’s industrial centers (Witte et al.). Nowadays, differences in economic 
performance, employment rate, and structural efficiency have increased the 
territorial dualism between the two regions. Flanders and Wallonia are often 
represented in antagonistic terms in the political debate. Flemish nationalists, in 
particular, managed to dominate the debate and achieve electoral success from 
2007 onwards, during the global financial crisis, claiming for a further separation 
of socio-economic matters including social benefits, welfare, and the social 
security system. 
It is on these premises that Flemish cultural diplomacy can be regarded as a 
political instrument which functions beyond the tasks of representing the region 
in the international arena. Apart from ideological and political conflict, specific 
organizations and the structures of the federal system itself greatly influence 
cultural diplomacy. In Belgium, cultural communities have exclusive jurisdiction 
over so-called ‘person-related matters’ including public policy-making with 
regard to art and culture-related activities. They operate within the limits of their 
own language territory except for the French and Dutch-speaking bilingual 
region of Brussels in which the Flemish and Francophone communities share 
jurisdiction. Cultural diplomacy is one of the initiatives in which language 
communities have a high degree of autonomy. In fact, the federal government 
does not have competences since the in foro interno, in foro externo principle 
introduced by a constitutional reform in 1988 guarantees the right for sub-state 
entities to manage the foreign policy concerning those matters for which they are 
granted domestic autonomy. Significantly, there is no cabinet position respon-
sible for culture-related matters in the federal government (Craenen). Although 
the communities are invited to cooperate under the coordinating role of the 
federal government, Belgian foreign policy is not always granted concrete 
institutional coherence with regard to the directions to take and actions to 
implement in matters pertaining to cultural diplomacy. Since the federal reform 
of 1993, the communities have enjoyed self-government with regard to interna-
tional relations, and cultural policies are governed by the principle of subsidiari-
ty according to which the government’s role is limited to general regulations and 
subsidies to non-governmental associations. Since then, and alongside the 
principle of democratic access that characterized the public approach towards 
culture and the arts, a business-oriented approach based on long-term policy 
planning has emerged in Flanders. 
A generalized fascination for a utilitarian vision of culture as a means to 
promote local development, as well as the specific attention towards its business-
related values, are not exclusive characteristics in the Flemish or Belgian con-
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texts. They are common features of the approach towards cultural policies and 
diplomacy taken by both national and sub-national entities all around Europe. In 
Belgium, however, the cause-and-effect relationship between the tensions in the 
federal system and the local, municipal, and regional policy-making level is 
particularly evident. Economic inequalities are the basis of separatist claims 
voiced by Flemish nationalists, since pro-federalist positions within this political 
tradition seem to have been less dominant in the last years than during the era of 
state reforms. A harsh debate concerns the question of social security transfers 
between regions and, more generally, the gap between the richer Flanders and 
the poorer Wallonia. This debate revolves around the regional development 
paradigm that identifies Europe’s wealthiest regions as endowed with particular 
sociocultural characteristics that foster development (Keating et al.). In Belgium, 
in both the regional and national public discourses, reference is often made to 
particular sociocultural specificities and endogenous virtues to explain Flan-
ders’s economic success (Huysseune).  
In this context, Flemish cultural diplomacy shifts from the principles of co-
operation to competition as it goes along with the trends and directions of the 
sub-national political environment increasingly dominated by Flemish nationalist 
trends. As a form of soft power aimed at attracting foreign audiences and institu-
tions (Nye), it reflects the region’s dominant political imperatives. Nowadays, a 
particular symbolic geography of a richer and more efficient Flanders versus a 
poorer and less efficient Wallonia seems to have an influence on the forms and 
contents of cultural diplomacy in Belgium. 
 
 
POLITICAL CONTEXT: FLEMISH NATIONALISM 
 
An analysis of the specific development of Flemish nationalism throughout the 
evolution of Belgian politics would exceed the purpose of this chapter. Never-
theless, it is important to briefly outline the evolution of Flemish nationalism and 
to highlight its contemporary ideological features as they affect the context and 
dynamics of the case study presented here. Flemish nationalism has been an 
established component of Belgian institutional politics since the interwar period. 
It is grounded in the ideology of the nineteenth-century Flemish Movement that 
was created to support social and cultural emancipation of non-Francophone 
populations at a time when Belgium was dominated by French-speaking elites. 
In the years before and after the Second World War, two forms of Flemish 
nationalism, one moderate and another more radical, emerged in the Belgian 
political landscape. These ideological trends have been translated into formal 
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political parties and have influenced institutional politics up to the late 2000s: on 
one side the moderate-nationalist and pro-federalist party Volksunie (VU) 
established in 1954; on the other, the far-right and ethno-nationalist party 
Vlaams Blok/Belang (VB), born from the radical-separatist wing that split from 
the VU in 1978. 
Seen as a direct expression of the traditional language-related struggle, VU 
was characterized by an idea of culture articulated within the claim for the 
emancipation of Dutch-speaking people and, by extension, as a means to pursue 
democratization. In the era of federal reforms from the 1970s to the early 2000s, 
VU aligned with the pro-federalist and pro-Belgium approach of the rest of the 
Flemish political groups, an attitude that represented the ground on which 
legislation concerning local and international cultural policy was thought and 
implemented. On the other side, the approach of VB was (and still is) framed 
within the traditional ethno-nationalist desire for congruence within the nation, 
in this specific case an independent Flemish nation, and a culturally homogene-
ous people. The making of a Flemish independent community and the protection 
of this community against external influences, even by rejecting culturally 
different people, are key issues that direct the party’s rhetoric towards racism 
and xenophobia still today. Interestingly, the party has often prioritized its 
connection to the Netherlands and other Dutch-speaking countries, while being 
radically opposed to European integration (for a national and international 
analysis of VB see Swyngedouw; Jamin). 
The bipolar nature of Flemish nationalism entails two completely different 
approaches towards cultural diplomacy as either an element to represent or share 
specific political ideas or as a concrete policy tool. Since the constitutional 
reform of 1993 that ratified the communitarization of foreign relations, the shape 
of international cultural policy and cultural diplomacy has partially reflected the 
twofold attitude of Flemish nationalism. In general terms, Belgian communities 
have been active in promoting a ‘Europe of the Regions’ and representing local 
specificities and interests (Massart-Piérard). The language communities of 
Belgium tended to establish strong relationships with neighboring countries 
speaking the same language. Flanders, in particular, developed its own policies 
in the longstanding international network called Nederlandse Taalunie (Dutch 
Language Union), the union of Dutch-speaking countries that includes Holland 
as well as Suriname and South Africa (Bursens and Massart-Piérard 96). Besides 
the principle of language affinity, Flanders’s international cultural policy fo-
cused on an identity-building project aimed at promoting the region’s cultural 
peculiarities. A series of historical and newly established agencies including 
cultural organizations, schools and concert halls were presented as cultural 
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ambassadors tasked with implementing cooperative projects with partners 
worldwide. Special subsidies were granted to international activities in line with 
this strategy. 
In the early 2000s, with the process of federalization being completed, VU 
fell apart and left space for the separatist extreme-right to represent the main 
ideological profile of Flemish nationalism. The political representation of VB 
has been limited, however, as the other Flemish parties agreed not to cooperate 
with the extreme-right and to contain the party in a so-called cordon sanitaire 
(buffer zone). In the same period, a new Flemish nationalist party emerged in the 
landscape of Belgian politics: the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA). Although 
the party’s main aim is to achieve independence for Flanders, N-VA has refor-
mulated this imperative in a contemporary diplomatic, pragmatic, and pro-
European setting as they wish to establish an independent Flemish republic 
within the European Union and the international political arena. The party has 
effectively differentiated itself from the radical image of nationalism represented 
by VB. N-VA describes its goal as a democratic project that has nothing to do 
with radicalism, but that concerns questions of economic and structural efficien-
cy as well as ethic and civic values (Maly). While VU and VB, for different 
reasons, never achieved large electoral success, N-VA gradually affirmed itself 
as a mainstream party with a large electorate, becoming the country’s largest 
party in the 2010 federal elections. 
The rise of N-VA in the regional and national political scene, and the gener-
alized support for neoliberal and austerity policies in both language communi-
ties, highlighted a pragmatic attitude towards cultural diplomacy in the whole of 
Belgian politics. Nowadays, N-VA’s policy approach aims particularly to the 
reduction of public spending as well as to the optimization of the institutional 
and government structure. Concerning the segment of cultural policy, one 
example of the influence of this institutional pragmatic approach is the so-called 
Arts Decree implemented in 2004 and amended in 2008. The Arts Decree 
represents the main instrument for cultural actors to access public funding for 
both national and international cultural activities. It provides two- and four-year 
funding for organizations and projects concerning cultural activities, arts educa-
tion, and culture-related initiatives. Support for international initiatives can be 
obtained by organizations that propose activities incorporated within larger 
projects. Concerning the optimization of institutional and policy structures, a set 
of institutions has been selected and given the status of official cultural institu-
tions of the Flemish Community and have been identified as main international 
actors. These institutions can rely on greater support from the regional govern-
ment. 
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DESINGEL IN FLANDERS AND EUROPE:  
AN EXAMPLE OF FLEMISH CULTURAL DIPLOMACY  
IN THE AGE OF N-VA 
 
As outlined above, the Flemish cultural sector is marked by the presence of main 
cultural actors selected as official institutions of the respective communities. The 
Antwerp-based international arts campus deSingel acquired the status of official 
cultural institution in 2004. It integrates a variety of culture-related activities 
covering different domains such as music, dance, theater, the performing arts, 
and architecture. It is a major public actor in the Belgian music landscape for 
activities ranging from music education to production and promotion. In addi-
tion, it is one of the country’s most renowned venues for chamber, jazz, and 
experimental music. Established in a large campus in the periphery of Antwerp, 
deSingel’s activities take place in a one-thousand-seat concert hall, an eight-
hundred-seat theater, various music and theater studios, an exhibition area, a 
reading room, and a café. 
According to the Arts Decree, deSingel’s official recognition as a community 
institution does not entail, in itself, direct access to public funding. Like any 
other non-governmental association, institution or actor, deSingel is called to 
submit its own plans in order to find public support for its activities. However, 
its large-scale infrastructure, multi-profile activities, and leading position in the 
Flemish cultural landscape facilitate access to subsidies. In this regard, President 
of the Flemish Parliament Jan Peumans states: 
 
It is obvious that such a large and active institution, a crown jewel in the Flemish creative 
and cultural sector, should rely on public subsidies. If you look at all the activities they 
provide, from education to entertainment, the public investment is no doubt compensated.2 
 
Accordingly, deSingel is largely subsidized by the public sector with about 
seven million Euros from the Flemish Community, plus a few hundred thousand 
Euros from the Province and the City of Antwerp, to cover almost nine million 
Euros of annual total costs (see table 1). 
                                                           
2  “C’est évident qu’une institution aussi grande et active, un fleuron dans le secteur 
créatif et culturel flamand, devrait compter sur des subventions publiques. Si vous 
regardez toutes les activités qu’ils font, de l’éducation au loisir, l’investissement pub-
lic est sans doute compensé.”  
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 Table 1: Overview over DeSingel’s Income (2011-2015). 
 
 Source: Beleidsplan 2011-2015. 
 
As a consequence, a clear commitment to the interests of the region lies at the 
core of deSingel’s official mission to be the beacon of Flemish arts in the 
international cultural scene. For example, in the official 2011-2015 policy plan, 
the international dimension of deSingel was clearly highlighted as a fundamental 
form of contribution to regional development: 
 
for major performing artists from abroad deSingel provides a quality venue of very high 
standard, and via the arts campus Flemish artists with international potential are sent out to 
all the most important venues abroad. . . . We are convinced that with this scheme we can 
make a major contribution to Flanders, which has a lively cultural community that plays 
an active part in the intense international arts scene. (DeSingel 10) 
 
The idea of arts production as a form of cultural capital to be safeguarded and 
enriched through contacts and exchanges with local and foreign partners is 
integral to the intention of acting on an international dimension. The policy plan 
states: “We shall continue our main task of stimulating and presenting interna-
tional arts production. In this way we safeguard our capital and remain a leading 
player on the international art scene” (DeSingel 22). 
In fact, deSingel acts on a twofold territorial dimension since it works as a 
community institution in collaboration with Flemish cultural actors, but also as a 
main agency in international networks. On one hand, it regularly consults with 
partners in Flanders and Brussels in order to avoid direct competition, preserving 
the complementarity of cultural offers and setting up co-productions and joint 
initiatives. This point is highlighted in the policy plan in the following terms: “in 
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no way is it our intention to compete with other Flemish Community institutions. 
On the contrary. Together with other institutions, and with an eye to cooperation, 
we have set up a joint consultative body” (DeSingel 108).  
On the other hand, deSingel is one of the country’s most active institutions in 
music diplomacy, collaborating closely with international partners in bordering 
and neighboring countries such as France, Holland, England, Germany, and 
Luxembourg. One example of collaboration within and outside the Flemish 
community is the biennial music festival Opera XXI, coproduced in Flanders by 
deSingel, the Vlaamse Opera and the Muziektheater Transparant of Antwerp. 
Characterizing the organization of the event, deSingel’s general manager Jerry 
Aerts asserts: 
 
Working with Flemish institutions is a priority for us. We want to stimulate and inspire 
other institutions as they represent the same cultural capital that we aim at opening and 
enriching. Opera XXI is a good occasion for achieving these tasks because it is in this kind 
of activities that we can bring our experience and structural organization into play. (Aerts) 
 
In addition to Flemish organizations, several institutions from neighboring 
countries, such as the Dutch Operadagen Rotterdam and the French Centre 
National de Création Musicale de Lyon GRAME, participate in Opera XXI. The 
way this itinerant event is exported to third countries and organized in interna-
tional venues is particularly paradigmatic of the way deSingel understands its 
representative role in the international arena. In this respect, Aerts discusses the 
edition hosted by the Italian Teatro Comunale di Bologna in April 2014: 
 
[Opera XXI] is an example of how we do international activities. For instance, lately we 
have brought the festival to Bologna and produced an amazing play written and directed 
by Andrea Molino and Giorgio Van Straten, two Italian renowned composers who worked 
with Flemish professionals for the occasion. It has been a sort of revolution for the Italians 
as Opera XXI has been thought to bring pop music and styles into the classical frame of 
the theater. But what we provided, apart from the artistic direction, is structural guidance. 
We made our structural organization available to local organizers and, of course, we put 
the money. . . . It was totally impossible for the Theater of Bologna to organize and 
support the festival on their own. (Aerts) 
 
The purpose of Opera XXI seems not only to be the representation of Flanders 
through musical and artistic exchange itself, but also to promote the institution’s 
structural and organizational qualities. What this form of music diplomacy seeks 
to showcase, to Italian audiences in this particular case, are the institutional ideas 
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and mechanisms of the Belgian region’s cultural sector, rather than the contents 
and forms of its art and culture. In other words, the need to attract audiences is 
pursued through the representation and amplification of a production system 
rather than of the productions themselves.  
If the process of Flemish identity building in the era of federal reforms re-
volved around the representation of local Flemish art forms and traditional 
cultural values, today these elements are no longer at the center of international 
projects. The Flemish community does not support and implement cultural 
diplomacy initiatives with the sole aim of showcasing its cultural values and 
identity through the arts and cultural production. Rather, supporting music but 
also dance, theater or any other art form in the international arena is a means for 
Flanders to spotlight its level of structural development and organizational 
capability. This approach can be seen as a reflection of the regional development 
paradigm that, as mentioned above, dominates the political debate both regional-
ly and nationally. DeSingel director Aerts is explicit in this sense: 
 
A small region in Europe; that is what we are. In the era of globalization we cannot rely on 
showing our traditional arts or cultural excellence which, certainly, we are proud of. And 
we are a Dutch-speaking region, not really a widespread language. That is why we prefer 
to export our know-how, our way to do the things rather than ‘the things’ themselves. . . . 
It is undeniable that the education system in our region, for example, is more developed. It 
simply works well. We have been able to transmit this level of efficiency to music 
education, and want to show how and why to our partners. That is how we attempt to 
reinforce the position of Flanders in the international scene. (Aerts) 
 
It is quite clear that this quote reflects a utilitarian vision of the Flemish cultural 
sector, a vision relying on the idealization of principles such as economic 
development, system stability, and institutional efficiency. Aerts’s words also 
convey a specific ethnocentric perspective depicting the Flemish way of operat-
ing in the cultural industry as a successful model to follow, without questioning 
the historical circumstances or the structural and economic conditions that led to 
the region’s performance and level of development. 
 
 
DESINGEL IN BELGIUM AND WALLONIA 
 
As already highlighted, deSingel was recognized as an official institution of the 
Flemish community in 2004 and, from then on, it has emerged as a main actor in 
the representation of Flanders in Belgium and beyond. However, its domestic 
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policy is apparently free from any particular obligation to serve exclusive 
community interests. Interestingly, concerrning deSingel’s policies for music 
education and support, Aerts states: 
 
We have students from everywhere. Of about 580 students attending our courses, forty 
percent are foreigners. This means something. This means that we are recognized as a 
place to go for developing your talent. Of course, we are formally asked to support 
Flemish musicians, but the point is how this definition is regulated institutionally. . . . 
Flemish musicians are not only those who were born in Flanders, but also those who have 
been living and studying here. It is not, let’s say, an ethnic or a nationalist distinction that 
we make, not at all. (Aerts) 
 
Aerts affirms to have only a formal commitment with the community interest, in 
particular with the obligation to support Flemish artists, but also wants to main-
tain an anti-essentialist approach to the idea of Flemishness. In his view, 
deSingel’s international students represent a tangible example of the way the art 
center promotes a form of identity whose limits go beyond the geographic 
territory of Flanders or the Dutch-speaking dimension.  
Nevertheless, the logic that informs this kind of agency does not escape from 
the binary opposition between Flanders and Wallonia in which the Belgian 
internal conflict and the Flemish nationalist ideology are framed. Indeed, 
deSingel’s activities can be regarded as having both symbolic and structural 
implications concerning the conflict between the language communities. First, 
deSingel’s structural organization and qualitative standards are likely to be 
connected to Flanders’s generalized prosperity and directly attributed to a form 
of local ethos, an attitude to business that could be considered an endogenous 
trait of Flemish people. This argument has great relevance in the political debate 
and public opinion in Belgium. Jan Peumans affirms: 
 
I am sure that Flemings have a different mentality. This is the reason why we have a 
different level of efficiency. We are enterprising people and we put transparency first in 
our institutions. The same cannot be said for the other side of the country. It is a cultural 
difference that concerns both the people and the political class.3  
                                                           
3  “Je suis sûr que les flamands ont une mentalité différente. C’est la raison pour laquelle 
nous avons un différent niveau d’efficacité. Nous sommes des gens entreprenants, et 
nous mettons d’abord la transparence dans nos institutions. On ne peut pas dire la 
même chose pour l’autre côté du pays. Il s’agit d’une différence culturelle, qui con-
cerne le peuple et la classe politique.”  
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The hypothesis that deSingel would produce, in a certain sense, the binary 
cultural opposition between the regions as it is understood by Flemish national-
ists is not easy to demonstrate. It is understandably difficult to assess whether the 
operating institution follows the nationalists’ ideas, or if the latter seek to appro-
priate the former’s work and use it as a confirmation of the cultural superiority 
of Flemings. However, this hypothesis is formally rejected by Aerts only to be 
reaffirmed shortly after when he describes deSingel as a resource for the whole 
country:  
 
We operate in a city governed by nationalists; we have nationalists among the members of 
our board. This does not influence our work. In what we represent, I don’t see any 
instrumentalization from Flemish nationalists. . . . We don’t close the door to French-
speaking students, musicians, scenographers or technicians. They can come here and take 
advantage of our structures, program, and policy which are the product of a better orga-
nized system. (Aerts) 
 
This quote shows how the position of deSingel as an official community institu-
tion is somehow ambivalent. On the one hand, there are not specific obligations 
or purposes to push forward the Flemish cultural identity, and deSingle repre-
sents itself as unconcerned with Flanders. On the other hand, however, its 
activity and leading position in the cultural sector bring out and reinforce an idea 
of structural and economic primacy of Flanders in the national context. To 
summarize, with regard to its functioning as a center for music education and 
cultural divulgation, the implications of deSingel with political nationalism are 
likely to be more symbolic than structural. 
The symbolic role of deSingel in the Belgian domestic conflict described 
above is thus enforced as a structural rather than a cultural matter. As such, it can 
concretely inform policy choices and direct the action of cultural institutions in 
the national context. In this sense, it is interesting to compare the way deSingel 
constructs and maintains its international and national inter-community relation-
ships with other partners. Indeed, the art center does not always seem to maintain 
the same approach. In the international scenario, as explained above, deSingel 
acts as a support partner when it comes to integrating international projects such 
as Opera XXI, providing structural and even financial support. The same cannot 
be said with regard to contacts and exchanges with Belgian French-speaking 
cultural institutions. As a matter of fact, deSingel is not involved in any interre-
gional project with Wallonia.  
In general, the reason for the lack of cooperation between deSingel and 
French-speaking cultural actors can be connected to the differences in the 
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economic performance between the two regions as well as the imperatives of 
institutional structural efficiency that dominate the contemporary political 
debate. According to utilitarian principles, cultural institutions and agencies 
would not be attractive as potential partners for their Flemish counterparts. 
When questioned about what French-speaking cultural institutions represent for 
deSingel, Jerry Aerts replies: 
 
We do not have prejudices against Wallonia; there are very good schools and places for 
music in the south of Belgium. The point is that it is not convenient for us to make deals 
with them, or at least it has not been the case so far. . . . For example, some time ago we 
were in contact with Théâtre de la Place in Liège. This is just to prove that we are not a 
priori opposed to interregional cooperation. I don’t know if any form of cooperation will 
be undertaken in the future, but it is difficult to organize things together in Belgium. There 
is a difference in the way we work on, organize, and finalize our projects, as well as in the 
way we use public subsidies. We are just like two separate neighboring countries. (Aerts) 
 
According to Aerts, obstacles to inter-community cooperation seem to be related 
to Flanders’s different and more effective subsidy system, and higher level of 
organizational efficiency as opposed to the real or presumed lower potential of 
Wallonia. It is important to remark that, as it has emerged above, differences in 
economic or structural efficiency are not conceived as an obstacle when deSingel 
is called to cooperate with economically and structurally weaker international 
partners, such as in the case of the collaboration on Opera XXI with the theater 
of Bologna.  
This evident contradiction reflects the relationship between the Belgian 
communities as it is regulated by the country’s federal arrangements. One 
guiding principle to the Belgian system, indeed, is that the governmental institu-
tions that form the federation do not interfere with each other in matters that fall 
under regional jurisdiction. This is clearly stated by Jan Peumans: 
 
The principle is not to stick your nose in the other’s public affairs. If they make what for 
us is a mistake, we have to respect their choice and not insist on changing or affecting 
their decisions, their practices. That is how we decided to act as a federal country when we 
reformed the constitution.4 
                                                           
4  “Le principe est de ne pas mettre ton nez dans les affaires publiques de l’autre. S’ils 
font ce que pour nous est une erreur, nous devons respecter leur choix et ne pas insist-
er pour changer ou influencer leurs décisions, leurs pratiques. C’est comme ça que 
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While Flemish cultural institutions can promote themselves as efficient models 
on the international arena, they cannot play the same role towards their French-
speaking counterparts. Not only does this principle frame the concrete action of a 
cultural actor such as deSingel, but it also informs the mutual understanding 
between Flemish and French-speaking public actors. The limits of the Belgian 
institutional setting are, according to Jerry Aerts, regrettably overlooked: 
 
I still believe that we could have a national-Belgian role, especially because we are not 
perceived as a Flemish institution by the people. In other words, it is a pity. It is a waste of 
resources the fact that cooperation with Wallonia is so difficult, but it is one of the 
negative implications of our divided system. So it is difficult to open a productive debate 
about that in the country. 
 
Although inter-community relationships are certainly affected by dichotomies, 
economic hierarchies and discourses about productivity and efficiency, these 
final quotes are key to understanding how the Belgian situation is also strongly 
conditioned by the limits of its federal system as it has been thought and imple-
mented in the last decades. It is arguable that Belgium’s federal arrangement not 
only can have serious consequences for sector economies—for the national 
cultural industry in this specific case—but also it undermines the possibility of 





This chapter has shown that both Belgium’s regional political context and the 
federal institutional structure have an effect on Flemish cultural diplomacy and, 
more specifically, on the action of a main actor such as Antwerp’s arts and music 
center deSingel. On a national level, deSingel acts as a Flemish institution since 
it establishes forms of cooperation in local networks and avoids direct competi-
tion with other actors in the region. It furthermore plays a symbolic role in the 
reproduction and promotion of Flanders’s cultural capital and helps to transform 
the Flemish identity towards a modern and cosmopolitan perspective. This 
transformation echoes the change in the ideological construction of Flemish 
nationalism that evolved, in the last decade, from a traditional and conservative 
approach to cultural identity and ethnicity to a discourse based on efficiency, 
                                                           
nous avons décidé d’agir en tant que pays fédéral, quand on a réformé la Constitu-
tion.” 
The Paradoxes of Cultural and Music Diplomacy in a Federal Country | 65 
development, and modernity. In other words, there is a linear correspondence 
between the values represented by deSingel, the utilitarian perspective on culture 
dominating the institutional-political environment, and also the principles of 
contemporary Flemish nationalism. This correlation, indeed, is linked to the 
discourse on the superiority of Flanders in Belgium and the claims for independ-
ence as elaborated by nationalists today. The representation of Flanders’s 
structural efficiency, a topic that nationalist movements themselves have pro-
duced and popularized, informs international cultural exchanges between the 
region and foreign countries. DeSingel positions itself as a model organization to 
be represented and promoted on the European stage, and maintains international 
relations with the aim of providing structural guidance and organizational help to 
its partners. Cultural diplomacy serves to represent and share a specific idea of 
Flanders as it has emerged from its conflicting and antagonistic relationships 
with Wallonia. 
Inter-community cooperation between Flanders and Wallonia is not institu-
tionally granted. The position of Wallonia is, indeed, an ambiguous one since the 
principles that inspire Flemish extra-regional cultural policies and those which 
regulate the political contacts between the Communities are in contradiction. On 
the one hand, the Flemish Community wants to make its own structural efficien-
cy available to non-Flemish actors characterized by weaker structures or lower 
financial means. On the other hand, it cannot play this role in Wallonia since the 
Communities cannot interfere in each other’s internal affairs. Networking is a 
priority for deSingel which puts strong emphasis on the internationalization of 
the cultural capital produced or supported through its structures. Among the 
local and international partners with which the institution continuously cooper-
ates, Belgian French-speaking actors are not considered as potential partners.  
In spite of its institutional role, deSingel does not want to be perceived as 
framed within a strong Flemish identity, or at least it does not want to be associ-
ated with any of its nationalistic or ethnocentric understandings. The cultural 
center welcomes students, musicians and other artists from everywhere, includ-
ing Wallonia, to join the music school as well as to perform and collaborate with 
local colleagues. They can develop their talent while enriching the local cultural 
scene; likewise, they can be presented as a product of the Flemish cultural sector. 
However, the exchange that exists between deSingel and its European and 
international partners, with thousands of artists and students being both sent to 
and received from partner institutions in foreign countries, cannot exist with 
French-speaking institutions in Belgium. While it is clearly affirmed that 
deSingel identifies cooperation as a main dynamic in its functioning—and non-
competition is agreed upon with other Flemish cultural institutions—the ap-
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proach to Wallonia seems to be forcibly oriented towards competition or, better, 
towards a kind of unilateral relationship. 
Music is among the most powerful elements through which the good of a na-
tion, its values and achievements, can be showcased. In different contexts, 
projects of cultural diplomacy concerning music can be articulated within the 
perspective of a competition for national prestige (see Nathaus in this volume). 
In the example presented in this chapter, music has been scrutinized in its 
organizational, structural, and financial rather than strictly musical dimensions, 
including the allocation of public funding, the coordination of activities such as 
production, events, and education as well as the implementation of projects. The 
case of deSingel demonstrates that it is through these constellations that music 
can function in Flanders as a means to represent the region’s prestige in the 
international arena. Flemish cultural identity, in the case of deSingel, is not 
conveyed by the music itself, but rather by the different structures and institu-
tional actors through which it is produced, supported, and shared with audiences. 
Such utilitarian vision of culture is articulated within the dynamics of competi-
tion between language communities in Belgium. Although limited to one specif-
ic case study, the findings discussed in this chapter can open a specific perspec-
tive to observe the social and political role of music and culture in contemporary 
European societies, particularly in ethnically, culturally, and politically frag-
mented contexts. This perspective entails that the relationship between culture, 
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Dervish on the Eurovision Stage 
Popular Music and the Heterogeneity of Power Interests  
in Contemporary Turkey 
Nevin Şahin  
 
Turkey’s journey of the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC), dominated by national-
istic identity claims, started in 1975, culminated in the country’s victory in 2003, 
and abruptly came to an end in 2012 in Baku. Turkey’s four decades of ESC 
participation illuminated conflicting power interests from the selection process 
of the songs to the decision process of the stage performances. The debates 
peaked in the 2004 final ESC night in İstanbul regarding the representation of 
whirling dervishes. Different stakeholders, including the tourist industry, the 
national broadcast channel Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu (TRT), the 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Sufi circles, and the singer and winner of the 
2003 ESC Sertab Erener, influenced the participation of whirling dervishes in 
the 2004 round of the ESC. In doing so, they created a web of contesting power 
dynamics, which can be theorized in the context of public diplomacy.  
Historian Jessica Gienow-Hecht emphasizes the heterogeneity in the struc-
ture of agency in cultural diplomacy (10). In a parallel manner, this chapter 
argues that there are heterogeneous power interests of different agents in the 
context of popular music and diplomacy in Turkey. How does the performance 
of “Turkishness,” emblematized by whirling dervishes on the ESC stage, reflect 
the competition and collaboration of actors in the cultural domain? In an effort to 
highlight power dynamics behind Turkey’s ESC performance, this chapter first 
focuses on Turkey’s ESC history. It then moves towards the competitive staging 
of whirling dervishes in other public events, followed by a Bourdieusian analysis 
of power and music diplomacy.  
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TURKEY AT THE EUROVISION SONG CONTEST:  
A SHORT HISTORY  
 
Turkey’s participation in the ESC has been a source of national pride and shame 
from the very beginning that can be compared to the Turkish reception of 
international soccer matches. Turkish soccer fans have treated matches between 
Turkish and non-Turkish teams like a war for many years. The experienced 
technical director and soccer celebrity Yılmaz Vural, for instance, did not 
hesitate to call the Ukrainian team Dynamo Kyiv “crusaders” in late 2016 
(HaberTürk). Similarly, the ESC turned into a “war zone” for the Turkish nation 
after the country’s debut in 1975 when the journalist Burhan Felek referred to 
the first ever contestant of Turkey, Semiha Yankı, as a “fedai” (warrior) (Şıvgın 
201). Every year, the contest was treated as another war to be won over Europe 
and became a spectacle of nationalism (Şıvgın 205), raising debates related to 
the contest and finding resonance in wider popular culture. In the debuting year, 
for instance, two winners came out in the national final and the jury selected 
Semiha Yankı’s “Seninle Bir Dakika” (One Moment with You) to represent 
Turkey in Stockholm, where ABBA’s epic victory had brought the contest to. 
The other winner, Cici Kızlar’s “Delisin” (You Are Insane), meanwhile, became 
the soundtrack of the namesake movie starring Tarık Akan, the most famous 
actor in Turkey at that time, and gained nationwide reputation just like the 
former. 
Although the jury of experts sought to represent Turkish national culture, 
they selected entries that followed popular music trends in Europe. For the ESC 
in 1982, Tahir Nejat Özyılmazel’s (Neco) disco-pop song “Hani?” (Where?) was 
selected as the Turkish contribution to the ESC. The title was deemed appealing 
since it sounded like the English word “honey” (Dilmener 294). In a similar 
effort, Çetin Alp and Kısa Dalga Vokal Grubu were selected to represent Turkey 
at the 1983 ESC with their song “Opera.” The lyrics of the song involved names 
of opera composers such as Wagner, Puccini, and Verdi, and referenced well-
known European operas like Tosca, Carmen, and La Traviata. The band per-
formed on the ESC stage with the English translation of their name (The Short 
Waves) and although the song was in Turkish, the naming of composers and 
operas made it sound “more European” as in the case of Neco’s song (Dilmener 
295). This also led to comments on social media that the song echoed the title of 
the runner up in the 1980 ESC, “Theater,” by German singer Katja Ebstein. 
Besides artistic concerns, such global issues as the 1979 Oil Crisis also found 
entrance in Turkey’s representation at Eurovision. In 1980, the Turkish celebrity 
singer Ajda Pekkan represented the country with a song named “Pet’r Oil.” With 
Dervish on the Eurovision Stage | 71 
lyrics like “Artık dizginlerim senin elinde petrol” (Oil, you now bridle me), the 
song equated the inevitable demand for oil during the embargo of Arab countries 
with the need for a lover’s affection. That song was special in that TRT decided 
that year to directly select composers of the ESC song, rather than allowing 
national selection. In addition, the song was recorded in three different versions, 
Turkish, English, and French, and included “oriental” elements like the peculiar 
düyek beat in contrast to previous songs which had tried to adapt to the aesthet-
ics of European popular music (Meriç 295-96). Despite the new strategies for 
better ranking, the song received 23 points and placed fifteenth (out of 19), 
ending up only slightly better than Semiha Yankı’s debut entry, which had come 
in last (Akın 125). In 1983, Çetin Alp’s “Opera” would stand for another episode 
of failure as it became the second Turkish contribution to the ESC to place last in 
the contest, and the first ever to receive zero points (Kuyucu 21).  
Similar to the preparations for an international soccer match, Turkey pre-
pared for the ESC with nationalistic enthusiasm and an updated strategy as a 
response to the failure of the previous years. But still there came another failure. 
By blaming “defeat” on the jealousy of Europeans (“Fortress Europe”), Turkish 
journalists and critics negotiated the fact that the Turkish contributions tended to 
do poorly in the ESC, forming antagonisms between East and West, and Chris-
tians and Muslims (Şıvgın 202-03). Up until Şebnem Paker’s third place in the 
1997 ESC in Dublin, the results almost always evoked the same feelings of 
disappointment among the Turkish audience. The long-awaited victory came 
only in 2003 with Sertab Erener’s contribution to the ESC, but this success was 
followed by criticism.  
Sertab’s performance of the winning song “Everyway that I Can” was criti-
cized by Turkish audiences, particularly with regard to her intonation, which was 
frequently off on the ESC final in Riga, as well as her narrow victory over 
Belgium’s entry by only two points. Most of all, journalists and commentators 
focused on criticizing the language preference in the song, emphasizing that the 
song was the first ever Turkish entry performed solely in English. The use of 
English lyrics had become possible after the ESC changed its language rule in 
1999, which had tied the songs of participating countries to their official lan-
guages (Schacht and Swann). As an English-language song, “Everyway that I 
Can” challenged Turkey’s linguistic nationalism. The disappointment of previ-
ous contests therefore took a different form at the 2003 ESC: critics claimed that 
Turkey was allowed to win only because it had given up its linguistic sovereign-
ty by embracing a Western European language (Kuyucu 29). Despite the Euro-
peanization efforts of the preceding entries and the use of English lyrics, Sertab’s 
song and performance included many neo-Ottoman elements, such as an oriental 
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beat performed with goblet drums and the seraglio-themed music video as figure 
1 shows, which thereby promoted “ethnic” styles in the ESC (Solomon 147).  
 
Fig. 1: A Screenshot of Sertab Erener’s “Everyway that I Can” featuring 
neo-Ottoman mis-en-scène. 
 
 Source: Courtesy of YouTube. 
 
This trend was followed by the Ukrainian singer Ruslana in 2004, who per-
formed with dancers that evoked the Hutsul people of Ukraine, and by the Greek 
singer Helena Paparizou in 2005, whose song included traditional Greek instru-
ments and a local “ethnic” sound (Baker 174). Despite these controversies, 
Sertab’s success made İstanbul the host city of the 2004 ESC.  
 
 
THE VICTORY AND THE DEBATES ON PERFORMANCE: 
THE ESC IN İSTANBUL 2004 
 
Sertab’s 2003 ESC victory provided the country with abundant opportunities for 
cultural tourism. Similar to the victory the previous year, however, the 2004 ESC 
in İstanbul triggered controversies. The Ministry of Culture and Tourism put 
great effort in representing the country’s cultural and tourism features, thus 
seeking to cater to the “tourist gaze” (Urry 1-2) of European audiences. The 
Ministry organized a reception for the contesting countries in the Dolmabahçe 
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Palace, delivered presents and souvenirs to the delegates of these countries, and 
filmed 46 “postcards” (video clips displayed before a country’s performance to 
entertain spectators during the preparation of the stage and the installment of 
props) with images of different parts of Turkey instead of receiving the videos 
from delegations of participating countries (Selcuk). The concern for the “tourist 
gaze” was an issue throughout the performances of the contest. Anatolian Fire, a 
modern dance group based on local themes and figures from Anatolian folk 
dances, for instance, performed before the moderators announced the voting 
results (Üstünel), thus musically promoting the regions of Anatolia as a tourist 
destination. 
Besides promoting tourism to Turkey, Sertab’s personal effort regarding her 
opening performance was significant for the evening. She prepared a medley 
including her 2003 winning song and the more operatic ballad “Leave,” an 
adaptation of her earlier song “Aşk” (Love), which had been released in 1999. 
Similar to Sertab’s 2003 ESC performance in Riga, the first part of the medley 
was accompanied by belly dancers. For the second part, she insisted on the 
accompaniment of male and female whirling dervishes. Musicologist Victor 
Vicente found this performance design meaningful as he identified Sufi connota-
tions in the ballad (234-35). Nevertheless, Sertab’s preference for, and insistence 
on, female whirling dervishes led to a broad-scale debate due to the largely 
accepted gender segregation in Mevlevi practices, in which men and women 
were not allowed to whirl together, and women were prohibited from whirling in 
public. The general coordinator of the contest, Bülent Osma, argued that the 
organization committee did not favor the use of female whirling dervishes as it 
was not in line with the tradition, but they eventually decided to have both male 
and female dervishes, considering that it was only a show, not a religious ritual, 
and that Sertab found it unmodern to question the participation of women in 
stage performances (Altuntaş).  
Although the debate concerning the ESC opening performance had cooled 
down, the debate between non-governmental organizations of Mevlevi Sufism 
(Mevlevi NGOs) did not cease. The vice president of the International Mevlana 
Foundation and descendant of the thirteenth-century Sufi poet Mevlana Jalal ad-
Din Rumi, Esin Çelebi, said Sertab knew that women can also whirl, but that it 
was not appropriate for men and women to whirl together. According to Çelebi, 
Sertab’s insistence on a mixed gender whirling performance was regrettable 
(Gülmez). Another member of the foundation, Işın Çelebi, once more empha-
sized that whirling is not a show but a ritual. She said the famous Turkish singer 
Zeki Müren and “queen of pop” Madonna had consulted the foundation years 
ago on including female whirling dervishes with colorful dresses in their perfor-
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mances. According to Çelebi, both Madonna and Zeki Müren dropped the idea 
of whirling in their stage shows after the foundation had informed them about 
the religious meaning of the whirling ceremony (Haber Vitrini).  
The debates on female whirling dervishes were over before the ESC final, 
and Sertab managed to share the stage with half-naked male belly dancers, which 
is unusual in the Turkish context, and mixed gender whirling dervishes, as can 
be seen in figure 2, which is also not common in the Turkish context.  
 
Fig. 2: A screenshot from the ESC 2004 opening ceremony in İstanbul, 15 
May 2004. 
 
 Source: Courtesy of YouTube. 
 
As her 2004 performance was not further criticized by mainstream media 
concerning whirling dervishes, she continued her successful stage performances, 
sharing the stage with the people she met during the ESC. 
 
 
WHIRLING DERVISHES  
BETWEEN RITUAL AND ENTERTAINMENT 
 
The whirling dervish controversy, despite dominating her ESC experience, did 
not recur in Sertab’s career afterwards. However, the whirling dervish started to 
occupy the national agenda especially after the debate concerning the ESC in 
İstanbul. Sertab has performed and collaborated internationally since the late 
1990s. Long before performing at the ESC, she released singles together with 
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international musicians. In 1999, for instance, she recorded a maxi single with 
the a cappella group Voice Male, and the following year she performed in a 
Turkish adaptation of Ricky Martin’s cover song “Private Emotion” (originally 
recorded by The Hooters), which he first released featuring the Swedish singer 
Meja. The same year, she covered her operatic ballad “Aşk” with Greek singer 
Mando, with half of the lyrics in Greek partly sung by herself. After their suc-
cessful collaboration on the single “Φως/Aşk” (Love), Mando and Sertab coinci-
dentally competed against each other in Riga in 2003. Probably as a result of her 
victory at the 2003 ESC, Sertab hit the top of the Greek charts with her singles 
“Here I Am” and the competing song “Everyway that I Can” (“Greece Top 20”). 
Sertab’s international collaborations with musicians not only resulted in 
commercial success but also led to improvements in musical and cultural rela-
tions between Greece and Turkey. Despite the countries’ shared history, which is 
filled with wars and conflicts since the Ottoman period (including the war 
between Turkish and Greek armies in 1922 and the Cyprus Operation in 1974), 
Sertab continued to work for peace and friendship on the stage with other Greek 
artists. After the ESC final in İstanbul, she gave a concert with the Greek popstar 
Sakis Rouvas, whose ESC entry ended up in third place in 2004. Co-organized 
by the Ministries of Culture of both countries, the concert took place before a 
large audience in Sultanahmet, a historical region of central İstanbul (Vat-
manidis). The main theme of the concert was friendship and peace, underlined 
by Sertab and Rouvas’s shared performance of John Lennon’s signature song for 
a peaceful world, “Imagine.” 
Nevertheless, the collaboration was not always peaceful. Rouvas had previ-
ously collaborated with another Turkish pop singer, Burak Kut. As he was also 
cast for the Turkish voice in the Walt Disney animation film The Hunchback of 
Notre Dame in 1996, Kut recorded the soundtrack of the movie with Rouvas in 
1997. This collaboration led to a peace concert at Ledra Palace on the Green 
Line in Cyprus, which separated the Turkish and Greek Cypriots after the war in 
1974. Unfortunately, both Greek and Turkish Cypriots protested the concert, and 
Rouvas interpreted this protest as a demonstration of the fact that the two nations 
were not ready for peaceful diplomacy (Akbaş). Compared to Kut’s effort, 
Sertab’s collaboration with Rouvas can be regarded as a diplomatic success in 
that this collaboration attracted a peaceful audience in contrast to the protests in 
1997.  
Keeping the collaboration of pop singers and Ministries of Culture in mind, 
we can return to the whirling dervishes to see if there is a similar path of diplo-
matic collaboration. Even though the debate was mainly on gender during the 
ESC, the actual issue related to whirling dervishes became their increasing 
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visibility, to which the ESC night inevitably contributed. Whirling dervishes 
emerged in the Turkish context several centuries ago, when, following Rumi’s 
death on 17 December 1273 in Konya, Mevlevi Sufism became an order. Ever 
since, devotees of this order have performed whirling in their special white 
gowns, accompanied by a special music performed in the background as part of 
the ritual called the Sema ceremony. Although the order became illegal by the 
implementation of law No. 677 in 1925 by the Turkish Republic, whirling 
gradually gained cultural heritage value and Sema ceremonies became part of the 
tourism in Turkey. The yearly Şeb-i Arus (Wedding Night) festivals held in 
December in Konya in order to commemorate Rumi, who interpreted death as 
reunion with “the Beloved” like a wedding, attract thousands of people to the 
city.  
2004 was significant not only for the ESC in İstanbul but also because it was 
the year the Mevlana Cultural Center in Konya opened during the Şeb-i Arus 
Festival. In terms of size, staging, and spectacle, the opening event resembled 
the ESC. Before the opening of the Mevlana Cultural Center, the Şeb-i Arus 
festivals had taken place in sports halls. Both the Turkish state and Mevlevi 
NGOs criticized the relegation of this important ritual to such an irrelevant place 
as a sports hall. As a consequence, the Turkish government funded the construc-
tion of the Mevlana Cultural Center, which was especially built for whirling 
ceremonies and also included smaller halls for other events. The opening cere-
mony of the cultural center took place on Sunday, 12 December, with fireworks 
and an excessive crowd comparable to the actual Şeb-i Arus celebrations on 17 
December. The Prime Minister at the time, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was present 
to honor the opening ceremony, and the audience applauded when he crossed the 
stage where the whirling ceremony was to take place. When Vicente attended 
this ceremony during his fieldwork in Turkey, he was shocked by what he 
described as the Erdoğan’s “inappropriate behavior to cross the whirling ground 
in a linear way” (159). The whirling ground was considered a holy place for the 
whirling ritual and only the postnişin, the dervish representing Rumi in the ritual, 
was traditionally allowed to walk straight across the whirling ground. Vicente 
was also astounded that the emcees warned the audience to respect the sacred 
ritual, asking them to turn off their cell phones and to refrain from using their 
cameras, applauding, and leaving their seats so as to preserve the tranquility of 
the ceremony (160). His bewilderment by the political leader’s disrespectful 
behavior and the emcees’ reminder implied what was emphasized in Osma’s 
declaration concerning the appearance of whirling dervishes on the Eurovision 
stage: the whirling ceremony was treated both by the Prime Minister and the 
audience more like a show than a ritual. 
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Sertab’s desire to see female whirling dervishes on the ESC stage was based 
on a secularized image of whirling dervishes detached from their ritualistic 
context. This detachment was so far-reaching that even in the original, ritualistic 
context of the Sema ceremony, the emcees felt the necessity to remind the 
audience that, in contrast to the ESC, the ceremony was not a show, but a 
ritual—a sacred event. All of a sudden, the whirling ground of the Mevlana 
Cultural Center built especially for a religious Sufi ritual turned into a mere 
performance hall where people needed to be asked to leave behind their secular 
attitudes towards the stage, which contributed to Vicente’s disappointment. The 
changing meaning of the whirling ground in the experiences of different actors 
signaled the heterogeneity of interests.  
The event in 2004 revealed the shared interest of Mevlevi NGOs and the 
government to promote whirling dervishes, leading to their collaboration in 
cultural heritage management. Representatives of the Ministry of Culture and 
Tourism and the International Mevlana Foundation prepared a comprehensive 
application to UNESCO on the cultural heritage status of Mevlevi Sufism 
(Yılmaz). In 2005, UNESCO proclaimed the Mevlevi Sema Ceremony an 
Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity, officially inscribing the ceremony on 
its Representative List in 2008. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Culture and Tour-
ism, the International Mevlana Foundation, and UNESCO jointly celebrated the 
800th anniversary of Rumi’s birth in 2007 as the so-called Mevlana Year. This 
level of international recognition inevitably provided abundant opportunities for 
cultural and national representation, similar to the visibility afforded by the ESC. 
Following Sertab’s performance at the 2004 ESC, the second most signifi-
cant name to bring whirling dervishes to the stage was Sami Savni Özer, a 
popular performer of religious music and an alleged member of a Sufi order, the 
Cerrahis. A pioneer of Islamic pop in Turkey, he started releasing albums in the 
2000s in which he sang hymns with a more secular, pop sound. His main success 
came with his 2006 album İnliyoruz Hasretinle (We Are Yearning for You). He 
recorded a video for the eighth track “Demedim Mi” (Didn’t I Say) with whirl-
ing dervishes as figure 3 shows, and he appeared on mainstream pop music 
channels with his video in Turkey.  
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Fig. 3: Screenshot from the video of Sami Savni Özer’s “Demedim Mi.”  
 
 Source: Courtesy of YouTube.  
 
The piece was a hymn of the Bektashi order, another Sufi order different from 
Mevlevi Sufism. Although the piece has a Sufi message that would also fit 
Mevlevi Sufism, it is not a Mevlevi piece of music. The hymn became very 
popular when it was released in 2006. Although Özer became famous across 
Turkey for his soundtracks of Cem Yılmaz’s movies, he continued performing 
the Bektashi hymn “Demedim Mi.” 
The success of this hymn associated with whirling dervishes gave rise to 
more appearances of whirling dervishes on music TV channels as well as in 
movies. For instance, director Doruk Somunkıran’s 2009 TV project Sufi Klipler 
(Sufi Videos) made “Demedim Mi” popular once more. According to conserva-
tive critics, TV representations of religious music could not be combined with 
mundane images of daily life, but rather had to be accompanied by “natural” 
images, such as flowers and the sun (Somunkıran). In contrast with this con-
servative approach, Somunkıran nonetheless decided to put religious music into 
the context of everyday life. In addition to including the streets and city walls of 
İstanbul in his videos, Somunkıran concentrated on whirling dervishes. 
“Demedim Mi” was part of the project and it was sung by Hayko Cepkin, a rock 
musician with Armenian origins. Besides his ethnic and religious difference 
compared to the majority of the country, his combination of Muslim Sufi music 
with a Mohawk, blue hair, and a hard rock sound were also unusual. Next to all 
the new and alternative images integrated into the scene, Hayko, with the ac-
companiment of whirling dervishes, whirled around as if he were another 
whirling dervish in the video. This unusual appearance of a rock singer with 
whirling dervishes in the Bektashi hymn was just one indicator for the hymn’s 
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popularity. “Demedim Mi” was performed in almost every occasion possible, 
frequently with the accompaniment of whirling dervishes as reflected in the 
video, shown in figure 4. That the hymn was parodied in Selçuk Aydemir’s 2011 
movie Çalgı Çengi (Musician and Dancer) testifies to its great popularity. 
 
Fig. 4: A screenshot from the Hayko Cepkin episode of the Sufi Klipler 
project. 
 
 Source: Courtesy of YouTube.  
 
Nancy Snow emphasizes the importance of reciprocity and multi-directionality 
of public diplomacy: “While dialogue between cultures is an admirable goal, it 
begins with dialogue between individuals, whether they are representatives of 
governments or private citizens” (17). Nothing can illustrate this better than 
Turkish public diplomacy on the level of micro-cultures regarding the adapta-
tions of this Bektashi hymn. Besides the range of styles in random performances, 
this hymn also accompanied the dialogue between politics and the wider public 
in Şeb-i Arus İstanbul 2013, the second largest whirling event following the one 
in Konya.  
A collaboration of the metropolitan municipality, private entrepreneurs, and 
several other sponsors, Şeb-i Arus İstanbul 2013 commemorated Rumi on 13 
December that year. The intended audience were İstanbul residents, who could 
not travel to Konya for the annual Şeb-i Arus festivals. The event imitated the 
aforementioned Konya festivals, in which a concert of religious music precedes 
the Sema ceremony. The concert at the 2013 event in İstanbul starred Sami 
Savni Özer, the singer who had first popularized the hymn, and two pop-
arabesque singers, Serkan Burak Tektaş (Alişan) and Ahmet Kutsi Karadoğan 
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(Kutsi), who had never been associated with religious music in their careers. 
With ticket prices ranging from 25 to 235 TRY (app. €9 to €85 at that time), the 
event had a diverse audience from every district of the city, with people from 
different economic backgrounds and political orientations in attendance. The 
invited politicians sat in the front rows as they had in Konya, and Prime Minister 
Erdoğan was invited on stage first to salute the audience. Despite the prime 
minister’s short salutation, which had a mere message of love and tolerance 
related to Rumi, his speech was protested by the audience—a response to the 
Gezi uprising which had taken place the same year, and which witnessed Ziya 
Azazi whirling in Taksim square while wearing a gas mask, shown in figure 5.  
 
Fig. 5: Ziya Azazi whirling in Gezi Park, in toxic green whirling gown and 
with gas mask, June 2013.  
 
 Photo: Arda Bengü. 
 
Supporters of the prime minister countered the booing and whistling with 
applause (“Başbakan”), turning the event into a “protestival,” a portmanteau of 
the words protest and festival (St John 130, 133). Sami Savni Özer afterwards 
held the microphone towards Erdoğan so that he could sing along to the Bektashi 
hymn “Demedim Mi.” After the concert, the whirling dervishes appeared on 
stage in order to perform the ritual, but neither the Sema ceremony nor the 
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Bektashi hymn could outshine the protests of the audience. The audience inevi-
tably associated whirling dervishes with this competition between popular 
figures and political messages.  
This contextual connection between Eurovision and the whirling dervish, 
embodied in a popularized and politicized hymn, signals the relationship be-
tween music and power, in which dialogue and protest can be observed along-
side images of whirling dervishes. The debate on the appearance of whirling 
dervishes on the ESC stage, the collaboration of different actors in promoting the 
cultural heritage value of the Sufi ritual of whirling dervishes, and the sharing of 
the stage with pop-arabesque singers and politicians with dervish performers 
point to the heterogeneity of power interests that intersect in the domain of 
music. A theoretical glimpse at this relationship and identification of different 
actors claiming power over Mevlevi Sufism can offer new perspectives in 




PERFORMERS AND AUDIENCES AS AGENTS 
IN THE STRUGGLE FOR REPRESENTATION 
 
The gender, national, religious, and political controversies related to the perfor-
mance of whirling dervishes revolve around issues of cultural heritage and 
national representation. Different religious, political, and cultural actors appro-
priate whirling for their own benefits, especially when their interests intersect 
with one another, utilize different strategies within the struggle to dominate the 
whirling ground.  
As mentioned above, the inscription of the Mevlevi Sema Ceremony on 
UNESCO’s Representative List of Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity 
resulted from the collaboration between the Turkish Ministry of Culture and 
Tourism and a Mevlevi NGO. This collaboration between two actors with 
different structures and agendas brought diplomatic success on an international 
level. But it should be kept in mind that this “heritagification” of Sufi practices 
privileges institutions over communities. At the 2008 UNESCO convention, 
governments were encouraged to put effort in making decisions and implement-
ing policies on intangible cultural heritage, while taking precautions to preserve 
potential heritage, which led to an extensive demonstration of the nationalist 
interests of governments in cultural heritage management (Aykan 2). The 
convention implied that heritage does not have inherent value, but that it ac-
quires cultural value through the socio-political construction of heritage (Byrne 
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229). According to Jean During, this led to a situation in which state authorities 
“skillfully appropriate the cultural heritage, turn it into an instrument of power 
and use it to their own advantage” (144). 
The “heritagification” of Mevlevi Sufism in Turkey was not solely in the 
hands of state authorities, but it began as a collaboration between the state and 
NGOs. In truth, however, the state authorities and representatives of Mevlevi 
foundations did not always collaborate. Despite their common success in the 
recognition of the Mevlevi Sema Ceremony as cultural heritage, they conflicted 
with each other in the debate on the visibility of whirling dervishes in Sertab’s 
opening performance for the 2004 ESC. Whereas the International Mevlana 
Foundation was completely opposed to the appearance of whirling dervishes on 
the Eurovision stage, TRT, together with the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 
supported the idea to some extent. The conflict was resolved by state authorities 
who eventually claimed that the performance of whirling dervishes was not part 
of the religious ritual but only an element of a secular stage show. Four years 
after the ESC in İstanbul, however, the Ministry delivered a notice which con-
tradicted the earlier decision. According to the notice, the ritualistic structure of 
the Mevlevi Sema Ceremony was confirmed holistically as cultural heritage and 
all events involving whirling dervishes other than the ceremony itself were 
condemned and imposed with sanctions so as to stop the corruption of the ritual 
(“Mevlevilik ve Semâ”). In a sense, the ministry was now condemning the 
Eurovision performance that had officially been approved. The recently gained 
and internationally recognized cultural heritage status of the whirling dervishes 
provided new opportunities for the country to appeal to the “tourist gaze,” on the 
one hand, but made the state authorities discard long benefitted opportunities of 
this gaze on the other. The lack of mutual agreement on how to interpret dervish 
performances resulted in upcoming notices by the ministry reaffirming the 
sanctity of whirling dervishes. 
During my fieldwork on contemporary experiences of Mevlevi Sufism in 
2013, I observed the commemoration ceremonies for Rumi in December. The 
official ceremony was held in Konya. Organized annually by the Ministry of 
Culture and Tourism, this 10-day event attracted an international audience, 
turning the month of December into Konya’s peak tourist season. The opening of 
the 2013 celebrations started with a candle lighting ceremony in central Konya 
on a symbolic location where Rumi and his spiritual mentor, Shams Tabrizi, 
allegedly met. The lighting ceremony was followed by the March of Love and 
Tolerance towards the Mevlana Cultural Center, which had been opened a few 
months after the 2004 ESC with a ceremony of similar glamor. The ceremony at 
the Mevlana Cultural Center went on in two sessions every day until 17 Decem-
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ber, with each session including a concert of religious music, readings from the 
Masnavi poetry collection, and a Sema ceremony as figure 6 shows. The whirl-
ing dervishes were for the event’s conclusion, prolonging the evening ceremony 
until around 11 pm. The schedule was tiring both for the performers and the 
audience. Parallel to the candle lighting ceremony, representatives of the state 
and Mevlevi NGOs gave speeches in the evening ceremonies of the first and the 
last days of the festival. After their speech on the candle lighting ceremony on 7 
December, guest politicians started the March of Love and Tolerance, which 
ended with a concert of military music provided by a state ensemble named after 
Mehter, the military band of the Ottoman Empire, in front of the governorate 
building. The members of the ensemble were dressed like Ottoman soldiers, and 
they performed traditional pieces on period instruments. 
 
Fig. 6: Whirling dervishes during the Sema ceremony in the opening day of 
the Şeb-i Arus Festival at the Mevlana Cultural Center in Konya, 7 
December 2013. 
 
 Photo: Nevin Şahin.  
 
In the early republican period, advocates of the founding father Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk’s ideology, Kemalists, legitimized their policies by rejecting all Ottoman 
values for the sake of creating a national identity. This included closing all 
dervish lodges in the country and pushing whirling dervishes underground (Ayas 
45, 66). Conversely, the conservative government of the twenty first century 
embraced these once rejected values in an effort to create a neo-Ottoman identity 
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against the Kemalist identity of the early republican period. Bearing in mind the 
conservative government’s policies of promoting values and symbols related to 
the Ottoman Empire, I interpret the appearance of a military band in the official 
ceremony before the performance of the whirling dervishes in two ways. First, it 
served the government’s conservative claim that it is embracing Ottoman values, 
thus making visible the dichotomy between Kemalist and neo-Ottoman policies. 
Second, the military band “self-exoticized” (Volcic 168) the traditional images 
belonging to the Ottoman period in order to appeal to the VIP audience and the 
“tourist gaze.” In a way, this self-exoticizing strategy was similar to the ap-
proach that had allowed Sertab to win the ESC with “oriental” tunes and Otto-
man themes in 2003. The whirling dervish as an image of cultural heritage thus 
served the conservative interests of the state in the Konya ceremonies. The 
whirling ceremony ended with a prayer of the postnişin, including a salutation to 
the contemporary government. Hence, the whirling dervish on the stage was also 
involved in the power struggle to establish the neo-Ottoman identity via the 
postnişin’s collaboration with the state in his prayer. 
In contrast to the celebrations in Konya, yet another ceremony was organized 
in Ankara by the Mevlana Culture and Art Foundation, another Mevlevi NGO 
based in the capital city, which holds looser ties with the state compared to the 
International Mevlana Foundation. The event took place in a concert hall con-
structed by a music foundation devoted to Kemalist ideology. The venue carried 
messages related to this ideological stance as pictures and sayings of Atatürk. 
Support from the state for this event was minor in that the ensemble on the stage 
involved a few musicians employed in state ensembles, who had been assigned 
duties in the Konya festival by the Ministry and who had received official 
permission to participate in the 2013 event in Ankara. Held on 13 December, the 
ceremony consisted of a short opening speech by the vice president of the 
foundation, Gülden Arbaş, a candle lighting ceremony, and the Sema ceremony, 
shown in figure 7.  
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Fig. 7: Celebration of Mevlana Culture and Art Foundation in Ankara. State 
musicians among the ensemble on the right, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s 
signature on top and his photo next to the banner of the foundation, 13 
December 2013.  
 
 Photo: Nevin Şahin.  
 
There were no other formal speeches, no Masnavi talks, no music other than that 
of the Sema ceremony, and no prolonged prayers. In her short speech, Arbaş 
criticized “those conservatives” who claimed to conserve the ritual but who, in 
essence, destroyed the humbleness, naivety, and integrity of the ritual in the 
name of preservation (Şahin). She referred both to the state institutions that 
organized the Konya event and to the private entrepreneurs who were con-
demned by the 2008 notice of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. In her 
speech, she affirmed the NGO’s claim of preserving the simplicity and humble-
ness of the ritual. In line with her speech, the performance was simple and short, 
lasting only until 9 pm. Arbaş claimed that the ceremony organized by their 
NGO adhered to the authentic ritual more closely than the state’s, and the 
performance afterwards affirmed her claim. This competition between one NGO 
and the state did not resemble the collaboration that brought the ritual the status 
of intangible cultural heritage.  
The protests against the prime minister right before the Sema ceremony in 
İstanbul and the contrasting celebrations in Konya and Ankara mentioned above 
showed that, in addition to the state and Mevlevi foundations, the performers, 
and even the audience, can become actors claiming power of representation in 
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the context of whirling dervishes. Influenced by Wittgenstein’s language-game 
in his theory on “obeying a rule” (In Other Words 9), Pierre Bourdieu focuses on 
the fields of struggle for power (Practical Reason 58, 59) and compares power 
relations in the field to a card game. Just as joining a card game necessitates the 
pre-acceptance of the rules, the agents entering the field tacitly accept the 
legitimated forms of struggle, putting power in the center of cultural life. Loïc 
Wacquant, in addition, compares this card game analogy to a “battlefield” (268), 
where bases of identity and hierarchy are constantly disputed. The fluidity of 
power relations in the field challenging hierarchies corroborates Gienow-Hecht’s 
notion of a heterogeneity of power interests in music diplomacy. The context of 
Mevlevi Sufism in twenty-first-century Turkey exemplifies this heterogeneity 
where multiple actors struggle for power over the image of the whirling dervish 
and constantly change roles, compete one day and collaborate another day, 
seeking to realize identity claims and achieve recognition beyond national 
borders. The war analogy of the Turkish audience in the contexts of soccer 
mentioned at the beginning, thus, not only applies to the competition for victory 
and collaboration for representation in the ESC, but also to the heterogeneous 
struggles for representing the values and meanings attached to whirling ceremo-
nies on national and international levels.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS: DERVISH CEREMONIES  
AS “BATTLEFIELDS” OF CULTURAL IDENTITY 
 
Turkey’s Eurovision history, on the one hand, and recent developments in the 
representation of whirling ceremonies as cultural heritage on the other, shed light 
on the heterogeneity of strategies of similar actors in the context of cultural 
diplomacy. As the most significant figure of Turkey’s ESC history, Sertab 
Erener has been a cultural ambassador of a modern and historically connected 
Turkey on a European stage. Not only did she mediate between competing 
cultures and nations, but she also combined tradition with modernity, associating 
the ritual of whirling dervishes with modern popular music. This effort, besides 
arousing debates between institutions on the representation of whirling dervish-
es, helped the whirling dervish image gain recognition beyond the religious 
domain and national borders, resulting in processes of cultural heritage manage-
ment, popularization, and politicization. 
Since then, the whirling dervish both as image and practice has been appro-
priated by a variety of actors ranging from directors to artists, tourism compa-
nies, and political institutions. The ESC winner wants to include whirling 
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dervishes in her performance on the opening ceremony of the contest, challeng-
ing the ritualistic meaning with a secularized stage show. The Mevlevi NGO and 
the Ministry collaborate for international recognition of the whirling ceremony 
as cultural heritage. The dancer whirls in a special whirling gown with a gas 
mask on his face as a way of protesting the government at Gezi Park. The 
dervish salutes the government at the end of the Sema ceremony in Konya. The 
state-employed musicians apply for official permission to perform in the NGO-
organized Sema ceremony in Ankara instead of the state-organized Sema cere-
mony in Konya. The audience mark the Sema ceremony with protest by whis-
tling and applauding in İstanbul. These actors all contribute to the struggle for 
power over the image and use of the whirling dervish. Debates over the repre-
sentation of whirling ceremonies show that collaboration can lead to internation-
al recognition, as in the inscription of the Mevlevi Sema Ceremony on 
UNESCO’s Representative List of Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity, 
which resulted from a shared initiative of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism 
and the International Mevlana Foundation. At the same time, competition among 
actors can lead to a “protestival” spectacle, as in the case of Şeb-i Arus İstanbul 
2013. In conclusion, Mevlevi Sufism has an expansive area of influence both at 
the national and international levels. In twenty-first-century Turkey, perfor-
mances of whirling dervishes involve complex interplays of power, and hetero-
geneous interests struggling for the power of representation lie beneath the 
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Part II:  




Between Propaganda and Public Diplomacy 




Recent research demonstrates that jazz had an important function not only in the 
conception of United States foreign policy, but also of the State Socialist coun-
tries in Eastern Europe. In describing the US conception as a whole, public 
diplomacy plays an important role (Cull, The Cold War; Critchlow; Bayles). 
Focusing on music and jazz, we find terms like cultural diplomacy (Fosler-
Lussier, “Music Pushed”), sound diplomacy (Gienow-Hecht, Sound Diplomacy), 
or jazz diplomacy (Davenport, Jazz Diplomacy). The variety of terms used by 
Western scholars describing the US efforts to use music—and specifically, 
jazz—in their foreign policy contrasts the Western lack of terms describing the 
conception of their State Socialist counterparts, which is labeled as propaganda. 
Although the term was also used in State Socialist scholarship (Lukin; Mazurek), 
there is a telling subtext in the use of the term in the Western academic circles. 
During the Cold War, a dichotomous notion separating “us” (meaning “The 
West”) from “them” (meaning “The East”) was in use in the countries of the 
Western world. Democratic countries of the West, often referred to as “us,” 
implement public diplomacy, whereas non-democratic countries, such as Nazi 
Germany during World War II or the Soviet Union and her satellites during the 
Cold War, simply spread propaganda (Colucci). This use of language had to do 
with the fact that Nazi Germany and State Socialist countries both used the term 
officially, for instance in official denominations. Joseph Goebbels’s ministry was 
officially called Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda (Reich 
Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda) and State Socialist govern-
ments used the term as well. For example, in the Soviet Union, the term Agit-
prop, a combination of the words “agitation” and “propaganda” was used as 
denomination of the main persuasion strategy since the beginning of this state.  
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According to this logic, the “free” countries of the West implemented “good” 
public diplomacy, and the “unfree” countries of the East implemented “evil” 
propaganda. This implies the idea that only the West has an elaborated concept 
of using culture as a means to promote its values abroad, but not the East, which 
only relied on propaganda and agitation without deeper ideological considera-
tions. However, both US public diplomacy and Soviet propaganda were theoreti-
cally founded in academic discourses. In the Western world, political scientists 
and opinion researchers like Paul Lazarsfeld and Jacques Ellul started this 
discourse, whereas the State Socialist discourse was rooted in the foundational 
works of Marxist-Leninist theory. In the latter, and in stark contrast to how the 
term is understood in Western circles, propaganda is positive as it refers to the 
way governments communicate political goals to the people and, thus, transport 
basic ideological values to people (Bussemer; Kamiński; Kenez). In the Soviet 
Union, there was a solid academic discourse on the theory of propaganda. 
During the Brezhnev era in the 1960s and 1970s, an article from the Bol'shaya 
Sovetskaya Ėntsiklopediya presents an overview of concepts in Soviet politics 
and culture (95). Is the Western depiction of Eastern “propaganda” simply 
nothing more than a stereotypical construction projected onto the “East” through 
a seemingly “objective” West, recalling the process of Orientalism criticized by 
Edward Said? Is not the Cold War period one of the best examples that the US 
and their allies in the West engaged in propaganda as well by spending enor-
mous sums of money and implementing a large bundle of measures designed to 
transport their basic ideologies of freedom and democracy? While the English 
term public diplomacy does not sound as harsh as the seemingly evil word, is it 
not simply a euphemism? In this context it is telling that the term had a positive 
connotation in the US during the 1950s. The early jazz tours were discussed in 
US middlebrow magazines as “good propaganda” (Stearns). Would it not 
therefore be more honest to speak of propaganda actions of the Cold War 
superpowers rather than juxtaposing public diplomacy and propaganda?  
Instead of using the terms public diplomacy (implemented by the US gov-
ernment) or propaganda (implemented by the State Socialist countries of the 
former Eastern Bloc), the aim of this paper is to compare what I will call, 
following Werner Wirth, strategies of persuasion with jazz (Wirth and Kühne). I 
will particularly focus on the Soviet Union and Poland, because these countries 
had a special position among the Eastern Bloc countries: The Soviet Union was 
the “homeland” of Socialist ideology and Poland was the country in the Eastern 
Bloc whose jazz scene was seen as a kind of “window to the West.” Rejecting 
generalized notions of US and State Socialist cultural politics with regard to jazz 
as a whole, I will compare the use of jazz as a vehicle for the persuasion of the 
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people in Eastern Europe. Specifically, I am interested in how US foreign and 
State Socialist domestic policies were implemented in the Soviet Union and 
Poland. Convincing the local populations was the shared goal of both the US and 
the State Socialist administrations; therefore, the measures taken are to a certain 
extent comparable as both governments used jazz as a means of persuasion. In 
how far were what we call public diplomacy on the US side and propaganda on 
the State Socialist side similar? 
 
 
THE US JAZZ STRATEGY AT THE BEGINNING  
OF THE COLD WAR  
 
At the beginning of the Cold War, the US government intended to use classical 
music as a vehicle of persuasion rather than jazz due to the fact that until the end 
of the 1940s jazz was regarded as a music of lower value, and the US govern-
ment thought they could only convince “Old Europe” with its traditions of high 
culture by exporting music from the high cultural sphere. As a result, the US 
mainly financed orchestra tours of representative ensembles such as the Boston 
Symphony Orchestra (Gienow-Hecht, “World”). However, the US government 
soon realized that jazz had a far greater persuasive potential than classical music 
in Europe. When Charles E. Bohlen, US Ambassador to Moscow in the early 
1950s, informed the US government that the Soviet youth was hungry for jazz, 
he provided a powerful argument for the official promotion of this musical genre 
(Ritter, “Broadcasting”). Exploiting the appeal of jazz to politically destabilize 
the USSR, if not the whole Eastern Bloc, seemed to be an almost logical conse-
quence.  
This became possible because at the beginning of the 1950s, jazz began to be 
accepted as an official musical form in the US as initiatives like Norman 
Grantz’s “Jazz at the Philharmonic” concerts and other similar activities increas-
ingly promoted jazz in American society. A new meaning of jazz evolved as it 
was no longer envisioned as a primitive form of music by an unloved minority 
but as a symbol for American core values including freedom, equality, and 
democracy. It was this ideology the US government wanted to promote by 
spreading US jazz abroad.  
The government’s idea was not to entertain some scattered jazz aficionados, 
but to create a serious basis for a revolution through the promotion of jazz music, 
which reached a wider audience than diplomatic speeches and political rhetoric. 
Scholars such as Penny von Eschen and Danielle Fosler-Lussier have demon-
strated that US administrations made intensive efforts in this regard (Eschen, 
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Satchmo; Fosler-Lussier, Music). Financed by the US State Department, numer-
ous musicians and ensembles were brought into the Eastern Bloc to perform jazz 
(Davenport, Jazz Diplomacy).  
In 1955, the US-financed radio station Voice of America (VOA) started a 
daily jazz program which was moderated by Willis Conover and could be 
listened to via shortwave in various Eastern European capitals, including Mos-
cow (Ripmaster; Ritter, “Broadcasting”). The propagation of jazz was intended 
to demonstrate that the US did not only produce a better music and culture, but 
that it also had a superior political and economic system. Jazz music was sup-
posed to accomplish what aggressive rhetorical strategies seemingly could not 
achieve: to win the hearts of the youth, to alienate them from communism, and 
to encourage them to actively oppose the Soviet Union. 
 
 
THE STATE SOCIALIST JAZZ STRATEGY  
DURING LATE STALINISM 
 
The end of World War II in Moscow was celebrated with Soviet jazz. On 9 May 
1945, Eddie Rosner’s Belarus SSR Jazz Orchestra performed at Red Square as 
part of the end of war celebrations (Starr). Like their US colleagues, Soviet 
cultural policy makers were aware of the great popularity of jazz among young 
people in the Eastern Bloc countries. Since Socialist education of young people 
was one of the crucial tasks of the political intelligentsia, the negotiation of jazz 
turned out to be one of the most important tasks for them. But when the US 
changed from a World War II ally to the main enemy at the beginning of the 
Cold War, performing jazz in public was increasingly restricted.  
As jazz began to be an accepted and even became an official form of culture 
in the US, the cultural politics of Josef Stalin and his culture minister Andrei 
Alexandrovich Zhdanov sought to remove jazz, the music of the new enemy, 
from public life in the Soviet Union. Jazz was depicted as having a minor quality 
and was viewed as a threat to the political promotion of communism (Gorodin-
skij; Šneerson). Musicians were deprived of their official status and, in some 
cases, were even sent to the gulag, such as Eddie Rosner (Pickhan and Preisler). 
Great efforts were made to implement counterpropaganda measures among the 
youth to prevent jazz’s corruptive influence. For instance, officials attempted to 
promote various forms of Soviet popular music to replace jazz. With his at the 
same time conformist and popular song compositions, sometimes including 
“harmless” jazzy elements, Soviet composer Isaak Dunayevskii played an 
important role here (Stadelmann), and the government sought to implement 
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shifting policies towards jazz in the other State Socialist countries accordingly 
(see Ignácz in this volume).  
 
 
FAILURE OF US AND SOVIET GOALS  
 
As we have seen so far, in the first decade after World War II the political 
function of jazz changed fundamentally on both sides of the Iron Curtain. For the 
US government, jazz became the most important musical genre to persuade 
Eastern Bloc inhabitants of US values, and for the Stalinist rulers jazz was 
regarded as dangerous. Despite these differences, both political administrations 
regarded jazz as a crucial means in the competition to convince people in the 
Eastern Bloc of their system’s superiority.  
At the beginning of the Cold War, the strategies implemented by both coun-
terparts were antagonistic: the US administration started to promote jazz whereas 
the Soviet administration started to limit people’s access to this music. Both 
sides formulated ambitious goals: while the US administration intended to use 
jazz in order to spread the political message of freedom, equality, and democra-
cy, the Soviet administration wanted to cut off their population from any West-
ern influences. Regarding these aims, both counterparts failed, as they soon had 
to realize that neither was the jazz propagation of the US the beginning of a 
strong movement demanding American freedom and democracy in the Eastern 
Bloc, nor did the governments of the USSR and their satellites succeed in totally 
preventing the public’s contact with jazz.  
Beginning with the post-Stalinist thaw in the mid-1950s, Soviet cultural poli-
cy makers realized their failure and implemented more elaborated policies 
regarding jazz. A bit later, their US colleagues realized their failure to implement 
their goals as well and adapted their policies accordingly. Setting aside their 
initial goals, from the 1960s onwards the USA and the USSR developed new, 
more differentiated methods of persuasion with jazz. These more elaborated 
strategies will be described below.  
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ROCK PUSHES JAZZ ASIDE IN THE LATE 1950S 
 
One of the reasons for the change of strategies was the changing social and 
cultural function of jazz starting at the end of the 1950s. The years of the first 
important East-West encounters in jazz, such as the Dave Brubeck tour to Poland 
in 1958 (Hatschek) and the Willis Conover tour in 1959 (Ritter, “Broadcasting”), 
marked the beginning of a world-wide fascination of young music listeners with 
a new musical style, starting with the sensational success of Bill Haley’s song 
“Rock Around the Clock.”  
From then on, a new pop music genre called rock ’n’ roll not only occupied 
the hearts of young people, it also pushed jazz aside. Rock ’n’ roll and the 
musical styles developing from its roots became the music of the youth, whereas 
jazz slowly transformed into a kind of art music, received less by younger 
audiences than by middle-aged people (Wicke). This development had important 
consequences for the use of jazz as means of a persuasion strategy in the East 
and West. Convincing the youth with jazz proved to be increasingly difficult 
because this was not the music they wanted to hear anymore. From the 1960s 
onwards, diplomatic efforts in the East and West switched from jazz to rock ’n’ 
roll and rock.  
Jazz, however, did not entirely lose its importance as a means of persuasion. 
From the 1960s onwards jazz listeners in the Eastern Bloc tended to be educated 
middle-class and middle-aged people with considerable social status and influ-
ence. Convincing them was an important purpose under the new conditions. 
Cultural politicy makers developed convincing strategies for the youth using 
mainly rock ’n’ roll and rock, and for older people using jazz. It is also because 
of this development that the generic goals of political leaders who relied on 




NEW JAZZ STRATEGIES  
IN THE EASTERN BLOC COUNTRIES AND IN THE US 
 
In the Eastern Bloc countries, the death of Stalin marked a starting point for 
more liberal jazz politics. In Poland, where the erosion of the Stalinist system 
started very early, the composer Henryk Czyż had already demanded the need 
for an idiosyncratic Polish jazz tradition in 1954 at a conference of the Polish 
Composer’s Union (Tompkins). During the next decade, this idea was formulat-
ed also in other State Socialist countries. In the Soviet Union this idea officially 
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occurred relatively late, and was discussed at a greater scale in a meeting of the 
Composers’ Union of 1962 (Gaut; Abeßer). Here, composer Dmitri Shostako-
vich demanded in a forceful speech the composition of jazz music by local 
composers in order to offer young listeners alternatives to the music of the 
capitalist class enemy (Ritter, “Negotiated”). Every State Socialist country 
developed its own model of implementing this new strategy. In general, re-
strictions against jazz were loosened, and composers were asked to develop 
stylistic ideas on how to create genuine forms in their own country. 
Again it was Poland where a second element of this new jazz strategy was 
implemented for the first time (Friszke). The Polish regime started collaborating 
with the jazz scene and opened the path for the first large-scale jazz festivals. 
State institutions not only approved but also financed the first public jazz festival 
in Sopot near Gdańsk in 1956, and the most important Polish jazz ensemble of 
this festival, the Sekstet Komedy, received an official government grant 
(Brodacki). Until the second half of the 1960s, the most important countries of 
the Eastern Bloc launched their own jazz festivals. Among them were the Jazz 
Jamboree in Warsaw, which has been held since 1958, the Prague Jazz Days, 
beginning in 1964 (Zaddach), and the festivals in Moscow starting in 1962 
(Ritter, “Negotiated”). All of these festivals were financially and logistically 
sponsored by their respective governments. Local jazz musicians were encour-
aged to present their compositions in order to demonstrate to the public that the 
State Socialist world was a promising field for fruitful jazz development. In 
order to emphasize that, open competition with US jazz at these festivals was 
created. In Poland, musicians from the US and other Western countries had been 
performing at the first public jazz events since the late 1950s.  
1956 marked a turning point for US public diplomacy (Stöver). Not only had 
the Hungarian Revolution that same year failed, but the US strategy of aggres-
sively encouraging an uprising in the near future, as it did in a Radio Free 
Europe (RFE) broadcast cast the US administration in a bad light. US officials 
had to learn that it would be counterproductive to demand an open fight for 
freedom and democracy because they themselves could not guarantee substantial 
help. As a consequence, the US State Department stopped the strategy of pro-
moting jazz openly in order to create an oppositional milieu. Instead, officials 
continued to use jazz as a kind of advertisement for their own country. Sending 
jazz musicians to the Eastern Bloc from that point onward had the primary aim 
to create a climate that was friendly to the United States, which corresponded to 
the new political line of peaceful coexistence (Mania). What did the implementa-
tion of these new persuasion strategies by both sides mean for the development 
of jazz music and the jazz milieus in Eastern Bloc countries? The following 
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glimpses into several aspects show that, in effect, these new strategies created 




INSTITUTIONS AND JAZZ PERSUASION STRATEGIES  
 
The use of jazz as a component of state-organized persuasion strategies entailed 
the creation of new institutions or the reuse of existing institutions as places 
where the implementation of concrete measures of the persuasion strategy was 
planned. In 1956, the US created an Advisory Committee of the Arts as a sub-
organization of the Office of Cultural Presentations, situated at the State De-
partment’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. Likewise, a Jazz and 
Folk subcommittee were set up in 1964. Here, cultural policy makers were 
advised by leading radio journalists and jazz experts on the necessity or useless-
ness to send jazz ensembles abroad (Campbell; Ansari). In Eastern Bloc coun-
tries, public diplomacy strategies were conceptualized in state-organized Com-
posers Unions (Tomoff). Resulting from the Marxist-Leninist understanding of 
culture as an important means for education (which was supervised under party 
and political power structures), every cultural activist including jazz performers 
and composers had to enroll in special arts unions. While it was illegal for any 
practitioner of cultural activities not to be a member of such an organization, 
approved membership meant official acceptance of one’s cultural work and 
financial safety.  
The discussion structure in both the US advisory panels and the State Social-
ist Composers’ Unions was very similar: members of the government dialogued 
with composers, musicians, and media experts on how to cope with jazz and 
which measures were to be taken. Here, controversial discussions took place 
before final decisions were made. In both cases, the proceedings became classi-
fied, remained unpublished, and were distributed to commission members only 
for internal use.  
Radio broadcasting is an additional example of how the implementation of 
state-organized persuasion strategies led to the creation or the strengthening of 
state-controlled institutions (Badenoch, Fickers, and Heinrich-Franke). Radio 
stations in Eastern Europe and other European countries were quasi-
monopolistic institutions. In the US, by contrast, radio was a commercial field 
not controlled by the government (Hilmes). The founding of Voice of America 
as a government-financed station meant a break with this tradition (Heil) as the 
government spent considerable amounts of money in order to create a strong 
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presentation of US government politics on shortwave radio (Johnson). State 
Socialist governments, on their hand, strengthened the quality of their stations in 
order not to lose the monopoly on information in the ether (Mikkonen). In the 
emerging “radio battles,” jazz music broadcasts had their place (Ritter, 
“Kontrollwahn”). State Socialist radio promoters faced the problem of coping 
with the influence of Western shortwave stations (Roth-Ey). On the State 
Socialist side, the State-controlled radio stations began focusing on agents of 
cultural politics and their institutions for the transmission of information. In 
terms of jazz-based persuasion strategies, hosts of music and jazz programs were 
included to create effective strategies. The counterparts of America’s Willis 
Conover were the Soviet radio broadcaster Arkadij Petrov, the Polish moderator 
Adam Jaroszewski, the Hungarian host Janos Gonda, and others.  
East-West meetings in the jazz community were regarded as important by 
both sides so that journalists but also members of the secret service or other 
internal organizations related these events in detail. Perhaps the best example for 
this is the jazz festival in Tallinn of 1967, where American musician Charles 
Lloyd performed with his band while Willis Conover was present (Ritter, 
“Broadcasting”; see Feustle in this volume). After his return to the US, Lloyd 
described his simultaneous feelings of optimism and fear, whereas the key 
Soviet article on the festival praised the birth and international acceptance of a 
genuine Soviet jazz culture. US ambassador William E. Thompson ordered a 
detailed report of the event in order to judge its impact on US jazz persuasion 
strategies, concluding that Lloyd’s and Conover’s presence had been a great 
success for American aims (Thompson). 
But for the Soviets, the Tallinn festival marked a breakpoint. On the one 
hand, the presentation of Soviet jazz was regarded as a success by Soviet cultural 
policy makers; on the other hand, communist party officers realized that with 
this festival they had begun to lose control over the cultural sphere, which they 
could not accept under any circumstances. Estonian organizers had invited Lloyd 
and Conover without being authorized by the Moscow leading party organiza-
tions to do so. As a result, the Estonian organizers of the festival were offended 
by their Moscow colleagues for having acted independently and without their 
permission, as an internal document of communist party control organs stated 
(Materialy). As a result, the organizers of the festival were expelled from their 
positions, and the already planned next edition for the following year could not 
take place. Even if Moscow’s political cultural actors regarded the festival as a 
success for the emerging Soviet jazz scene, they stopped its further development, 
instead aiming for the unconditional control of all jazz events in their country. 
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JAZZ FESTIVAL STRUCTURES IN EASTERN EUROPE:  
A WIN-WIN-SITUATION FOR THE COMMUNITY 
 
After new jazz festivals had been set up in various Eastern Bloc countries since 
1958, they soon became a working place for cultural policy makers from both 
sides (Applegate). Eastern European politicians supported these festivals logisti-
cally and financially because they wanted to demonstrate the modernity and 
openness of their own cultural sphere with regard to current and modern forms 
of music in accordance with the new Soviet jazz strategy. They also had a 
second aim: By fulfilling the wishes of their own national jazz scenes, they 
hoped to prevent them from developing anti-state oriented political actions. As 
jazz seemed to be relatively harmless after the rise of rock, political cultural 
agents in Eastern Bloc countries decided to cope with possible risks. Their 
colleagues from the West were willing to support these festivals, too. By sending 
jazz musicians or ensembles to these events, they intended to create or consoli-
date an America-friendly climate. Both political administrations thus shared an 
interest in continuing this festival structure. 
As a result, a festival organizing mechanism evolved which was supported 
by activists from both sides. The jazz community of a given Eastern Bloc 
country created festival organizing boards that undertook concrete preparations 
for events. For logistic and financial support, the State Socialist governments 
provided help. If the festival board wanted to invite guests from the West, they 
contacted the US government either via US ambassadors in their countries or 
through personal contacts. VOA host Willis Conover played an important role in 
this as he could draw from a large network in Eastern Europe. After the festival, 
both sides celebrated the event as a success of their own strategies. Consequent-
ly, the organization of the following edition of the festival one or two years later 
was an almost logical step.  
The best example for this mechanism is the Warsaw Jazz Jamboree which 
was held annually since 1958 throughout the whole Cold War period, only with 
a short interruption in the time of Polish martial law at the beginning of the 
1980s. Here, the shared allocation of money by Polish and US or Western 
governments resulted in the performances of first-class jazz musicians in War-
saw being all but an exception. Likewise, the Debrecen Jazz Days festival in 
Hungary continued for decades. Other festivals were less long-lasting. The 
Prague Jazz Days, for instance, did not survive the end of the Prague Spring in 
1968. But even in this case festival organization created a network of musicians, 
government employees, and media (especially radio) employees who used the 
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infrastructure of US public diplomacy and the public diplomacy of the Eastern 
Bloc countries for their own purposes. 
 
 
EMERGING TRANSNATIONAL JAZZ SCENES  
IN THE EASTERN BLOC:  
A CONSEQUENCE OF COLD WAR COMPETITION? 
 
As a result of the new jazz policy, the Soviet Union encouraged the rise of a 
indigenized azz scene: jazz ensembles were officially registered, and musicians 
could compose, perform, and submit their compositions to radio stations. In 
addition, the government opened special public venues such as bars or cafes that 
catered to the new jazz scene (Ritter, “Negotiated”). In their efforts to create 
their own jazz culture, both the government and the jazz community referred to 
musical traditions in the Soviet Union. In fact, composers of the 1950s and 
1960s could harken to the works of such early Soviet jazz musicians as Leonid 
Utyosov (Akimov), Aleksandr Tsfasman, or the German-Russian Eddie Rosner 
(Pickhan and Preisler), who were famous in the Soviet Union but almost totally 
unknown outside the Soviet world. Jazz and jazz education were included in 
Soviet institutions of higher musical education, and soon the Soviet jazz scene 
included musicians and composers like Oleg Lundstrem, Vadim Lyudvikovskiy, 
German Luk’yanov, and many others. Additionally, the Soviet government used 
the community to demonstrate the high quality of jazz music in the USSR.  
Similar to the US State department tours, Soviet jazz ensembles had been 
sent on tours abroad since the mid-1960s. First, they toured other State Socialist 
countries, such as the Czech Republic (Prague Jazz Days) or Poland (Warsaw 
Jazz Jamboree). Beginning in the 1970s, they also travelled to the West, as in the 
case of the famous Ganelin-Trio, which performed in the US in 1988 (Ritter, 
“Radio”). The development of local jazz scenes in Eastern Bloc countries was 
supported by the US government as well. For American politicians, the members 
of these scenes were important progenitors of a pro-American orientation and as 
such had great value with regard to their persuasive power.  
One of the most important US-American supporters of Eastern European 
jazz scenes of that time was VOA radio host Willis Conover. His radio show 
earned him such a great reputation in the Eastern Bloc countries that festival 
organizers invited him to their initial festivals at the beginning of the 1960s. 
Conover provided logistical help through the shipping of records, organizational 
help by establishing contacts to American jazz musicians and jazz institutions in 
the US, and personal help by inviting individual musicians with grants to the US, 
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as for instance to the Berklee College of Music, and even sponsoring them. Al-
though Conover continued to declare his engagement as purely private, he could 
not deny that his aims and the aim of US political-cultural agents were the same 
(see Feustle in this volume). 
Perhaps the strongest consolidation of a national jazz scene in a country in 
the Eastern Bloc occurred in Poland (Brodacki). Starting with musicians like 
Krzysztof Komeda (Batura), and later with Zbigniew Namysłowski, Adam 
Makowicz or Tomasz Stańko, to mention only a few, Polish jazz became its own 
brand (Ciesielski). Soon Polish jazz gained a high reputation not only within the 
Eastern Bloc countries but also in the West, especially in the US. Besides being 
highly original, the Polish jazz scene managed to present an image of itself as 
politically independent, if not dissident to the political regime while at the same 
time benefiting from collaboration with the Polish government. Polish musicians 
as well as their Soviet colleagues were honored with medals by their govern-
ments. Adam Makowicz even received a medal of honor from the US. This 
demonstrates that both sides understood the consolidation of local jazz scenes in 
State Socialist countries as a success of their own respective persuasion strate-
gies (Fosler-Lussier, “Music Pushed”; Hatschek). 
 
 
LEARNING FROM EACH OTHER:  
CULTURAL COMPETITION AS INNOVATION TRIGGER  
 
Comparing the internal papers of cultural promotion officers on both sides of the 
Iron Curtain, one finds processes of constant mutual observation and learning 
(Aust and Schönpflug). A good example is the mutual observation of the use of 
jazz in American and Eastern European radio stations. The most famous jazz 
program of the US was Willis Conover’s Music USA-Jazz Hour, which was 
broadcast via shortwave every night throughout the entire Eastern Bloc. Since 
this program had a wide audience, Soviet cultural policy makers attached a 
certain political significance to it. Conover’s program as well as VOA as a whole 
was listened to and criticized not only by ordinary citizens, but by the Soviet 
government. They analyzed these programs in order to adapt their own persua-
sion strategies and their radio programs.  
State-owned publishers issued books and articles in scholarly journals in or-
der to differentiate the ostensibly higher quality of their own broadcasting 
programs from the “harmful” activities of the US (Kurčatov). In reality, howev-
er, they provided detailed analyses of US-broadcasting practices, aiming to adapt 
these methods to their own broadcasts. From the mid-1960s on, the Soviet radio 
Between Propaganda and Public Diplomacy | 107 
station Junost’ launched a jazz program called Radioklub Metronom, for which 
Conover’s show served as a blueprint (Kiseleva). Here, jazz from the Soviet 
Union, from other Eastern Bloc countries, and even from the US was presented 
in order to offer the audience an ersatz to Conover’s program. In the concrete 
example of the observation of Conover’s broadcast, this process of mutual 
observation was continued on the other side of the Iron Curtain. From the 
research department of VOA, Conover obtained copies of these Eastern Bloc 
publications which had concrete mentions of his broadcast so that he could 
respond to any attacks made on his show.1 
 
 
CHALLENGES OF SOVIET PERSUASION STRATEGIES:  
AMBIVALENT CONTACTS TO THE WEST 
 
The crucial idea for cultural policy makers in all Eastern Bloc countries was the 
strong effort to maintain control over all phenomena of cultural life at any time. 
This was not only a consequence of the basic positions in the role of culture in 
Marxist-Leninist ideology, but also a question of concretely maintaining political 
power. In their attempt to implement persuasion strategies with jazz, however, 
this idea limited State Socialist options.  
As a consequence, any attempts to open Soviet and State Socialist cultural 
life towards forms of culture coming from abroad automatically entailed an 
ideological threat (Gould-Davies). Tensions occurred between promoters of 
cultural opening, on the one hand, and defenders of state control, on the other. 
The history of jazz in the Eastern Bloc is therefore a history of rapid changes 
between acceptance and restriction of that music with sharp and abrupt changes 
of diametrically opposed positions, often within short periods of time, without 
the option of a clear long-term perspective. In many cases, the personal sympa-
thy or antipathy of an individual state politician decided the policy regarding 
jazz in any given town and even throughout the entire country. In contrast to the 
German NS regime with its openly racist approach to jazz, State Socialist 
countries never officially prohibited jazz. Even under Stalinism, when jazz was 
excluded from the public sphere and heavily restricted, no formal act of prohibi-
tion was made.  
                                                           
1  See copies of Jurij A Lukin’s papers in the Willis Conover Collection (WCC) at the 
University of North Texas. Conover’s assistant Efim Druker marked sentences related 
to VOA and Conover’s broadcast. 
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The more the cultural policy makers in any Eastern European Bloc country 
followed an ideology and believed in the need for strict control, the more their 
interpretation of a persuasion strategy with jazz caused problems for them. 
Among the Eastern Bloc countries, great differences in practical realization 
occurred. While states like Poland or Hungary allowed their own jazz musicians 
access to some tours in restricted ways in the West, for Soviet political-cultural 
actors even a tour of a Soviet jazz ensemble into other State Socialist countries 
proved to be a problem. For instance, when a Soviet jazz band performed at the 
Prague Jazz Days in 1965, they were accompanied not only by high-ranking 
cultural policy makers like the president of the Composers Union, but also by 
secret service agents (Ritter, “Broadcasting”). This strong fear of foreign influ-
ence also explains why State Socialist political-cultural actors accepted tours of 
Western jazz ensembles. For them, this was the smaller evil: it was better to have 
US jazz musicians touring around the Eastern Bloc than to allow their own 
people to travel abroad. In the former, control over the public was possible; in 
the latter, it was not. During the existence of the Soviet Union and the Eastern 
Bloc, this strong idea of control limited the general options of Soviet and State 
Socialist persuasion strategies with jazz.  
 
 
CHALLENGES OF US PERSUASION STRATEGIES: 
JAZZ AND RACE 
 
A constant problem of the US administration with their implementation of 
persuasion strategies with jazz was the need to deal with discrimination against 
African American citizens confronted by the Civil Rights Movement. US 
officials as well as their ideological enemies in the East knew perfectly well that 
racial inequality in the US was one of the main problems in propagating jazz as a 
model for American values and democracy (Davenport, “Jazz and the Cold 
War”; Dudziak; Eschen). Therefore, an important question was how to cope with 
this inevitable issue. Speaking of jazz automatically meant that racial inequalities 
had to be brought up, which could disturb the proper image of America as a 
country of personal freedom and equal rights. Documents from US administra-
tions suggest a sharp contradiction between the restricted awareness of racial 
inequality in the state apparatus, on the one hand, and the fabrication of an 
overwhelmingly positive image for the world on the other (Racial Issues). 
Conover himself, who had actively fought for desegregation in Washington after 
World War II (and who was offended by a branch of the Civil Rights Movement 
calling themselves Black nationalists) (Kofsky, my emphasis), did not speak on 
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this issue in his broadcasts. If, in any case, racial inequality was spoken of in 
official media, it was amplified by the Civil Rights Movement, and was thus 
framed as a soon-to-be cured symptom in an overall democratic system. 
Jazz fans in Eastern Bloc countries had an entirely different approach to this 
issue than their US-American colleagues. Among fan cultures in the East, 
American jazz musicians were usually highly valued, and this value tended to be 
even higher if the musicians were black. In his book Black Music, White Free-
dom, which was first published unofficially in the Soviet samizdat in 1977, the 
Russian writer Efim Barban connected this idea to the Négritude Movement, 
thus giving it a theoretical conception (Barban). As jazz was considered an 
Afrodiasporic musical tradition, fan cultures in the Eastern Bloc projected onto 
black musicians the highest degree of authenticity and originality. The State 
Socialist government tried to benefit from this preference for black musicians. 
They installed their own ideological narrative as the real defenders of human 
values exemplified by their treatment of black people who could, according to 
them, live in peace only in Socialist countries, whereas they were oppressed and 
persecuted in the capitalist West. Soviet officials supported this argument by 
pointing to African American intellectuals and musicians who had embraced 
socialism such as W.E.B. Du Bois and Paul Robeson (Baldwin).  
This official façade of interracial friendship and comradeship, however, ob-
scured a variety of racist stereotypes and prejudices. Poland is a particularly 
telling example: positive opinions towards black people were found most of all 
in the small jazz community whereas resentments against them were widespread 
in other parts of society (Antoszek; Ząbek). For instance, so-called guest workers 
from sub-Saharan African countries experienced the silent but powerful every-
day racism that existed under Socialism (Moskalewicz; Fereira). Racial discrim-
ination in the Soviet Union was spoken of in no single way during the entire 
Socialist period, nor was it addressed in the oppositional movements in Socialist 
countries. Thus, US officials did not speak about race because of the existing 
inequalities in American society, while USSR officials stressed this point in 





Both the US and State Socialist countries used jazz as a persuasion strategy in 
the Eastern Bloc for their ideological purposes. Yet, the basic conditions of its 
implementation by US actors differed with regard to the Eastern Bloc countries. 
This resulted in consequences for the argumentation on both sides. Especially at 
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the beginning of the Cold War, jazz was perceived as American music not only 
in the US, but also in Europe, if not in the whole world. Even after the consolida-
tion of national jazz scenes in Eastern Europe, this perception remained. This 
meant that US political-cultural agents could spread their own music, albeit 
sometimes a bit naïvely, and their State Socialist counterparts had to accept it. In 
the words of Fosler-Lussier, jazz was the “music pushed” from the point of view 
of the US whereas it was “music pulled” from the view of the East (“Music 
Pushed”). The crucial problem of State Socialist cultural-political actors was that 
they were forced to use a “foreign” music as a means to persuade their own 
population of the supremacy of their own cultural and ideological model which, 
according to Marxist-Leninist ideology, per definition could not be the case. It 
was a demanding task to bring ideology and reality together, which proved to be 
a constant problem for State Socialism.  
The US administration had a similar inconsistency problem with their ideol-
ogy of democracy and freedom as they promoted Afrodiasporic popular music at 
a time when the question of racial equality remained unsolved. Even if these 
ideological inconsistencies could not be hidden totally from the public, the US 
government’s use of jazz as a crucial persuasion strategy in Eastern Europe 
worked out because Eastern Europeans knew little about segregation while the 
attraction of jazz music performed by black artists was extraordinarily high.  
Looking at the implementation of persuasion strategies with regard to jazz 
itself, we clearly see parallels. After the failure of their initial actions during the 
1950s, both counterparts explored differentiated models, but we find similarities 
in the institutional implementation of persuasion strategies. Both sides organized 
or reused think tanks to develop concrete measures. Radio was used by both 
sides as an important means for jazz transmissions. Tours by key musicians were 
regarded as important political endeavors which had to be organized and fi-
nanced by the state. Thus, government-sponsored initiatives gave the jazz 
community a variety of options which, without the Cold War, might not have 
existed. It is telling that most of the Eastern European jazz festivals, having been 
so powerful over a number of decades, came into serious financial problems 
after the Cold War. Thus, jazz milieus benefited from this cultural competition. 
In a way, the Cold War did not so much disturb jazz’s development but rather 
proved to be an important stimulus. In this sense, the Cold War created its own 
cultural model, making the situation of constant threat in certain ways productive 
for musical developments (Gienow-Hecht, “Cold War Culture”; Langenkamp). 
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The events of the 1967 Tallinn Jazz Festival were the culmination of years of 
American public diplomacy through jazz, the longest and most sustained exam-
ple of which was Willis Conover’s radio program Music USA on the Voice of 
America (VOA). Music USA began at the end of 1954 as one hour of light 
popular music, followed by an hour of jazz. Both hours were later shortened to 
45 minutes of music with news breaks interspersed, but Conover’s regular 
announcement that it was “time for jazz” in the second hour became a fixture in 
the lives of fans and musicians around the world. In the nations of the Warsaw 
Pact, the program was a reliable source of the latest developments in jazz amid 
limited access to Western commercial recordings. While the program started on 
a provisional basis with uncertain plans for the future, Conover’s commitment to 
quality, his personal network with major jazz musicians, and his prior experience 
as a leading jazz broadcaster in Washington DC increased the odds of success in 
public diplomacy using jazz, even as jazz and politics sometimes mixed like oil 
and water. 
Conover’s own words and actions paint a picture of a man who loved jazz 
and wanted to share it, boundaries notwithstanding. As he had earlier assisted in 
the racial integration of the Washington DC club scene during the late 1940s 
(Conover, CD 1, Track 2), he showed a lifelong disdain for arbitrary conditions 
that separated people with a common passion for music, whether it be the color 
of one’s skin or geopolitical situations. This decision was at once principled and 
pragmatic, from the earliest days of his career, through his years at the VOA, and 
through struggles over his participation with the National Endowment for the 
Arts and the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts (Breckenridge 
124). Conover recognized that he existed in a lifelong catch-22 situation, be-
cause the perception of his actions depended upon the politics behind the eye of 
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the beholder, whether on Capitol Hill, in Moscow, or in the office politics of the 
VOA. If he talked about politics, there would be trouble. If he did not talk about 
politics, there would be trouble. Through a political lens, his every word and act 
could be taken with the assumption of bad faith, so it made sense to keep the 
focus on the music, when music was his purpose in the first place. 
Conover’s via media proved effective, both for his continued employment, 
and for the success of jazz in the musical diplomacy of the VOA. This chapter 
will present the Charles Lloyd Quartet’s performance at the 1967 Tallinn Jazz 
Festival, which broke the “stagecraft” of prior jazz diplomacy with the Soviet 
Union, and proceeded despite numerous official attempts to derail it, as a case 
study in the effectiveness of Conover’s approach over the twelve years since his 
VOA program began in 1955. 
 
 
CONOVER’S BACKGROUND AND JAZZ MUSIC 
AS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY  
 
Before Music USA began, several precedents worked in favor of jazz as an 
instrument of diplomacy. First, jazz already had a small, but dedicated audience 
in Central and Eastern Europe before the onset of the Cold War and even before 
and during World War II. Even in the Soviet Union itself, critic S. Frederick 
Starr describes a “Red Jazz Age” between 1932 and 1936 in which jazz especial-
ly flourished (107-10). The New York Times noted that “Each of the big hotels in 
Moscow has its own jazz band and dancing floor … [Many] Russians go there, 
especially on ‘Red Saturday,’ the night before their free day. Foreigners on these 
nights are decidedly in the minority … Jazz is staging a remarkable comeback in 
Soviet Russia after years of virtual prohibition” (qtd. in Starr 110-11). One 
American diplomat who was there to witness the popularity of jazz was Charles 
Bohlen, who later proposed what eventually became Willis Conover’s Music 
USA (Starr 109-10). 
While not officially banned, jazz was conditionally tolerated in the Soviet 
orbit insofar as it could be leveraged ideologically. Anthropologist Alexei 
Yurchak explains that  
 
[C]ultural forms at times could be considered proletarian and at other times bourgeois, 
[and] they were not necessarily defined by class … therefore, if jazz was clearly an 
example of bourgeois culture in some contexts, it did not have to be so in all contexts. 
This is why jazz was criticized but also tolerated. (166-67) 
 
“Liberated from Serfdom” | 119 
However, as Starr notes, the period of toleration that began in 1932 ended by 
1936 amid other political developments in the USSR (163). Nevertheless, when 
the United States government decided to use jazz in public diplomacy, it did so 
out of a desire to continue cultivating an existing point of cultural contact.  
Secondly, while Conover’s Music USA was the most famous example of jazz 
in American diplomacy, it was neither VOA’s nor Conover’s first attempt. A 
Washington Post profile of Conover notes in 1951 that the radio host produced 
jazz programs for the VOA several years before the beginning of Music USA 
(Stein “Jockey” B11). One such example from 1949 survives on a broadcast 
transcription disc in the Willis Conover Collection (WCC) at the University of 
North Texas. Titled American Jazz, the program features Conover discussing 
and playing the music of Duke Ellington in English, with a parallel translation in 
Swedish following Conover’s spoken segments (Conover, “American Jazz #1”). 
The US National Archives chronicle other jazz programs which came and 
went in the early 1950s. An early success came with Leonard Feather’s Jazz 
Club USA, which ran from 1950 through 1952. The content of Feather’s pro-
grams focused mainly on traditional and swing jazz, though a few programs also 
focused on more progressive sounds from Stan Kenton and Woody Herman, and 
Charlie Parker and Bud Powell do appear in the playlist. Still, the program 
summaries notably show a lack of emphasis on bebop, which was the most 
transformative force in modern jazz at the time. In addition, Feather’s programs, 
and indeed Conover’s American Jazz, contained no overt political content, which 
set a precedent for Music USA. Thus, Bohlen’s proposed jazz program built on 
existing precursors in American public diplomacy for instrumentalizing jazz as a 
tool for public diplomacy. Bohlen knew there was a pre-existing audience in the 
USSR, where he understood jazz to be undergoing a renaissance after the death 
of Stalin. 
Therefore, the Voice of America set about looking for a broadcaster. Their 
first choice was not Willis Conover, but a congenial sportscaster named Ray 
Michael. He was a competent broadcaster who went on to have a successful 
career in the region, but his specialty was not jazz. The long-term product of 
Michael’s broadcast was likely to be serviceable, but unremarkable. Or, as 
Conover put it, “My feeling was, since I am not an expert in sports, that I would 
do a sports program about as well as he would do a jazz program, since my 
interest was not in sports and his was not in jazz” (qtd. by Groce 3). 
However, Willis Conover had found out by chance that the VOA was look-
ing for a jazz broadcaster at a point in his career where he would welcome a 
change. He had recently lost $12,000 (over $100,000 in the present day) through 
an unsuccessful concert promotion. Worse yet, his contract at WWDC radio was 
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not renewed after he lost his sponsor, Ballantine Ale. Conover’s correspondence 
in 1954 hints at his dissatisfaction with the commercialism of WEAM radio and 
his struggles to play music he believed worthy of airplay. But WEAM was good 
for one development: It was there that he heard that the VOA had a program in 
need of a host (Conover, CD 1, Track 3). 
Conover’s career in the preceding 16 years had prepared him well for the po-
sition at the Voice of America. In 1939, Conover left college after one year at 
Salisbury State Teachers College in Maryland to work as an announcer at 
WTBO radio station in Western Maryland after winning an announcer’s contest. 
It was during his time at WTBO that he discovered jazz via Charlie Barnet’s 
recording of Billy May’s arrangement of “Cherokee,” and Billy May’s arranging 
style led him to discover Duke Ellington (Conover, CD 1, Track 1). Conover 
was drafted in September of 1942, and served until February of 1946. His 
experience interviewing people on radio helped secure him a position as a 
classification specialist at Fort Meade in Maryland, keeping him close to Wash-
ington DC. 
Conover’s career in the capital city began when he saw an opportunity at the 
Stage Door Canteen in Washington, during a party where the selected music was 
not holding the crowd’s interest. Selecting a better set of music, Conover caught 
the attention of the wife of a local broadcaster at WWDC (Conover, CD 1, Track 
3). From there, Conover worked weekends at WWDC when on leave from the 
Army base, and hit the ground running as a full-time employee at WWDC when 
he completed his military service (Stein, “That Fatal” S8). In short order, 
Conover was interviewing major artists such as Duke Ellington, Peggy Lee, Stan 
Kenton, and others, building a network of contacts he later drew upon in arrang-
ing interviews for his VOA broadcast. Most of the guests he interviewed for the 
Voice of America were musicians he had interviewed or otherwise crossed paths 
with as a broadcaster or concert promoter, including Ellington, Lee, Kenton, 
Billie Holiday, Louis Armstrong, Billy Taylor, and Dizzy Gillespie (Feustle). 
Conover’s personal network and encyclopedic knowledge of jazz were 
unique assets he could offer the VOA, and which consequently set the show 
apart. His was not a mere token jazz program from the VOA, but one as good as 
any that one might hear on American radio. While musicians rightfully receive 
much of the attention as proof of Conover’s impact, listening is not a passive act 
that leaves the hearer unaffected. In proposing the term “musicking,” musicolo-
gist Christopher Small observed that listeners are intentional participants in the 
making of music. Indeed, they are participants in “musicking,” either listening to 
a live ensemble or a recorded broadcast (Small). As Paddy Scannell notes, the 
success or failure of a program depends greatly on how it engages listeners as 
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participants, not as passive targets. Due to the immediacy of the human voice 
and its unique tone color in every individual, radio can be an intensely personal 
medium if used intentionally and sincerely. Scannell used as his main example 
Kate Smith’s success in raising millions of dollars in War Bonds over the radio. 
Smith’s sincerity made the message personal, and listeners were moved to 
contribute (Scannell). 
The features identified by Small and Scannell resonate well with Conover’s 
approach years earlier. Through his spoken word style, and in his approach to 
programming music, Conover engaged listeners as participants. In addition to 
the resonant, baritone timbre of his voice, Conover took care to remain intelligi-
ble amid linguistic and technological barriers. He spoke slowly and simply for 
the benefit of speakers of English as a second or third language. Conover’s 
approach likely held the listeners’ attention amid static and other interference on 
shortwave radio bands. 
Musically, Conover also took particular care to include a balance of what he 
called “traditional, middle, and contemporary” jazz in planning the Jazz Hour, so 
that the program itself had a balanced presentation of jazz styles. In browsing 
Conover’s early playlists, one may accordingly find “T, M, and C” in the mar-
gins as he ensured that all were represented (WCC, Series 1, Sub-Series 1, Box 
1). Such attention to detail was in response to the polarization of jazz audiences 
in the 1940s between traditionalism and modernism, concurrent with the revival 
of early New Orleans jazz styles and the advent of bebop. A dedicated disciple 
of Duke Ellington (Stein, “The Jockey’s” B11), whose music spanned the 1920s 
onward, Conover was more disposed to see jazz from a perspective of continuity 
than rupture. As one who made his living broadcasting jazz, he also had an 
interest in not being pigeonholed as an advocate of any one subgenre to the 
exclusion of another. Conover also took care to craft a program with a holistic 
sense of progression to a climactic point, demonstrating that the broadcaster’s 
curation of the program was an essential aspect of a quality program (CD 1, 
Track 3).  
Regardless of other circumstances, the greatest chance Music USA had for 
success was that it was done well, and Conover was able to ensure that. At Music 
USA’s inception, no one could have imagined that it would continue for 41 years 
to outlive the Soviet Union. Nor could anyone be sure what “success” would 
look like. Conover’s initial contract was for 80 programs—a number someone 
decided would be sufficient for the VOA to see how the show was received so 
VOA could cut its losses if the show were unsuccessful (WCC, Series 3, Sub-
Series 1, Box 7). Initially, Conover’s programs were broadcast on the weekend 
while Ray Michael had the weekdays, but by the middle of 1955, the roles had 
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reversed and Conover was the lead host. Different weekend hosts continued 
through 1961. 
In addition to his handling of the music and spoken portions of the program, 
Conover had a further asset in his independence as a contractor. The number of 
programs per contract and the amount of compensation changed, but Conover 
remained an independent contractor with the Voice of America for the rest of his 
life. That relationship arose from the initial wait-and-see approach to the pro-
gram: the VOA position started out as a side job for Conover, who continued to 
toil at WEAM for most of 1955. At the outset, Music USA had no indication of 
becoming the lifelong vocation it ultimately became. Though Conover was in his 
mid-30s when Music USA began, he decided for years to come that the benefits 
of being a contractor outweighed the obligations and liabilities of being a full-
time employee of the US government. He was entirely in control of his time and 
pursuits, without concern for dual employment issues, and continued to pursue 
numerous other non-VOA projects throughout his career. Those projects, which 
survive in Conover’s personal archive at the University of North Texas, included 
concert promotion, writing for newspapers and magazines, preparing liner notes, 
hosting concerts and television shows, narrating films, and working for other 
broadcasters, as he did in the early 1960s at WCBS, the flagship station of the 
Columbia Broadcasting System in New York City. Recording schedules show 
that Conover generally pre-recorded several programs in a span of one or two 
days at the VOA, leaving the rest of his time free to commute between Washing-
ton DC and his residence in New York City (WCC). 
More importantly, remaining a contractor gave Conover maximum control 
over the content and nature of his programs for the Voice of America. Sacrific-
ing a federal employee pension, and government-provided health care, Conover 
protected the integrity of his program. It was his program, and he could walk 
away with it. His independence provided a degree of separation from govern-
mental involvement. As the dialogue at the end of this chapter demonstrates, he 
could always maintain that Music USA was not Uncle Sam telling people what to 
listen to and what to think about it, but, as with Leonard Feather’s Jazz Club 
USA, it was an actual jazz expert brought in specifically to run a music broadcast 
as he saw fit. 
With Conover’s quality, independence, and sincere enthusiasm, Music USA 
gained improbable momentum. The program was initially aimed at the Soviet 
Union and its satellite nations, but radio waves do not stop at national borders. 
Rather, they travel impressive and surprising distances after dark, depending on 
atmospheric conditions. Therefore, early positive responses via listener mail 
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came from Yugoslavia and Poland, Denmark, Norway, Trinidad, Guatemala, 
India, and Australia (WCC, Series 3, Sub-Series 1, Box 7). 
A memo from the VOA’s John Wiggin to both Conover and Ray Michael in 
early 1956 instructs: 
 
Please plug on every program for two weeks that: Music USA is getting a lot of mail. We 
are very pleased with these letters and we will try to answer any questions on the program 
without identifying the sender. (WCC, Series 3, Sub-Series 1, Box 7) 
 
Consequently, by the spring of 1956, Music USA was expanded to worldwide 
coverage (“Voice’s Jazz Program” 1). Signs of success continued in the Warsaw 
Pact nations as well. In 1956, Ernest Nagy, the General Consul of the United 
States Embassy in Budapest recognized the difficulties jazz musicians faced in 
Hungary and rented the Hungarian Record Company’s studio for a recording 
session of a group of Hungarian jazz musicians. According to the Embassy: 
 
At the time the Communist government had banned jazz. It could only be heard by 
secretly listening to the Voice of America’s Jazz Hour program hosted by Mr. Willis 
Conover. Two employees of the Embassy smuggled the record to Mr. Conover … This 
recording of that ‘Jazz From Hungary’ program is one of the remaining links to Hungary’s 
underground jazz scene of the 1950s. (Revolutionary Jazz) 
 
Such a response points to the importance of Conover in particular, and not just 
any broadcaster, as an authoritative source of jazz, and it speaks to the personal 
connection Conover had made with his listeners. 
The University of North Texas Music Library holds the only currently 
known complete recording (Conover, “Hungarian Jazz Guests”). The program’s 
introductory material and playlist show that it was hurried into production after 
the violent suppression of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. In a rare acknowl-
edgement of political circumstances, Conover presented it as a symbol of soli-
darity with the anti-Soviet “freedom fighters” of Hungary. At the time, it was 
unknown how the musicians had fared after the uprising, i.e. if they were alive, 
imprisoned, or in hiding. It only emerged in late 2016 that they had been able to 
hear themselves on VOA and regarded it as a great achievement (Gorondi). 
Still, just two years later, relations between the US and the Soviet Union had 
improved to a point that the two nations signed a cultural exchange agreement in 
1958, paving the way for a sponsored tour of the Soviet Union by Benny Good-
man in 1962 and numerous other events. When this window of opportunity 
opened, Conover and the Voice of America were not only ready to cover the 
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events, but they had helped prepare the ground by continuously cultivating 
audiences for jazz wherever the broadcasts were accessible. While some were 
casual fans, others developed a lifelong passion. Danielle Fosler-Lussier ob-
serves that “[t]he existence of these expert fans was likely due to another US 
propaganda effort: the broadcasting of American music on Voice of America 
radio, especially Willis Conover’s Music USA” (87-88). 
Crucially, however, Music USA did not facilitate a one-way conversation, but 
rather a two-way exchange. Beginning with his visit to Poland in 1959, Conover 
began broadcasting large segments of live jazz performances by overseas bands 
(“Recording Schedule”, 1962-1973). This decision served to encourage the 
musicians, expose their work to a global audience wherever the VOA’s signals 
reached, and demonstrate with evidence that a successful cultural exchange was 
taking place. From the series of Music USA broadcasts in Poland in 1959, highly 
skilled musicians were taking what they heard on Conover’s program and 
making new music with it, participating in an exchange of jazz made increasing-
ly global by Conover’s propagation of international jazz artists on his program.  
As jazz festivals such as Poland’s Jazz Jamborees and the Prague Jazz Festi-
val proliferated in Eastern Europe, Conover broadcast excerpts on his program, 
and reported back to American audiences on the festivals in magazines like 
Down Beat. He continued to devote multiple programs to events including the 
Warsaw Jazz Festivals of 1965 and 1966, Prague Jazz Festivals of 1965-1967, 
and the Bled, Yugoslavia, Barcelona, and Moscow jazz festivals of 1966 (“Re-
cording Schedule”, 1962-1973). 
 
 
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AT THE TALLINN JAZZ FESTIVAL 
 
In 1967, Conover accompanied the Charles Lloyd Quartet1 in their travels to the 
Soviet Union (Yurchak 181). According to Down Beat magazine, the Tallinn 
Jazz Festival was also the first time “live modern American jazz”—that is, post-
bop jazz—had come to the Soviet Union through the inclusion of the quartet. 
From the outset, the quartet’s invitation to the Soviet Union was fraught with 
uncertainty. A letter from Alexei Batashev to Conover dated 25 February 1967 
shows that Lloyd was under consideration as a performer several months in 
advance, belying the impression that authorities’ figuring out what to do with 
him was an ad hoc affair (WCC, Series 3, Sub-Series 1, Box 9b). Rather, the 
                                                           
1  Charles Lloyd (sax), Keith Jarrett (p), Ron McClure (b), and Jack DeJohnette (d) 
(Gitler 15). 
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officially-unofficial nature of Lloyd’s trip had the practical effect of maintaining 
authorities’ leverage in the transaction by keeping every decision conditional and 
subject to change. 
Lloyd was technically welcome to attend as a tourist. It was a proverbial foot 
in the door, and a first step toward possibly being able to play. When Lloyd’s 
manager, George Avakian, was told ten days before the departure date that no 
foreigners would be allowed to perform, he was ready to call off the trip. Then, 
they received official confirmation that they would be welcome, presumably as 
performers. An unnamed Soviet diplomat in New York claimed to Avakian that 
the group would not be welcome, and that the Soviet people “don’t really like 
American jazz,” but they received their visas and traveled anyway (Gitler 15). 
Upon landing in Estonia, the group continued to experience what Ira Gitler 
called an “on again, off again routine, replete with bureaucratic excuses, and 
cries of scheduling difficulties” (15). Lloyd was asked to do a clinic or work-
shop, but insisted that he be allowed to play for people. The group was requested 
to do a TV show, but in an empty studio. On 12 May, the group was pulled off 
the program five minutes before they were scheduled to perform. While the 
official news organ Izvestia had announced the performance, the KGB prevailed, 
forcing organizers to reassert that Lloyd’s group was to be there strictly as 
spectators (Starr 287), suddenly claiming they had “no official sanction” to let 
the group perform. Avakian was told that an eleven-man committee had called 
off the concert (Gitler 15). In a subsequent oral history, George Avakian adds 
that Willis Conover himself interceded to help make the performance happen 
(Avakian, Side F, Track 2). 
Finally, on 14 May, the group performed and received an eight-minute and 
twenty-second ovation—from people who allegedly did not really like American 
jazz—to the horror of festival officials who admonished, “We are not children. 
Please sit down!” (Gitler 15). This loss of control had consequences. The festi-
val’s chief organizer, Heinrich Schultz (misspelled as “Henry Shults” in the 
cover notes to the album Charles Lloyd in the Soviet Union), saw his career 
grind to a sudden halt when he was removed from his position (Vermenich). Jazz 
writer William Minor notes that the festival was “a mark of Estonia’s independ-
ence that they could hold such an event without official approval, but as a result, 
many of the city leaders were sacked, and [as of 1995] such a festival never 
occurred there again” (109). 
Despite the consequences for the local leadership, the 1967 Tallinn Jazz Fes-
tival had achieved a lasting effect through the inclusion of what was then cut-
ting-edge jazz to a live audience in spite of the authorities who tried in various 
ways to derail the Charles Lloyd Quartet’s performance. Down Beat quoted 
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Avakian: “I had a strong sense of history. My feeling was involved with the 
young people of the audience. This was the music the young people wanted, not 
just a tour arranged by officials. My biggest hope is that we’ve opened a door 
that will stay open” (Gitler 15).  
Avakian was not alone in this assessment. One may assess the Tallinn festi-
val as a turning point for the musicians because they said so themselves: Fellow 
Soviet saxophonist Boris Ludmer went so far as to say that “[t]he Tallinn Festi-
val liberated us [the musicians] from serfdom. We played one hundred percent 
differently after Tallinn” (Starr 286). It is not insignificant that the musicians 
saw the event as being so momentous: They were the most obvious and public 
participants in the music, and would feel the most impact of the negative recep-
tion of their music. Moreover, the reference to liberation from serfdom points to 
more than aesthetic liberation, but a social and psychological change. 
 
 
TALLINN’S IMPACT IN THE EAST AND THE WEST 
 
S. Frederick Starr elaborates on the turning point that Tallinn represented, noting 
that a full exchange of jazz culture with the Soviet Union had been lacking thus 
far: Official trips by Benny Goodman and Earl Hines were very isolated occa-
sions, happening four years apart (1962 and 1966). There was also a disconnec-
tion between the USSR and other Warsaw Pact nations with American and 
European artists going quite freely to jazz festivals in Eastern and Central 
Europe, but only a few European artists going to the USSR. Therefore, with the 
Charles Lloyd Quartet, “the possibility of achieving in Tallinn what had not been 
accomplished through the official cultural exchanges was most appealing” (286). 
Since this exchange was not driven by governments, but by jazz musicians and 
fans, a milestone in cultural exchange occurred as the connection between 
musicians and listeners had taken on a momentum of its own. Through its 
persistence, the Charles Lloyd Quartet had broken the stagecraft of prior jazz 
diplomacy described by Starr, in which jazz was carefully managed for social 
acceptability and older forms of jazz, such as that of Benny Goodman, were 
favored. 
Years of Conover’s music-first approach made this breakthrough possible. 
He had said on numerous occasions that he did regard jazz as a microcosm of 
American society, and regarded it as an ideal cultural medium for that reason; to 
him, it spoke louder than words. He made similar statements over the years that 
were variations on a theme; in 1958, he told High-Fidelity magazine: 
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Jazz . . . is a reflection of our national life. Americans can’t see that fact: we’re too close 
to it. To me, and I think to most people, democracy is a pattern of laws and customs by 
which we agree voluntarily to abide: within this fixed and clearly defined framework we 
have freedom. . . . People in other countries, in other political situations, detect this 
element of freedom in jazz. (Randal 88) 
 
Similarly, he told Time in late 1966: “Jazz tells more about America than any 
American can realize. It bespeaks vitality, strength, social mobility; it’s a free 
music with its own discipline, but not an imposed, inhibiting discipline” (“Na-
tion: Swinging Voice”). Still, Conover always strove to compartmentalize 
politics, writ large, from his work. In addition to excluding overt political 
content from his programs, he remained secretive about his political leanings, 
working equally well with the Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations. 
In a 1994 oral history with Billy Taylor, the interviewer, by noting Conover’s 
precarious health and lack of coverage, tried to goad Conover into discussing the 
political battle over healthcare as it was being debated during Bill Clinton’s first 
administration. Conover stopped Taylor outright, saying, “Dr. Taylor, never 
discuss politics or religion” (CD 2, Track 8).  
Of course, Conover’s via media also met resistance. To paraphrase author 
Allen Furst (himself paraphrasing Trotsky), “you may not be interested in 
politics, but politics are interested in you” (“Leon Trotzky”). In a discussion with 
a Soviet gentleman he refers to as “V”, Conover’s desire to avoid politics was 
accordingly challenged on his trip to Tallinn, which aptly summarizes the 
intersection of Cold War politics and jazz (WCC, Series 3, Sub-Series 1, Box 
15). In the same interview, Conover explained why he was in Tallinn: “To see 
the Soviet people I met in Prague again, and to listen to your music, and to write 
friendly words about your musicians whenever I can honestly do so.” V brought 
up Vietnam as a stumbling block between American and Soviet relations. In this 
private exchange, Conover was frank: “Well, if your government would take 
steps to solve its end of Vietnam, our government’s end would automatically go 
away.” He later added: “Anyway, I don’t want to talk about Vietnam. It’s not 
that I can’t talk about it, but I didn’t come here for that reason.” An extended 
portion from the interview is particularly revealing: 
 
V.: “Why did you come here?” 
Conover: “I told you. To say hello and listen to your music. You think I’m here for 
political reasons?” 
V.: “Everything is political.” 
Conover: “Do you think I’m here for political reasons?” 
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V.: “Everything is politics.” 
Conover: “What do you mean? Are you saying that when Soviet dance troupes and 
concert pianists come to America, they’ve been sent by Russia for political reasons?” 
V.: “Everything is politics.” 
Conover: “Then you believe that I’ve been sent here for politics.” 
V.: “I believe you are here for the reasons you say, but I still say that in effect your 
presence is political.”  
He later adds: “the fact that your music program is broadcast on the Voice of America 
makes it a political program.” 
Conover: “Would you be happier if I quit broadcasting Music USA?” 
V. “No, but if only you were not broadcasting it on the Voice of America.” 
Conover (sarcastically): “Where do you want to hear it, on Radio Free Europe?” 
Conover: “Seriously, what would you rather I did? I’m doing a pure music show. There 
isn’t a political word in it. What can I do to make it ‘less political’ for you? The Voice of 
America decided to do a jazz program 13 years ago, partly because they knew there were 
people in other countries who would like to hear jazz and partly because jazz began as an 
American music and so the Voice of America should broadcast jazz to show something of 
what our people do. Because I was in domestic radio and because jazz was my hobby, I 
wound up doing a jazz radio program for the Voice of America.” … “What should I say to 
them: ‘No, I won’t do a music program because somebody in Russia would think it’s 
political?” (WCC, Series 3, Sub-series 1, Box 15) 
 
It is unclear if V. is serious or needling Conover for a reaction, as V. goes on to 
maintain that Conover surely could have broadcast jazz on Radio Moscow 
thirteen years prior, but only for a month.  
Nevertheless, Conover made a valid point: He was subject to criticism and 
scrutiny no matter what he did, but it was not about to stop him from doing the 
radio program he wanted to do. In the same archival box as Conover’s tran-
scribed dialogue with “V,” there is another scrap of writing—one of many on 
which he jotted down random thoughts and observations as he found the words 
to express them. It is a generalized summary of his reaction to the personal and 
professional costs of persevering in what he believed to be the right course of 
action: Even if he did not “win” in attaining the approval of others and any 
esteem or material benefit that might follow, he remained true to himself. It is 
fitting in light of the foregoing dialogue with “V.”: 
 
You can’t win their way. 
You can’t win negatively: doing what won’t offend them. 
That way, you can’t win. 
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So, do it the best of your way: 
You may not win your way, 
But you may win … Anyway, your way you have a 50/50 chance of winning; their way, 
you can’t win. Do it your way, wholeheartedly. (WCC, Series 3, sub-series 1, Box 15) 
 
Conover indeed did it his way, wholeheartedly, and it was his approach, his 
authority as a jazz broadcaster, and even his own intercession in Tallinn (Avaki-
an, Side F, Track 2) that set the stage for the Charles Lloyd Quartet’s ground-
breaking performance at the Tallinn Jazz Festival of 1967. The festival thus 
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A Musical Inquisition? 
Soviet ‘Deputies’ of Musical Entertainment in Hungary 




At the beginning of 1948, the Soviet government began to intervene in the 
internal affairs of musical life in the Soviet Union. The major party ideologist 
Andrei Zhdanov outlined the new aesthetic principles in two speeches during the 
convention of Soviet musical experts in the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in which he incited his audience to 
struggle against formalism and cosmopolitanism. When on 10 February 1948, 
his words became party decree (Zhdanov), the process of creating socialist 
realist aesthetics of music, based on the idea that musical aesthetics had to 
correspond to communist values defined by the CPSU, appeared to be accom-
plished. From then on, Zhdanov’s speeches (and the decree in the wake of them) 
were looked upon as unquestionable measures for every kind of music in the 
Soviet Union and the rapidly Sovietized satellite states in Eastern Europe. 
Especially from 1949 on, the Soviet policy of adopting socialist realist aesthetics 
was also emulated in Hungary. The local communist government identified this 
policy as the only model for Hungarian musical politics and ideology. It can 
already be documented, however, that nobody gave exact orders or analyzed in 
what manner this model should properly be followed. In my chapter I argue that 
the so-called musical revolution and the transformation of musical life according 
to Zhdanovian socialist realist principles was a rather arbitrary and improvised 
initiative, in which Hungarian policy makers and musical experts often used the 
Soviet ideas and prescriptions only as pretexts for Sovietizing the music scene 
according to their own personal plans.  
In fact, local experts and musicians tended to have only a superficial 
knowledge of musical socialist realism and Soviet music due to language diffi-
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culties, especially the genres of the so-called bitovaya muzyka (everyday or 
popular music).1 The intentions of Soviet musical advisors and guests, who 
visited Hungary, were primarily to hammer into Hungarian heads the basic 
Zhdanovian demands about eliminating the gaps between art music and popular 
music or finding folk musical origins in all kinds of musical compositions. In 
their lectures and presentations given in Hungary, however, the Soviets very 
rarely referred to the theoretical background of socialist realism or detailed 
descriptions of how to manage this transformation process. Notwithstanding 
these circumstances, music diplomacy played an important role in the Sovietiza-
tion of both art and entertainment music in Hungary. By examining the Soviet-
Hungarian intercultural and musical relations during the High Stalinist period 
(1949-1953), I will inquire about the extent of Soviet influence in the Sovietized 
Hungarian popular musical arena. 
 
 
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND HUNGARY 
 
Historians of Soviet foreign policy and Soviet-Hungarian bilateral relations all 
agree that Hungary was geopolitically marginal within the Soviet sphere of 
influence before 1953/54 (Borhi; Borsody; Hajdú; Baráth, Kreml Árnyékában). It 
is obvious, however, that the Soviet Union influenced both foreign and domestic 
policies in Hungary already from the very end of World War II. Still, the USSR 
paid little attention to popularizing the communist worldview or the Soviet-type 
social system and lifestyle before the aggravation of the Cold War in 1948.  
The turning point in international relations took place in 1949 when the so-
called system of political vassalage reached its developed form. Political vassal-
age describes the process by which Eastern European governments, including the 
Hungarian one, became subordinated to the Kremlin. Anxious to gain the favor 
of Stalin, party leader Mátyás Rákosi repeatedly tried to surpass Soviet expecta-
tions (Rainer 91-100). The Soviets relied on the help of their satellites in both 
                                                           
1  In my paper, I systematically avoid using the widely used but normative term ‘light 
music’ (könnyűzene in Hungarian) while maintaining the distinction between the con-
cepts of pop music and popular music. The former is generally used to refer to the 
musical lineage originating in the rock and roll of the second half of the 1950s, includ-
ing the many trends of beat and rock music. Popular music, however, similar to the 
Russian term, bitovaya muzyka, is to be understood as a much wider, dynamic, social-
ly, historically, and politically invested category which includes a large number of 
traditions and genres ranging from operetta to jazz, dance, and folk music.  
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economic and military terms. The Sovietization of Hungarian society and 
culture, however, was generally not reckoned among the most perennial topics of 
Soviet foreign policy. Cultural Sovietization was more in the interest of the 
Hungarian communist party than in Moscow’s.  
According to the evidence collected by the historian Magdolna Baráth 
(“Testvéri”; “T. et.-nak átadva”), one of the major consequences of the vassalage 
was the involvement of Soviet advisors (usually party officials, diplomats, 
soldiers, members of secret policy, or experts) in various fields of everyday life 
in Hungary. That the control of economic, military and intelligence activities 
enjoyed priority is indicated by the fact that the first advisors from 1948 worked 
mainly in these domains. Their growing presence in Hungary’s cultural and civil 
life, however, could be observed only after 1950 (Baráth, Kreml Árnyékában). 
One should emphasize that these advisors, who held greater power than 
Hungarian officials, acted on Soviet orders, even though they had always been 
formally invited by the host countries. Officers in the Hungarian ministries and 
institutions often sought the help of their Soviet colleagues who initially only 
provided assistance in the tasks required by Moscow or the Hungarian govern-
ment, but later on they also worked for both the Soviet and Hungarian secret 
services. Theoretically, advisors did not have the authority to give direct instruc-
tions to local institutions. Notwithstanding, their words were often received as 
commands. Their communication has not been exposed to careful historical 
examination due to the nature (or even absence) of evidence as Soviet advisors 




SOVIET-HUNGARIAN CULTURAL RELATIONS  
IN THE 1940S AND 1950S 
 
Cultural relations between the Soviet Union and Hungary were formally coordi-
nated by the state-funded Hungarian-Soviet (Friendship) Society (Magyar-
Szovjet [Baráti] Társaság) which was established in Budapest shortly after 
World War II in June 1945. In its first few years, the Society tried to recruit 
those who were interested in Soviet culture and obtained the support of promi-
nent intellectuals such as Albert Szent-Györgyi, Zoltán Kodály, or Gyula Illyés. 
Initially the creation of a mass organization of “millions of people” and the 
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Cultural Sovietization of Hungary were not on the agenda until 1948/49.2 
Radical changes concerning the reorganization of Hungary’s cultural life started 
only from 1949 on. Scholars point towards different events which may have 
encouraged the Hungarian Communist Party to initiate the so-called Cultural 
Revolution, the transformation of Hungarian culture according to Stalinist 
principles. Some emphasize the importance of the visit of Soviet composer 
Mihail Chulaki in February 1949 (Standeisky 164-66), while others focus on the 
role of a ministerial deputy (Vladimir Baikov) who was not satisfied with the 
efficiency of the Hungarian ideological struggle against American influences 
(Baráth, “A Szovjetunióról” 66). 
In May 1949, Mátyás Rákosi, General Secretary of the Hungarian Com-
munist Party and Stalin supporter, issued a call for the Cultural Revolution after 
winning the one-party elections. The so-called Agitation and Propaganda Col-
lege of the Hungarian Working People’s Party (HWPP) decided on immediate 
measures concerning the promotion of the Soviet Union already in June 1949. 
For that purpose, the College expressed the completely unrealistic demand of 
setting up a group responsible for the propagation of the Soviet way of life 
within a mere few weeks. The College wanted to establish literary, theatrical, 
and musical committees in order to realize “the drastic overhaul of the cultural 
front, regarding the basic principles of Soviet culture.”3 
József Révai, the Party’s major Stalinist ideologist and Minister of Public 
Education, supplemented these objectives in his programmatic article entitled 
“Let Us Learn from Soviet Culture” (“Tanuljunk a szovjet kultúrából”) which 
was published in the newly released journal Szovjet Kultúra (Soviet Culture): 
 
We have not yet met the requirements of getting acquainted with Soviet culture. An 
occasional acquaintance with this culture … is important, but insufficient. We need to get 
acquainted with it continuously in order to facilitate its integral and constant influence on 
our new, improving culture. (Révai “Szovjet Kultúra” 1, emphasis in original, all transla-
tions are my own)4  
                                                           
2  MNL OL P2148, 1. d. Cited according to the Hungarian archival citation system. D. 
refers to doboz (box).  
3  MNL OL M-KS 276 f. 54/32. ő.e. (f. refers to fonds, ő.e. is an abbreviation of őrzési 
egység, a smaller unit such as a folder within a fonds). 
4  “a szovjet kultúra komoly megismerése érdekében eddig nem tettünk eleget. Az 
alkalmi ismerkedés ezzel a kultúrával . . . fontos, de nem elegendő. Arra van szükség, 
hogy folyamatosan ismerkedjünk ezzel a kultúrával, hogy lehetővé tegyük szerves és 
állandó hatását, a mi születő, új kultúránkra.” 
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 From then on, the party propagated the Soviet Union as a utopian state, re-
narrating Soviet-Hungarian cultural relationships and subordinating them to the 
myth of an interstate friendship.5 Drawing attention to the advantages of friend-
ship between the two nations, Révai wrote: “the Soviet Union gives us more than 
we give and can give to her … In establishing a socialist state, society, economy 
and culture, the Soviet Union is far more experienced than our nation” ( “Szovjet 
Kultúra” 3).6 Révai still emphasized the importance of remaining loyal to the 
Soviets in his speech which he delivered at the second congress of the Hungari-
an-Soviet Society in February 1953 (“Révai József” 3-4). Ferenc Erdei, Excecu-
tive Director of the Society, tried to surpass him by expressing appreciation for 
the Soviet artists and scientist who “helped us generously” and who “lent wings 
to the workers of Hungarian culture with their art and education” (MNL OL 
P2148 1. d.).7  
 
 
THE REPRESENTATIVE PUBLIC SPHERE 
 
Hungarian ministries and institutions tried to introduce Soviet cultural products 
and methods in many different ways. One might stress the importance of written 
documents (such as the translation of Soviet fiction, philosophy, media coverage, 
academic books and articles), visual culture (such as paintings and photographs) 
and music (such as records), or the presence of the above-mentioned advisors. 
The role of official Soviet deputies and guests, however, seems to have been 
even more important from my point of interest. These guests (usually artists, 
writers, and scholars) usually visited the satellite states on ceremonial or festive 
occasions, and they were instructed to represent the current official position of 
the Soviet government in the limelight of publicity while advisors often re-
mained incognito. 
The so-called Friendship Months, which became one of the major symbols of 
interstate cultural relations, were among the most significant public events which 
                                                           
5  On the ideological background of the term Great Friendship, and the Polish and 
Eastern-German comparison see Behrends. 
6  “A Szovjetunió többet ad nekünk, mint amennyit mi adunk és adhatunk neki . . . A 
Szovjetunió tapasztalatai mérhetetlenül nagyobbak a mi tapasztalatainknál, . . . a szo-
cialista állam és társadalom, gazdaság és kultúra felépítésében.”  
7  “önzetlenül segítve . . . művészetükkel és tanításaikkal szárnyat adtak a magyar 
kultúra dolgozóinak.” 
138 | Ádám Ignácz 
the Soviet guests attended. Hundreds of thousands of people were forcefully 
mobilized to attend these events, and a huge machinery was responsible for the 
organization, including the staff of the Ministry of Public Education, the Institute 
of Cultural Relations, the All-Hungarian Association of Trade Unions, the 
Hungarian-Soviet Society, the State Security Office and, of course, the Central 
Committee of the Party (MNL OL P2148 5. d.). The local government never had 
much of a choice in selecting the guests, although it could make suggestions. 
Since only official contacts were permitted between Hungarians and Soviets 
during the period of High Stalinism in the early 1950s, the Soviet deputies never 
came to Budapest spontaneously and voluntarily, but only as representatives of 
the Soviet regime.  
If vassalage is an appropriate term to define the political relations, one can 
use another feudal term in connection with guests and delegates: representative 
publicity. This Habermasian concept describes the blurring of boundaries 
between private and public spheres (Habermas 58-68). Applied to Eastern 
Europe after 1949, representative publicity refers to the establishment of a 
distorted communication framework in which Soviet participants aimed at 
representing the splendor of the Soviet Union while Hungarians were expected 
to show great admiration for all Soviet presentations and instructions. Therefore, 
it may seem that the Soviets manually controlled all domestic decisions and 
administrative measures in Hungarian domestic politics. As mentioned above, 
some evidence, however, raises doubts about this picture.  
 
 
SOVIET GUESTS IN HUNGARY AND THEIR ROLE  
IN THE SOVIETIZATION OF MUSICAL ENTERTAINMENT 
 
Considering that the cultural delegations were often led by musicians, music 
certainly played an important role in public diplomacy. Soviet musicians (com-
posers, performers) and musicologists frequently visited Hungary from 1949 
onwards in order to play concerts, give presentations, or participate in local 
discussions, symposiums, and public debates. According to public speeches of 
such Soviet composers as Michail Chulaki, Kirill Molchanov, Vladimir Zacha-
rov or Jury Milyutin, the Sovietization (i.e. the Zhadovian transformation) of 
classical musical life always took priority over musical entertainment and 
popular musical genres. However, since socialist realist musical aesthetics 
insisted on abandoning the ‘bourgeois’ distinction between ‘serious’ and ‘light’ 
music, Stalinist cultural policy was committed to the demarcation between 
politically ‘useful’ and ‘useless’ (or hostile) rather than ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ 
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spheres of art. Soviet composers, whose compositions usually exemplified the 
relatedness of the two musical spheres, had to handle, at least in their verbal 
manifestations, those spheres simultaneously.8 As we shall see below, however, 
the topic of popular music and classical music received unequal treatment in 
Soviet-Hungarian public diplomacy in the Stalinist period. Popular music was 
usually judged by the criteria of (socialist) high culture, and only very few 
Hungarian documents bear witness to an actual and properly Soviet interest in 
popular music.  
Of those Soviet musical delegates who visited Hungary during the Stalinist 
period, the General Secretary of the Association of Soviet Composers, Mihail 
Chulaki probably made the first observation on Hungarian musical entertain-
ment. The Hungarian musicological journal Zenei Szemle (Musical Review) 
considered Chulaki’s visit in early 1949 as one of the most important musical 
events of post-war Hungary. Edited by committed communist musicologists 
after late 1948, the journal expressed great appreciation for members of the 
Soviet delegation who “represented the musical life of the Soviet Union, and its 
humanistic magnificence” (“Szovjet Kultúra Hónapja” 1).9  
However, as the article added, “we are indebted even more [to Chulaki] for 
spending most of his time with us, in order to discuss all the issues of our 
musical life. As a result, our tasks have become so obvious and conscious that 
the only thing left is to act” (“Szovjet Kultúra Hónapja” 1).10 
On 24 February 1949, Chulaki gave a talk at the Hungarian Academy of Mu-
sic on post-war Soviet music. According to a public report published in the 
journal Új Világ (New World), the audience was encouraged to ask him ques-
tions. One of those questions from the audience inquired about the relationship 
between classical and popular music in the Soviet Union, giving Chulaki the 
opportunity to define the official Soviet position: 
 
In the West, it is impossible to overcome the differences between ‘serious’ and ‘light’ 
[music]. Light music degenerated and became an instrument of the most inferior type of 
entertainment. It adapted itself to the unhealthy erotic atmosphere of pubs, night clubs and 
                                                           
8  See, for instance, the oeuvre of Milyutin or Alexander Novikov. The latter was also 
invited to Budapest to introduce his mass musical compositions in 1951. 
9  “a Szovjetunió zenekultúráját, ennek a zenekultúrának a mindenkihez szóló humanista 
nagyszerűségét reprezentálták.”  
10  “[Csulakinak azonban] főleg sokat köszönhetünk, aki csaknem minden idejét velünk 
töltötte, átbeszélve, átvitázva zeneéletünk minden problémáját. Ezután oly világossá 
és tudatossá váltak feladataink, hogy most már csak meg kell oldanunk őket.”  
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dance clubs. Moreover, serious music remained the privilege of those few who had the 
upper hand over the masses by their superior existential and social status.  
 
(The reporter comments on Chulaki’s statement): Contrary to this, there is no gap between 
light and serious music in the Soviet Union. Both of them embody the emotional experi-
ences of people, both of them communicate intellectual contents toward great masses of 
people, both of them are rooted in rich folk music traditions, and they both take their 
nutrimental juices from these traditions. (Chulaki qtd. in Új Világ 7)11 
 
This direction, however objective it may have seemed, provided little help for 
the practical realization of socialist realist musical entertainment. The Hungarian 
Working People’s Party understood that they had to undertake general measures 
before a more comprehensive Zhdanovian program could be implemented. It is 
no accident that Zenei Szemle, which highly praised Chulaki’s remarks, focused 
on what the Soviet deputy said about “severe and straightforward”12 criticism 
and self-criticism (Chulaki 1) and a fully centralized institutional framework 
which would guarantee a major transformation of the Hungarian musical land-
scape into a version of the Soviet Union. 
Besides Chulaki’s visit there was another important event in 1949, namely 
the Budapest concerts of the Osipov Folk Ensemble, a folk orchestra that was 
considered to be one of the important export products of Stalinist Soviet Culture. 
According to contemporary reviews, Hungarian audiences enthusiastically 
welcomed this Soviet group at all of their concerts (Kadosa 39). Following the 
tour, the musicology department of the Hungarian Association of Musicians 
dedicated a complete review session to the visit of the Osipovs. Participants 
agreed that contrary to the “sloppy” performance styles of dance music and jazz 
musicians, the real artists of the Soviet group had the ability to raise popular 
                                                           
11  “Nyugaton a könnyű és komoly közötti különbség áthidalhatatlan. A könnyűzene 
lesüllyedt a legalacsonyabb fokú szórakozás eszközévé. Lokálok, bárok, dancingok 
beteg erótikus [(sic!]) világához idomult, a komolyzene pedig azoknak a ke-
vésszámúaknak a privilégiuma lett, akiket anyagi és társadalmi helyzetük a tömeg felé 
emelt. (A riporter válasza): Ezzel szemben a Szovjetunióban a könnyű és komoly zene 
közötti szakadék ma már ismeretlen, mindkettő a nép érzésvilágát szólaltatja meg, 
mindkettő magas eszmei tartalmak közvetítője a széles néptömegek felé és mindkettő 
a gazdag népzenei hagyományok talajában gyökeredzik, és onnan szívja tápláló 
nedveit.” 
12  “őszinte, nyílt kritika.” 
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music to the level of symphonic music, and therefore their performances served 
the “noble” amusement of the working people (MNL OL P2146.). 
A year later in 1950, the tour of the Pyatnitsky Choir received an even 
warmer response by some Hungarian music critics. The ensemble was accompa-
nied by a dance group and an orchestra of Russian folk instruments. Members of 
the Pyatnitsky Choir were recruited from all over the Soviet Union, representing 
the ‘equality’ and ‘friendship’ of the Soviet nations. As Viktor Lányi, reporter of 
the journal Új Világ stated, the audience of one of the Budapest concerts “was 
holding its breath” during the famous song “Steppe Only Steppe,” while “it fully 
felt the essence of the new way of music” (Lányi 20).13  
The international tour of Pyatnitsky indicated already a modified definition 
of popular music in Hungary. An article entitled “The Effect of Soviet Music,” 
written for the Hungarian-Soviet Society, reported about commercially success-
ful Western (i.e. American) music in the past tense and praised the proliferation 
of Soviet entertainment and folk music (MNL OL P2148 5. d.). Simultaneously, 
the Association of Hungarian Musicians invited Vladimir Zacharov, the leader 
and chief composer of the Pyatnitski Choir, to speak about his group’s inspira-
tions and artistic approaches at a plenary session. Responding to questions 
following his talk, Zacharov pointed out that the Soviet youth had been success-
fully weaned away from listening and dancing to jazz and Western dance music 
as a result of the successful propagation of folk and certain ballroom dances 
(MNL OL P2146 62. d.). 
The Pyatnitsky Choir was also one of the important role models for musico-
logist Iván Vitányi. In his article “On the New Hungarian Social Dance Culture,” 
Vitányi demanded the domestication of newly designed folk dances which could 
help to shape the “new socialist man” and to develop the socialist consciousness 
of the people (16). As he pointed out, American social dances had already been 
successfully suppressed in the Soviet Union, but not yet in Hungary (16-17).  
Vitányi found one of his positive examples in the ball scene of the Soviet 
film Kubanskie Kazaki (Cossacks of the Kuban, 1950) while he was searching 
for models for new Hungarian social dances. To Vitányi’s mind, the scene 
demonstrated the collective spirit of the people, and it expressed the joviality and 
happiness characterizing new social dances of the future. Vitányi emphasized the 
                                                           
13  Since, beginning in 1949, publishing anything that deviated from the official line was 
not permitted anymore, we should not attempt to infer how ideologically committed 
journalists were at that time. This commitment can only be clearly proven by the 
quantity of somebody’s writings and by the nature of their verbal communication dur-
ing non-public debates in the committees and departments. 
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importance of the already existing Hungarian dance musical initiatives which 
tried to imitate Soviet examples. That is why he mentioned the new state-
supported Dance with Us movement, which introduced two czardas-type Hun-
garian dances, the so-called karikázó (round dance) and farkastánc (wolf’s 
dance). Vitányi was not the only one in favor of these endeavors. The popular 
music department of the Hungarian Association of Musicians and the Associa-
tion of Dancers launched a monumental joint initiative to create the choreogra-
phy and accompanying tunes of these dances which were supposed to replace 
tango and swing in Hungary (MNL OL P2146 62. d.). 
The diatribes against jazz and Western dance music initially seemed to be 
successful. A series of propagandistic articles from 1950 and 1952 reported that 
the bourgeois jazz music and partner dances were expected to cause protest and 
indignation among socialist people. The new audience apparently already denied 
“the bad taste and pornographic songs and lyrics of nonsense of English and 
American jazz titles”: “Our youth … loves dancing, but it is fed up with the 
raving, worrying … dances” (“Szünjék” 9).14 According to the official media, 
swing and samba were systematically popularized by the US and socialist 
countries had to be alert in order to prevent being infiltrated by the “poison of 
cosmopolitanism” (“Szünjék” 9). 
In 1951, the Hungarian Working People’s Party called upon every jazz and 
dance musician of the country to join the “musical revolution” (MNL OL XIX-I-
3-n 1. d.). In the same year, the All-Hungarian Association of Trade Unions 
organized a music competition which aimed at struggling against cosmopolitan-
ism (“Tánczenekaraink” 1). The Association primarily invited local bands which 
had participated in the World Festival of Youth and Students (WFY) in East 
Berlin a few months earlier. The aim was to eliminate the “artful sounds,” the 
“cacophonic jazz-harmonies” or “distorted rhythms” (Tamássy 37-38) and to 
acquire the severe performing style that stays loyal to the musical message and 
intellectual content. The twelve bands which entered the competition, among 
them the groups led by Mihály Tabányi, Lajos Martony, and Péter Hajdú, were 
forced to compile a colorful program reflecting the “optimistic atmosphere” of 
the third WFY, “expressing the youthful impetus and desire for peace character-
istic of young people” (“Tánczenekaraink” 1).15 The program turned out to be 
                                                           
14  “Ez az új közönség . . . visszautasítja az ízléstelen, pornográf kuplékat, az angol, 
amerikai értelmetlen jazz-számokat.” “Ifjúságunk . . . szeret táncolni, de felháborod-
nak az ízléstelen, testet-lelket elgyötrő . . . táncokon.” 
15  “fejezzék ki az ifjúság békevágyát, fiatalos lendületét, a III. VIT . . . optimista 
hangulatát.”  
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colorful indeed. Contemporary Hungarian stars such as Tabányi and Martony 
played covers of Soviet hits, presented a cover of the official March of the World 
Federation of Democratic Youth, and even a version of Alexander Alexandrov’s 
famous “Cantata about Stalin” (“Tánczenekaraink” 1).  
The most important element, however, was missing, namely socialist realist-
inspired Hungarian popular songs produced and performed by Hungarian 
musicians. Socialist realist musical discourses revealed and named only the 
allegedly wrong, hostile, and inadequate elements and attributes of works of art, 
and made only vague and contradictory references to the criteria of ideal compo-
sition. The accessibility to the broadest masses or the simplicity and clarity of 
form were definitely included in the list of those criteria. The requirements of 
ideological commitment and national/popular spirit were among the most 
frequent ones, too (Heller). Besides, composers and musicologists continuously 
proclaimed the need for the primacy of the melody since they believed that 
music has to imitate the intelligent and expressive human speech. As a result, 
they demanded linear melodies that are easy to sing and memorize. Simultane-
ously, they launched a campaign to promote thinking in clear and easy harmonic 
structures in order to avoid the “formalist cacophony” of jazz music and to create 
a jolly and optimistic musical atmosphere. Opinions differed regarding the 
implementation of new Hungarian social dances: while some composers and 
musicologists wanted to keep the traditional dance-rhythms (such as slow fox, 
waltz, polka, etc.) and integrate them into the new musical material, others 
advocated the design of completely new rhythms based on the peculiarities of 
Hungarian folk songs (MNL OL P2146 61. d.; 62. d.; 66. d.; Ignácz, “Hungarian 
in Form”). 
Similar to the lyrics of classical compositions, the ones of popular music 
pieces had to depict the new socialist way of life in Hungary. As the director of 
Hungarian Radio, István Szirmai stated at a debate session in 1950, “our youth is 
growing, the factory is producing, and a new type of socialist man is growing up 
in the factories who is dancing, loving or having fun. Therefore, dance songs 
have to portray the humor and playfulness of this new man” (MNL OL P2146, d. 
62).16 At the beginning, patriotic and folkish, rural topics were also welcomed. 
The topic of love, however, was considered dangerous and risky, as it was 
connected with sexuality, melancholy, or resignation. According to a 1954 press 
debate, these lyrics “allow for no glimmer of hope, and passion for life and 
                                                           
16  “nő az ifjúság, termel a gyár, a gyárban egy új típusú szocialista ember nő fel, aki 
táncol, szeret, szórakozik, a táncdalok az ő életétének humorát, játékát adják vissza.”  
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work.” Instead “they are training for cynicism, laxity of morals, and extrava-
gance, as if everyone were living only in the here and now” (G. Horváth 8).”17  
Although there was supposed to be a tacit agreement as to what “socialist 
content” should mean in the field of popular music, members of the Association 
of Musicians assumed very different viewpoints regarding the primacy of lyrics 
or sound. Many argued that good music depends on the preexistence of good 
lyrics. According to the politically most influential composer, Ferenc Szabó, 
ideologically committed dance music has to be based on the rhythmic, intellec-
tual, and emotional message of the lyrics. Some of his colleagues claimed that 
the message and structure of music could enrich the fantasy of librettists. How-
ever, nobody doubted the view that only those popular songs could be successful 
in which sound and lyrics are inseparable from one another other. It is no acci-
dent that in the first years of communist rule the idea of instrumental dance 
music was hardly discussed. 
 
 
HUNGARIAN DANCE MUSIC COMES TO TRIAL:  
THE CRITIQUE OF KIRILL MOLCHANOV 
 
Beginning in late 1950, a few efforts were launched to implement communist 
musical ideals. The first serious test of Hungarian-produced socialist realist 
dance songs was an evening of the First Hungarian Musical Week on 20 No-
vember 1951 where Ilona Hollós, László Kazal and other famous singers of the 
time performed 25 songs accompanied by the State Radio Dance Orchestra. A 
few days later, on 24 November, higher local officials and foreign guests were 
invited to evaluate the event at a review session hosted by the Budapest Acade-
my of Music (MNL OL P2146 61.d.). The Soviet delegation was led by Tikhon 
Khrennikov, President of the Association of Soviet Composers, who otherwise 
was known in his country not only as an ardent supporter of socialist realism 
(Tomoff; Heikinheimo), but also as the main censor of jazz and American dance 
music (Starr 180). However, Khrennikov’s talk in Budapest focused exclusively 
on such general aspects as the dangers of formalism and cosmopolitanism, 
refraining from analyzing the popular musical compositions of the Hungarian 
Musical Week. Khrennikov appointed Kirill Molchanov in his stead to critically 
evaluate the conditions of socialist realist dance music in Hungary.  
                                                           
17  “akire hatnak, abból kiölik a jövőbe vetett hitet, az életkedvet, munkakedvet, a nemes 
emberi érzelmek megbecsülését és tiszteletben tartását. Cinizmusra, erkölcsi lazaságra 
nevelnek, szertelenségre, azon az alapon, hogy ki tudja, mi lesz holnap.” 
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Molchanov, General Secretary of the Soviet Association, downplayed the 
importance of popular music in favor of program music and opera. He said, 
however, that supporters of socialist realism all have to be concerned with 
popular music, because the global hegemonic aspirations of the US and the 
destructive effects of cosmopolitanism are embodied in the “bourgeois” popular 
music of recent years (MNL OL P2146 61.d.). The Soviet deputy expressed 
fierce criticism about the pieces he had heard a few days before, calling them 
mentally empty and in want of ideas. According to him, songs which attempted 
to force “sensible” lyrics related to the new contemporary life into jazz schemes 
were even worse than their musical models (MNL OL P2146 61.d.), that is, the 
original jazz compositions. Molchanov inquired why Hungarian composers of 
popular music were not making more use of the wealth of Hungarian folk music. 
He reminded the audience that the Hungarian people had already created their 
songs and dances. In order to reflect the spirit of the people in popular music, 
one would only need to call Hungarian folk songs and dances in mind (MNL OL 
P2146 61.d.).  
It is difficult to assess the impact of Molchanov’s speech, again, since he 
echoed only the widely known basic Zhdanovian demands, without going into 
any theoretical or practical details. Following his exhortations, however, begin-
ning in early 1952, the state increasingly controlled the composition and distri-
bution of dance music in Hungary. State control manifested in regular consulta-
tion sessions about popular music and the establishment of a state-funded dance 
music composing course. In this course (called tánczeneszerzői tanfolyam in 
Hungarian), enthusiastic novices studied the theory of socialist realism, the 
history of folk music, and technical aspects of composing. At the end of the 
course, they had the opportunity to discuss their works with a delegated working 
group of the Association of Hungarian Musicians which then assisted the pub-
lishing and recording of the most valued pieces. 
The politically influential composer Endre Székely first drew attention to the 
necessity of those consultations in Hungary. Székely regularly enjoyed the 
hospitality of his Soviet colleagues and had first-hand experience on how dance 
music composition courses were organized in the Soviet Union. He delivered his 
remarks at a review session on 25 January 1952, an event which was incidentally 
dedicated to the “morals of the Hungarian Musical Week.” Several participants 
of the meeting agreed that Molchanov’s perspicacity was disturbed by the bad 
amplifying and the lack of translations of the texts. Zdenkó Tamássy, the former 
leader of the popular music department of the Association of Hungarian Musi-
cians, also expressed his sincere surprise about the complete lack of Soviet help 
(MNL OL P2146 62.d.).  
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Thus, Soviet instructions eventually proved futile. With very few exceptions, 
the “Hungarian-style” popular songs composed under the supervision of censors 
did not become popular. The concept of folk music-based national dance music 
obviously had undergone a crisis by the spring of 1953. Examining the tracklists 
of radio programs, live shows, and music festivals shows that the imaginary 
“jazz-free” new popular music scene suffered from a severe shortage of musical 
material to be aired. Since communists were constantly lagging behind in 
designing the new style, the topic of what to play and listen to at the “stage of 
transition” (which the communists referred to as “the interregnum”), was perma-
nently on the agenda (MNL OL P2146 62.d.). To many, the adaptation of 
popular Soviet songs, such as the ones of Isaak Dunayevsky or Jury Milyutin, 
and their “Magyarization” seemed to be the best solution to remedy this defi-
ciency. There were frequent clashes, however, concerning the extent to which 
jazz, foxtrot or tango covers of Soviet hits could serve the purposes of socialist 
entertainment. Pianist László Turán, member of the Radio Dance Orchestra, 
complained already at a conference held on 30 September 1950 that his band had 
been criticized by a few participants for as slight a modification as accelerating 
the original tempos and trying to make the converted Soviet compositions more 
dance-able using dotted rhythms and syncopations (MNL OL P2146 62.d.). 
 
 
SOVIET DANCE MUSIC IN HUNGARY BEYOND 1953 
 
It was under these circumstances that Jury Milyutin visited Budapest. The Stalin-
prize-winning composer of operettas, dance music, and soundtracks drew 
attention to the ideological message of dance music compositions and the 
importance of intonation in his talks held at the Academy of Music in February 
and March 1953 (“Miljutyin” 7). It is noteworthy that Milyutin showed compli-
ance towards those high-quality pieces which remained perfect in their socialist 
intellectual content, but were less nationalistic in their intonation. Still, he finally 
urged his Hungarian colleagues to turn their attention to the “most noble and 
most complicated task” of composing popular songs national in both form and 
content (“Miljutyin” 7). 
The musicologist János Maróthy, who later became an initiator and major 
figure of the local political and aesthetic discussions concerning popular music, 
considered Milyutin’s talks a fundamental inspiration. In his article “Urgent 
Tasks,” published immediately after the visit of the Soviet delegation, Maróthy 
discussed what is probably the last large-scale concept of national dance music 
(Ignácz, “Music”), but his contribution added little that was new to the musical 
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discourse of social realism. The point under discussion was once more, like in 
the earlier Stalinist years, the importance of the so-called “Hungarian-style 
school,” which Maróthy described as the most progressive socialist realist dance 
music endeavor in the country (Ignácz, “Music”). 
It seemed inconceivable, even in early 1953, that there could be any trans-
formation in the Stalinist artistic approach or in the rigid system of censorship 
seeking to prevent cultural infiltration. Stalin’s death in 1953, however, caused a 
dramatic political and social change in each country of the Eastern European 
satellite states. As a consequence, the Hungarian-Soviet Society was forced to 
admit its former faults, including the way in which they had idealized the Soviet 
Union, thus making Soviet culture virtually inaccessible to a broader audience 
(MNL OL P2148 4.d.). 
Soviet-Hungarian relations also underwent a change because of the détente. 
The communication became less ritualized, and more functional with the result 
that questions of popular genres in public diplomacy lost relevance. The same 
trend was indicated by the report entitled Proposal for the Reinforcement of 
Interstate Relations (Javaslat a Nemzetközi Kapcsolatok Erősítésére) issued by 
the Ministry of Public Education in May 1954. The document contained im-
portant critical remarks about Soviet-Hungarian relations in the field of popular 
music. It observed that popular music is the only musical field where the “ex-
change of experiences” between Eastern European countries is still absent. The 
Ministry encouraged the cultural policy makers to organize a pan-European 
estrade festival in co-operation with Czech, Bulgarian, East German, French, 
Italian, Polish, and Soviet bands. This festival, however, was never realized. This 
document appears to be the only one questioning Soviet responsibility for the 
failure of renewing Hungarian popular music. None of the presentations and 
performances of the above-mentioned Soviet deputies were deemed to be 





This contribution argued that political leaders and cultural elites in Hungary tried 
to transform popular culture by using elusive Soviet models and examples. It 
seems that, contrary to other fields of public life, Soviet deputies of popular 
music were not in all instances instruments of a “manual control” of Hungarian 
cultural life and musical production. They did not always manage to directly 
influence the popular music scene in Hungary. Therefore, their speeches need to 
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be treated with the utmost caution when reconstructing the history of Hungarian 
popular music of the early 1950s.  
Even though the main intention of Chulaki, Zacharov, Molchanov or 
Milyutin was to hammer the Zhdanovian artistic approach into Hungarian heads, 
policy makers and musicians used their ideas as pretexts for Sovietizing the 
popular music scene on their own account and according to their own methods 
and plans. The reason for the relative independence of Hungarian cultural policy 
in this field was most probably the relative insignificance of popular music in 
Soviet public diplomacy. If Stalin and his comrades had declared the transfor-
mation of Hungarian popular culture a priority, Hungarian communists would 
have had no alternative but to be entirely at their disposal and to strictly follow 
Soviet instructions.  
During the Stalinist period of the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Sovietiza-
tion of popular music, everyday culture, and leisure time in Hungary was less 
important than that of the economy and state machinery. The significance of 
Soviet interventions in Hungarian cultural policy was, however, enlarged by the 
Hungarian government’s efforts to surpass Soviet expectations in many fields of 
everyday life. The very reforms in Hungarian cultural life and Soviet-Hungarian 
relations took place only after Soviet pressure had forced the Hungarian gov-
ernment to admit some of its former mistakes in June 1953. At that time, a new 
period of different competing conceptions began. The ‘dogmatic’ approach and 
Zhdanov’s principles did not completely retreat, but the emphasis slowly shifted 
from technical and compositional questions to the aesthetic education of musi-
cians and audiences as well as institutional positions and circumstances of 
production and distribution.  
At a meeting held on 27 February 1954, lyricist József Romhányi and com-
poser Béla Tardos spoke quite openly about the paralyzing effects of state 
control over the process of composing. They already considered all administra-
tive measures or direct interventions, even the Soviet ones, risky and admitted 
that socialist realist musical entertainment does not gain anything from re-
strictions of artistic freedom anymore. From then on, the Association of Musi-
cians and the Ministry of Public Education tried to outline only the general 
ideological framework, and it was the artists’ and theoreticians’ personal respon-
sibility to comply with the guidelines of socialist realism in their own individual 
ways (MNL OL P2146 62.d.). 
At the same time, the regime began to gather more information about the 
needs and expectations of the audience. This new direction—which brought 
public procurement contracts—was not much different from the cultural policy 
established after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. The creed of this policy was 
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from the very beginning decent and classy entertainment and aesthetic education 
of the youth. It seems that these changes in Hungary brought about a collapse of 
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Part III:  




Dancing in Chains 




My title comes from Friedrich Nietzsche (247), but currently it is being quoted 
by Chinese writers, artists, scholars, and journalists as a way of describing the 
experience of working under the growing repressions of President Xi Jinping. 
There are, of course, many Western scholars and journalists who make similar 
complaints about various formal and informal pressures to “self-censor.”1 So in 
that broad sense, we are all dancing in chains. 
But there are chains and there are chains. The political liberty and freedom of 
expression enjoyed by those of us who live and work in the West are not perfect. 
But they are a lot better than the authoritarian alternative.  
There was a time, half a century ago, when American popular music was 
seen as a beacon of political liberty and free speech and expression. As such, it 
played an important role in making liberal democracy attractive to millions of 
people living under fascist or communist domination. That time spanned World 
War II and the Cold War, and while the story was never a simple morality tale, 
neither was it false. 
The thesis of this essay is that the relationship between American popular 
music and US public diplomacy has changed drastically. Not only has popular 
music ceased to be a beacon of liberal democracy, it has also, at times, propagat-
ed a negative image of Western freedoms that repels ordinary people and 
strengthens tyranny. 
                                                           
1  There are countless examples of this view, but one very prominent statement came 
from the novelist Salman Rushdie, who stated before an audience at the University of 
Vermont on 15. Jan. 2015, “the moment somebody says, ‘I believe in free speech, 
but,’ I stop listening” (Associated Press). 
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This essay has four parts: 1) an overview of how popular music (first jazz 
then rock) enhanced American prestige during the crucial period of World War 
II and the Cold War; 2) a brief summary of the drastic changes that have oc-
curred since the Berlin Wall fell in 1989; 3) some examples of how today’s 
popular music does and does not support freedom in the world; and 4) a warning 
that if Americans—and Europeans—are to develop a renewed public diplomacy 
for the twenty-first-century, we will have to draw more cogent lessons from this 
history than we have so far drawn. 
 
 
FROM GOLDEN GLOW TO PLASTIC PEOPLE 
 
Europeans and Russians discovered jazz around 1917, when Sidney Bechet 
accompanied the composer-conductor Will Marion Cook on a European tour. 
Then, during World War II, the jazz programs of the US Armed Forces Network 
provided respite, not only to US servicemen, but also to ordinary Europeans. 
Building on this popularity, the Voice of America (VOA) began in 1955 to beam 
“the music of freedom,” as host Willis Conover called it, to a regular audience of 
100 million worldwide, including 30 million behind the Iron Curtain (Thomas). 
Then in the early 1960s, the State Department sponsored tours by such jazz 
masters as Sidney Bechet, Louis Armstrong, Duke Ellington, Dave Brubeck, 
Benny Goodman, and Dizzy Gillespie. 
The appeal of the VOA broadcasts is well documented. To the Russian nov-
elist Vassily Aksyonov, they were “America’s secret weapon number one . . . a 
kind of golden glow over the horizon” (Richmond 207). To a young Russian fan, 
Conover’s program was “a source of strength when I am overwhelmed by 
pessimism” (Lester). Looking back on his years as an underground jazz musician 
in Czechoslovakia, novelist Josef Škvorecký writes that “our sweet, wild music 
was a sharp thorn in the side of the power-hungry men, from Hitler to Brezhnev, 
who successively ruled in my native land” (83). 
The tours were more challenging, in part because key decision makers at the 
State Department were less interested in the music than in using African Ameri-
can jazz masters to blunt Soviet criticism of American racism. Historian Penny 
von Eschen notes that there was “a glaring contradiction” in using “black artists 
as goodwill ambassadors . . . when America was still a Jim Crow nation” (9). 
This is true. But as von Eschen also notes, the tours succeeded in large part 
because the musicians were allowed to speak freely about racial discrimination. 
Even Gillespie, whose acerbic comments on the topic upset his State Department 
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sponsors, admitted that “our interracial group was powerfully effective against 
Red propaganda” (Gillespie qtd. in Eschen 17). 
And the music transcended politics. During the darkest years of the twentieth 
century, millions of people around the world came to see jazz as proof that 
freedom and democracy can co-exist with a highly cultivated artistic sensibility. 
It would be nice to think that artistic cultivation is a necessary condition for 
successful musical diplomacy, but to judge by what happened next, it is not. As 
the Cold War unfolded, the official export of jazz mattered less than the unoffi-
cial export of a vigorous but much less refined genre of music: rock. 
Rock music, or rock ’n’ roll as it was called then, first gained a following in 
the Soviet Union in the 1950s, via smuggled 45s, audiotapes made from foreign 
radio broadcasts, and (my personal favorite) the roentgenizdat—an ingenious 
method of transferring the grooves on a vinyl record to discarded X-ray plates. 
This “music on ribs” became a booming underground industry, with a distribu-
tion network that at one point reached as far as Siberia (Ryback 32-3). By the 
mid-1960s, VOA had caught up with the craze and was broadcasting the various 
styles of rock (and soul) popular at the time. 
But rock’s greatest moment came later, during the 1970s and 1980s, when 
growing communication and travel facilitated a steady eastward flow of Ameri-
can and British popular music, from commercially successful rock, soul, and 
folk acts to more underground groups, such as Frank Zappa’s the Mothers of 
Invention and the Velvet Underground. With their dark lyrics and discordant 
sounds, the latter two would never have passed muster with VOA. But given the 
rebellious mood of their fans in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, their 
unofficial status only added to their impact (Bayles, “Struggle”). 
The best example of this impact is the Plastic People of the Universe, a 
Czech band modeled after the Velvet Underground. Formed in 1968, shortly 
after Russian tanks crushed the Prague Spring, the Plastic People’s music was 
neither refined nor especially crowd-pleasing—indeed, their 1970s performances 
were more like avant-garde “happenings” than rock concerts. But over time, the 
band’s stubborn defiance of the communist authorities attracted a following. In 
1976, when its members were subjected to a Kafkaesque trial, Václav Havel 
spoke out in their defense, and the trial became a rallying point for the Czech 
movement of resistance to Soviet domination (Vaughan). 
Thus did the American counterculture, intended to subvert authority at home, 
become even more subversive overseas. The process continued through the 
1980s, as American and British popular music became second nature to a 
generation of Russians and East Europeans. Then came the collapse of the Berlin 
Wall, followed by the 1990s—a transformative decade whose definitive history 
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has yet to be written, perhaps because our present world is still reeling from the 





We now turn to three of those transformations: a steep decline in US public 
diplomacy efforts; an upsurge in the export of US popular culture; and the rise—
in Russia, China, and many other countries—of a new kind of authoritarianism, 
in which social and economic freedoms are expanded, at least for a while, while 
political liberty remains as restricted as ever. 
The first transformation occurred between 1993 and 2001: funding for US 
cultural and educational exchanges was cut by one third, from $349 million to 
$232 million (Curb Center 18). Overseas this meant closing many American 
libraries and cultural centers that had long served as meeting places and free-
speech zones. Finally, in 1999, the US Information Agency (known overseas as 
USIS), which had conducted public diplomacy since 1953, was dismantled, and 
its activities scattered throughout the State Department. This meant a drastic loss 
of independence, not only in terms of budget, but also in terms of public diplo-
mats’ ability to operate in the field.2 
The second transformation was the opening of new media markets around 
the world, as state-controlled terrestrial channels gave way to new, privately 
owned satellite services. Hungry for content, these services acquired a huge 
number of US feature films, TV programs, and popular music, at a time when 
many of the most successful individuals in Hollywood were busy pushing the 
envelope of violence and vulgarity. The result was a sudden flood of American 
entertainment into parts of the non-Western world where the vast majority of 
people had no real exposure to, or knowledge of, life in the United States. 
Did anyone in the US government worry where this might lead? In most ca-
ses, no. But there were some notable exceptions. For example, in 1998, when the 
USIS was about to be closed, its director, Joseph Duffey, warned against leaving 
“the portrayal of American culture . . . exclusively to the mainstream media.” 
With remarkable prescience, Duffey continued: 
 
                                                           
2  This statement, like many others made in this essay, is based on the many interviews 
the author conducted with former public diplomats and foreign service officers (see 
Through a Screen Darkly). 
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While the United States enjoys a dominant position in the production and exportation of 
entertainment products, it remains debatable whether these products best serve America’s 
broader interests and ultimately democracy itself. . . . If morally questionable program-
ming is viewed as destructive to the moral fiber of American citizens, then what can be 
said of such programming when it is given wider airing on the international stage? On the 
one hand, it can have the same corrosive effect in countries that embrace American 
entertainment. . . . On the other hand, in countries that are repelled by American and 
Western values, such as those in the Pacific Rim, espousing a new “neo-Confucianism,” 
or Islamic countries that reject Western secularism, such programming only confirms the 
worst suspicions that the West, and America in particular, is morally corrupt and intellec-
tually devoid. (13) 
 
The third transformation was even more worrisome: the rise of a new type of 
authoritarian rule, which, rather than control every aspect of people’s lives, seeks 
only to control political thought and behavior. At the heart of this new approach 
are the media. With the exception of North Korea, the world has moved beyond 
the age of stultifying state propaganda. Instead, the media in Russia, China, and 
other authoritarian states have spent the last two decades copying Western 
entertainment and “infotainment,” while at the same time strictly forbidding 
anything resembling Western political reporting—or press freedom more gener-
ally (Diamond et al.). 
As Duffey suggests, these same regimes have also learned how to turn some 
of the West’s popular culture against it, citing crude and sensationalist films, TV 
shows, and popular music as evidence that Europe and (especially) America are 
“immoral,” “decadent,” and “gay” (13). This provides these regimes with an 
excuse to crack down on Western cultural imports—a form of censorship that 
upsets Westernized elites but is often supported by the majority of the popula-
tion. The next step, seen first in Putin’s Russia and now in Xi’s China, is to 
broaden the crackdown to include dissidents, artists, writers, scholars, activists, 
bloggers, and everyone else who dares to raise their voice against the govern-
ment (see Diamond et al.; see Ostrovsky; Arutunyan for Russia; for China see 
Brady; Stockmann).  
A different but equally worrisome dynamic is at work in the online recruit-
ment efforts of violent Islamist extremist groups such as ISIS, Al Qaeda, and 
Boko Haram. These groups also denounce the immorality and decadence of 
Western media, but when staging and filming their own acts of brutality and 
murder, they, too, borrow from those media. In particular, they borrow the style 
and imagery of American action films, videogames, reality shows, even pornog-
raphy (Cottee, “Pornography”; “Challenge”; “Jihad”). The result is a horrific 
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form of entertainment-propaganda that attracts young men (and some women) in 
both the Middle East and the West by appealing to their craving for excitement 
and adventure—not to mention freedom from the constraints of life in traditional 
Islamic families and communities (Fernandez). 
These new threats are every bit as complex as those the West faced during 
the early years of the Cold War. But disturbingly, we do not seem to be grasping 
them as quickly. 
 
 
HOW POPULAR MUSIC DOES—AND DOES NOT—
SUPPORT FREEDOM 
 
Back in 1917, President Woodrow Wilson described the new medium of film as 
“a universal language [that] lends itself importantly to the presentation of 
America’s plans and purposes” (qtd. in de Grazia 299). Since then, Washington 
has consistently labored to boost the export of Hollywood’s products. On 
occasion, these efforts have alienated other governments, as when Washington 
used coercive measures to pry open resistant foreign markets. But boosting the 
export of popular culture has never alienated Americans, in part because it 
imposes no burden on the taxpayer. On the contrary, it makes a hefty profit and 
helps to right the balance of trade. 
Add the tributes to jazz and rock music that emerged from the former Soviet 
sphere after the end of the Cold War, and you have a sufficient explanation of 
why the export of popular culture in general, popular music in particular, has 
long been considered good business and good public diplomacy. But is this still 
true? 
The export of popular music is still good business. Global revenue for the US 
music industry (including concerts and touring) has held steady at $15 billion 
since in 2012 (Media and Entertainment Spotlight). This figure is declining 
because of competition from European and Asian markets and, of course, the 
digital revolution. But America is still home to the “big three” record compa-
nies—Universal Music Group, Sony Music Entertainment, and Warner Music 
Group—as well as a strong indie sector. And it still dominates the global per-
formance-rights market, as well as earning half of all “synch revenue,” or fees 
paid for the use of music in other media, such as films and videogames (Media 
and Entertainment Spotlight). 
But the evidence suggests that, with regard to communicating America’s 
most cherished ideals of political liberty and freedom of expression, there is 
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good news and bad news. Some of today’s exports are effective in communi-
cating these ideals; others are not. 
First, the good news. In nearly every country, there is a localized version of 
the TV format pioneered as Pop Idol in Britain, American Idol in the United 
States. These shows are referred to as “reality shows,” because they feature 
ordinary people, as opposed to professional performers. But there are two kinds 
of reality shows: the exhibitionist kind, where naïve, deluded people compete on 
the basis of foolishness and shamelessness; and the talent-based kind, where 
singers, dancers, chefs, and other ambitious amateurs compete on the basis of 
effort and skill. The pop-idol show is talent-based, and the values it displays—
hard work, playing by the rules, and accepting the outcome of a fair contest—are 
everywhere associated with democracy. 
Perhaps the most striking case occurred in China. For the observer of popular 
culture, there have been few more fascinating spectacles in recent years than 
Beijing’s efforts to create what might be called “Youth Culture with Chinese 
Characteristics.” During the 1990s and 2000s, these efforts were part of a system 
of carefully calibrated censorship, in which mass-market newspapers and films 
enjoyed very little latitude; but small-circulation newspapers, the fine arts, and 
English-language scholarship enjoyed a lot more. It all depended on the size and 
potential influence of the audience. But in television the pattern was different: 
the degree of control depended less on the size of the audience than on the 
content. TV news, especially political news, was tightly controlled, but TV 
entertainment was given relatively free rein. 
Thus, in 2004 a regional TV channel, Hunan Satellite TV, came up with a 
pop-idol show called The Mongolian Cow Sour Yogurt Super Girl Contest (after 
its main sponsor). Better known as Super Girl, the show became a local hit, and 
when the channel got permission to broadcast it via satellite, it sparked a national 
craze. Auditions in Hunan, Guangdong, Henan, Zhejiang, and Sichuan provinces 
drew over 120,000 contestants. Fans held mass demonstrations in streets and 
shopping malls, prompting the official state newspaper, China Daily, to com-
ment that millions of Chinese were being “swept . . . into a euphoria of voting 
that [was] a testament to a society opening up” (Zhou Dake qtd. in Zhou). And 
the season finale attracted 400 million viewers and 8 million texted votes (a 
number that would doubtless have been higher if texting did not cost money). 
The winner, a 21-year-old music student from Sichuan named Li Yuchun, 
was a charismatic figure who defied convention by dressing in jeans and loose 
shirts, wearing no makeup, and performing songs ordinarily sung by men. Tall 
and slim with spiky hair, Li’s appearance would not have raised an eyebrow in 
the West. But in China, the victory of this apparent tomboy set off a huge public 
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debate—especially after the Hong Kong edition of Time magazine asked, “Super 
Girl—experiment in democracy?” 
The show’s popularity made it hard for the Central Propaganda Department 
to cancel it outright. But according to an official in the Central Committee 
Global Communications Office whom I interviewed in Beijing, Super Girl 
prompted “an urgent debate in the higher circles of government” (Bayles, 
Through a Screen Darkly 104). Eventually, the propaganda department decided 
to do what it does best, launching a campaign to “guide” public opinion back in 
the right direction. This happened in stages: first, China Daily asked: “How 
come an imitation democratic system ends up selecting the singer who has the 
least ability to carry a tune?” (Zhou 52). Second, a rumor was planted about Li’s 
sexual orientation. Third, an official opinion poll (predictably) found high levels 
of public disapproval of Super Girl (Bayles, Through a Screen Darkly 101-6). 
With this justification, Super Girl was canceled just in time for the 2008 
Olympics in Beijing. The following year it was revived, but it was no longer the 
same. Indeed, it was no longer a bona fide pop-idol show, because instead of 
being chosen through a process of viewer voting, the winner was now selected 
by a panel of “experts.” Even the normally compliant China Daily seemed 
disappointed. Griped one editorial, “the public voting system was dropped in 
favor of professional musicians and star-makers from entertainment companies 
acting as judges. It was the least interesting competition of the three years, 
because we all knew the answer” (Tian). 
But here we see a crucial difference between past and present: Li Yuchun 
was not sent to re-education camp or prison, as would certainly have been the 
case in Maoist times. On the contrary, she was made into a Party-approved 
superstar. In 2008, she released an album called Youth of China, billed as a “gift 
blessing” to the Beijing Olympics. Today, her music is exported under the 
Anglicized name of Chris Lee; she is in demand as a celebrity model for design-
ers like Jean Paul Gaultier, Donatella Versace, and Karl Lagerfeld; and she 
makes commercials for Coca-Cola and L’Oréal Paris (“Li Yuchun”). 
Far be it from me to begrudge Li her success. But I do wonder why, in the 
frothy cloud of international celebrity that now surrounds her, there is never any 
mention of the tomboy from Sichuan whose independent spirit and disruptive 
power to win votes made her threatening enough to provoke a government 
crackdown. 
Now for the bad news. Against this backdrop of authoritarian entertainment-
propaganda, it is painful to see American and European pop stars, a group who 
despite certain constraints enjoy more freedom of expression than almost any 
artists in history, enriching themselves by lending their glamour to kleptocrats 
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and dictators. In May 2014 the American R&B singer Erykah Badu gave a 
concert in Swaziland celebrating the birthday of King Mswati III. When human 
rights organizations raised an outcry, Badu’s response was: “I can’t be held 
responsible . . . I signed up as an artist, not as a political activist” (Brown). To 
another critic who pointed out that Swaziland has not had a free election in 27 
years, Badu’s response was: “I think that’s how kingdoms twerk” (Brown). 
The reference to twerking was no accident. As defined by the Oxford English 
Dictionary, to twerk means to dance “in a sexually provocative manner involv-
ing thrusting hip movements and a low, squatting stance.” Performers like Badu 
are so accustomed to defending their right to free expression with regard to 
sexual content, they can be deaf to other kinds of criticism—including criticism 
based on something they claim to care about, such as the rights of ordinary 
people not to be starved and oppressed. 
Badu is not alone in having poor political judgment. The list of other musical 
luminaries who have received lavish payment for concerts and serenaded tyrants 
includes the following:  
 
• Kanye West was paid €2.7 million in 2013 by President Nursultan Nazarbayev 
of Kazakhstan, who presides over a deadly gulag worthy of Stalinist Russia.  
• Jennifer Lopez was paid €1.3 million in 2013 by President Gurbanguly 
Berdymukhamedov of Turkmenistan. Berdymukhamedov, who insists on 
being called “The Protector,” is known for having brutally crushed the “per-
sonality cult” of his predecessor, only to erect a 21-meter-high gilded statue of 
himself on horseback. Turkmenistan is consistently found on Freedom 
House’s “Worst of the Worst” list. 
• Sting was paid €2.1 million in 2010 by President Islam Karimov of Uzbeki-
stan, who is known to have forced large numbers of children into slave labor. 
• Mariah Carey was paid €900,000 in 2011 by Libyan President Muammar al-
Gaddafi. Despite claiming later that she felt “horrible and embarrassed” about 
this, Carey went on in 2013 to accept €1.4 million to perform for Isabel dos 
Santos, the daughter of Angola’s deeply corrupt dictator, José Eduardo dos 
Santos. 
 
Of the performers on this list, the only one to offer a convincing apology was 
Jennifer Lopez. The rest settled for variations on this inane comment from 
Erykah Badu: “In the end, I love everyone, and I see freedom ahead for those 
enslaved and the slave masters” (Brown, emphasis in original). 
Troubling as it is, this habit of performing for dictators is hardly the sum to-
tal of America’s twenty-first-century musical outreach. More significant are the 
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changes American music has undergone since the days when jazz constituted the 
“music of freedom,” in Willis Conover’s memorable phrase. American music 
still commands the world stage, and not always to ill effect. But there is no 
denying that for millions of people around the world, US musical exports are no 
longer about freedom in the positive sense meant by Conover. Instead, a great 
many of those exports are narrowly, obsessively, about sex. 
Popular music has always been about romance, eroticism, and good times. 
But only recently has it verged on soft-core pornography. Significantly, this is 
not true of the pop-idol TV show. Perhaps this is because pop-idol shows are 
watched (and voted on) by families. Or perhaps it is because the contestants 
understand that they are not in a market where singing matters less than bumping 
and grinding for the camera. Whatever the reason, the pop-idol show offers 
living proof that musical entertainment can attract large audiences without 
succumbing to nonstop vulgarity. 
Tune in to a commercial radio channel on any continent and you will hear 
popular music that does not quite sound American, often because it utilizes non-
American instruments and vocal styles, but that nonetheless conforms to an 
American template. That is to say, the music is melodically catchy, rhythmically 
infectious, and structured into three-minute songs. To describe this music as 
derivative of American pop is to annoy those who champion “world music” as 
pushback against the US cultural hegemon. But except for the rare case when an 
unaltered folk style makes its way into the mainstream, the music referred to as 
“world music” is a hybrid, and its hybridity is deeply American. 
Or more accurately, Afro-American. I borrow this term from the eminent crit-
ic Henry Pleasants, who used it to describe the dominant musical idiom of the 
United States. Afro-American no longer refers to the ethnicity of the musicians 
involved, because today these come from every part of the globe. Instead, it 
refers to a range of musical practices introduced into the Americas by enslaved 
Africans and their descendants. As used here, the term encompasses a broad 
range of musical styles, from ragtime to rap, that share certain distinctive charac-
teristics, among them rhythmic complexity and the ability to absorb musical 
influences from very diverse sources (Pleasants, Serious Music; Pleasants, Great 
American Popular Singers). 
The two genres of Afro-American music that have proved most globally ab-
sorptive in the late twentieth and early twenty-first-centuries are the pop style 
associated with Michael Jackson; and hip-hop, also known as rap.3 
                                                           
3  Hip-hop is the more inclusive term of the culture, used to describe both musical and 
nonmusical aspects, such as music, clothing, dance, graffiti, and education. Rap origi-
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With the advent of MTV in the 1980s and the “concert spectacular” pio-
neered by Michael Jackson, American pop music shifted its priority from 
pleasing the ear to dazzling the eye. This created a problem, because musical 
talent does not always correlate with physical appeal. The Indian film industry, 
which relies heavily on music, solved this problem years ago by having “play-
back singers” with beautiful voices provide the soundtrack for actors with 
beautiful faces. This solution has not caught on in America, where lip-syncing is 
considered cheating. Instead, the American solution, adopted in the heyday of 
MTV, has been to crank up the sexual heat. 
According to one study, the percentage of American music videos containing 
sexual content rose from 47 to 73 percent between 1985 and 2005 (Turner 160). 
Most of this content was not explicit, but it was relentless: an unending stream of 
female bodies (the point of view was relentlessly male), writhing and gyrating in 
outfits that grew ever tighter and scantier. The highest concentration of these 
images appeared in videos by black performers, including rappers and pop 
singers—a fact that has not gone unremarked, either in African American 
communities or overseas. 
A similar pattern is evident in hip-hop. By the mid-2000s many African 
Americans who had grown up embracing hip-hop as a grassroots, multimedia art 
form began objecting to the way commercial rap videos were depicting black 
women as gold-digging “bitches” and “ho’s.” The same videos also depicted 
black men as foul-mouthed pimps and gangbangers, but that was less remarked 
upon. In 2005 the black women’s magazine Essence launched an online debate 
about the topic (“Take Back the Music”). And as editor in chief Diane Weathers 
told me, there were quite a few comments from African readers expressing 
“disgust at what their African-American brothers and sisters are doing in enter-
tainment. They wonder if we’ve lost our minds” (Weathers). 
This is not to suggest that Africans dislike hip-hop. On the contrary, its less 
offensive forms are popular throughout the continent. This is hardly surprising, 
given that the original rappers were West African griots: oral historians who 
could recite clan histories, offer praise songs, and practice the fine art of ritual 
insult. In the Caribbean, where enslaved Africans were cut off from their clan 
histories and had few occasions for praise, the griot tradition became focused on 
                                                           
nally referred only to the rhyming verses spoken by a rapper working with an emcee, 
or deejay. But later it came to be used interchangeably with hip-hop. These are not 
formal definitions, but it seems that in contemporary American English, rap connotes 
the more vulgar, commercialized type of music, while hip-hop connotes grassroots, 
often political, expression. 
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insult. Over time, this gave rise to two broad tendencies: bragging about oneself 
while bad-mouthing one’s rivals; and, in straitened political circumstances, 
giving voice to the voiceless.  
In North American hip-hop, which was created in the 1970s largely by Afro-
Americans and Afro-Caribbean immigrants to New York, the first tendency 
dominated, as rappers and emcees vied for gigs. But during the 1980s and 1990s, 
when rap caught on with the larger and more lucrative white audience, the 
danger arose that, like nearly most previous genres of Afro-American music, it 
would be appropriated by white performers. One way to “keep it black” was to 
“keep it ghetto.” First this meant gangsta rap, which began with a political 
message but soon devolved into lurid tales of gang violence. Next came party 
rap, with its many references to hard drinking, striptease, and lap dancing. 
Gangsta and party rap have made a lot of money, both in America and over-
seas. But they have also tarnished hip-hop’s reputation. Throughout the world, 
rappers continue to speak out against injustice and tyranny. But their reach is 
limited, because as noted by journalist Robin Wright, serious political rappers in 
places like the Arab Middle East must struggle to distance themselves from “the 




DOES POPULAR MUSIC HAVE A PLACE  
IN A RENEWED AMERICAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY? 
 
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, Washington scrambled to revive public 
diplomacy in the Arab Middle East. One highly visible effort was Radio Sawa, a 
government-sponsored radio channel playing a commercial-style mix of Ameri-
can and Arab pop music. There have been many criticisms of Radio Sawa, 
beginning with the fact that it replaced VOA’s Arabic service, which at the time 
was lobbying for funds to expand its programming. VOA’s Arabic service never 
received those funds—indeed, that service was terminated, in large part because, 
only a few days after the attacks of 9/11, its news editors had attempted to 
broadcast an interview with Taliban leader Mullah Omar (Bayles, Through a 
Screen Darkly 165-66). 
A more important criticism, expressed by many Americans who know the 
region well, was that a radio channel playing pop music is a pitifully inadequate 
response to the violent radicalization of Arab Muslim youth. Underlying this 
criticism is the obvious but little noted fact that, unlike Eastern Europeans 
yearning to breathe free, most Arabs did not see the United States as a beacon of 
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hope for political change. On the contrary, they understood all too well that 
Washington had long supported many of the region’s most repressive govern-
ments. 
Still other critics (including this one) argued that, unlike VOA, which fol-
lowed the public diplomacy strategy of reaching out to a carefully targeted 
audience of thinkers, movers, and shakers, Radio Sawa followed the commercial 
strategy of trying to attract a large, undifferentiated youth audience. Because 
entertaining the masses is not considered part of public diplomacy, these critics 
concluded that Radio Sawa was not the best use of resources. 
Does this mean popular music can no longer be used in US public diploma-
cy? Yes and no. 
Let us begin with hip-hop. The first wave of hip-hop diplomacy occurred in 
the mid-2000s, when the State Department began sending “hip-hop envoys” to 
North Africa and the Middle East, as well as to Pakistan, Mongolia, and Indone-
sia. The idea was to draw disaffected Muslim youth away from violent extrem-
ism by connecting with young Americans who personified their nation’s racial 
and religious diversity, as well as its freedom of expression. In 2006 a similar 
program was started in Muslim immigrant neighborhoods in Britain, the Nether-
lands, and France, to the discomfiture of some British, Dutch, and French 
officials (Aidi). 
In one respect, this effort was strikingly on target. According to Toni Black-
man, the first and most celebrated hip-hop envoy, a key message of the program 
was that not everyone in hip-hop “behaves like a juvenile delinquent on MTV.” 
Indeed, Blackman has repeatedly emphasized that the vulgar, offensive rap that 
“mainstream radio and television represent . . . Lil Wayne, or Jay-Z or 50 Cent, . 
. . is not what we’re talking about” (“Hip-Hop Diplomacy”). 
Blackman has also described her own performances as an attempt to “reach 
across generations” with expressions of “spirituality, religion, feelings and 
emotions, love songs, celebration of one’s parents . . . true stories from the heart” 
(“Hip-Hop Diplomacy”). To judge by the reaction of one Moroccan participant, 
the message got across—and the message was not just about hip-hop, it was also 
about America: “I went around saying to a lot of rappers, men and women, it’s 
not what you see in TV and movies,” this participant said. “People in America, 
they are not so vulgar, they are just talking like us, about real topics” (“Hip-Hop 
Diplomacy”). 
“Real topics” can pose a challenge, however. Hip-hop is a form of music that 
emphasizes speech and rhythm over melody and harmony. And like all speech, 
the supercharged lyrics of hip-hop can be turned to any purpose. For example, 
during the Arab Spring, hip-hop was used to express a variety of views: anti-
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regime, pro-regime, anti-democracy, pro-democracy, and religious sectarian—
even radical Islamist. In such a context, it is tricky for an American hip-hop 
envoy to connect with a particular audience without inadvertently taking sides in 
a local conflict (Aidi). 
This challenge is reflected in the second wave of hip-hop diplomacy, a State 
Department program called Next Level, which in recent years has reached out to 
hip-hop performers in Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador, 
Honduras, India, Montenegro, Senegal, Serbia, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, and 
Zimbabwe. As stated on its Facebook page, this program’s aims are “to promote 
cultural exchange, entrepreneurship, and conflict prevention” (“About Next 
Level”). Suzi Analogue, an American participant who traveled to Uganda with 
the program, has a loftier view. Testifying on the program’s website, she claimed 
that its purpose is “to promote peace and understanding worldwide.” Then, 
perhaps feeling the need to say something more down to earth, she added, “in 
hip-hop music globally, the beat itself serves as the backbone for people to come 
together and share ideas and self-expression” (“Uganda”). 
These claims recall Conover’s Cold War statement that jazz is “the music of 
freedom.” To support that claim, Conover sometimes compared the interplay of 
soloist and ensemble in a jazz performance to that of individual and community 
in American democratic society. In other words, Conover’s claim tried to 
connect jazz with something important about America—namely, its system of 
political liberty and protection of individual rights. By contrast, the claims being 
made on behalf of hip-hop diplomacy seem hopelessly vague, perhaps because 
the program is trying to avoid the genre’s connection with politics? 
Let me close with a less visible use of musical public diplomacy: a series of 
presentations on the highly commercial genre of country music identified with 
Nashville, Tennessee, held by a former diplomat from Austin, Texas named 
David Firestein. Firestein did not grow up listening to country music (Austin 
being a long way, geographically and culturally, from Nashville). But after 
serving several years in Russia and China, Firestein came to believe that the 
State Department was too “jazz and hip-hop oriented” for socially conservative 
audiences overseas (Firestein, Event). So he used his fluent Mandarin and 
Russian to introduce foreign audiences to a more socially conservative form of 
American popular music. 
Firestein’s country music diplomacy struck a responsive chord. As he ex-
plained to me, “the Chinese and the Russians really liked the strong vocals and 
the melodies. They also liked the lyrics, because they emphasized a different 
side of America, a side they could relate to better: hard work, family, and 
learning the difference between right and wrong” (Firestein, personal interview). 
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When the Chinese presentation was broadcast on the Mandarin service of Radio 
Free Asia (RFA), there were many calls asking for more. One caller exclaimed, 
“Make Firestein ambassador!’” (Southerland). 
In Washington I observed one of Firestein’s presentations before an audience 
of 55 secondary-school teachers visiting from Muslim-majority countries 
(Event). He captured their attention through the simple device of handing out the 
lyrics of several hit songs, playing the songs, and discussing their themes: small-
town life (“Boondocks,” by Little Big Town); pride in humble origins (“Redneck 
Woman,” by Gretchen Wilson); the work ethic (“Hardworking Man,” by Brooks 
& Dunn); family (“Watching You,” by Rodney Atkins); and faith (“Jesus, Take 
the Wheel,” by Carrie Underwood). About the last song, Firestein declared, 
“You don’t have to be Christian to appreciate this song. I’m not Christian, I’m 
Jewish, but I get goose bumps whenever I listen to it.” The reaction was sus-
tained applause (Firestein, Event). 
Today VOA plays country music, and the domestic audience for the genre is 
actually becoming younger and more diverse (Rau). But in its wisdom, the State 
Department never followed up on Firestein’s idea, and country music diplomacy 
ended when he took early retirement. Would the world be a better place if the 
State Department had scaled up his idea, perhaps even sending “country music 
envoys” to places where they would be appreciated?4 It would be nice to think 
so, but given the hostility felt towards America in many parts of the world, it 
seems unlikely that even the most carefully crafted musical diplomacy would 
help very much. 
But silence is not an option. Against the attacks being directed against liberal 
democracy, America and Europe need a renewed public diplomacy capable of 
defending liberal democracy as the only form of government that, in Abraham 
Lincoln’s words, speaks to “the better angels of our nature” (Lincoln). This does 
not mean PR, “counter-narratives,” or the type of manipulative “messaging” that 
tries to put a positive spin on real problems. Rather it means candid and open 
                                                           
4  There is one subgenre of country music, broadly defined, which the US government 
has sponsored overseas, and that is bluegrass. Created in the 1940s by the Kentucky 
musician Bill Monroe, bluegrass survives today as a “roots” style performed with cre-
ative variations by groups such as the Stash Wyslouch String Band, a group that has 
toured with the State Department’s American Music Abroad program. However, a few 
moments of listening will reveal pronounced differences between bluegrass and 
Nashville country as exemplified by Hank Williams, George Jones, Loretta Lynn, 
Johnny Cash, Dolly Parton, Merle Haggard, Willie Nelson, and the like. Rarely, if 
ever, have these Nashville performers been invited to serve as “musical ambassadors.” 
170 | Martha Bayles 
discussion of those problems, to show that democracy is better than dictatorship 
at facing hard facts and devising solutions that do not oppress the powerless. 
Such a renewed public diplomacy would be effective precisely because so many 
people around the world are forbidden to speak their minds on any topic of 






“About Next Level.” Facebook. Next Level USA, 1 Aug. 2016. Web. Aug. 
2016. <https://www.facebook.com/NextLevelUSA/info/?entry_point=page_ 
nav_about_item&tab=page_info>.  
Analogue, Suzi. “Uganda On The Beat: Suzi Analogue’s Beatmaking Notes 
From Kampala.” USC Center on Public Diplomacy 24 June 2015. Web. 1 
Nov. 2015. <https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/tags/next-level-0>. 
Arutunyan, Anna. The Putin Mystique. Newbold on Stour: Skyscraper Publica-
tions, 2014. Print. 
Associated Press. “Rushdie Defends Charlie Hebdo, Free Speech.” YouTube, 15 
Jan. 2015. Web. 24 July 2017. <https://youtu.be/q9cYuQonbXs>. 
Atkins, Rodney. “Watching You.” If You’re Going Through Hell. Curb, 2006. 
CD. 
Bayles, Martha. “The Struggle for Hearts and Minds: America’s Culture War 
and the Decline of US Public Diplomacy.” The Hedgehog Review 16.1 
(2014): Web. 16 Aug. 2016. <https://iasc-culture.org/THR/THR_article_ 
2014_Spring_Bayles.php>. 
---. Through a Screen Darkly: Popular Culture, Public Diplomacy, and Ameri-
ca’s Image Abroad. New Haven: Yale UP, 2014. Print. 
Brady, Anne-Marie. Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in 
Contemporary China. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009. Print. 
Brooks & Dunn. “Hardworkin’ Man.” Hardworkin’ Man. Arista, 1993. CD. 
Brown, August. “Erykah Badu on Performing for a Dictator.” Los Angeles 
Times, 1 May 2014. Web. 16 Aug. 2016. <http://www.latimes.com/entertain 
ment/music/posts/la-et-ms-erykah-badu-on-performing-for-dictator-thats-ho 
w-kingdoms-twerk-20140501-story.html>. 
Cottee, Simon. “The Challenge of Jihadi Cool.” The Atlantic, 24 Dec. 2015. 
Web. 16 Aug. 2016. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/20 
15/12/isis-jihadi-cool/421776/>. 
Dancing in Chains | 171 
---. “The Jihad Will Be Televised.” The Atlantic, 28 June 2016. Web. 16 Aug. 
2016. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/06/terrorism-
execution-film/489152/>. 
---. “The Pornography of Jihadism.” The Atlantic, 12 Sept. 2014. Web. 16 Aug. 
2016. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/09/isis-jihadi 
st-propaganda-videos-porn/380117/>. 
“Cultural Diplomacy and the National Interest: In Search of a 21st-Century 
Perspective.” Report for Curb Center for the Arts, Enterprise, and Public 
Policy. Vanderbilt University, 2005. PDF file. 
de Grazia, Victoria. Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance Through Twentieth-
Century Europe. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2005. Print. 
Diamond, Larry, et al. Authoritarianism Goes Global: The Challenge to Democ-
racy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2016. Print. 
Duffey, Joseph. “Hollywood Disinformation.” Interview in New Perspectives 
Quarterly 15.5 (1998): 13-17. Print.  
Eschen, Penny M. von. Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play 
the Cold War. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2006. Print. 
Fernandez, Alberto M. “Countering the Islamic State’s Message.” Journal of 
International Security Affairs 30 (2016). Web. 16 Aug. 2016.  
Firestein, David. Event hosted by the International Educators Program (IEP). 
Gallaudet University, Washington DC, 19 June 2007. 
---. Personal interview. 5 May 2007. 
“Hip-Hop Diplomacy.” YouTube, 24 Apr. 2012. Web. 16 Aug. 2016. <https:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=ud7VsICdqQw>. 
Hisham, Aidi. “The Grand (Hip-Hop) Chessboard.” Middle East Report (2011): 
25-39. 5 May 2016. Web. 24 Aug. 2018. <http://www.tennessean.com/story/ 
money/industries/music/2016/05/05/country-music-sees-growth-millennials-
hispanic-fans/83963618/>. 
Lester, James. “Willis of Oz: A Profile of Famed Voice of America Broadcaster 
Willis Conover.” Central European Review 1.5 (1999): Web. 16 Aug. 2016.  
Lincoln, Abraham. “First Inaugural Address of Abraham Lincoln.” The Avalon 
Project. Yale Law School, 2008. Web. 16 Aug. 2016. <http://avalon.law. 
yale.edu/19th_century/lincoln1.asp>. 
Little Big Town. “Boondocks.” The Road to Here. Equity, 2005. CD. 
“Li Yuchun.” Business of Fashion. Web. 16 Aug. 2016. <https://www.business 
offashion.com/community/people/li-yuchun>. 
“Media and Entertainment Spotlight: The Media and Entertainment Industry in 
the United States.” SelectUSA. International Trade Administration, US De-
172 | Martha Bayles 
partment of Commerce, Web. 16 Aug. 2016. <https://www.selectusa.gov/ 
media-entertainment-industry-united-states>. 
“Next Level.” US Department of State. Web. 1 Nov. 2015. <https://www.next 
level-usa.org/about/>. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. “Human, All-Too-Human, Part II, section 140.” Project 
Gutenberg. 24 Oct. 2011 Web. 16 Aug. 2016. E-Book. <http://www.guten 
berg.org/files/37841/37841-h/37841-h.html>. 
Ostrovsky, Arkady. The Invention of Russia. New York: Penguin, 2017. Print. 
Pleasants, Henry. Serious Music—and All That Jazz: An Adventure in Music 
Criticism. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1969. Print. 
Pleasants, Henry. The Great American Popular Singers. New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1974. Print. 
Rau, Nate. “Country Music Sees Growth with Millennials, Hispanic Fans.” The 
Tennessean. 5. May 2016. Web. 16 Aug. 2016.  
Richmond, Yale. Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Cur-
tain. University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 2003. Print. 
Ryback, Timothy. Rock Around the Bloc: A History of Rock Music in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union. New York: Oxford UP, 1990. Print. 
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Becoming a Blue-Collar Musical Diplomat 
Billy Joel and Bridging the US-Soviet Divide in 1987 
Nicholas Alexander Brown 
 
 
Songwriter and performer Billy Joel holds an exalted status in the upper echelon 
of popular artists in the United States. His accomplishments include over 150 
million record sales, thirty-three “Top 40” singles, and six GRAMMY awards 
among twenty-three GRAMMY nominations. Joel is a Songwriters Hall of Fame 
inductee and has been awarded a Kennedy Center Honor and the Library of 
Congress Gershwin Prize for Popular Song (Joel, “Billy Joel Biography”). 
Beyond these major financial and musical successes, Joel’s greatest achievement 
has been the popular appeal of his songs and lyrics, which are informed by his 
background as a child of the working class in the golden era of American 
prosperity. His desire to “play my music from my experience” (Schruers 242) 
created an oeuvre that pinpoints integral aspects of the human condition, from 
love and youthful rebellion to depression, addiction, and suicide. Joel created a 
platform via his music from which he has the power to influence political and 
cultural issues.  
Joel’s July and August 1987 tour of the Soviet Union, which included three 
concerts each in Moscow and Leningrad with an excursion to Georgia, is an 
example of his assuming the global stage with a fiery self-made and self-
marketed brand of blue-collar diplomacy. Now, over thirty years since the tour, 
Joel acknowledges that he and his band “were literally offering a musical bridge 
to our cultures, and we knew that was important” (Gamboa). In establishing an 
image as a blue-collar or working-class musician, Joel successfully marketed 
himself as a cultural ambassador who could transcend the elitism of the political 
and diplomatic sphere by aligning himself with the general populace in both the 
United States and Soviet Union. This served to ease Cold War tensions on a 
citizen-to-citizen level and was driven by several motivations; Joel’s genuine 
interest in grassroots political engagement, personal legacy building, his role as a 
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self-appointed celebrity diplomat, and prospective commercial benefits. Joel has 
a record of taking advantage of his status as a public figure to champion social, 
political, and cultural causes. He is pictured here attending a gala at the 
Metropolitan Opera in 2009, representing his support of classical music 
throughout his career (see fig. 8). 
 
 Fig. 8: Billy Joel at the Metropolitan Opera.  
 
 Photo: David Shankbone/Creative Commons, 2009. 
 
 
JOEL’S POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT 
 
Billy Joel’s life story is filled with conditions that inform his political 
engagement. Joel’s father Howard was of German-Jewish origin and his family 
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escaped Nazi persecution by emigrating to the United States via Cuba in 1942. 
Howard was drafted into service with the US Army shortly thereafter and 
participated in the liberation of Dachau. Rosalind, Joel’s mother, was native to 
Brooklyn and the descendant of a Russian-Jewish and English family. Joel was 
born in the Bronx in 1949 and his parents quickly relocated to the working-class 
suburb of Hicksville on Long Island, where “the American work ethic was in full 
bloom” (McKenzie 4-5). Both of Joel’s parents were amateur musicians and they 
encouraged their son to learn classical music, beginning with piano lessons at the 
age of four.  
In 1956 Howard and Rosalind divorced, leaving Rosalind in Hicksville with 
Joel and his sister Judy. Howard relocated to Vienna, Austria and eventually 
started a new family. Joel was impacted by the separation of his parents and 
recounts the hostile treatment he received from neighbors and classmates who 
did not view him as their equal: The Joel family was the only single-parent and 
culturally Jewish household in a majority Catholic neighborhood. Joel was 
baptized Protestant and enjoyed going to various Christian church services with 
friends in childhood (Bielen 5). On top of these social conditions, Joel’s mother 
struggled to make ends meet and worked multiple jobs. The experience of 
growing up in this family environment was formative in developing Joel’s 
personality and thick skin. He recounts this period by commenting: “We were 
blue-collar poor people…not poor poor people. You don’t go to the welfare line 
when you’re blue-collar poor, you find work, somehow. You never ask for a 
handout—you would die first!” (Bielen 5-6). Joel began working as a musician 
during his youth and developed a strong work ethic that was rooted in his 
working class upbringing, which has served him throughout his career, no matter 
the professional or personal difficulties. He climbed his way from the bottom of 
the music industry, as a local nightclub musician, to the very top echelon, as the 
longest running resident act in the history of Madison Square Garden (Buehrer). 
In the early 1970s Joel struggled to find his niche in the commercial music 
industry in the United States. The turning point came when he gave up “trying to 
make it as a rock star” and pursued autobiographical narratives in his songwrit-
ing; Joel describes this shift as an attempt to “do what I always wanted to do—
write my own experiences and chuck the commercial influences” (McKenzie 
27). Joel states that his “[s]ongs mean something. They mark different periods of 
my life, whether I was happy or sad. It’s the same for everyone” (DeCurtis 143). 
He champions the voice of the working class in his lyrics, offering a glimpse of 
the life experiences and challenges that many Americans face in everyday life. 
Joel’s portrayal of the American experience contradicts the fabricated utopian 
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vision of the lifestyle modeled by the Cleaver family in the 1950s television 
show Leave it to Beaver.  
The story of the working class emerges in Joel’s lyrics, which combine with 
a distinct musical idiom that is influenced by a wide cross-section of popular 
artists and styles, including classical music, Elvis, the Beatles, R&B, James 
Brown, and Ray Charles. His lyrics resonate with a wide range of people across 
generations in the United States, because they address issues that pervade 
society. Listeners can relate personally to the topics and emotions contained in 
his songs, therefore making relatability a key ingredient in understanding the 
popular appeal of his music. Joel himself has struggled with depression, 
alcoholism, suicide, failed relationships, and disastrous financial dealings. In a 
song like “Captain Jack,” for example, Joel describes witnessing suburb dwellers 
buying drugs from the inner-city public housing projects across from his one-
time apartment. Bill DeMain refers to this type of narrative as a “look out the 
window” song, representing someone watching what takes place in the world 
immediately around them (117).  
Beyond his music, Joel has a long track record of being engaged in political 
advocacy. His ideology can be described as liberal nationalism, and is captured 
in his own words: “I’m very chauvinistic. Not in a political sense, but in a 
national sense. I love my country. I don’t think any government really represents 
the people, but I do know that there are a lot of nice people in this country and 
that’s about as chauvinistic as I can get” (qtd. in Myers 88). In the 1970s Joel 
was vocal about global events, separately from his music. He particularly took 
issue with vitriolic and anti-American international responses to the Iranian 
hostage crisis that were insensitive to the differences between the American 
political apparatus and the average citizens who have little or no say in foreign 
policy. Later on, Joel took a stance in opposition to President Carter’s request 
that the US Olympic Committee boycott the 1980 Olympics in Moscow, which 
was a protest of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He felt that American 
athletes should have the opportunity to compete, regardless of the political 
conditions of the Cold War (Myers 86-88). This opposition to President Carter 
indicates that Joel’s politics are not consistently aligned with the values of the 
Democratic Party. Joel’s public political positions are most representative of the 
moderate independent political ideology in the US, in which individuals are 
known to support positions or politicians of both major political parties and are 
not devout party loyalists. 
Joel’s attentiveness to American foreign policy continues to the present. His 
2007 song, “Christmas in Fallujah,” criticizes the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, 
while simultaneously shedding light on the plight of the American soldier, who 
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follows orders, is “tired” and “cold,” and realizes that “no one gives a damn.” 
Troops are stuck in war-torn Iraq where there is “a sea of blood” (Schruers 293-
94). This type of vivid imagery in Joel’s lyrics conveys his interpretation of the 
human experience via an artistic form that aims to resonate with people of 
diverse cultural backgrounds. Joel can always be found on the side of the 
everyman or everywoman, a representation of his own humble upbringing and 
empathy for citizens who are taken advantage of by their political leaders. 
Since the early 2000s, Joel has frequently participated in liberal presidential 
campaigns, headlining fundraisers like “Change Rocks” in 2008 to support then-
Senator Barack Obama’s campaign. This fundraiser generated approximately $8 
million in campaign contributions (Schruers 291). During the tumultuous 2016 
presidential campaign in the United States Joel garnered Twitter and popular 
press coverage for a quip made during his May 27 concert at Madison Square 
Garden. Joel facetiously dedicated his song “The Entertainer” to Donald Trump 
(Polus), mocking Trump and minimizing the legitimacy of his standing as a 
presidential candidate. When asked in an interview with Boston’s public radio 
station WGBH if he would be willing to perform at Trump’s inauguration in 
January 2017, Joel stated “No. I won’t be anywhere near the place” (Boston 
Public Radio Staff). While Joel attended Trump’s 2005 wedding to Melania 




MARKETING BILLY JOEL AS A MUSICAL AMBASSADOR 
 
Joel’s tour to the Soviet Union was the greatest example of his self-driven 
insertion into political affairs, but it was not the first instance in which he 
performed in communist nations. Prior to the Soviet tour, Joel performed in 
Fidel Castro’s Cuba in March of 1979 at the Karl Marx Theater (of all places). 
The appearance was part of Havana Jam, a major three-day music festival that 
featured American and Cuban artists. The American contingent was the first 
                                                           
1  In the first two years of the Trump presidency Joel has been very vocal about his 
disdain for the administration’s policies towards refugees and immigrants. In the days 
following the 11-12 August 2017 white supremacy riots in Charlottesville, VA, Joel 
wore a “Star of David” patch on his suit during his monthly Madison Square Garden 
concert in protest of the rise of neo-Nazism and the administration’s weak response 
(Respers France). 
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sanctioned delegation of US musical acts to perform in Cuba in over twenty 
years (Bego 147-50). As always with Joel, this appearance had a personal 
motivation beyond the desire to make a political statement on US-Cuba 
relations. “My father had lived in Cuba, so I was interested for that reason,” 
stated Joel in a biography by Hank Bordowitz (107). Howard Joel spent time in 
Cuba while in transit to the United States as a refugee from Germany (Bego 
148). The Cuba performance afforded Joel the opportunity to symbolically 
connect with a period of his estranged father’s life by experiencing Havana and 
the Cuban people.  
John Rockwell of the New York Times came away from the festival 
impressed with Joel’s role, commenting: “in the right context rock-and-roll still 
has the power to be subversive” (Rockwell). Given that Joel’s songs and lyrics 
come from a place of acknowledging and empowering the underappreciated 
working class, he uses his art to take a stand on the world stage by ideologically 
unshackling the body politic through his music. Other international appearances, 
like Joel’s shows in Israel, drew fire from elements of the American political 
establishment, particularly during the period of the Camp David Accords. This 
1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt (brokered by American President 
Jimmy Carter, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, and Prime Minister Menachem 
Begin of Israel) called for Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and the 
development of Palestine’s independent government. To Joel, there was no 
fathomable reason to avoid preaching his musical gospel in nations filled with 
strife. He eloquently summarizes his approach as follows: “I played in Israel for 
the same reason I played in Cuba—to play for the people. We wanted to see 
what the people in Israel were like instead of listening to the propaganda we get 
in [the United States]” (Bego 151-152). But even his historic appearances in 
Cuba and Israel were not enough to satisfy Joel’s zeal for stepping into the 
middle of contentious diplomatic situations. Despite Joel’s stated motivations for 
bridging cultural divides, it is entirely plausible that his pursuit of a performance 
in Cuba could have been a strategic move to expand his commercial viability and 
appeal among audiences in communist countries. He positioned himself as a 
self-made musical ambassador whose popular appeal could transcend negative 
attitudes towards American foreign policy or politicians, evidenced by a warm 
reception from the concert audience in Havana. In retrospect, the Havana Jam 
appearance proved to be an early step in a series of efforts by Joel to deliver his 
music—through live performances—to international markets. An undercurrent 
to Joel’s own commercial ambitions was the capacity of his performances—as a 
form of soft diplomacy—to ease the tensions of the Cold War.  
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In 1985 the US and the Soviet Union advanced a new agreement for cultural 
exchange immediately following a period of icy relations. The easing of cultural 
relations on the Soviet side stemmed from their promotion of the glasnost policy 
that stood for greater openness and publicity (Cameron and Lebor). This caused 
a noticeable shift in how flexible Soviet citizens could be with relative freedom 
of speech. As a result, it was possible for an artist like Billy Joel to realistically 
conceive the first full-fledged tour of the Soviet Union by an American rock 
musician. According to author Mark Bego, “The very idea of being able to be 
the first Western rock star to play a full-out series of rock concerts in the Soviet 
Union became a quest of Billy Joel’s” (231-232).  
The US had a history of major cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union 
between the 1950s and 1970s. Many of the early exchanges were restricted to 
high art forms like orchestral music, jazz, ballet, and musical theater, including a 
landmark 1955-1956 tour to Leningrad and Moscow of Porgy and Bess by 
George and Ira Gershwin that featured an African American cast (Bego 231). 
The overall intention of these exchanges from the American perspective, as 
outlined by Theodore Cuyler Streibert, director of the US Information Agency in 
1955, and summarized by Lisa Davenport, was to increase international 
recognition for American “cultural achievements,” “refute communist 
propaganda,” and use culture to ease political and diplomatic tensions (39). 
Davenport describes the gradual decline in cultural exchanges between the US 
and USSR in the 1970s as a result from American involvement in Vietnam 
(145), as the USSR and China were involved in supporting the North 
Vietnamese communist regime in opposition to the US (Suri). Additionally, 
American jazz tours to the USSR were halted in 1979 upon the USSR’s invasion 
of Afghanistan (Davenport 148). 
Joel’s 1987 tour reflects a shift in emphasis of the cultural exchanges 
towards popular culture. Shortly before Joel’s tour launched in late July of 1987 
there was a major series of concerts in the USSR called the July Fourth 
Disarmament Festival. Soviet and American artists performed, most notably 
James Taylor, Bonnie Raitt, the Doobie Brothers, and Carlos Santana (Bego 
232). While press accounts of Joel’s tour position his appearances as unique 
forays into the Soviet Union by an American artist, the fact is that others had 
come before him. Where Joel’s tour stands apart from the July Fourth 
Disarmament Festival is that his shows featured him and his band, and not a 
lineup of multiple headliners performing short sets. Despite the earlier 
appearances by American artists in 1987, the narrative Joel provides about his 
tour suggests he leverages the experience to benefit his legacy. He has 
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effectively curated extensive promotion of his tour’s impact on cultural affairs 
for almost three decades. 
In the mid-1980s Joel was engaged in bitter legal and financial disputes with 
Frank Weber (his longtime manager and former brother-in-law), which put a 
great strain on Joel’s finances and ultimately cost him millions in income, due to 
poor investments and other deceptive business practices (Schruers 206). In 1989 
Joel filed a lawsuit against Weber, accusing him of unauthorized expenditures in 
the range of $30 million (Dougherty). This ongoing turmoil may have 
contributed to Joel’s desire to launch the 1987 tour, which he viewed in part as a 
commercial opportunity that could lead to the stabilization of his finances. The 
tour required an extensive financial investment on Joel’s part, of $2 million for 
the basic expenses of running the trip (Bego 233), which could only be 
effectively recouped through the sale of tour-related recordings, merchandise, 
and broadcasts. Beyond his personal financial motivations, the tour was 
officially made possible when a formal invitation was extended by the USSR’s 
Ministry of Culture (Billy Joel – A Matter of Trust Deluxe Edition). In order to 




THE PEOPLE’S MUSICIAN 
 
The primary platform from which Joel was able to establish a bond with the 
Soviet people was the concert stage. The tour schedule, which featured six 
concerts (see table 2), indicates that Joel had high expectations for ticket sales; 
100,000 people were projected to attend performances during the tour (Peasley 
G3). Communist officials reported that 22,000 tickets were sold for the first 
Leningrad show (Barringer C15) and the New York Times reported that the 
Moscow shows were sold out (Associated Press). If those reports are accurate, 
Joel’s advance audience estimate was on target and likely even surpassed. Joel 
                                                           
2  The author’s Freedom of Information Act request to the US Department of State for 
any records related to Joel’s Soviet Tour yielded no declassified pertinent information. 
The documents do prove that the US Embassy in the USSR was at minimum aware of 
the tour. If any documentation exists outlining a formal US government role in plan-
ning the tour it remains in classified files. The National Archives and Records Admin-
istration and the affiliated Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, Cali-
fornia report that their collections do not contain any accessible records about the tour 
(Langbart; Ross). 
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also performed an “unscheduled concert” during his visit to Tbilisi in the week 
before his public shows in Moscow, though the exact date of this appearance is 
not recorded in the existing accounts of the tour (Bego 232). 
 
 Table 2: Billy Joel 1987 Soviet tour concert dates. 
Venue Date 
Olympic Sports Complex, Moscow  26 July 1987 
27 July 1987 
29 July 1987 
Lenin Sports & Concert Complex, Leningrad 2 August 1987 
3 August 1987 
5 August 1987 
 Source: “Jumpy in Moscow.” 
 
Joel’s carefully chosen set list maximized the opportunities for the Soviet 
audiences to connect with the American working class experience, as represent-
ed by Joel. The concerts opened with “Prelude/Angry Young Man” from Joel’s 
1976 album Turnstiles. His brash lyrics capture the universal plight of the young 
working class man, who is in a constant struggle to survive in a world that seems 
to be against him: 
  
There’s a place in the world for the angry young man 
With his working class ties and his radical plans 
He refuses to bend he refuses to crawl 
And he’s always at home with his back to the wall 
And he’s proud of his scars and the battles he’s lost 
And struggles and bleeds as he hangs on his cross 
And likes to be known as the angry young man (“Prelude/Angry Young Man”) 
 
The representation of the working class in these lyrics was relatable to many in 
the general USSR populace, as the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
began to publicly recognize citizens’ need to express their frustration with “civic 
and employment-related problems” (Buchanan 9). Joel’s lyrics in  “Pre-
lude/Angry Young Man” can be interpreted as empowering the voices of the 
disenfranchised youth, especially men who have made symbolic sacrifices and 
received “scars” from fighting in “battles.” While Joel is not addressing specific 
movements of resistance or dissent among the USSR’s citizenry in these lyrics, 
184 | Nicholas Alexander Brown 
he makes a case for the value of struggle and sacrifice for improving individuals’ 
socio-economic or personal status. He even references Christian theology in the 
song, by stating how the narrator “bleeds as he hangs on his cross,” implying 
that sacrifices listeners make of their own well-being can serve the greater good. 
As Joel performed “Prelude/Angry Young Man” on the first formal show of 
the tour in Leningrad he was met with the proverbial sound of crickets in the 
audience. The front rows of the arena were filled with Soviet party officials, 
which was to be expected given that government officials (regardless of the 
country) frequently attend cultural diplomacy events that they are sponsoring, 
hosting, or monitoring. Their icy response to Joel’s act led the singer to think 
that he was “going right down the tubes” (Bielen 109). Realizing that his actual 
fans—referred to as “young true bloods” in Richard Scott’s biography on Joel 
(59)—were seated behind the officials, Joel had his staff move young people 
from the back to the front to liven-up the crowd once the regime’s senior 
representatives departed mid-show. The fans were understandably timid about 
reacting positively towards Joel, given the presence of the ominous Soviet 
regime, but his encouragement and moving them forward had a profound effect 
on altering the audience dynamic (Bielen 110). Prior to Joel’s live performances 
in the USSR, some music fans there would have become familiar with his 
recordings through the bootleg market, as American rock albums were banned 
from sale for much of the communist era. State television stations managed to 
broadcast several of Joel’s music videos in the lead up to his concerts (Scott 58). 
The reality was that many in the audiences had not heard Joel’s music prior to 
his appearances in Leningrad and Moscow, but they responded favorably to what 
one Soviet audience member perceived as the “forbidden” quality of his songs 
and performance, given that rock music had been previously officially banned by 
the communist party (Billy Joel – A Matter of Trust Deluxe Edition). 
“Prelude/Angry Young Man,” and effectively the entire tour set list, served 
to give voice to common struggles faced by young people of the working class in 
both the Soviet Union and the United States, highlighting the frequent 
disconnect between the political classes and the body politic. The Soviet shows 
included “The Ballad of Billy the Kid,” “Allentown,” “Goodnight Saigon,” “The 
Longest Time,” “Only the Good Die Young,” “Sometimes a Fantasy,” and 
“Uptown Girl.” Two of these songs were particularly poignant for the blue-collar 
outreach: “Allentown” and “Goodnight Saigon” touched upon two of the most 
contentious issues in the American working class during the 1980s, economic 
collapse and processing the lingering effect of the Vietnam War. Both songs 
appeared on the 1982 album for Columbia Records, The Nylon Curtain, which 
Walter Everett describes as a representation of “the plastic (i.e., forced artificial) 
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and tranquilizing quality of American, chiefly suburban, life…an American 
counterpart to the Soviet Union iron curtain” (Everett 116). “Allentown” tells of 
the difficulties of economic hardships and unemployment faced by the children 
of the baby-boomers. The collapse of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation 
specifically provided material for Joel’s creative depiction of the disappearing 
opportunities in working-class America, as “they’re closing all the factories 
down” (Schruers 153). Joel tells of “waiting here in Allentown / For the 
Pennsylvania we never found / For the promises our teachers gave / If we 
worked hard / If we behaved.” The working-class dream seems to be beyond the 
grasp of the average blue-collar worker, a depressing realization that conflicts 
with the traditional American expectation of vertical class mobility through hard 
work. Joel’s audiences in Leningrad and Moscow would have recognized a 
parallel with the narrative in “Allentown” and the economic situation under their 
political leaders, whose policies failed to deliver the common prosperity 
promised by communist ideologies (Ball and Dagger). Instead, by 1985 the 
regime was in search of viable remedies to address economic stagnation, 
production failures, and “shortages of goods” (Buchanan 9). Americans were 
reacting to similar financial crises and Joel managed to channel those sentiments 
into his lyrics. During the tour, Joel introduced “Allentown” with the help of his 
translator, recounting the plight of Americans living in the city and asking the 
audience, “Maybe that sounds familiar?” (Billy Joel – A Matter of Trust Deluxe 
Edition).  
“Goodnight Saigon,” Joel’s commentary on the Vietnam War, outlines the 
radical shift towards a dark pessimism in American society after President John 
F. Kennedy’s 1963 assassination, colored by the economic struggles of the 
working class. This song describes the transformation of men from basic training 
in the Marine Corps, of being “so gung ho / To lay down our lives,” to the 
horrors of combat, when “we would all go down together.” In the recent 
Schruers biography on Joel, the songwriter cites having been motivated to 
compose “Goodnight Saigon” by the experiences of his Vietnam veteran friends. 
Joel had long questioned the American interventionist policy of attempting to 
shape the internal affairs of foreign nations. One poignant saying he recalls from 
the period is “Vietnam is sending the black man to kill the yellow man for the 
white man who stole the land from the red man” (qtd. in Schruers 154). This 
comment is a harsh summation and condemnation of American foreign policy 
and race relations. Similar debates raged in the USSR as to the burden of the 
Soviet participation in the Afghan War of 1979-1992, which was met with high 
levels of dissatisfaction among the Soviet people due to high financial and 
human resource drains (Office of Soviet Analysis iii). 
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The positive reception Joel received for his original songs throughout the 
Soviet Union served as proof that these themes resonate from Moscow to Long 
Island. Joel was ultimately met with “cheering enthusiasm,” but not without 
making his tour staff anxious about being chastised or even punished for his 
riling up the crowds (Bego 232). The tour manager purportedly hid in a 
bathroom after one of the Moscow shows, in fear of reprisal from angry 
representatives of the Soviet Central Committee who were in attendance 
(Bordowitz 161). Columbia Records president Walter Yetnikoff, who was part 
of the tour entourage, commented that Joel “rocked harder than the Soviets 
wanted him to rock” and that “American rock ’n’ roll ripped up the Iron Curtain” 
(Bego 233). Felicity Barringer reported in the New York Times that Billy Joel 
“won the souls of those in a stony Soviet audience, leaving them cheering, 
dancing on chairs and looking around in fearful wonder as they followed the 
music and not the rules” (C15). During these synergistic moments in the 
concerts, music successfully created a bond between Joel, his band, and the local 
audiences that helped Joel see past the political differences between the US and 
USSR. He described this change in his perception of the Soviet Union in a 
Rolling Stone interview by stating, “The Cold War ended at a lot sooner for me 
than it has for everyone else” (Wild), suggesting that the warm reception his 
music received during the 1987 tour had a major impact on Joel’s personal 
beliefs. 
The shows also included a cover of the Beatles’ “Back in the USSR,” which 
hinted at Joel’s respect for the revered British band, but more importantly served 
to show honest appreciation for the citizens of the country. In a video 
documentary of the tour, American flags can be seen being waved 
enthusiastically by Soviet men and women throughout the audience. Joel, with 
help from his translator, concluded the night by saying “Don’t take any shit from 
anybody” (Billy Joel – A Matter of Trust Deluxe Edition), a rallying cry that had 
enormous appeal to the generally repressed Soviets. The second cover that Joel 
included in the shows was Bob Dylan’s “The Times Are A-Changin’,” a 
powerful protest song that directly calls out American government officials as 
needing to “Please heed the call / Don’t stand in the doorway / Don’t block up 
the hall,” for a social and political revolution was emerging that would change 
the course of history. Beyond the themes of global unrest, war and economic 
disillusionment, the songs on Joel’s tour sought to bridge cultural boundaries by 
touching upon such common themes as love, unemployment, family, war, and 
death. 
In addition to sharing the rabble-rouser spirit of his protest songs, some of 
Joel’s onstage behavior showed his bucking of establishment expectations and 
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thinking, at least symbolically. Joel electrified the audiences by delivering a 
genuine rock show. He climbed on his piano, crowd surfed, and danced around 
with his microphone stand. One of the band members, Mark Rivera, recently 
recounted how the general concert attendees completely overran the front VIP 
section at the arena in Moscow after the Soviet officials departed in the middle 
of the show. He remarked, “It wasn’t a protest. It was just the guys jumping up 
and down on the chairs because they were having so much fun” (Gamboa). 
Joel’s music and performance moved them to unleash their inner excitement and 
feelings. 
During the second show in Moscow, Joel had a famous explosion against the 
video crew that was capturing the show for the future cable television and video 
specials. The most shocking aspect of this was that public outbursts were not 
generally tolerated in Soviet society. Joel, who believed the video crew was 
interfering with the live audience’s enjoyment of the performance by shining 
bright lights on them (and tapping into their inhibitions about being seen to enjoy 
American rock music by authorities), had a violent outburst that involved 
flipping over an electric piano and swinging a music stand over his head (Bego 
233). The international press quickly picked up on this moment and headlines 
read “Billy Joel Has a Tantrum,” though the Associated Press reported that “the 
audience seemed unsure if the temper tantrum was part of the show” (Associated 
Press). In video footage of the incident, the audience immediately surrounding 
stage did not skip a beat of rocking out to the music. Joel recounts that young 
audience members came up to him after the concert and told him “they really 
liked it” (Billy Joel – A Matter of Trust Deluxe Edition). For better or worse, 
these antics increased the Western press attention for the tour and implied that 
Joel was a man of the people for adamantly protecting the audiences’ best 
interests, even to the detriment of his own documentary production. 
Several of the powerful instances of cultural exchange on Joel’s tour took 
place away from the concert stage. He gained mass attention through publicity 
stunts like being the first American to appear on the Soviet music television 
program Muzykalnyj Ring, or The Music Ring. Additionally, the final concert on 
the tour was the first live rock concert to be broadcast simultaneously to the US 
and Soviet Union. The truly special moments were always based on interactions 
with common everyday Soviet citizens, for whom Joel felt a kindred spirit. He 
fondly recalls giving his leather jacket to “the hippie guy,” Oleg Smirnoff, Joel’s 
translator; Smirnoff never wore the jacket and displayed it on his wall. Joel 
retrospectively acknowledged that “the importance of the relationship we had 
with the people there is still hanging on people’s walls” (Scott 61-62). Joel 
clearly had a profound impact on individual citizens, irrespective of whether or 
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not his tour enhanced overall US-USSR cultural relations. Many of the personal 
interactions between Joel and locals are captured in A Matter of Trust, showing 
his gifting a personal St. Christopher medal to an aspiring musician (O’Connor, 
“Review/Television” C30). He is also depicted wandering through traditional 
markets and being physically embraced by locals, which prompted many 
beaming smiles on Joel’s part (Billy Joel – A Matter of Trust Deluxe Edition). 
After attending a performance by local musicians in Tbilisi, Georgia, Joel 
was inspired to include the traditional Georgian folk song “Odoya” on his live 
tour recording Kohuept. In the context of US music diplomacy during the 
twentieth century, Joel’s inclusion of local artists performing a folk work 
functioned as a form of “musical flattery,” a principle outlined by Danielle 
Fosler-Lussier (78) that observes American musicians paying homage to local 
cultures during international exchanges by performing and recording native 
music. Mario Dunkel (149-50) emphasizes the prevalence of this practice during 
tours to the Eastern Bloc by American jazz artists in the 1950s.  
Joel had a moving experience at the grave of musician and poet Vladimir 
Vysotsky, who died in 1980 while publication of his poems and songs was 
restricted by the communist regime. Vysotsky’s work conveyed the spirit of the 
Soviet people, much to the chagrin of the political elites, and commented on the 
struggles of life under communist rule in the same way that Joel’s songs 
represent the American working class experience. Joel, his then-wife Christie 
Brinkley, and their daughter Alexa went on to visit Vysotsky’s mother. All of 
this memorialization of Vysotsky served as a gesture of respect for the artist and 
the people who saw him as their voice against the deprivation forced upon them 
by their government (Bielen 110).  
 
 
DUAL PROPAGANDA ROLES 
 
A Quid pro quo scenario is at the root of most diplomatic negotiations or 
exchanges, including in music diplomacy. Exploring Joel’s Soviet tour 
inherently requires a consideration of what may have motivated the US and 
Soviet governments to allow the tour to occur. Putting aside Joel’s personal 
intellectual, musical, and commercial motivations, there were tangible 
diplomatic benefits to this tour for both governments. The Soviets, with their 
tolerance of Joel’s riling up of their young citizens, could point to the freedom to 
get wild at the concerts and the leeway Joel had to interact with the populace as 
proof of their seriousness about the glasnost policy. The regime’s acceptance of 
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visible and public dissension, albeit in a contained concert setting, was 
undoubtedly a meaningful and surprising gesture to many Soviets.  
Writing in The Washington Post, Alex Heard explains that one of the 
communist regime’s motivations for authorizing Joel’s tour was to learn more 
about American rock ’n’ roll and to copy it as a means for matching the global 
dominance of American pop and rock music. Oleg Smoliensky, director of the 
USSR cultural enterprise Goskonzert (госконцерт) during the time of Joel’s 
tour, is quoted as saying “Soviet officials are pleased…We did not make a 
mistake in choosing [Joel]. You have achieved a lot in this field. Our cultural 
exchange will help us catch you” (Heard W7). This sense of gamesmanship is 
also seen in the competition to win the medal count at Olympic games. Whether 
this endorsement of Joel’s tour was intended to drive perception of the 
communist party’s promotion of rock music or not, it is indicative of complex 
political aims being at the core of why the officials did not block Joel’s tour. 
They manipulated it to their own ends, while revealing how they were 
uncomfortably making strides towards greater openness in Soviet society. 
The American government side of the exchange was equally nuanced. On the 
surface, the tour served as an example of global American dominance of popular 
music and culture. Here was Joel, a blue-collar American guy, filling arenas in 
the Soviet Union with catchy pop music that was decidedly connected to the 
American working class experience, which has always been a point of similarity 
in cultural exchanges. Allowing Joel to adopt the role of unsanctioned musical 
ambassador can be interpreted as having several benefits to American 
propaganda efforts during the Cold War. Joel, in speaking his mind in his 
lyrics—including against policies of the US government, such as the Vietnam 
War—was a symbol of American freedom of expression. By sanctioning this, 
the Regan administration projected a model of democratic open society that 
would have a positive influence on Soviet citizens who might intensify their 
demands for the same type of freedoms, especially given the parallels between 
the contemporary Soviet engagement in Afghanistan and the Vietnam conflict. 
Western English-language press coverage of Joel’s tour conveyed a striking 
narrative of his overwhelming effect on young people in his audiences, one of 
reaching the hearts and minds of youth in a rabble-rousing American way, 
complete with instances of bucking authority. Reports of 200 chairs being 
broken at one of the Leningrad concerts, a result of fans rushing to the foot of the 
stage (“Jumpy in Moscow”), give a visual symbol of breaking down what was 
perceived as the forced neutral decorum expected by the Soviets. Among the 
headlines were “Pop Weekend: From Moscow to LA: Soviets Warm Up to Billy 
Joel” (Los Angeles Times), “In Moscow, a New Era? Protest and Rock Fete are 
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Tests of Glasnost” (New York Times), and “Billy Joel parts the Iron Curtain” 
(Globe and Mail). The North American press largely portrayed Joel’s tour as 
having the effect of unnerving the Soviet regime: “Considering his effect on 
seats, can you wonder the Kremlin is nervous?” (“Jumpy in Moscow”). In 
reality, the local audience benefitted from Joel’s engagement with concert-goers 
in this fashion. Communist goals of promoting glasnost via the tour were met 
concurrently with the American perception of the tour as a penetration of Soviet 
society with American values and freedom of expression. As such, Joel and his 
tour functioned as propaganda for both the USSR and the United States, a 
careful balancing act that fulfills the expectation of music diplomacy satisfying 
aims for all parties engaged.  
The successes of Joel’s Soviet tour enabled him to partner with Mikhail 
Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union 
from 1985 to 1991 and the official ultimately responsible for glasnost, for a 
charity concert entitled “Together for Our Children—Musicians Unite with Stars 
to Immunize Children.” The event took place after the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union in 1993 in Los Angeles and was broadcast globally (Harring 19). 
This symbolic partnership would not have been possible if Joel’s previous tour 




CONCLUSION: COMMERCIAL LEGACY BUILDING 
 
Since 1987, Joel’s engagement with the memory of his Soviet tour has exceeded 
what was accomplished personally or for international relations over the course 
of the trip to Leningrad, Moscow, and Tbilisi. Several initiatives that directly 
relate to the tour indicate Joel’s long-term vision for developing the legacy of the 
tour commercially. In the almost thirty years since the actual tour, Joel has been 
involved in the release of several audio and video recordings that intend to sell 
the success of the Soviet trip to the history books, bolstering Joel’s place in the 
pantheon of civically engaged popular and rock musicians from the United 
States.  
An immediate and visible product of the tour was the release of a documen-
tary in 1987 called Billy Joel from Leningrad, USSR as part of the HBO World 
Stage series, which gives a curated visual and musical snapshot of Joel’s ener-
getic engagement with his audiences throughout the tour. The one-hour film was 
conceived by Robert Dalrymple and Rick London, and commemorates the tour 
as “. . . a nonstop celebration—of togetherness, of rock music, and, of course, 
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Billy Joel” (O’Connor, “TV Reviews” C22). Columbia Records released the 
album Kohuept in late 1987, which included live and studio recordings from the 
Soviet tour. Curiously, this recording was Joel’s first in ten years not to reach 
gold level sales of 500,000 albums sold, and as such it was not perceived as a 
clear commercial success (Bego 237). A second film, Billy Joel – A Matter of 
Trust: The Bridge to Russia Dalrymple in 1987 and aired on ABC in 1988 under 
the title A Matter of Trust: Billy Joel in the USSR. In 2014, Joel was involved in 
releasing a “deluxe edition” of Billy Joel – A Matter of Trust: The Bridge to 
Russia, which includes the first DVD/Blu-ray versions of the 1987 Soviet 
concerts to be released, a two-CD recording of Soviet tour performances, and a 
new documentary film produced by Showtime and directed by Jim Brown.3  
These various recordings, television documentaries, and video releases have 
served three purposes: to generate additional revenue from the tour, to promote 
the perceived impact of Joel’s tour in the history of US-Soviet relations during 
the waning years of the Cold War, and to raise Joel’s visibility as an artist of 
purpose on the commercial marketplace. By marketing the story and music 
through films and sound recordings, the 1987 tour is revisited by longstanding 
Joel fans and is used to reach new audiences that may not be otherwise drawn to 
the singer’s brand of music. While the continued commercial potential of the 
Soviet appearances continues to receive attention from Joel in the second decade 
of the twenty-first century, the cultural exchange nonetheless proved to be a 
meaningful experience for him personally while drawing attention to the 
capacity of an American artist to make public relations splash behind the Iron 
Curtain.  
As Russia and the United States are again in a period of icy relations, albeit 
under different circumstances, both countries would be wise to engage in music 
diplomacy as they did through Billy Joel’s tour. Music diplomacy offers 
opportunities for societies to engage informally, connect through similar social 
tropes, and work towards a better understanding of cultural and political 
differences. Joel saw an opportunity to advance his political activism by 
engaging in Cold War music diplomacy. He marketed himself as an 
“Ambassador of Rock” (Kent A38) with his 1979 appearance in Cuba, the 1987 
tour to the USSR, and in the decades since. Joel’s foray into the musical scenes 
of communist countries was launched in part to positively influence US-USSR 
relations at a grassroots level and cement Joel’s legacy as an American celebrity 
who could connect with the working class based on his personal background. 
                                                           
3  Sales figures for the various commercially released documentaries of the 1987 tour 
are not available at the time of publication.  
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Joel’s bottom-up initiative and courage in guiding the direction of the Soviet 
exchange at all levels revitalized the potential to bridge differences, no matter 
how intense the divisions, by sharing the story of working-class America with 
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Music Trade in the Slipstream  
of Cultural Diplomacy 




Western cultural diplomacy significantly influenced the musical preferences and 
listening habits of music fans in Eastern Bloc countries. Throughout the Cold 
War era, policy-makers in the capitalist democracies of the West used the 
popular appeal of genuinely Western genres from jazz and blues to rock, pop, 
and disco for the purpose of disseminating Western values and ideals in Bloc 
societies. In the early decades of the East-West power struggle, American 
authorities including the Department of State and the United States Information 
Agency (USIS) cooperated with private sponsors to send distinguished jazz and 
gospel performers on live concert tours through adversarial countries (Daven-
port; Eschen; Fosler-Lussier). To the excitement of young music listeners in 
particular, radio stations of countries including the United States, Great Britain, 
and West Germany transmitted the latest in contemporary hit music deep into 
Bloc territory (Nelson; Cummings; Schlosser). This chapter looks beyond the 
direct agency of Western policymakers, showing that the performance of West-
ern sounds on stages and their omnipresence on the ether impacted the produc-
tion of records and consumption of music in the Eastern Bloc.1 
Although the state-owned music industries of communist countries had a 
mandate to promote ideologically unproblematic popular music performed by 
domestic artists, the familiarity of large audiences with Western pop shaped the 
repertoire of those record companies. Because of the country’s close proximity 
                                                           
1 This paper is based on a presentation that summarized a dissertation in progress 
during the research phase. Contemporary witnesses who contributed oral histories to 
the dissertation research will remain unnamed in this article. 
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to Western cultural production in geographical and linguistic terms, music fans 
in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) benefited from this circumstance 
more than their peers in most other Soviet satellite states. As the GDR music 
industry sought to profit from the extremely high demand for popular music 
from Western countries, East Germans depended less and less on Western 
cultural diplomacy to access recorded content as the Cold War progressed. As its 
political authorities continued to denounce Western genres as subversive propa-
ganda of cultural imperialists, the GDR’s record industry made a habit of acquir-
ing licenses from record companies in the capitalist hemisphere to domestically 
produce and mass-distribute the works of international star performers. Circulat-
ing commercially on disks pressed in East Berlin, Anglo-American rock and pop 
came to represent a popular cultural commodity among the people and, at the 
same time, an immensely profitable catalog component for the state-owned 
industry. This article clarifies that the dissemination of Western music in Eastern 
Bloc societies did not solely depend on the undertakings of Western cultural 
diplomats. It reveals that cooperation between record companies in East and 
West resulted in the familiarization of communist consumers with hit records of 
the capitalist entertainment industry. By examining the influx of Western pop 
music into the GDR’s walled-in marketplace, it underscores a facet of Cold War 
contestation that all Bloc states faced in similar ways: Isolationist policies did 




BUILDING AN EAST GERMAN MUSIC INDUSTRY 
 
World War II left Germany’s entertainment industry in rubble. In contrast to the 
Allied zones, where prewar recording companies like Deutsche Grammophon 
and Electrola resumed production soon after the Third Reich’s surrender in May 
1945, Germany’s East entered the postwar period without a music production 
infrastructure of its own. Moreover, while the American occupiers enlisted 
recording labels to disseminate their distinct brand of popular culture in the 
West, Soviet presence did not trigger any form of cultural Russianization or 
Sovietization in the Eastern part (see Ignácz in this volume). The administrators 
of the Soviet occupied zone valued German high-brow culture and swiftly 
reopened renowned sites of classical music performance in Dresden, Leipzig, 
and Berlin. They also granted a license to press records to Ernst Busch, a 
staunchly communist folk singer and stage performer who had worked at Radio 
Moscow during the Third Reich era. Enjoying comprehensive Soviet support, 
Music Trade in the Slipstream of Cultural Diplomacy | 199 
Busch became the founding father of the East German music industry. The 
catalogue of his Lied der Zeit (Song of the Times) enterprise blended political 
content with light entertainment. Yet in the course of the new state’s efforts to 
consolidate and nationalize all industrial operations, tensions arose between Lied 
der Zeit’s entrepreneur and Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED, the 
GDR’s Socialist Unity Party). To acquire full control over the country’s record 
production, the political élite opted to disown Busch. In April 1953, Lied der 
Zeit became a nationally owned enterprise (“Lied der Zeit”). 
As a state-owned monopolist, the record company evolved into a major play-
er on East Germany’s cultural circuit. In 1955, when the GDR’s Ministerium für 
Kultur (MfK, Ministry of Culture) replaced the Ministerium für Leichtindustrie 
(Ministry of Light Industries) as the supervising body, Lied der Zeit became 
Deutsche Schallplatten (DS, German Records). At the same time, Harri 
Költzsch, a twenty-seven year-old mid-level supervisor at the MfK with an 
academic background in Economics, took the general manager position at DS 
(Register der Volkseigenen Wirtschaft). Mandated to transform the firm into a 
profitable venture whose musical output would meet the cultural demands of the 
people, Költzsch remained at the helm for the next thirty-three years and over-
saw DS’s development in the fashion of a Western tycoon. Under his auspices, 
DS developed into a flagship enterprise. It maintained five recording studios, 
operated two manufacturing plants, and employed a labor force of about 750. Its 
annual industrial output skyrocketed from roughly four million sound carriers in 
1960 to seven million by 1970 and reached twenty million by the mid-1980s 
(Schindler 73). When Költzsch eventually stepped down as General Director in 
1988, he did so realizing that “his” company, much like the Eastern Bloc as a 
whole, had exhausted its potential for economic growth. The development of 
Deutsche Schallplatten between 1955 and 1988, however, bears testimony to his 
qualities as a successful manager in an economy of scarcity. 
Despite its status as a state-owned monopolist, DS remained surprisingly in-
dependent from the GDR’s policymakers for a variety of reasons. First, the MfK 
applied a comparably liberal approach to political supervision. Traditionally a 
junction for state representatives and intellectuals, the ministry always acted as 
one of the lesser conformist authorities. The other two producers of recorded 
music, radio and television, by contrast, reported to committees at the Council of 
Ministers, which were staffed with SED hardliners. Moreover, DS’s General 
Director succeeded in containing the influence of the party. With the exception 
of top-level supervisory positions like Director of Artistic Production, the 
company’s employees felt no political pressure. Költzsch’s approach of staffing 
elevated positions with party members provided him sufficient freedom to 
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emphasize talent and expertise when hiring music producers, sound engineers, 
and other personnel with professional responsibilities. Most importantly, per-
haps, DS flourished economically. The music enterprise was one of very few 
cultural producers in the GDR that did not permanently depend on state subsi-
dies. In fact, for many years DS represented a significant contributor to the 
national budget: The earnings that it transferred to the state grew from less than 
ten million East German marks in 1955 to about eighty million by 1975 and 
approached the two-hundred million mark in 1989 (Schindler 74). Additionally, 
DS earned substantial amounts in hard currencies, which the GDR required 
desperately. Scant surviving evidence suggests that by the 1980s, DS had about 
two million in freely convertible valuta (predominantly American dollars, British 
pounds, and West German marks) at its disposal while it likely earned up to 
three million for the state every year (Ministerium für Kultur, “Staatliche 
Auflagen”). Költzsch’s ability to satisfy his political superiors, his emphasis on 
qualifications and know-how in hiring, and the company’s outstanding economic 
performance under his management guaranteed DS a degree of autonomy that 
was rare, if not unique, in the GDR’s cultural sphere. 
The record company’s successful course of development was not predeter-
mined. After Költzsch took office, he spent much time lobbying for increased 
investment to modernize the outdated manufacturing facilities. In 1957, Költzsch 
called for six-figure valuta investments in order to establish the production of 
long-playing records. In order to deflect the manager’s demand for record 
presses that needed to be bought for hard currencies, representatives of the state 
authorities even proposed to stall all modernization efforts and simply outsource 
the production of albums to the Czech Republic (Ministerium für Kultur, “Fra-
gen”). State authorities provided the means for DS to keep up with the general 
technological developments in the music industry such as longplay production 
and stereophony during the 1960s, yet the closing of new development gaps 
remained the General Director’s top priority. By the early 1970s, the GDR 
mobilized unprecedented funds to comprehensively modernize its music monop-
olist. In 1973, the Council of Ministers approved a plan to ensure the “increased 
satisfaction of the citizens’ cultural demands with recording disks and music 
cassettes” (Ministerrat der DDR). It allotted millions in domestic and hard 
currencies for DS to double its annual output of records from eight to sixteen 
million in only three years, and increase the manufacturing of cassettes twenty-
fold in the same period. While buying materials and labor from amounts in 
domestic currency, DS spent valuta on technological equipment for the recording 
of music and the manufacturing of sound carriers. Depending exclusively on 
microphones, mixing desks, vinyl presses, and other facilities made in capitalist 
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countries, DS resembled an imported industry. Profitability was the key condi-
tion for the existence of such a construct, and in order to guarantee it DS re-
quired complete control over the home market and free hand to cooperate with 
partners in the capitalist world. 
Its capacity to generate highly sought-after valuta is crucial to conceptualiz-
ing the dual nature of DS as a communist corporation. On the one hand, it 
represented a monopolist that controlled the GDR’s strictly isolated marketplace 
for recorded music. Apart from occasional joint ventures with fellow monopo-
lists in communist brother states, DS supplied all sound carriers that East Ger-
man money could buy. Költzsch never tired of calling on his contacts in the MfK 
to rigorously suppress even the slightest ambitions of unaffiliated music produc-
ers to distribute recordings independently. These efforts became frequent when 
music cassettes enabled musicians and other actors to disseminate their creations 
commercially in small editions (Meyer). On the other hand, DS was a recording 
company with a profoundly international orientation and a wide network of 
partner firms in the capitalist world. These relations had formed during the 
postwar era, when Lied der Zeit turned to firms in Germany’s West to purchase 
materials like pvc granulate, paper labels, and record sleeves. Even after the 
GDR had walled in its domestic market in 1961, DS intensified relations with its 
capitalist partners to be prepared for material shortages that may have stalled the 
production flow. As these business relations across the Iron Curtain blossomed 
regardless of the frosty geopolitical climate, Western companies developed an 
interest in something DS had to offer to them: classical music. 
 
 
CLASSICAL MUSIC AND CULTURAL PRESTIGE 
 
In the aftermath of World War II, East Germany developed into a stronghold of 
classical music. After the Soviets had promoted Germany’s classical heritage in 
their attempts to create diversions during the immediate postwar period, the 
GDR’s cultural policymakers continued on that trajectory. The MfK poured 
enormous sums into world-renowned classical music institutions such as 
Staatskapelle Dresden and Gewandhausorchester Leipzig. Presenting itself as the 
patron of the German nation’s high-brow heritage, the GDR hoped to gain 
prestige in cultural and diplomatic circles. Cautious of progressive genres like 
jazz and outright anxious about the challenges that rock music posed to social 
norms in Western societies, GDR cultural planners decided to heavily promote 
classical music on the home front as well. Werner Rackwitz, who chaired the 
musical division at the MfK, insisted that “historical continuity from the heydays 
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in human civilization” was indispensable for the development of the GDR’s 
“musical life and the socialist national culture” to fend off the “destructive 
aberrances [and] impoverishment” that contemporary Western styles represented 
(Rackwitz 1-2). As modern socialist approaches to contemporary song and dance 
failed to strike a chord with the public, cultural officials resorted to acting as the 
true guardians of Germany’s musical heritage. Naturally, East Germany’s 
recording industry became a main beneficiary of state support for classical 
music. The MfK insisted that DS’s classical music division, Eterna, received 
priority access to talent, funds, and technology to represent the GDR in the 
international market for recorded high-brow content. 
Eterna was the undisputed flagship of Deutsche Schallplatten. The classical 
music department employed the largest workforce among DS’s labels, main-
tained recording studios in two churches, and enjoyed priority access to imported 
machines and materials. “Over the entire course of my career at Deutsche 
Schallplatten,” a former sound engineer for Eterna recalled, “I never had to use 
domestically produced recording tape just once. Anything that had relevance for 
the sound was imported from the West.”2 Beginning in 1984, the MfK allocated 
four million East German marks to DS for the purpose of building new produc-
tion facilities that enabled Eterna to create stereophonic recordings digitally 
while the GDR was many years away from making digital playback devices 
available (Stadtrat Mitte). Imported technology incurred additional valuta 
expenditure. Yet these efforts served a clear purpose: Eterna produced record-
ings of classical works with world-renowned artists and orchestras that could be 
licensed to record companies in capitalist countries. In order to make those 
recordings appealing to Western firms, the quality standards had to be on par 
with what consumers in the Cold War West had grown accustomed to. The GDR 
invested heavily in Eterna to enable DS to earn valuta by either co-producing 
classical recordings with Western partners in the GDR, or by simply exporting 
finished tapes under licensing agreements. DS prioritized co-productions and 
licensed exports as the GDR economy grew increasingly dependent on hard 
currency investments during the second half of the Cold War. Between 1978 and 
1988, the share of co-productions among Eterna’s album projects grew from less 
than two-thirds to about ninety percent (Ministerium für Kultur, Produk-
tionspläne). Re-cord companies from West Germany, Great Britain, the Nether-
lands, Japan, and elsewhere were keen to cooperate with DS because the partner-
                                                           
2  “In meiner gesamten Zeit im Betrieb [Deutsche Schallplatten] hab ich nicht ein 
einziges Mal mit [einer] DDR-Band arbeiten müssen. Alles das, was Einfluss auf den 
Klang hatte, kam aus dem Westen” (former Eterna sound engineer). 
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PURCHASING POWER AND POPULAR MUSIC 
 
The second-largest division of DS was Amiga, the GDR’s only label for popular 
music. Amiga remained a necessity in the perception of cultural planners from 
the earliest days of DS, when music producers and political officials clashed 
over questions of whether music styles like jazz and beat should feature at all in 
East Germany’s music market, to the second half of the Cold War, when the 
nation’s recording artists struggled to compete with stars from capitalist coun-
tries. Amiga released about two-thousand albums, contributing slightly more 
than a quarter of all albums available in the GDR. These releases, however, 
accounted for at least half of all album sales in the national market, a circum-
stance that bore testimony to the high demand for popular content (Rauhut and 
Rauhut 8). Amiga’s commercial relevance fueled suspicions on the part of the 
party that the label may risk instilling the wrong ideas in young socialist minds. 
To ensure ideological transparency, all native performers of popular music had 
to sing in German, and their lyrics had to be submitted long in advance of the 
scheduled production dates. An allotment key prescribed genre quotas for 
Amiga’s musical output as an additional means to curtail the influence of West-
ern styles. Releases in contemporary pop, rock, and dance music—contemporary 
genres that had evolved under the creative leadership of Anglo-American 
artists—could not exceed twenty-five percent of catalog numbers in the annual 
repertoire. For balancing purposes, the same share was reserved for schlager, a 
distinctly German blend of upbeat music with sentimental lyrics. The remaining 
half of release slots required the production of albums with jazz and blues, song 
and folk, musicals and operettas, children’s entertainment, and other content 
(Leitner 182). While pop music labels in the West specialized in particular 
genres, striving to create recognizable label identity, Amiga for its monopoly 
position had to operate in the fashion of a one-stop shop. 
The hottest items in Amiga’s store were albums that contained contemporary 
rock and pop music and, to a lesser extent, some releases in the schlager column. 
The GDR music scene produced a few rock bands and disco outfits that more or 
less expertly emulated the style and sound of their Western role models. Bands 
such as Puhdys, Karat, and Stern Meissen represented the most prolific domestic 
rock bands while artists including Silly, Peter & Paul, and Inka epitomized East 
Germany’s pop sound. With performers like Hauff & Henkler, Frank Schöbel, 
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and Wolfgang Ziegler, the GDR also managed to establish a few homegrown 
vocalists of the more sedate schlager genre in opposition to the supremely 
popular West German and Austrian stars. The concentration of power over the 
production of pop records in the Amiga offices and the lack of state-of-the-art 
recording equipment for productions outside classical music, however, hampered 
the appeal of domestic artists in comparison with their Western counterparts. 
Aware of the citizens’ access to Western radio signals, and perhaps also hoping 
to retain some minimal control over the musical intake of younger generations, 
cultural policymakers and repertoire managers at DS opted for an approach that 
blended cultural liberalization with economic profitability. Catering to wide-
spread demand, the GDR’s music monopolist integrated the original productions 
of predominantly American, British, and West German artists into Amiga’s 
catalogue. 
Licensed records—albums and singles that contained original recordings by 
Western artists but were pressed by DS in East Berlin—gradually became a 
staple position in Amiga’s catalog. As far as contemporary pop and rock music 
were concerned, licensed records accounted for about forty percent of albums 
and twenty percent of singles released in that category between 1964 and 1990 
(Rauhut). As licensed releases were strictly limited in the number of units made, 
they became a much sought-after commodity. Contemporary music purchasers 
remember waiting in line much longer than usual when licensed albums were 
rumored to go on sale. “To us,” one GDR record collector recalled, “buying 
licensed records felt like acquiring material tokens of the big, wide world that 
was beyond our reach.”3 For consumers of popular culture, Amiga’s expanding 
program of licensed records metaphorically resembled a widening crack in the 
Wall. 
Licensed Amiga disks premiered in 1964. When Beatlemania had just begun 
to sweep America, young music fans in the GDR were able to purchase early 
Fab Four singles as “Ain’t She Sweet” even before their peers in some Western 
European countries gained the opportunity (The Beatles). In the second half of 
the 1960s, DS began releasing the first albums by artists from the United States. 
For the time being, the two groups who qualified for admission into the com-
munist marketplace were representatives of the urban leftist folk milieu (such as 
Bob Dylan, Pete Seeger, and Joan Baez) as well as famous African American 
jazz performers (including Louis Armstrong, Ella Fitzgerald, and Duke Elling-
                                                           
3  “Für uns fühlte sich das [Kaufen von Lizenzplatten] an, als würden wir materielle 
Dinge aus einer Welt kaufen können, zu der wir keinen Zugang hatten” (GDR record 
collector). 
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ton). At least at the beginning, Western artists had to be outspoken adversaries of 
capitalism or members of disenfranchised minorities to have records released in 
East Germany. In the following decades, however, Amiga constantly expanded 
and diversified its Western licensed album program. After the enormous invest-
ment offensive of the mid-1970s, DS released hit albums by a large variety of 
iconic artists that included classic superstars such as Elvis Presley, countercul-
ture icons of Jimi Hendrix’s caliber, and disco pioneers like ABBA. In the 
1980s, DS fully embraced the Western musical mainstream and offered GDR 
consumers top sellers by Madonna, Whitney Houston, Michael Jackson, and ZZ 
Top. Choosing from an album repertoire that captured the corporate music 
culture of Reagan America, East German record buyers were among the first to 
enjoy the effects of ideological and political liberalization when the Cold War 
began to wind down. 
Naturally, music albums by Western artists needed to be approved before 
they could appear as licensed albums on the Amiga label. The review process, 
however, was a surprisingly laissez-faire matter. Amiga music producers rec-
ommended Western releases to their editor-in-chief; once he had signed off, 
obtaining consent from DS’s top-level creative supervisors and economic 
managers constituted a mere formality. Although translated lyrics for every song 
had to be forwarded to all DS affiliates involved in the approval process, the 
projects that Amiga’s music producers proposed at their discretion usually made 
it into stores. Rather than adhering to specific directives of a supervising body, 
the producers based their decisions on what they considered common sense. “We 
were aware and did not need to be told that no song could promote drug use, 
instigate violence, or criticize the great accomplishments of the Soviet Union,” 
one of the producers recalled.4 Minor adjustments to the original Western 
releases, however, became necessary every now and then. When Amiga released 
ABBA’s album Arrival renamed as Dancing Queen, for example, the record’s 
biggest hit was absent. ABBA’s iconic single “Money, Money, Money,” a 
tongue-in-cheek celebration of affluence and the good life, could not be consid-
ered funny in the self-proclaimed “workers’ and farmers’ republic,” and so 
Amiga substituted the band’s mega hit with an older and obscure flipside 
(ABBA). 
                                                           
4  “Wir wussten schon—und brauchten auch nicht erinnert zu werden—dass die Lieder 
nicht Drogen verherrlichen konnten, oder zu Gewalt aufrufen konnen, oder Kritik an 
den großen Errungenschaften der Sowjetunion äußern konnten” (former Amiga edi-
tor). 
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Amiga encountered little interference from state authorities regarding its li-
censing program. The label remained largely autonomous in its repertoire 
development and did not have to obtain consent for its Western releases from the 
corridors of political power. DS’s Director of Artistic Production emphasized 
that the enterprise neither had to arm-wrestle cultural policymakers nor adhere to 
formal criteria in the process of producing licensed Western records. “It was 
known,” Hansjürgen Schaefer stated in his last interview, “that Deutsche 
Schallplatten was bolder than broadcasting, especially when it came to lyrics” 
(Wicke and Müller 117). As licenses had to be paid in hard currencies, and since 
the company’s valuta budget was always tight, DS preferred to buy Western pop 
music from the same companies that were buying classical music from them: 
EMI in London provided licenses for the pressing of the Beatles and Queen, the 
American giant CBS contributed recordings by Supertramp and Johnny Cash, 
and the West German Deutsche Grammophon supplied tapes by Cream and The 
Police. Eventually, DS found itself spending much of the hard currencies it was 
earning from the export of classical recordings on acquiring licenses for the 





The evolution of Amiga’s Western licensed music program illustrates a cultural 
dilemma that virtually all Eastern Bloc countries faced in similar ways. Much 
like its communist brother states, the GDR failed not only politically and eco-
nomically but also culturally. Opposed to Western innovations in popular music 
and unwilling to free cultural production from state monitoring and interference, 
the country’s policy-makers promoted high-brow traditions from bygone centu-
ries that failed to strike a chord with the general public. Cultural authorities came 
to realize that the popular appeal of Western popular genres was difficult to 
challenge with state-commissioned counterproposals off the communist drawing 
board.  
Particularly in the GDR, where a vast majority of citizens routinely accessed 
Western radio and television programs with relative ease, young music fans 
turned their ears and eyes to the West for modern and exciting sounds. Deutsche 
Schallplatten responded to the preferences of East German citizens by importing 
hit music from the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, and other 
countries west of the Wall. In this sense, Amiga’s Western licensed album 
program represented the admission of lacking competitiveness from a state-
owned monopolist that depended on attractive product to exhaust domestic 
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purchasing power. Yet the GDR’s music trade with Cold War adversaries also 
illuminated the remarkable permeability of the Iron Curtain in both economic 
and cultural regards: It remained at all times penetrable for Western capital, and 
it was always too porous to keep Western music out. As a result, music trade 
across the East-West divide manifested in the slipstream of Western cultural-
diplomatic endeavors because communist music markets could not defy the 
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Flamenco as an Instrument of Spanish Public Diplomacy in 
Franco’s Regime (1939-1975) 
Carlos Sanz Díaz and José Manuel Morales Tamaral 
 
 
In December 1963, the flamenco dancer and choreographer Guillermina Mar-
tínez Cabrejas, known under her stage name of Mariemma, addressed the 
Spanish Minister of Information and Tourism, Manuel Fraga, with a long letter 
of complaint (Martínez Cabrejas). Her point was clear: Because she had been 
lending a great service to the image of Spain and to the prestige of the authentic 
“Spanish Dance” worldwide since the 1940s, she deserved some financial 
compensation after a last-minute cancellation of some scheduled performances 
by the Ministry. Hence, Mariemma remembered her successful performance in 
the Comic Opera in Paris “despite the campaign directed against me inside and 
outside the theater, for I had been declared a ‘Francoist’ at a time when the 
public opinion worldwide was resolutely counter to Spain” (Martínez Cabrejas). 
Not by chance did Mariemma include in her letter the words uttered in 1948 by 
the highest representative of the Spanish government in Washington DC, the 
diplomat Jose Félix de Lequerica, who expressed himself after Mariemma’s 
performance in New York in the following terms: “After a long time finding in 
the international press nothing but a litany of insults against Spain, it is reward-
ing and soul-stirring to read finally some compliments about something Spanish” 
(Martínez Cabrejas).1 That “something Spanish” was flamenco music and dance. 
                                                           
1  “A pesar de la campaña desarrollada contra mí dentro y fuera del teatro, por haber 
sido declarada ‘franquista’ en momentos en que la opinión mundial se manifestaba re-
sueltamente contra España . . . Después de tiempo que llevamos no encontrando en la 
prensa más que verdaderas letanías de insultos contra España, es consolador y alegra 
el alma leer al fin elogios sobre algo español.” All translations into English our own. 
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Strictly speaking, flamenco is a popular Romani-Andalusian musical genre 
which emerged in its present form in the eighteenth century from the fusion of 
ancient Moorish, Romani, Castilian and Jewish roots. It is traditionally charac-
terized by a strong passionate and emotional expression displayed on stage in 
different manifestations—singing (cante), musicianship (toque), and dancing 
(baile).  
The identification of flamenco as a semi-state music and theatrical genre 
dates back to the origins of the dictatorship of General Franco (1939-1975). 
Nevertheless, it took some time for flamenco to prevail over other styles and to 
become an instrument of Francoist public diplomacy, thus giving rise to the 
phenomenon of “National Flamencoism” (in Spanish, nacionalflamenquismo). 
We define it as the identification of flamenco with the essence of Spanish 
culture. According to Theresa Goldbach, “a conflation of flamenco with other 
Spanish national genres, an exaggeration of flamenco costuming, and an overly 
commercialized interpretation of the genre all marked the style of nacionalfla-
menquismo” (1).2 National Flamencoism emerged in cultural studies by analogy 
with National Catholicism (nacionalcatolicismo), which refers to the idea that 
the Roman Catholic religion is the basis for the Spanish national identity (Álva-
rez Bolado; Botti; Payne 171-91). In both cases, a particular cultural trait is 
forcibly expanded to impose a common identity to the whole of Spanish society. 
In both cases, the concept has an homogenizing effect: A variety of cultural 
identities and values, sometimes in conflict—as happened amongst the regional 
cultural traditions of the Basque, Catalan, Galician, Castilian, and Andalusian 
people—were subsumed into something greater, amalgamated in the case of 
flamenco in a musical genre with popular roots. 
This chapter aims to explain how the dictatorship of General Franco created 
an institutional framework in order to instrumentalize flamenco, thereby putting 
it at the service of Spain’s international agenda. We intend to show the motiva-
tions, mechanisms, and some of the initiatives through which the dictatorship 
seized the cultural wealth of flamenco and its international acclaim, and incorpo-
rated it into its foreign propaganda. Our approach intends to go beyond contribu-
tions of flamencology and cultural studies, which have underlined the political 
and identity links between flamenco and the Franco regime primarily from an 
aesthetic and performative point of view (Washabaugh). Based on unique source 
material from the Spanish administration, we contend that the political use of 
flamenco by the dictatorship can be located in a broader context of the diplomat-
                                                           
2  For other cultural approaches to this phenomenon, see Álvarez Caballero, Hayes, and 
Washabaugh. 
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ic use of music by governments during the Cold War (Ahrendt; Gienow-Hecht; 
Tompkins). Despite Spain’s relative isolation under the dictatorship, “flamenco 
diplomacy”—namely, the political instrumentalization of flamenco in the 
international arena—can be regarded as a local expression amidst a global 
struggle for prestige and political legitimacy fought with cultural weapons since 




AND THE FRANCOIST MUSIC DIPLOMACY  
 
Since the late nineteenth century, the social and identity background of flamenco 
music has generated a debate on the nature of this style. Is flamenco a tradition-
al, pure, and essentially ethnic musical genre (cante jondo), or is it rather a 
hybrid, popular genre, a commercial and globalized kind of music in a continual 
process of aesthetic adaptation to different performance practices (Folch; Oroz-
co; Pantaleoni)? At the beginning of the Franco dictatorship, the discussion was 
reformulated as an opposition between two phenomena. On the one hand, a kind 
of respectable flamenco music and dance, a regional variant of the authentic 
Andalusian folklore, could be supported by the state under the formula of 
“Choirs and Dances” (Coros y Danzas).3 On the other hand, a commercial and 
market-oriented variety called género folclórico (“folk genre”), consisting of an 
amalgam of clichés and stereotypes rooted in distinctive Andalusian particulari-
ties, was rejected by the state on the grounds that it allegedly caricatured the real 
musical Spanish character.  
This opposition linked with a wider contemporary debate on the role of pop-
ular music in the propaganda and cultural diplomacy of Francoist Spain. Two 
stages can be distinguished in this regard. In a first phase (1939 to the mid-
1950s) Spain was culturally oriented towards the European fascist powers and, 
gradually after 1945, to Western anticommunist states. Notwithstanding their 
rivalry, Falange (FET y de las JONS), the sole legal party of the Spanish dicta-
                                                           
3  “Coros y Danzas de la Sección Femenina” (Choirs and Dances of the Womens’ 
Section) was a dancing and singing company created in 1939 and extinguished in 
1977 that belonged to the “Falange Española”, the Spanish fascist party. According to 
the Falangist writer Mercedes Formica, the idea of its foundation came from Pilar 
Primo de Rivera, sister of Falange founder José Antonio Primo de Rivera and founder 
herself of the Women’s Section, the only single mass organization of feminine charac-
ter that existed during the dictatorship (Richmond 152). 
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torship created in 1937 from the union of the fascist Spanish Falange and tradi-
tionalist groups, and the Catholic Church marshaled cultural affairs.4 In these 
years, the Spanish regime advocated creating a “Spanish music,” a fusion of 
several folk music traditions from the regions of Spain, an endeavor which 
Falange and the Comisaría General de Música (General Music Office) undertook 
in 1940 through the Ministry of National Education. Their efforts soon exceled.  
At the level of “serious music,” the government laid the foundations of an 
idealized Spanish classical music based on the repertoire of world-famous 
composers, such as Juan Crisóstomo de Arriaga, Isaac Albéniz, Enrique Grana-
dos, Manuel de Falla, and Joaquín Turina. Their music was believed to share an 
unmistakable Spanish air, which was difficult to define beyond the invocation of 
a certain “soul,” “genius,” or Spanish “essence” (Moreda Rodriguez, “Folklore 
and Gender” 637). The Spanish government displayed widely this sort of music 
in a series of German-Spanish Festivals held jointly with the Nazi government 
between July 1941 and August 1942 in Bad Elster (Saxony), Madrid, and Bilbao 
(Moreda Rodriguez, “Hispanic-German”). At the same time, a National Orches-
tra of Spain and a National Chamber Orchestra were created in 1940, both 
depending eventually on the Ministry of National Education as the department 
directly involved in the promotion of classical music throughout Spain. Over 
time, the dictatorship diversified the initiatives on this issue, launching in 1952 
an International Festival of Music and Dance in Granada, which included a 
session devoted to flamenco singing—specifically pure cante jondo—and in the 
sixties and seventies both an Opera and a Ballet Festival in Madrid and Barcelo-
na.5 
In the realm of popular music, the Governement created a National Institute 
of Musicology and launched the so-called Misiones Folclóricas (Folk Missions) 
which between 1941 and 1961 collected and transcribed folk material in differ-
ent regions of Spain, with the aim of creating and publishing a corpus of Spanish 
folk music. Within this framework, Coros y Danzas emerged as the best musical 
Spanish trademark abroad, going on an initial international tour through Latin 
                                                           
4  The acronym “FET y de las JONS” corresponds to the oficial name of the party, 
“Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista” 
(Traditionalist Spanish Phalanx of the Committees of the National Syndicalist Offen-
sive). 
5  On the International Music and Dance Festival of Granada and the Opera and Ballet 
Festival of Madrid and Barcelona, see Archivo General de la Administración (AGA), 
Alcalá de Henares (Madrid, Spain), Sección de Cultura, (3) 52.15, Boxes 73579 and 
88419. 
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America in 1948 and continuing to visit the US, several European countries, and 
the Middle East in the following years. This ensemble arrogated the role of 
representing genuine Spanish musical folklore, which according to Falange was 
popular, anonymous, choral, and underpinned by the so-called baile suelto, a 
dance without physical contact between men and women, thus acceptable for 
strict Catholic sexual morality. By doing so, they subsumed regional particulari-
ties under a common national identity which was epitomized in the representa-
tion of Castile as the forger of the unity of Spain. Therefore, flamenco found 
little place in Coros y Danzas performances, where conversely different variants 
of Andalusian regional dancing were well represented (Stehrenberger). As a 
genre that concentrates primarily on the individual, flamenco carried too many 
connotations of anarchy and rebellion. In addition, it was psychologically 
associated with sexual exuberance and a certain orientalism. In a nutshell, 
flamenco collided with the cultural roots of National Catholicism. 
Despite this first mismatch, a certain type of commercial music of Anda-
lusian and flamenco flavor became very well-accepted beyond Spanish borders, 
setting the path for a shift in official Francoist cultural policy with regards to 
music diplomacy. In fact, the backgrounds of a marketable flamenco variant are 
historically to be found in the late nineteenth century at the cafés cantantes 
(flamenco cafés), and already in the interwar period at the óperas flamencas 
(flamenco operas). The latter consisted of a kind of variety show mixing flamen-
co and copla or canción española (Spanish song), which allowed cante jondo to 
be performed out of its small Romani nucleus for the first time (Cruces Roldán). 
Between 1933 and 1945 many film productions exemplified this specific usage 
of flamenco, while some of them were co-productions with the German film 
industry, such as Carmen de Triana (1938), with Imperio Argentina or Suspiros 
de España (1939), with Estrellita Castro (Jarvinen and Peredo-Castro; Paz and 
Montero 222-23). Likewise, during the 1940s and 1950s some private flamenco 
groups, like the ones led by Luis Pérez Dávila “Luisillo,” Carmen Amaya, and 
Antonio Ruiz Soler “Antonio,” succeeded in their long tours around Europe, 
Latin America, and the US. They were promoted by such big impresarios as the 
Frenchman Fernand Lumbroso—who later participated in the Spanish govern-
ment’s musical diplomacy, as we will see below—or the American Sol Hurok 
(Robinson), with whom Carmen Amaya recorded Original Gypsy Dances in 
1941 (Arce; Madridejos). Copla singers like Lola Flores and Concha Piquer 
were also prominent figures in flamenco show business. 
Against this backdrop, Spanish music diplomacy entered a second phase in 
the mid-1950s. Spain was opening to the world economy at that time, pursuing 
international recognition through a strategic alignment with the Western bloc—
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for example, the Spanish-US military agreement in 1953 marked a milestone in 
this regard (Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla et al.; García Delgado and Jiménez 125-
49; Viñas 45-332). The country underwent fast and steady economic growth, 
along with the development of tourism as the first national industry and the rise 
of a mass consumption of cultural products (Cazorla 133-71; Pack 83-104). 
Meanwhile, the waning power of Falange amidst the governmental elites and the 
rise of technocrats and a pragmatic policy called desarrollismo (developmental-
ism) had enormous leverage on Francoist musical concerns. Castile was no 
longer privileged as the epitome of the Spanish nation, and it was displaced 
instead by Andalusia as the region that could best represent Spain abroad. Very 
timely, Andalusia lacked nationalist tensions, and was the ancestral home of a 
numerous Roma community without political organization (Orozco)—not to 
mention the sun, joy, and quaintness that millions of tourists were looking for. 
Andalusia was also the home of flamenco music in its most popular variant, a 
cultural export easily recognizable worldwide. It was then the reorientation of 
the Spanish cultural core that lies at the emergence of what we might call fla-
menco diplomacy—that is, the use of commercial flamenco by the state as a tool 
for Spain’s self-representation abroad. 
Since its creation in 1951, the Ministry of Information and Tourism (MIT) 
joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) as a key official actor in the realm 
of cultural diplomacy (Delgado Gómez Escalonilla; Jevenois and Romero de 
Terreros), assuming a critical role in the touristic diffusion of Spain through 
every kind of instrument, including the promotion of popular culture inside and 
outside Spain. MIT’s most important cultural enterprise in this sense was the 
Planes Nacionales de Festivales de España (National Plans of the Spanish 
Festivals). Launched in 1954, they consisted of annual three or four-month 
campaigns running approximately from May to September and including various 
dance, music, and theatrical shows performed by significant domestic and 
international ensembles in theaters, urban gardens, and monumental complexes 
or natural venues. Building on previous experiences, namely the Granada 
Festival and the new International Festival of Santander created in 1952, the 
Festivales de España (FE) turned into the main accomplishment of the high-level 
state music policy under Francoism (Ferrer Cayón). They enjoyed the highest 
official support (both in terms of funding and political endorsement), the widest 
domestic and international propaganda, and, at least according to official Span-
ish sources, the greatest success.  
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Decisive support to the FE came when Manuel Fraga was appointed Minister 
of Information and Tourism in 1962;6 shortly thereafter he began to work closely 
with two collaborators, his brother-in-law Carlos Robles Piquer—General 
Director of Information (1962-67) and General Director of Popular Culture and 
Entertainment (1967-69)—and Enrique de la Hoz—Deputy General Director of 
Popular Culture (1962-69). Their networking resulted in a significant increase of 
the FE from the point of view of their frequency, their quality level, and their 
funding. As an example, 45 FE and almost 800 different shows took place in 
1963, while their number amounted to 83 in 1969 (MIT, Report 1964; Robles 
Piquer, Memoria 264-69). At the same time, the budgets of the Festivals shot up 
from 4-5 million pesetas per year in the 1950s to 100 million per year in the 
1960s.7 In addition, the MIT and the MFA improved their coordination, permeat-
ing—albeit at a lower intensity—the Ministry of National Education. 
The FE under Fraga’s office had two major targets. Domestically, the FE 
sought to bring so-called educated art forms to the lower strata of Spanish 
society, as was the case with other contemporary European dictatorships (Buch 
et al.). In doing so, they supported “the rise of the cultural and artistic level of 
the Spanish population, the creation of a refined taste for aesthetic manifesta-
tions among the masses, and the human dignity by providing easy access to the 
highest forms of intellectual creation” (MIT, Report 1964).8 
At an international level, and reflecting the turn in Spanish foreign policy, 
the government intended to promote Spain as a tourist destination abroad and to 
contribute to the international acceptance of the dictatorship through the FE’s 
policy (Sanz and Morales Tamaral). As a result, the MIT enhanced coordination 
with private travel agencies vis-à-vis the international dissemination of FE since 
the beginning of the 1960s—for instance, a travel guide from 1965 advertised 
Madrid as “the capital of good food, joy and flamenco” (MIT, Notes on Adver-
tising). Even the Library of Congress showed an evident interest in these musical 
shows, asking the MIT for booklets of the FE in October 1964 (Library of 
Congress).  
                                                           
6  For an insider’s account of the many activities developed by the MIT in the subse-
quent decade, see the memories of the Minister Fraga between 1962 and 1969 (Memo-
ria Breve 33-255). 
7  The evolution of the FE’s budgets can be reconstructed in the annual reports located at 
the AGA, (3) 49.12, Boxes 44166, 44265, and 44267. 
8  “ . . . elevación del nivel cultural y artístico de la población española, creación de una 
autentica afición por las manifestaciones estéticas en las masas populares, dignifi-
cación del hombre por su acceso a las formas superiores de la creación espiritual.”  
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Robles Piquer inspired the MIT’s master guidelines for the popular culture 
policy, as well as devised its adaptation to the public relations of the dictatorship. 
His was the idea of the state as the best mediator among public and private actors 
behind cultural diplomacy implementation, extolling Spain’s unique position 
between the characteristic abstentionism in cultural matters of liberal states and 
the excessive interventionism imposed by totalitarian ones (Robles Piquer, 
Puntos 4-9). Robles Piquer had also a notion of what a ballet español (Spanish 
ballet) should mean. Not exclusively identified with flamenco though almost 
monopolized by it, ballet español meant in his view “a cultivated product rooted 
in popular tradition, traditional dances and clothing, and the experience of its 
typical values” (Robles Piquer, Letter to Moreno).9 The dance troupes led by 
Luisillo, María Rosa, Rafael de Córdoba, Antonio Gades, Vicente Escudero, and 
Antonio Pavón, all of them renowned flamenco dancers, were labeled by this 
category.  
Nevertheless, Spanish ballet and the social pedagogy behind MIT’s cultural 
businesses clashed with the burst of enthusiasm triggered by trendy Western pop 
and rock ’n’ roll music. Particularly popular among young people, events like 
the Festival de Benidorm were not role models in the eyes of the Ministry, “for 
they tend[ed] to distort the audience’s taste, create bad taste, or decrease rather 
than increase the artistic culture of the Spanish people” (MIT, Confidential 
Report).10 The criterion was to be “modern but Spanish,” as the title of a song 
recorded in 1970 by the popular Spanish singer Manolo Escobar stated (“Moder-
no pero Español”).11 Characteristically, the concert by the Beatles in Madrid in 
July 1965 was boycotted by the Spanish government through a massive police 
presence. The four British pop stars received a bullfighter’s hat as a welcome 
gift upon their arrival at Madrid’s airport, and they were later shown by the 
media among flamenco dancers on a visit to a sherry wine cellar, both signs of 
                                                           
9  “procedimiento de elaboración culto, efectivamente, del acervo popular, las danzas y 
vestiduras más autóctonas y la vivencia de sus valores típicos.”  
10  “propenden a deformar el gusto del público, o a crear el mal gusto y a que el nivel de 
la cultura artística de los españoles descienda antes que aumente.”  
11  The song was part of the original soundtrack of the film En un lugar de La Manga 
(dir. Mariano Ozores, 1970). This is a commercial comedy typical of the touristic 
Spain of the 1960s, in which the conflict between tradition and modernity is exempli-
fied by the main character’s refusal to sell his property, located on the Mediterranean 
Coast, to a real estate developer. For a long-term perspective on the dialectics between 
modernity and tradition in the use of Spanish popular music as a tool of musical di-
plomacy see Marc. 
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the dictatorship’s unease with foreign popular music, as well as symptoms of the 
government’s desire to españolizar—in other words, to adapt any kind of 
cultural expression to Spanish standards (Luqui 97-112). The Spanish govern-
ment sought ultimately to avoid an explicit prohibition of modern music trends, 
thus adapting them to acceptable art forms for the dictatorship’s values and, at 
the same time, diminishing its subversive and unsettling potential (Gracia García 
and Ruiz Carnicer). 
 
 
FLAMENCO MISSIONS TO GERMANY  
AND THE SOVIET UNION 
 
Two dance exchanges with Germany and the USSR better elucidate the actors, 
motivations, and outcomes that played an important role in the implementation 
of flamenco diplomacy within the institutional framework of the FE. The first 
state-guided flamenco mission concurred with the 25th anniversary of the end of 
the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), which was lavishly celebrated by the dictator-
ship in 1964 under the slogan “25 Years of Peace” (“XXV Años de Paz”). For 
this occasion, the MIT encouraged an ambitious cultural program inspired by 
pedagogic and political motivations, including popular contests, documentaries, 
exhibitions, and all kinds of musical concerts. The aforementioned Opera 
Festival, together with the Spanish-Latin American Music Festival, were 
launched in Madrid for the occasion. The official commemoration’s goals were 
twofold. Firstly, it sought to assert the essentially conservative, nationalist, and 
authoritarian principles of the Francoist regime, yet adapting them to the rapid 
social and economic transformation resulting from the unprecedented prosperity 
achieved during the years of developmentalism. Secondly, and according to the 
Campaigns and Festivals Section’s chief, it sought to praise the cultural standard 
attained by the Spanish people thanks to the unceasing educational concerns of 
the dictatorship after more than ten years of FE’s campaigns (Campos de Espa-
ña). 12 
Such broad propagandistic aims put a tacit ideological slant on every single 
show sponsored by the Spanish regime during 1964, even when the artists 
involved were not consciously willing to contribute to that aim. This happened 
particularly with the three music pieces commissioned by the MIT for the 
Concierto de la Paz (Concert of Peace), for which the contemporary avant-garde 
                                                           
12  Ramón Campos de España was in charge of the MIT’s Campaigns and Festivals 
Section and appointed Deputy Commissioner of the “25 Years of Peace” Festivals. 
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musicians Miguel Alonso, Cristóbal Halffter, and Luis de Pablo enjoyed free-
dom to compose their works as long as they adapted to the “noblest of events, 
such as the one being commemorated” (qtd. in Contreras Zubillaga 183). Fur-
thermore, the MIT did not only establish a National Council of Festivals and 
organize the first National Meeting of Festivals at the end of 1963 in order to 
prepare the 25 Year commemorative ceremonies, it also pursued closer coopera-
tion with the cultural attachés that had been appointed to some strategic Spanish 
embassies for the occasion. The Operation Festivals, as the exuberant cultural 
campaign was called in the official documents, sought a strategic scheduling of 
diplomatic music exchanges—eased when possible by foreign funding—for the 
dissemination of Spanish culture abroad (MIT, “Acta”).  
As a result of such ambitious plans, it is highly significant that flamenco 
emerged as an intangible, semiofficial diplomatic means directed to rally a very 
specific target audience—Spanish emigrants—for a clear reason, namely, to 
bring them back into the fold of the motherland. In this context, the FE made the 
leap overseas to perform in Santa Isabel, the capital of Spanish Guinea (now 
Equatorial Guinea) in November 1964, in which flamenco was represented by 
the Spanish Ballet of María Rosa.13  
Nevertheless, the dictatorship’s biggest effort to increase the international 
impact of the 25 Years of Peace events was the visit of the Spanish Ballet of 
Mariemma to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in July 1964. That 
endeavor, which was inspired by a cluster of international propaganda efforts, 
both at the state and the civil society level, was possible thanks to coordination 
among different institutions, such as the MIT, the German Arbeits- und Sozial-
Ministerium (German Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social Affairs), the 
Landeshauptstadt Düsseldorf Wirtschaftsförderungsamt (State Capital Düssel-
dorf’s Business Development Office), the Instituto Español de Emigración 
(Spanish Emigration Institute, IEE), and the emigrants’ Casas de España (Hous-
es of Spain) in North Rhine-Westphalia. However, it was actually an actor, 
named Manuel Collado, who came up with the idea in March 1964. Collado was 
an important Spanish actor and stage manager. He maintained a close relation to 
MIT’s authorities as his theater company participated annualy in the FE cam-
paigns. Accustomed to German performing arts since he had studied in Germany 
years before, and because he had translated German authors into Spanish, 
Collado had no troubles obtaining permission from the MIT and the IEE to 
                                                           
13  On the documents on the performance of the Ballet Maria Rosa in Santa Isabel from 
17-21 November 1964 see AGA, (3) 49.12, 44140. 
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negotiate in situ every detail of the tour with all involved parties beginning in 
May of that year (Collado, “Anteproyecto”). 
Collado’s prompt report to the MIT from Germany testifies to constant ad-
ministrative obstacles and funding problems, including the delayed disbursement 
of 5 million pesetas to nurture the project (Collado, Letter to Araujo). 14 Spanish 
authorities improvised some changes along the way. Firstly, after considering 
several venues for the show, including Bonn, Hamburg, and Frankfurt, the 
organizers selected Düsseldorf, Dortmund, and Mannheim as the festival’s sites, 
following the recommendations of local artistic partners. These industrial cities 
and their surrounding urban areas were home to tens of thousands of Spanish 
workers who had emigrated since the late 1950s in search of better employment 
opportunities (Bundesanstalt 39-40). The numbers of this community in Germa-
ny speak for themselves: the FRG hosted 200,000 Spanish workers, which 
amounted to 45 percent of the total number of Spanish emigrants in Europe 
between 1959 and 1964 (Sanz Lafuente 293-305). 
Secondly, Collado’s first proposal of a FE in Germany, which consisted of a 
flamenco show with additional theater plays, classical music concerts, and 
exhibitions, was restructured into a simple performance of Spanish dance 
starring Mariemma. Her show comprised a condensed glance at the history of 
Spanish folk music, including regional Basque and Aragonese dances, Anda-
lusian “fandango” and, of course, flamenco, with live music played by the 
Madrid Symphony Orchestra under the direction of Enrique Luzuriaga, who was 
also Mariemma’s manager at the time (Cavia Naya). The German première of 
the film Sinfonía Española (Spanish Symphony, 1965), an audio-visual glorifica-
tion of Spain as a tourist Mecca, enriched the event. The film, which was pro-
duced by American director Samuel Bronston, who had achieved widespread 
commercial success with the Hollywood productions El Cid (1961) and The Fall 
of the Roman Empire (1964). Sinfonía Española (all shot in Spain), was praised 
by Robles Piquer for “its artistic beauty . . . its positive insight into the old and 
modern Spain and its consideration as the feature film that has best visually 
described Spain with serious and significant contents” (Robles Piquer, Note to 
Fraga, 8 Apr.).15  
                                                           
14  Joaquín Araujo led the Programming Administration at the MIT’s General Depart-
ment on Festivals (Comisaría General de Festivales). 
15  “la belleza cinematográfica de Sinfonía Española, su positivo enfoque respecto a la 
España de siempre y a la de hoy y el hecho de ser el mejor documental de largo metra-
je que ha fotografiado a España con un contenido serio y trascendente.” Due to Ro-
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As stated in the program handout designed and translated into German by 
Collado, Mariemma’s flamenco performances between 14 and 19 July 1964 
represented an “artistic mission” in the FGR. Since “Spain and its history are 
performed on the German stage,” the event should serve as a “deep memory of 
the Homeland for our countrymen who live there and also for the German 
audience at the celebration of the 25 Years of Peace” (Robles Piquer, Note to 
Fraga, 8 Apr).16  
In spite of the persuasive effect pretended by flamenco diplomacy, the se-
lected target groups did actually notice the underlying political message that 
surrounded this propaganda initiative, expressing some reservations shortly after 
the FE was announced. When they first heard about Mariemma’s visit to Germa-
ny, Spanish emigrants remembered some previous disappointing musical experi-
ences promoted by the Spanish government—Coros y Danzas above all—which 
in their opinion did not correspond to their self-ascribed identity (Collado, 
“Informe General”). In Mannheim it was possible to gather enough Spanish 
immigrants willing to pay the low price tickets, but in Düsseldorf and Dortmund 
the organizers had to give away tickets to ensure a sufficient audience (Collado, 
Report to De la Hoz and Magariños).17 On the reception of flamenco among 
Spanish emigrant communities in neighbouring Belgium, cultural studies have 
shed some light that allows us to deepen our case study. Even when immigrants 
from Spain were willing to see flamenco as a familiar musical genre, Spaniards 
in Belgium tended to remove any kind of biased Spanish nationalist connotation 
in flamenco, re-appropriating it as an ancestral cultural heritage and, mainly, a 
means of socializing and networking in the host country (Ruiz Morales). Either 
way, there is evidence that Mariemma’s performance enjoyed greater success 
than Bronston’s film in general terms (Collado, “Informe General”). 
A possible hostile reception of flamenco diplomacy in the German public 
opinion was clear enough to Collado, who recommended a subtle administrative 
procedure and avoided explicit references to the state sponsorship in order to 
prevent distortions or public alarm (Collado, Report to De la Hoz). All efforts 
were in vain. Some German press outlets strongly criticized the tour due to its 
                                                           
bles’ compliments on the film, Sinfonía finally preceded each Festival during the 25 
Years’ celebrations. 
16 “España y su historia se representan en el escenario alemán . . . recuerdo vivo de la 
Patria a nuestros compatriotas residentes en dicho país y al público alemán, con moti-
vo de la conmemoración de XXV Años de Paz Española.”  
17 Fernando Magariños led the Assistance Abroad Section (“Sección de Asistencia 
Exterior”) at the IEE. 
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ideological background. The journalist Kurt Krausbeck wrote on 23 June in the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung:  
 
We are not against Spanish artists and really want to live in peace with Franco. But 
celebrating his revolution in Germany is a slap in the face to every democrat for whom 
democracy is considered more than a temporarily useful form of governance. . . . A 
democracy that celebrates a coup d’état against democracy in Spain, does not show 
disrespect towards democracy? Will we celebrate “GDR” holidays in our National Theater 
in the future? (qtd. in Collado, “Informe General”)18  
 
According to the Neue Rhein Zeitung, Mariemma’s performance in Düsseldorf 
proved how totalitarian states took such opportunities and exploited them for 
their own political goals. Despite these dissonances, the contemporary musical 
reviews reflected a consensual atmosphere of acceptance: “Flamenco up to 
Exhaustion,” (qtd. in Aymamí)19 titled the Rheinische Post an article in their 18 
July issue, highlighting flamenco’s emotional power in contrast to other neutral 
popular Spanish genres (Robles Piquer, Note to Fraga, 15 July). In addition, the 
Neue Rhein Zeitung described the festival as a great gift offered to both German 
and Spanish audiences (Aymamí).20 
This partial success achieved by the first FE abroad encouraged the MIT to 
continue in the same way while diversifying music diplomacy towards unex-
plored strategic objectives of Spanish foreign policy. The next target area was 
the other side of the Iron Curtain, specifically the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly, 
flamenco played a significant role again. 
The Spanish-Soviet cultural diplomacy program was initiated by the French 
impresario Fernand Lumbroso in November 1964, who was by then in charge of 
French-Soviet cultural exchanges. He outlined an attractive music businesss after 
an interview with MIT officials in Madrid in November 1964. The draft included 
                                                           
18  “Wir haben nichts gegen spanische Künstler und wollen mit Franco im Frieden leben. 
Aber seinen Putsch-Feiertag bei uns mitfeiern, das ist ein Schlag ins Gesicht jedes 
Demokraten, dem die Demokratie mehr als eine zeitenweise zweckmäβige Staatsform 
ist. . . . In einer Demokratie, die Feiertage erfolgreicher Putschisten gegen die Demo-
kratie mitfeiern—heiβt das nicht bekunden, wie wurscht und fremd einem Demokratie 
sei! Wird man künftig auch etwa der Feiertage der ‘DDR’ durch Feierstunden im Na-
tionaltheater gedenken?”  
19  “Flamenco bis zur Erschöpfung” 
20  Luis Aymamí was in charge of migration affairs in Düsseldorf as a member of the 
staff of the Spanish Consulate. 
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a first visit to Moscow led by the Ballet of Antonio, one the most accomplished 
world-famous Spanish flamenco dancers at that time, and, in turn, a tour in Spain 
featuring the Ballet of the famous Russian choreographer Igor Moiseyev, which 
specialized in performing folkloric dances from the fifteen Soviet Republics. In 
Lumbroso’s opinion, this bilateral initiative carried out by dance diplomats was 
to pave the way for further exchanges of soloists and classical concert perfor-
mances between Spain and the Soviet Union (Lumbroso). Robles Piquer accept-
ed Lumbroso’s proposal immediately, arguing that Spain could gain a big 
advantage on the international stage with such strategic maneuver. The exchang-
es could help to urge the US government to invest in Spain in order to contain 
communism, since, according to Robles Piquer, “it is useful to have communists 
around when dollars are required” (Robles Piquer, Note to Fraga, n.d.).21 In any 
case, nobody should be surprised by a rapprochement between Francoism and 
the USSR because in Robles’s opinion, the “Russian soccer team has visited 
Spain before and played against its Spanish counterpart, who can be considered 
up to some extent as official as the Spanish Festivals, as well as an emblematic 
symbol of the nation” (Robles Piquer, Note to Fraga, n.d.).22 
The Cold War atmosphere could indeed not be more favorable for a deepen-
ing of Spanish-Soviet diplomatic relations. Notwithstanding its alignement with 
the West, the Spanish government jumped on the détente bandwagon encouraged 
by the concurrent Vatican rapprochement towards the Eastern Bloc. Madrid and 
Moscow initiated a bilateral round of talks in Washington DC, in June 1964, 
leaving behind decades of misunderstandings in the UN. The outcome was an 
informal agreement for the promotion of Spanish-Soviet tourist and artistic 
exchanges as a first step towards a future multi-level rapprochement (Suárez 
Fernández 245-74). Two Spanish-Soviet press and naval agreements followed 
this first deal in September 1966 and February 1967, respectively.  
Significantly, the deal was signed at the same time as Lumbroso put forth the 
Antonio-Moiseyev exchange in late November 1964. The project was set aside 
in March 1965, however, because the Soviet authorities offered unacceptable 
low fees to the Spanish ensemble. As a result, Antonio continued with his 
professional duties in Canada and the US, while the Spanish MFA demanded 
that the flamenco mission precede Moiseyev’s tour as a key condition to a final 
                                                           
21  “es conveniente tener comunistas cuando se quiere tener dólares.” 
22  “Al fin y al cabo el equipo nacional ruso de futbol ha venido a España y ha jugado con 
el equipo nacional español, al que puede considerarse quizá tan oficial como a los Fes-
tivales de España y más representativo del país en ciertos aspectos.” 
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agreement (De la Serna). 23 Everything may have come to nothing had it not been 
for the unexpected emergence of a private liason. The accomplished bullfighter 
and member of the Spanish political and cultural elites Luis Miguel Dominguín, 
who had addressed the Soviet cultural administration some months before in 
order to organize two bullfights in Moscow and Leningrad (Dominguín), was 
asked in December 1965 by the Soviet Ministry of Culture to mediate among the 
Spanish authorities, putting the dance exchange back on track again (Boni).24  
After a long, arduous negotiation, Antonio was finally allowed to perform in 
eight Soviet cities, including Leningrad, Kiev, and Moscow between June and 
July 1966. His performances received all imaginable compliments from the 
audience and the press: “Antonio is a dancing Paganini” (qtd. in MIT, File 2),25 
declared Moiseyev after enjoying the dancer’s accurate flamenco technique in 
Moscow. On 9 July, the Literaturnaya Gazeta similarly noted the aesthetic 
delight of the audience, claiming that Antonio depicted the talent of the entire 
Spanish people (MIT, File 2). The Spanish Ambassador to Paris reported on 23 
June the evident contrast between the popular acclamation of Antonio’s perfor-
mance by the Soviet audience and the unenthusiastic reception of the American 
Ballet Theater tour that took place at that time (Cortina Mauri). 
Subsequently, Moiseyev’s ballet toured several Spanish cities as the grand 
finale to the FE campaign in August and September 1966. Spanish representa-
tives monitored the visit very closely trying not to leave any detail to improvisa-
tion. For example, Antonio received Moiseyev and his company in his studio, 
the Spanish press covered every daily movement of the Soviet dancers, and visits 
to Seville’s most famous tablaos (flamenco bars) and Basque industries were 
scheduled. To increase the political significance of the musical exchange, the 
secret police supervised the tour thoroughly (MIT, “Proyecto”).26 Seeking to 
fulfill the specific objectives of the dictatorship regarding the Soviet visit, the 
Dirección General de Seguridad (General Directorate of Security) infiltrated in 
the company of Moiseyev two musicians as local staff who acted as informants 
for the Spanish government. The dance diplomats were supposed to be over-
whelmed by the Spanish endeavors to modernize the Spanish working class, 
                                                           
23  General Director of Cultural Relations at the MFA.  
24  V. Boni was the Chief of Gosconcert, the Concert Asociation of the Ministry of 
Culture in the USSR. 
25  “Antonio es el Paganini del baile.” 
26  Further newspaper clippings on the Moiseyev’s visit to Spain in AGA, (3) 49.12, 
44170. 
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“convincing them with facts that the workers could be better redeemed than in 
the ways proposed by the Soviets” (Arespacochaga).27  
An ideological background dominated Francoist music diplomacy until the 
end of the dictatorship, as the Fourth International Dance Festival celebrated in 
Madrid between October and November 1975 revealed. At that time, the strict 
international isolation which burdened Franco’s regime in the 1940s revived 
because of the last death penalties that were enacted by Franco in September 
1975, only shortly before his own death. In the context of this extreme situation, 
performing flamenco on the stage of Madrid’s Teatro de la Zarzuela implicitly 
assumed a political overtone once again. First of all, it is quite surprising that the 
Spanish representation at the event was run by Antonio as the leader of a new 
National Ballet of the Spanish Festivals. It was the first official Spanish dance 
company launched in 1974, long after flamenco had been associated with 
Spanish national authenticity. Moreover, the stage turned into a political space 
when La Scala Ballet and the Belgian Ballet du XXe Siècle, directed by Maurice 
Béjart, decided to protest against the recent executions by refusing to perform at 
the festival. Eventually, the show could go on thanks to the personal contacts 
from the MIT’s managers such as Mario Antolín Paz, the MIT’s General Direc-
tor of Theatre who succeeded in programing different French, British, and 





Flamenco diplomacy under Franco’s dictatorsship consolidated as an official 
diplomatic practice that resorted extensively to private actors—namely, impresa-
rios and popular flamenco stars. It was strengthened fundamentally when the 
MIT assumed a leading position in the implementation of the state music policy 
and the international promotion of Spanish popular culture from the 1950s 
onwards. The Ministry’s administration tried to close the gap between classical 
and folk music developed in the years when Falange and Coros y Danzas were in 
charge of music policy, transforming the popular music styles into high culture. 
However, this pedagogical target failed: The popularization of elitist cultural 
manifestations did not actually mean that lower or middle-class audiences 
                                                           
27  “[C]onvencerles con realidades que, a la masa obrera, se la puede redimir mejor de lo 
que ellos propugnan por otros caminos.” Juan Arespacochaga was the MIT’s General 
Director of Touristic Promotion.  
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attended classical music shows which they could not afford—or which they did 
not really want to attend.  
Beyond the Pyrenees, Franco’s regime instrumentalized flamenco under the 
conviction that it would achieve immediate positive results for Spain’s recogni-
tion and tourist developments. Some reasons explain this choice. On the one 
hand, the Roma community did not have a strong political organization, which 
was a pleasant advantage for the dictatorship’s propagandistic aims in order to 
appropriate its culture heritage easier.28 On the other hand, flamenco had already 
been commercialized since the late nineteenth century through cafés cantantes 
and óperas flamenco. This consumerist way of understanding flamenco, associ-
ated with all imaginable Andalusian clichés and romantic connotations—for 
example, depicting Andalusia as a land of bullfighters, bandits, and brave 
women—was shared by many people around the world. Thus, Franco’s dictator-
ship reshaped flamenco into a cultivated form of “Spanish ballet,” almost 
monopolized by flamenco, yet only as far as music and dance were concerned. 
Lyrics were set aside since they were not paramount to fulfill the main goal of 
Spanish tourism policy—namely, to leverage the image of a modernizing and 
unique nation recognized as a legitimate partner by the Western, and even the 
Eastern, bloc.  
Regardless of the ambivalent reception of flamenco missions in some cas-
es—for example, among the Spanish emigrants in the FRG—the most influential 
achievement under Franco’s dictatorship was, in short, to transform flamenco 
into a “national ballet.” Francoism created a National Flamencoist system based 
on the inclusion of flamenco in the national apparatus of public diplomacy. 
Domestically, the instrumentalization of flamenco resulted in its depoliticization, 
primarily because this asserted that flamenco represented the ancient roots of 
“Spanish” music history and a single “national” identity. 
Finally, flamenco diplomacy brings us closer to the difficult balance between 
private diplomats’ agency and state guidance in public diplomatic affairs, and 
more precisely to the current public diplomacy program fostered by the Spanish 
government, namely the Marca España (“About”). Not only does the collabora-
tion of state and private actors on a shared international image of Spanish culture 
continue to be scarcely harmonic, but it also supports the old Francoist discourse 
of flamenco’s allegedly Spanish essence (Perujo). Flamenco courses, agreements 
for a global dissemination of flamenco art, and the inclusion of flamenco on the 
                                                           
28  It was not until the 1970s that a group of “new flamenco” performers began to subvert 
the Francoist simplification of flamenco art, engaging regionalist political movements 
with an Andalusian inspiration (Grimaldos). 
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Part IV:  





The Ethics and Politics of Empathy 
in US Hip-Hop Diplomacy 
The Case of the Next Level Program 
Kendra Salois 
 
In the mid-2000s, the US State Department revised its historic musical diploma-
cy strategies, sending more genres abroad, linking to existing exchange pro-
grams, and increasing opportunities for musical interaction. The newest initia-
tive, named Next Level, conducts workshops in the hip-hop arts for beginners 
and professionals alike while refining its domestic and foreign audiences. Unlike 
the mid-twentieth century “Jazz Ambassadors,” Next Level (NL) seeks Ameri-
can musicians who identify as activists and teachers as much as emcees, deejays, 
dancers or beatmakers. NL’s format and desired performers can be read as the 
latest iteration of best practices in person-to-person diplomacy. I argue it also 
expresses an ideological shift towards privileging musicians’ affective labor—
that is, their work on themselves and others to perceive an embodied interper-
sonal connection that transcends language—in and beyond musical performance.  
Historians of the US Cultural Presentations Program (CPP), which sent jazz 
and art music ensembles abroad from 1954 through the 1970s for multi-country 
tours aimed at elite audiences, frequently focus on the ways that American 
musicians achieved their personal goals for meeting and playing with and for 
non-elites (see Eschen). Danielle Fosler-Lussier has recently argued that we 
should read these tour anecdotes not as moments of “subversion,” but as ac-
commodated, even appreciated, by State Department and Foreign Service 
personnel (Cold War Diplomacy 98-99). Regardless of how we interpret them, 
scholars agree that such moments and the CPP as a whole expressed all partici-
pants’ understandings of themselves as active in one Cold War front. By con-
trast, the artists I have spoken with about their involvement in NL and other 
programs see themselves as transcending US diplomatic and policy goals, 
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whether they agree with them or not, precisely through their own sincerity of 
intention (Salois “US Department”).  
This chapter argues that the Next Level program demonstrates what the State 
Department has learned from previous generations of musical diplomacy. With 
its small-scale workshops and hand-picked collaborations, NL has taken the 
unplanned encounters and unexpected consequences of earlier tours and made 
them the center of its programming strategy. Under this ideal, person-to-person 
musical diplomacy is mobilized not for the wholesale winning of hearts and 
minds—regardless of the cultural or class status of those hearts and minds—but 
for a micropolitics of empathy, where the goal is an affective sense of being 
mutually recognized and appreciated, if not understood.  
This chapter discusses how NL’s structure requires affective labor from its 
musicians. I focus on the kinds of intersubjective connections desired between 
American musicians, foreign musicians, and their target audiences. Ultimately, 
this chapter focuses on participants’ intertwined musical and affective labor in 
order to move beyond framing “hip-hop diplomacy” solely as a contradiction, 
viewing it instead as an extractive application of the State Department’s under-
standings of human and musical intersubjectivity.  
 
 
US ARTS DIPLOMACY: PHILOSOPHY AND PRACTICE 
 
US cultural diplomacy policy has been characterized by public-private partner-
ships, “policy incoherence…and political vulnerability” (Sablosky 31), and 
differing opinions within the foreign policy establishment since its inception in 
the 1920s and 1930s. As such, musical diplomacy has seen a succession of 
experiments, especially since its revival in the post-9/11 era. The forerunner of 
today’s arts-diplomacy programs, the Cultural Presentation Program (CPP), was 
established in 1954. Debates dating to CPP’s origins, including its founding 
board’s preference for art musics, and its quick addition of internationally-
known jazz ensembles to its roster of orchestras and chamber groups, constitute 
an important backdrop for present-day programming choices (Campbell; 
Eschen). Historians also emphasize the CPP’s intention to demonstrate that US 
culture achieves its greatest potential through, not despite, its private markets 
(Monson 111). 
Diplomacy practitioners and historians describe the decade after 1989 as a 
nadir in financial and political support for US cultural diplomacy (Bayles 235-
36; see Bayles in this volume; Cull 180-83). The United States Information 
Agency (USIA), which was responsible for most arts diplomacy programming 
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during the Cold War, shrank from 1978, when the Carter administration com-
bined it with the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs 
to create the United States International Communication Agency (USICA), 
through the 1980s and 1990s. In 1999, it was fully dissolved and its non-
broadcasting programming integrated into the Department of State’s Bureau of 
Educational and Cultural Affairs (Sablosky 32; Hayden 179).  
After the attacks of 11 September 2001, a small boom in publications by 
scholars, practitioners, and advocates argued for a “new public diplomacy,” 
described by Nicholas Cull as a response to changed factors including new 
political contexts, technologies, state and non-state actors, and theoretical 
approaches (Bayles 235; Cull xi-xii). Cultural programming was central to calls 
for renewed public diplomacy, as commentators pointed out its relatively low 
costs and the target youth audiences’ desire for creative products. In 2005, the 
Rhythm Road program, now known as American Music Abroad (AMA), revived 
and expanded the mid-century “Jazz Ambassadors” model (Aidi; AMS Planning 
and Associates 21). AMA was the first of several new concert and exchange 
programs in music and dance. While the philosophical and theoretical underpin-
nings of new and old programs are similar, current arts diplomacy programming 
has also diversified its methods, its musical styles, and its targets, recognizing 
that no single musical export can meet the preferences of diverse youth audienc-
es. Instead, realizing these audiences lack not American musical products but 
experience with actual Americans, programs like Next Level, OneBeat, and to 
some extent AMA focus on bringing individuals together for intensive short-
term encounters. 
Since their inception, US arts-diplomacy programs have relied on an appar-
ent contradiction. On one hand, artists and audiences are perfectly capable of 
separating American people from American policy, and often willing to do so 
(Fosler-Lussier, “Music Pushed” 63).1 On the other hand, that separation allows 
those who might disagree with US foreign policies to develop good will toward 
individual Americans. This in turn better prepares those audiences to accept 
American interests. In the words of the 1993 US Advisory Commission on 
Public Diplomacy (US ACPD), “US foreign and economic policies will be 
understood best . . . by those whose views are based on personal observation of 
American society and contact with a broad cross-section of Americans” (US 
ACPD 2, qtd. in Sablosky 38). To accept the notion of separate cultural and 
                                                           
1  Referring to both target audiences and American musicians, former NL site manager 
Paul Rockower remarked, “for the most part, people, I find, can differentiate between 
political representatives and people who are cultural representatives.” 
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political spheres is in itself to accept a fundamental argument made by US 
diplomacy. 
For Craig Hayden, this apparent contradiction confuses the legitimization of 
public diplomacy with the practice itself. He argues that US advocates often 
“conflate the compelling aspects of US values with the deployment of technolo-
gies that are perceived to be demonstrative of these values” (175). Hayden neatly 
encapsulates what Marshall Stearns and Dave Brubeck argued in the 1950s and 
1960s, and what contemporary diplomatic and musical practitioners often argue 
today. According to this narrative, jazz and hip-hop do not merely sound Ameri-
can; the personal interaction their musical organization requires directly express-
es central American values of individuality, mutual respect, dialogue, and debate 
in a democratic public sphere (Crist; Fosler-Lussier, Cold War Diplomacy 86).  
Similarly, Hayden argues that “US public diplomacy [assumed] that . . . ex-
posing foreign audiences to US values will illuminate a shared identification 
with US motives and policies. In this view, public diplomacy provides a kind of 
revelatory function—pointing foreign audiences toward the belief that American 
values and institutions are in fact their values” (180). By contrast, the Obama-era 
focus on diplomacy’s methods of communication, rather than on a single strate-
gic message, reveals a belief that “influence accrues not in the elaboration of 
arguments about the United States, but in the symbolic significance of diplomat-
ic practices that aid . . . and connect” target populations (182). 
Both of Hayden’s comments fit two features of Next Level. First, the pro-
gram emphasizes connecting different hip-hop communities, both in placing 
geographically distant American artists on teams together and in the Global Next 
Level All-Stars, the team of foreign artists formed from professionals in host 
countries and brought to the US for a two-week residency at the end of each 
edition. Second, narratives about hip-hop music frequently focus on its rapid rise 
to preeminence as a “global” popular form, combining an assumption of music’s 
universality with a strongly held belief in hip-hop’s particularity as a means of 
resistance and a demonstration of agency.2 Deployed uncritically, such narratives 
                                                           
2  Hip-hop connection narratives, in which practitioners in widely disparate places 
understand systemic racism against African Americans as either practically resem-
bling their own marginality or as a metaphor for their own struggles for recognition, 
strongly resemble Lauren Berlant’s depiction of “intimate publics”: “What makes a 
public sphere intimate is an expectation that the consumers of its particular stuff al-
ready share a worldview and emotional knowledge that they have derived from a 
broadly common historical experience. A certain circulation structures an intimate 
public, therefore: its consumer participants are perceived to be marked by a commonly 
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imply all hip-hop practitioners will immediately understand each other if only 
given the opportunity to connect. In this vision, NL is less a demonstration of an 
American way of life and more a service provider to small groups of influential 
artists in each country. Yet simultaneously, NL communicates the “global” 
relevance of American aesthetics and values precisely through the “revelatory 
function” of its networking platform. 
 
 
STRUCTURING EMPATHY: THE NEXT LEVEL PROGRAM 
 
Like other State Department arts-diplomacy programs, the Next Level program 
began with a call for applications from the Bureau of Educational and Cultural 
Affairs to non-profit groups to audition, arrange, and run the proposed trips. 
Mark Katz, Professor of Music at UNC-Chapel Hill in North Carolina, won the 
pilot grant in 2013; the grant has been renewed five times, including for the 
upcoming 2019 edition (Katz, Dec. 2016 and Feb. 2018). According to the 
ACPD’s 2016 report, the program’s 2013 budget was $960,000, with subsequent 
years funded at $800,000. This budget includes, but is not limited to, the costs of 
travel, accommodations, salary, and per diem for an average of 26 participants 
for two to three weeks each (US ACPD, 2016 Comprehensive Annual Report 
103).  
During its first year, NL sent teams of American “artist-educators” to six 
countries—India, Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro, Serbia, 
Senegal, and Zimbabwe—to hold workshops in hip-hop emceeing, deejaying, 
composition or beatmaking, and dance. Like other programs, youth in countries 
or cities with significant Muslim populations are an important target audience. 
As Martha Bayles notes (255), unlike contemporary arts diplomacy programs 
that seek to reach mass audiences, such as American Music Abroad, DanceMo-
tionUSA, or the regional Voice of America and Radio Sawa broadcasts, NL 
targets only pre-selected groups of youth and hip-hop devotees. Typically, the 
State Department confirms the cities each NL edition will visit before auditions 
occur for that grant year; NL organizers have input, but not a final say over 
                                                           
lived history; its narratives and things are deemed expressive of that history while also 
shaping its conventions of belonging; and, expressing the sensational, embodied expe-
rience of living as a certain kind of being in the world, it promises also to provide a 
better experience of social belonging—partly through participation in the relevant 
commodity culture, and partly because of its revelations about how people can live” 
(vii). 
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where to go (Katz “Hip-Hop Diplomacy”; Rockower). Site managers visit each 
host city prior to the teams’ arrival to meet with embassy personnel and the 
heads of non-profit groups with whom the teams will work, to scout accommo-
dations and locations, and to confirm their presence will not inflame any local 
rivalries. In each location, NL team members spend most of their time working 
with school-age youth, often with some practical exposure to the hip-hop arts.3 
Itineraries also leave time for team members to meet advanced students, take 
cultural excursions, and collaborate with local musicians and each other. Each 
trip culminates in at least one public performance by the team’s students and one 
by the team itself.  
NL’s programming relies on teams of artists with strong teaching credentials 
as well as expert musicianship. The application for the 2015-16 year required 
“teaching ability and experience,” “potential to use music or dance to promote 
peace and cultural exchange,” and the “potential to thrive as cultural diplomats” 
(“Apply”). These application criteria also tend to encourage “conscious” artists, 
who explicitly use their music and lyrics for socio-cultural commentary. Like-
wise, foreign service personnel indicate that they are usually offered and prefer 
artists with a track record of social engagement, such as teachers, mentors, or 
non-profit entrepreneurs (Werberg).  
The examples in the next section show that from audition to final perfor-
mance to post-return media management, musicians’ personal qualities of 
generosity, sincerity, and empathy are at the heart of a successful NL trip. I am 
most concerned with empathy, provisionally understood here as an affective 
recognition of the other as deserving of interest, investment, and care—and thus 
as equal, despite being dissimilar. As a concept, “empathy” is often deployed in 
a manner similar to “affect.” It has enough of an implied conceptual core to be 
useful, but fuzzy boundaries and multiple theoretical genealogies permit wide 
variations in application. Lauren Berlant identifies a “metacultural ideal of 
liberal empathy” that expresses itself through “the ideal of a ‘one people’ that 
can absorb all differences” (55). This universalist discourse underpins much 
public diplomacy and is echoed by several interviewees.  
As Martha Nussbaum (Upheavals of Thought) and Carolyn Pedwell (“Affec-
tive (self-) transformations”; Affective Relations) point out, different theories 
about empathy presuppose different emotional mechanics. Pedwell summarizes 
feminist and anti-racist definitions of empathy as concerned with “imaginative 
reconstruction,” “perspective-taking,” and “mutuality” (Affective Relations 51). 
                                                           
3  Katz notes that today, “the typical age range is 18-25,” but teams occasionally partner 
with high schools (Feb. 2018).  
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These intertwine the rational, creative imagination and the affective, embodied 
dimension of understanding that imagination. By contrast, Sara Ahmed suggests 
a different process in her discussion of representations of queer lives. In her 
filmic and novelistic examples from the late twentieth century, queer subjects’ 
happiness is derailed by the unhappiness of their loved ones, who themselves 
insist they are being empathetic when they fail to imagine happiness outside of 
conventional straight romantic lives (Promise 92-96). Ahmed uses these repre-
sentations to insist on the inescapable otherness of the target of empathy, arguing 
that “empathy sustains the very difference that it may seek to overcome: . . . 
subjects ‘feel’ something other than what another feels in the very moment of 
imagining they could feel what another feels” (Cultural Politics 30).4  
If commonplace discourses about empathy hold that it encourages people to 
see themselves as fundamentally similar, while critical theorists note that this 
can shade into appropriation or pity, how do diplomacy professionals deploy the 
idea? Pedwell distinguishes between theorists who see empathy as a “capacity, 
skill or tool,” which can be instrumentalized by institutions and cultivated by the 
neoliberal subject invested in developing herself as a set of human resources, and 
those who see it as closer to affect, as an intersubjective “social relation or 
product of circulation” (Affective Relations 49). The latter, perhaps paradoxical-
ly, are more likely to understand the production of empathy as an economy of 
circulation with, like other economies, winners and losers. 
 
 
EMPATHY AS AFFECTIVE LABOR 
 
In what follows, I offer examples of the affective labor NL participants, includ-
ing program organizers, must do throughout their trips. This work is not directed 
solely at workshop participants at the teams’ field sites, but also at their team 
members, State Department personnel, and themselves. As effective teachers and 
“cultural diplomats,” the musicians selected must demonstrate heightened 
interpersonal skills. They must be able to engage equally effectively, and on 
short notice, with a wide variety of strangers, including their musical colleagues 
from across the US, American and foreign embassy personal at their site, local 
                                                           
4  In her summary of feminist thinking around this issue, Clare Hemmings reminds us 
that “transnational feminist perspectives . . . have highlighted a further likely slip be-
tween empathy and pity in white Western consideration of ‘global others’ . . . and em-
phasised the struggles and loss of authority that real empathy requires” (152).  
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leaders at the institutions where they are placed, and youth workshop partici-
pants ranging from rank amateurs to devoted hip-hop heads.  
While NL applicants are not asked to complete in-person interviews, expec-
tations of applicants’ personal engagement are shaped by and similar to those of 
other State Department-sponsored programs. As described by site manager and 
public diplomacy specialist Paul Rockower, the audition for American Music 
Abroad requires musicians to perform an emotional connection with their 
interviewers. Rockower noted “[t]here were some groups that were Grammy-
nominated . . . they didn’t get accepted because they were dour” during their 
auditions and interviews. That emotional connection was in part based on 
demonstrating a shared mission and reflecting organizers’ own sense of the 
project’s meaning and prestige. As he put it, “[y]ou don’t want divas. You want 
people who will appreciate the opportunity.” Further, musicians were asked to 
cultivate an empathetic response to the challenges of travel. Rockower recalled 
asking applicants to anticipate disastrous scenarios: “Pretend you’re doing a 
program in Lebanon and you’re on your way to a Palestinian refugee camp. . . . 
[When you arrive,] they’ve been sitting there for two hours and there’s no 
power. What do you do?” Although this hypothetical two hours probably in-
cludes stressful situations for the musicians, team members are expected to 
desire to put the needs of the audience first, rather than being “divas.” 
Once musicians have completed their tour with NL or its sister programs, 
they are ineligible for subsequent editions for a minimum of three years (“Ap-
ply”). Should we consider NL and similar programs exploitative if these excel-
lent artists cannot find a similarly remunerative opportunity, without the obliga-
tion to advance the US’s diplomatic and political goals, in the private sphere? 
NL organizers themselves are sensitive to this possibility. Katz and his staff 
work to provide more secure employment and to sustain musicians’ commitment 
to the program. During the second edition in 2015-16, teams went to El Salva-
dor, Honduras, Tanzania, Thailand, and Uganda (“About”). According to 
Rockower, the Thailand trip was managed by an artist from the pilot year. By the 
summer of 2016, three artists had become site managers, with others expected to 
do so in future editions (Katz, July 2016). In addition, NL hires former partici-
pants for other roles in which they have expertise, such as videography. A 
former participant who also manages his own arts non-profit, dancer Junious 
Brickhouse, now serves as Associate Director (Katz, Feb. 2018).  
Katz sees a responsibility to compensate hip-hop’s artistic community in a 
sustainable way. As he explained in a public lecture during the pilot year, “I’m 
sure this is not the State Department’s agenda, to employ hip-hop artists . . . but 
it is a part of my agenda. . . . I’m sending taxpayer dollars into the hands of hip-
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hop artists, and I think that’s a good thing” (“Hip-Hop Diplomacy”). Additional-
ly, Katz has  
 
long thought that it was important to bring hip-hop practitioners into the administration of 
the program. . . . One way to do that is to hire them as site managers. It’s also a way of 
continuing that relationship and cultivating a strong and mutually beneficial relationship 
with the community that I interact with. . . . I can tell . . . that some artists will be excellent 
at site management—they have that skill set and that temperament. (July 2016) 
 
By conflating “skills” and “temperament,” Katz implies that managing person-
alities, reactions, and emotions is a major part of leading a team as a site manag-
er.  
In addition, NL organizers are careful to assemble inclusive teams for each 
trip. These not only show target audiences the diversity of musical styles, ages, 
religions, racial and/or ethnic backgrounds, sexual orientations, and gender 
identities in US hip-hop today, but demonstrate a commitment to the entire hip-
hop community rather than a normative masculinist vision. During interviews, 
Katz, Rockower, and project manager Michael Cohen all emphasized the pro-
gram’s commitment to forming teams that included at least one woman. Howev-
er, the ACPD data on NL show 30 percent female participation across the first 
three years, hinting at how difficult it is to achieve this goal at present (US 
ACPD, 2016 Comprehensive Annual Report).5 Keeping a diverse roster of 
musicians in the pool of potential labor in this way, while working around the 
rule against musicians going on multiple tours, is paradigmatic of what Carolyn 
Pedwell describes as the results of empathetic responses to differential life 
chances idealized by both critical scholars and international development profes-
sionals. 
 
[T]he radically ‘unsettling’ affective experience of empathy . . . is conceived as potentially 
generative of both personal and social change . . . [I]n these and other feminist and anti-
racist texts, the suggestion is that, while ‘we’ might theorise social inequalities and 
commit ourselves to social responsibilities and obligations in the abstract, a transformation 
at the affective level is required to make ‘us’ actually feel, realise and act on them. 
(“Affective (Self-)transformations” 166) 
 
                                                           
5  Katz notes that “in the next [cycle] it will be 39 percent [female participation]” (Feb. 
2018). 
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In this reading, Katz’s goal of “continuing that . . . mutually beneficial relation-
ship” is ultimately informed by affective connections to his interlocutors.6  
In what follows, I will use the case of DJ 2-Tone Jones, a Washington DC-
based artist who went on the first NL trip to India, to illustrate how NL’s “artist-
educators” are expected to manage their affective and musical labor abroad. 
Jones’s background makes him an excellent choice for a team of “artist-
educators” designed to introduce youth to hip-hop beyond internationally 
popular artists. His personal style is historicist in outlook, as evidenced by his 
published mixes and his Shaolin Jazz Project, which highlights the continuing 
influence of jazz on hip-hop by pairing jazz remixes with famous Wu-Tang a 
cappella raps. He is also active with a hip-hop non-profit called Words Beats & 
Life in Washington DC, coaching teenagers in deejaying and chess. In our 
interview, he described finding that the NL application reflected what he already 
does. He was also interested in “the approach of bringing together different 
artists who hadn’t really worked with one another” to go abroad.  
The team met for the first time in orientation in Washington DC in early 
summer 2015. The following month, they spent two weeks in Patna, the capital 
city of the Indian state of Bihar, working with children at a local high school. 
This was followed by one week at the US Consulate in Kolkata, working with 
more advanced students in their late teens to early twenties. As Jones explained 
to me, and as participants in other tours confirmed (Gann; Rockower), the very 
first trip of the pilot year was busier and more experimental than subsequent 
trips. The group worked with novice students three to four hours a day in order 
to prepare for their culminating performance. After hours, artists also rehearsed 
amongst themselves, preparing for their own performance at the end of the 
residency. They replicated that structure in Kolkata.  
However, the team also had an additional mandate. The Consulate “wanted 
us to create six [public service announcements, PSAs] . . . three for radio, three 
for TV—that involved the youth in social issues they dealt with on a daily basis. 
We had to create those while teaching them while getting the performance 
together . . . and have the PSAs actually completed to actually display during the 
performance,” recalled Jones (Wallace). As a dedicated teacher who frequently 
works with school-age children, Jones already had a strong idea of how long it 
would take absolute beginners to achieve a performance that was both rewarding 
                                                           
6  Note that this reading does not require a single kind of relationship between affective 
“transformation” and moral or ethical norms. I am not suggesting, for example, that 
Katz’s desire to redistribute is not also based in a belief that it is the right thing to do. 
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for them and appropriately conversant in hip-hop conventions. According to 
him, the program did not allow for the latter goal:  
 
We really had about 8 days with the kids . . . it’s a hundred-plus degrees every day . . . and 
the artists who are leading this, we’ve never worked together. And we have to do our own 
performance. And we have to meet with local artists and put something together with them 
that will also be a part of this culminating [performance]. . . . So yeah, my average day 
might be waking up at 7 and then I might be going to bed at like 2 or 3 in the morning. 
(Wallace) 
 
At the same time, Jones emphasized that he enjoyed working with the students in 
Patna. “If anything, [the kids] were better than my expectations,” he commented. 
“They were just excited . . . about every day we were there.” The equanimity 
with which Jones recalled the stresses and highlights of the three weeks, and his 
sense of being “kind of like the guinea pigs” (Wallace) on the program’s first 
trip, demonstrated the precise blend of resilience, optimism, technical ability, 
and gratitude that the application process appears to seek.  
 
 
EMPATHY ON STAGE  
 
When they gathered to perform in the Kolkata Consulate at the end of the third 
week, team members still did not have strong expectations for how they would 
interact beyond basic hip-hop conventions. As Jones put it, “as a deejay, one of 
the people I should be able to feed off the most is the emcee, but I didn’t hear her 
rap until the second week” (Wallace). Layering additional non-hip-hop musi-
cians onto that lack of familiarity required complex musical negotiations at the 
moment of performance. Empathetic listening practices and affirming responses, 
understood here as affective “social relations” in Pedwell's sense, are vital to 
turning individual musicians’ choices into an ensemble’s coherent performance. 
To illustrate this, I will analyze specific moments from a video of the team’s 
final performance. In this video, DJ 2-Tone Jones, producer Ko, and emcee 
Purple Haze collaborate with two Baul musicians, OneBeat alumna Malabika 
Brahma and her musical partner, percussionist Sanjay Bhattacherjee (Next Level 
USA 0:00-2:40). 
The video begins with Jones scratching into the percussion pattern that opens 
Main Source’s 1991 hit “Looking at the Front Door,” which is based in F minor. 
He launches the sample four measures before the song’s famous vocables-based 
chorus. Ko is situated to the left of Jones; off screen, on the stage to the left, 
244 | Kendra Salois 
Purple Haze and Malabika Brahma wait for their cue. Standing behind Ko and 
Jones, Bhattacherjee listens carefully for the right moment to enter. He makes 
tentative noises with his khamak, a tension drum, to find a pitch that will match 
the guitar in Jones’ sample.7 After two measures on the dominant pitch, 
Bhattacherjee lands on the tonic sounded by the bass guitar in the sample, while 
maintaining an off-beat pattern that echoes the guitar and hit-hat rhythms. Ko, 
who has been watching Jones and nodding along to this introduction, turns to his 
equipment to prepare to enter at the start of the eighth measure, or halfway 
through the chorus. At nearly the same time, emcee Purple Haze says “give us 
something Ko” as sixteenth notes beginning on the second half of the third beat 
of the eighth measure, so that her spoken “Ko” lands on the “and” of the fourth 
beat. At this cue, Bhattacherjee increases the volume of his strumming pattern in 
the ninth measure, his tonic pitch sliding slightly sharp. Ko’s initial drum sounds 
land late; after two measures, he settles on a clap on the “and” of beats two and 
four.  
Once a new eight-measure unit begins, Jones turns the volume down on his 
sample to highlight the other musicians. Ko glances back at Bhattacherjee, and 
they exchange a smile just as Malabika Brahma drifts into the frame as she 
moves to the beat. Throughout this and the next eight-measure units, Ko adds a 
syncopated bass-drum pattern of two dotted-eighths plus an eighth note, while 
Bhattacherjee occasionally throws in four eighth notes played on the beat to 
contrast this syncopation (0:00-1:09).8  
Off camera, Purple Haze prepares to enter with the word “yeah” on the “and” 
of beat two of the sixth measure of a unit (approximately 1:04). Ko immediately 
drops the claps in his percussion pattern and Bhattacherjee fills the rest of the 
measure with on-beat strumming. Purple Haze then enters with the phrase “I 
used to be in love but no not anymore,” so that the first syllable of “used” lands 
on the first beat of seventh measure, and “not” and “more” line up with Ko’s 
bass-drum pattern. Combined, these give the effect of a late entrance, so that it 
sounds as if she rushes her first phrase to catch up. In her second line, “so I left 
my heart open where I once had it stored,” with “left,” “once,” and “stored” 
lining up with dotted eighths in the bass-drum pattern throughout the eighth 
                                                           
7  Alternately known as a khamak (or khamaka) or ananda-lahari, this drum is usually 
hung from a shoulder strap and held under the arm. One or two strings threaded 
through the drum head are attached to a much smaller drum, held in the hand, with 
which the performer can change the strings’ tension and pitch (Capwell 95). 
8  As Mario Dunkel points out, Ko’s bass-drum pattern gives the effect of 2/4 measures 
over the 4/4 of “Looking at the Front Door.” 
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measure of the unit. During the next full eight-measure unit, Purple Haze settles 
into a straight eighth-note rhythm, contrasting the syncopated bass-drum pattern. 
Bhattacherjee transitions to a stable supporting pattern, letting the interplay 
between Purple Haze’s phrases and Ko’s changing drum samples be the focus of 
the unit. The camera focuses on Purple Haze as she directs her rap to Brahma, 
turning her body towards Brahma, smiling and looking at her even as Brahma 
gazes at the ground in an attitude of attentive listening. Both women keep time 
with their bodies, shifting their weight on subdivisions of the beat. 
In the following eight-measure unit, Malabika Brahma’s entrance precipi-
tates new responses from each musician. Brahma enters on E, a major seventh 
above the tonic F sounded by the bass in “Looking at the Front Door.” She ends 
her first phrase on the sixth degree above the tonic, or D-flat. Jones drops the 
Main Source chorus sample, in which the melodic phrase resolves to the domi-
nant, avoiding potential dissonance. Bhattacherjee immediately fills in on the 
tonic for four measures. In her second phrase, Brahma climbs towards a higher 
register. In her third phrase, Brahma ascends to and holds a D-flat, which 
Bhattacherjee reinforces by playing it one octave below. Without the Main 
Source sample, this has the effect of establishing the sixth degree as a new tonic 
pitch. Purple Haze then initiates an exchange of lines in what I hear as the new 
key, singing “You know my heart, though you know I didn’t tell you/How do 
you know me?” so that the ends of both lines fall on the new tonic pitch. Brahma 
and Purple Haze then cue each other to trade off phrases with eye contact, 
physical gestures, facial expressions, and verbal cues. After Brahma’s phrase, 
Purple Haze repeats her line in her second entrance. However, beyond the 
camera’s frame, Bhattacherjee shifts his accompaniment pattern back to the 
original tonic F immediately after Haze’s line. As a result, Brahma takes the 
exchange in a different direction, rejoining with “I know” on a low F. As Purple 
Haze freestyles over the next measures, Brahma smiles and shakes her head 
while giving eye contact and focus to her, as Jones quietly brings back the 
chorus of “Looking at the Front Door.” When Brahma enters again, she sings 
over the sample, using Purple Haze’s melody from “you know my heart” as a 
cadence on the D-flat (1:32-2:40). 
These moments demonstrate how difficult it is for seasoned musicians to an-
ticipate unfamiliar collaborators’ actions, read each other’s cues, and decide 
what to do next, often within a subdivision of the beat. When I showed Jones this 
clip, he said, “This was one of the ones that was a little more thrown together in 
the moment. . . . All the others were things we might have tried in a jam session, 
whereas this was kinda like, ‘uhh, hey I remember we did something the other 
day, do you remember?’” He offered that since he was not sure what would 
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happen next, he thought “I can just do a basic beat, [Bhattacherjee] can just do 
whatever he’s doing behind me.” He noted that he did not feel the Baul musi-
cians and the group had enough time to rehearse beforehand, but they “still made 
it work some kinda way” (Wallace). 
Each decision discussed here has the potential to derail the performance. 
When Ko first enters, his slightly out-of-time sounds in his first two measures 
could confuse less able collaborators. When Bhattacherjee starts to vary his 
patterns, Ko looks back in a way that could be interpreted as either reinforcing or 
discouraging. When Purple Haze starts using shorter patterns that pull against 
the rhythms set up by Ko and Jones’ sample, or when Brahma structures her 
melodic line around the sixth scale degree, both lead the backing musicians to 
reduce the texture to essential percussion.  
In each case, the musicians respond to what they are hearing, even if it is not 
what they are listening for. For example, when I interpret Brahma’s melody as a 
change of key, I am listening with the ingrained assumption that the bass line of 
“Looking at the Front Door” implies an unchanging tonal center, even when the 
sample itself is no longer audible. In a sense, I am unable to avoid hearing my 
own expectations, set up by the sample. The ensemble, however, fluidly moves 
between the F minor established in Main Source’s chorus and Brahma’s tonal 
center of D-flat, and between following the deejay or the khamak as the leading 
instrument. In a sign of the flexibility and intercultural adaptability that NL 
prizes in its musicians, both the hip-hop and Baul musicians in this example 
listen beyond genre conventions and affirm unexpected results.  
Video analysis also demonstrates how the musicians use their roles in the 
group to promote effective turn-taking and expectations of reciprocity. In the 
moment of performance, the musicians manage their own reactions, their inter-
group responses, and what they are showing to the audience all at once. Both 
vocalists, as the center of attention for the live audience, appear focused on 
making the audience feel comfortable with what is happening on stage. They 
maintain their composure and their smiles, literally reaching out to the audience 
with their gestures, and sharing space equally on stage even as they move from 
one side to the other. On the interaction between Purple Haze and Brahma, Jones 
commented, “there was a section of time where . . . I was like ‘you know, where 
you guys going with this?’ But. . . . They had a bond, they had a moment.” 
Holding only microphones, the female vocalists use their relative freedom of 
movement to visualize their sonic dialogue, confirming their attention to and 
interest in each other’s performances for both the instrumentalists and the 
audience. Likewise, the instrumentalists also constantly affirm each other’s 
initiatives with non-verbal cues, even as their faces are turned to their instru-
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ments and their musical gestures may lead in a different direction. While the 
artists give a visual and sonic impression of confident spontaneity, on close 






Next Level has turned a traditional weakness of arts diplomacy, the inability to 
judge performances’ effectiveness with large audiences, into a strength. Alt-
hough today’s descendants of the mid-twentieth-century Cultural Presentations 
Program include more workshops and collaborations than the CPP was designed 
to do, they also still conduct multi-stop tours with audiences in the hundreds. To 
date, reviews of these programs’ effectiveness rely on press clippings and 
anecdotes from embassy personnel. While these are often high-quality, well-
contextualized data, they skew towards elite audiences and towards demonstrat-
ing the efficacy of the host embassies. In contrast, by targeting small groups pre-
selected by the host embassy or consulate, or by the local school, NGO, or youth 
group, NL avoids having to adjudicate its impact on large audiences in the first 
place. Instead, as DJ 2-Tone Jones’ example demonstrated, a successful Next 
Level trip negotiates a path through the occasionally conflicting goals of the 
embassy, the target institutions and students, and the artists themselves. 
Despite differences these examples bring out within and between groups, 
everyone interviewed remains committed to the idea of forging a lasting connec-
tion and to the belief that they did so. NL completed its pilot year in April 2015 
by bringing five foreign musicians to Washington DC and Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina. Dubbed the “Next Level Global All-Stars,” they were among those 
who had collaborated with the NL teams on each tour. Each was chosen based 
on recommendations from NL organizers, the participating Embassy, and the NL 
musicians (Rockower). Like the US artists, the musicians chosen for the global 
residency were already active as professional musicians, teachers, advocates, 
media personalities, and/or activists. According to Mark Katz, the goals of the 
residency were to reunite selected foreign musicians with American participants 
and to offer an opportunity for one person from each country to create with the 
others (2014). In a blog post for the NL website, a staff member wrote, “Hip-hop 
represents a worldview where diversity is the norm, not the exception, and we 
strive to uphold that. . . . The same performance can even be meaningful to 
different people for different reasons, and this understanding has always been at 
the heart of our diplomatic mission” (“Amazing Journey”).  
248 | Kendra Salois 
Paul Rockower likewise described the Global All-Stars residency as “creat-
ing space in which diverse voices can be heard.” But he also emphasized the 
difference between the goals of the NL organizers and those of the State De-
partment, noting that for the latter, it was less about advancing hip-hop as an art 
form and more about training future leaders. As he put it, “That’s why we do lots 
of workshops in entrepreneurship, in social activism, in conflict resolution . . . 
trying to give them more skills so they can . . . be involved in their communi-
ties.” The organizers ran such workshops with the help of DC-based NL partici-
pants, including Jones, who joined a panel to discuss hip-hop pedagogy. 
Based on their public comments, the members of the 2015 global residency 
were enthusiastic about the State Department’s vision of hip-hop as social 
advocacy and entrepreneurship. In a roundtable in Washington DC on 10 April 
2015, the All-Stars were asked what lessons they would bring home from the 
residency. Zimbabwean beat maker Nyari “FTR” Mazango said:  
 
The possibility that what I do, music, hip-hop, can connect me to so many people just as a 
medium in itself, I think is the biggest thing I can ever take from all this. . . . Because I can 
go back with it, and when I’m building community programs, . . . I can show them the 
possibility of connecting with so many people through the music itself. 
 
Similarly, emcee Black Zang answered the same question with, “[In Bangladesh] 
we really can connect through hip-hop, we really can help each other . . . on any 
kind of issues.”  
In this way, Next Level may do its most profound work—or at least its most 
trackable work—on its American participants and their professional foreign 
counterparts who continue to reflect on their intercultural experiences, rather 
than on the youth who attend in-country workshops. Dr. Elliot Gann, a beatmak-
er and educational psychiatrist who joined the NL Senegal team in summer 
2014, described telling his audience on a Senegalese radio show, “I wish every 
American could have the experience that I’m having.” Toni Blackman, the first 
“hip-hop envoy” in the American Specialists Program and also part of the NL 
Senegal team, recently published her appreciation for the Dakaroise emcee 
Toussa, her collaborator and member of the global Next Level All-Stars in 2015, 
in a series of Instagram posts: “Toni & Toussa. Sounds like a great name for a 
café or the title of an EP. . . . It’s so dope to see artists you helped mentor and/or 
coach soar. I’m so excited and proud.” For his part, Jones described returning to 
DC with a cache of mid-century Bollywood recordings and a new interest in 
exploring the genre for beatmaking and collaboration.  
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What does a focus on affective labor, and empathy in particular, do for our 
understanding of artists’ agency during Next Level or similar programs? My 
concern here is not whether artists’ political speech is censored; every participant 
I have interviewed affirmatively stated they felt no pressure to be silent or avoid 
specific topics. Since the reorganization of USIA into USICA in 1978, safe-
guards have existed against cultural programs being co-opted by other parts of 
the State Department, and against compelling participants to act or speak on 
behalf of US foreign policy (Sablosky 32; Hayden 177).9 Instead, I am interested 
in how artists are positioned and what makes them useful to the state.  
Jones summed this up when I asked what he thought the State Department 
gets from Next Level.  
 
Of course it is a way to better the US image abroad, that’s the nature of the program. . . . 
These kids never thought in a million years that someone would pick them to work with 
hip-hop artists from the US. . . . Even if I found out there was some ulterior motive, I still 
would feel justified that these kids got something out of it. (Wallace) 
 
Here, Jones takes for granted that the State Department is acting in its own 
interest, though he also said that he felt there were Department personnel with 
sincere interest in hip-hop music and culture. At the same time, the mutual 
attachment of teachers and students allows him to avoid asking or worrying 
about “ulterior motives.”10 In a similar vein, Jones appreciated that the program 
was “sending authentic artists,” not necessarily “iconic” hip-hop artists, and 
placing a premium on teaching ability rather than fame. This individualized 
sincerity of intention allows hip-hop artists, who might not agree with US policy 
in the places they are going or in general, to join the program and make it work.  
Additionally, the way that arts-diplomacy rhetoric positions artists who are 
working for these programs tends to erase their expertise and their labor as 
contributions. Precisely because artists are encouraged to say what they think, 
they are not encouraged to see themselves as representatives of the state or of the 
                                                           
9  I am not aware of an explicit policy regarding advertising NL’s accomplishments to 
US citizens, but since the program routinely posts professionally edited videos to its 
own social media accounts, anyone in the personal and professional networks of NL 
and its current and former musicians can see program news through Facebook, Twit-
ter, and elsewhere. 
10  In our discussion, Jones recalled with a laugh that the team’s Patna students “still 
reach out to us on Facebook. . . . I still get some of these random profile pictures on 
my page” (Wallace). 
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American people as a whole (though some do). Because they can run their 
workshops, demonstrations, and collaborations how they see fit, they are not 
encouraged to see themselves as employees of the state. Because they are 
selected as much for their personal qualities as for their musical abilities, they 
are not encouraged to see themselves as working, but rather as “doing what they 
love.” Paradoxically, this devalues people’s musical expertise and years spent 
honing their craft in favor of appreciating their generosity, flexibility, sincerity, 
empathy, or independence.11 When this mode is embraced by musicians as well 
as State Department organizers, it serves to depoliticize the state’s choice of hip-
hop regardless of the performers’ lyrical statements. Next Level and other 
programs stress the universalism of artists’ affective labor instead of the system-
ic, race-based difference-making hip-hop arts so often identify and critique.  
Next Level builds upon the now-commonplace “public diplomacy” paradigm 
by orchestrating moments of person-to-person diplomacy. Hip-hop’s origin 
narrative, when told through institutions committed to color-blind policy, 
contributes to a belief in its power to overcome linguistic, religious, political, or 
cultural barriers shared by program organizers, workshop participants, and 
musicians themselves. As Rockower insisted in our discussion, “Hip-hop is 
universal. It’s this empowering force in all of these different countries. . . . The 
value of this stuff—there’s no metrics that will ever support it.” I do not doubt 
the sincerity of this comment, but as in any genre, “empowerment” through hip-
hop is dependent on local contexts and definitions of power.  
In claiming that hip-hop transcends linguistic and political borders, the State 
Department deploys seductive assumptions about the universality of art. Howev-
er, it does this through the paradoxical position hip-hop music occupies world-
wide. While at home, US artists must continually reassert hip-hop’s aesthetic 
value in order to combat systemic discrimination against the genre and African 
Americans. Abroad, Next Level relies on the affective labor of its teacher-artists 
to leverage hip-hop lovers’ own narratives about the genre’s role in supporting 
freedom and resistance. To return to Hayden’s observations, NL thus serves a 
“relevatory function,” confirming to both American and foreign participants a 
fundamental sameness of values understood as central to US public diplomacy 
                                                           
11  In reviewing this chapter, Katz suggested, instead, that NL participants are allowed to 
focus on their craft as musicians and teachers, “Instead of pressuring them to perform 
in areas in which they are not expert (speaking about US foreign policy, etc.)” (Feb. 
2018). My point is not that NL participants should be expected to cultivate expertise 
in such traditional diplomatic skills, but that in practice, their affective labor is consid-
ered as or more important as their musical and teaching labor.  
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(180). This, in turn, serves to naturalize US cultural dominance and diminish 
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Popular Musicking and the Politics of 
Spectatorship at the United Nations 
James R. Ball III 
 
What is the place of the emotions in music? . . . 
[One view] holds that music is concerned with 
the “communication” or the “expression” or the 
“representation” of emotions . . . Common sense 
leads me to ask why people should devote so 
much of their lives and resources to the commu-
nication of emotions . . . and why, for that mat-
ter, listeners should be interested in having them 
communicated to them. After all, we all have 
plenty of emotions of our own without having to 
feel other people’s.  
(Small 135-6, emphasis added) 
 
Musicologist Christopher Small’s work is often invoked to make romantic 
claims for music’s capacity to forge community. In Musicking, the work from 
which my epigraph is drawn, he argues optimistically that music is a process in 
which performers and listeners each participate, a ritual that bonds people by 
celebrating their unique social worlds. Nonetheless, his glib argument against 
identifying the affective transmissions music engenders with its purpose pulses 
with charming anti-social cynicism. Small dismisses the theory that music 
facilitates the transfer of feelings between individuals, indicating his exhaustion 
with the often-invoked notion that art can make a better world by encouraging 
empathetic encounters between national and cultural others. Small’s skepticism 
of aesthetic theories based in empathy offers a useful frame for reconsidering the 
use of music in diplomacy, especially in international institutions such as the 
United Nations.  
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Musical programs have often appeared at the UN, and music has long offered 
a set of handy metaphors to theories of international relations. In an early effort 
to theorize the work of the UN as performance, the Irish diplomat Conor Cruise 
O’Brien wrote that a resolution of the General Assembly “has the force of law in 
the same sense as has a sacred song: it provides spiritual encouragement and 
comfort and induces a sense of collective righteousness and of the legitimacy of 
a common endeavor” (19). At the UN, states performatively enact the contours 
of an international community, staging consensus and dissensus1 in an effort to 
momentarily stabilize a particular configuration of states and peoples. As 
O’Brien implies, this work is also addressed to a global audience without diplo-
matic credentials in an effort to activate positive feelings regarding our species’ 
shared humanity, responsibility, and purpose.  
This chapter focuses on the divergent responses of multiple spectators ad-
dressed by the UN when it stages performances that incorporate popular music. I 
argue that the UN deploys musical performance as part of a broader project to 
transform the individual global citizens who follow the UN’s work into docile 
subjects of global governmentality. However, this effort is undermined by the 
instability of the moment in which those individuals watch and listen. In what 
follows I will examine two scenes of what Small terms musicking: instances of 
performing or listening to music, an expanded category that recognizes that even 
spectatorship and audition constitute active participatory processes that make 
meaning. First, I will examine events produced by the UN Secretariat to com-
memorate the third International Happiness Day, held in 2015, which centered 
on the participation of the pop star Pharrell Williams. On that day, Williams 
straddled the line between two energetic audiences: a crowd of high school 
students who watched him from the floor of the General Assembly hall, and 
anxious UN functionaries who watched the crowd from the hall’s green marble 
dais. Second, I will examine a New Year’s concert mounted in the General 
Assembly in 2013, which featured a performance by Serbia’s Viva Vox choir. 
Here I will focus on the Secretary-General as a highly-placed spectator who 
becomes a source of discomfort and offense for civil society groups and journal-
ists who watch him in turn.  
Among these other spectators, I will also locate my own gaze—my place as a 
spectator consuming these events through the UN’s streaming web video service. 
                                                           
1  Dissensus is philosopher Jacques Rancière’s term for a dispute that reveals inequality 
in spaces that claim to be egalitarian. He writes, “dissensus is not a conflict of inter-
ests, opinions, or values; it is a division put in the ‘common sense’: a dispute about 
what is given, about the frame within which we see something as given” (304). 
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I include my spectatorship not in an effort to generalize from my reactions, but 
rather to highlight their contingency. As ethnomusicologist Deborah Wong 
reflects on her own auto-ethnographic practice in the collection Shadows in the 
Field, “It’s not impossible that your subjectivity and mine have points of over-
lap, but our responses are not, and can’t be, equivalent” (80). My own reactions 
to these scenes of musicking vary widely from bemusement to aversion. I am 
primed to distrust sincerity, and occasionally cringe at the ways these events use 
pop stars, diplomats, and lay-persons. These reactions may well be a function of 
my privilege and position as a spectator. Nonetheless, this article is not about the 
contents of any individual spectator’s experience, but an account of the instant of 
hailing whereby performance in international institutions impacts a spectator’s 
subjectivity, interpellating that spectator as a subject of ideology. This instant 
will necessarily differ for each individual hailed.2 I include my own first person 
accounts in an effort to theorize such moments even in their heterogeneity. As 
performance studies scholar Della Pollock asserts, “[t]his performative ‘I’ thus 
has a politics and an ethics. Performing displacement by error, intimacy, others, 
it moves beyond the atomization, alienation, and reproduction of the authorial 
self toward new points of identification and alliance” (252). My performative “I” 
is thus a consciously idiosyncratic refusal of identification with UN spectacle in 
service to thinking through other forms of affinity and organization.  
At stake in this endeavor is a clearer view of the ways in which international 
institutions and the states that work within their confines exercise power via 
performance and spectatorship. The Secretary-General makes clear the central 
place of spectatorship in diplomacy at the UN; he facilitates spectatorship. His 
most explicit power is enshrined in the UN Charter’s Article 99: “The Secretary-
General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in 
his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security” 
(UN). The Charter calls on the Secretary-General to act as a global spectator. 
The Secretary-General trains the gaze of the UN Security Council on specific 
regions in conflict, a gaze followed often by the indirect application of economic 
                                                           
2  Here I follow Louis Althusser’s theory of interpellation, as described in his essay, 
“Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.” Althusser tells his readers that interpel-
lation “can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or 
other) hailing: ‘Hey, you there!’” (118). While Althusser goes on to disclaim the the-
atricality of this example and the “temporal succession” it implies (118), the cases in 
this chapter insist on the utility of conceiving interpellation via the theatrical moments 
of hailing in which the implicit process of interpellation rises to the surface of con-
sciousness.  
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and military force in the form of sanctions, peacekeeping, and related mecha-
nisms. The UN’s spectatorship is performative insofar as it is an integral part of 
a system of global governmentality that manages world populations by targeting 
“someone’s body, soul, and behavior” (Foucault, Security 122). In other words, 
the UN acts on the world stage via spectatorship: by looking and not looking at 
particular individuals, populations, or territories, and by influencing what they 
can and cannot see in turn. In this context, the moment of interface between 
spectators and international institutions in performances of popular music at the 
UN provides an opportunity to reimagine the radical agency of even the most 
disenfranchised spectators on the world stage. Where powerful states mobilize 
performance on the world stage to emplace a spectator, in that spectator’s 
reactions she or he may refuse to be placed.  
 
 
INTERNATIONAL HAPPINESS DAY 
 
In 1972, the King of Bhutan proposed a new indicator of national development, 
Gross National Happiness, or GNH, to be measured alongside indicators like 
Gross Domestic Product. GNH looks beyond what money can buy in the admin-
istration of the state by focusing regulative and legislative attention on four 
pillars: Sustainable and Equitable Socio-Economic Development, Conservation 
of the Environment, Preservation and Promotion of Culture, and Good Govern-
ance (“Four Pillars”). In Bhutan, a Gross National Happiness Commission is 
charged with mainstreaming these principles into national policies, orienting the 
apparatus of government towards the subjective wellbeing of citizens, monitor-
ing their affective lives in regular nationwide surveys. These surveys consist of 
dozens of questions measuring and quantifying a respondent’s psychological 
well-being, health, relationship with the environment, economic standard of 
living, and so on (“Gross National Happiness”). Internationally, GNH has also 
become an ideological export, a form of diplomatic cultural capital for Bhutan 
on the world stage. Advancing the cause of happiness, Bhutan placed the issue 
on the UN’s agenda in 2011 through resolution 65/309, and a year later the 
General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 66/281, also penned by 
Bhutan, proclaiming 20 March the International Day of Happiness. The resolu-
tion also emphasized the Secretary-General’s important duties vis-à-vis global 
spectatorship by calling on him to bring the proclamation to “the attention of all 
Member States, organizations of the United Nations system and civil society 
organizations for appropriate observance” (UNGA 1).  
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International Happiness Day is hardly a distraction for the Secretariat: it pro-
vides an anchor for spectacles designed to encourage global spectators to sign on 
to UN priorities on issues like climate change and poverty eradication. As 
feminist scholar Sara Ahmed details in The Promise of Happiness, happiness 
also functions as a performative promise that “gives us a specific image of the 
future” suggesting “happiness lies ahead of us, at least if we do the right thing” 
(29). As a promise, happiness organizes and intensifies the energies of those to 
whom it is addressed. At the UN action is often accomplished through the use of 
performative speech, for instance, in the active language peppering the opera-
tional paragraphs of resolutions of the Security Council or General Assembly. 
Philosopher J. L. Austin’s theory of the speech act (detailed in his lectures, How 
to Do Things with Words) may be even more broadly applied at the UN. Interna-
tional relations is a realm composed of diplomatic performatives: discrete, 
efficacious utterances deployed to affect the relations between states. A treaty, 
the threat of sanctions, an off the cuff remark by a head of state—each of these 
may function as a diplomatic performative, as an effort to remake the world 
through verbal performance. The promise of happiness is another diplomatic 
performative that works to interpellate states and citizens as good institutions 
and subjects on the world stage.  
For the third observance of International Happiness Day in 2015, Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon released a brief video advertising programs run by the 
Secretariat in cooperation with groups like The UN Foundation, a non-
governmental organization founded by Ted Turner to “connect people, ideas and 
resources to help the United Nations solve global problems” (“What We Do”). In 
the video the Secretary-General stands in front of a wall of neon pink flat screen 
monitors, imploring his audience in different languages to “be happy,” while the 
best-selling song of 2014, pop star Pharrell Williams’s “Happy,” plays in the 
background (see fig. 9). The video launched multiple programs planned for 
2015, including the #HappySoundsLike Campaign, a collaboration with stream-
ing music platform Mix Radio, in which the public was invited to nominate 
songs to a global happiness playlist; an educational event in the General Assem-
bly featuring Williams in conversation with environmental activists Philippe 
Cousteau and Sylvia Earle; and the Happy Party website (another co-production 
between Pharrell Williams and the UN Foundation, with support from Google) 
with which users could make animated gifs of themselves dancing along to 
“Happy” yet again.  
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Fig. 9: A screenshot of the UN promotional video “Ban Ki-moon Joins the 
#HappySoundsLike Campaign,” featuring the Secretary-General.  
 
 Source: Courtesy of the United Nations. 
 
At first glance Pharrell Williams’s pervasive presence appears to be a product of 
the coincidence that Gross National Happiness found global purchase at the 
same time that Williams’s hit song was climbing the charts. Extended reflection 
suggests a deeper affinity, however, between a discourse of happiness that is 
anti-consumerist on its face and a heavily commercialized popular music market. 
Even if some economists3 are stymied by a “Happy Planet Index” that ranks the 
US in 150th place—“behind Burkina Faso,” as Foreign Policy Magazine reported 
in 2009 (Yester)—it is not hard to be suspicious that Gross National Happiness 
in fact supports prevailing economic relationships. Gross National Happiness 
rewrites the terms with which populations are governed or managed while doing 
little to alter the structures of power underwriting the hierarchical distribution of 
states and their populations in the twenty-first-century.  
Evident in the 2015 programs, implementing the Secretary-General’s Inter-
national Happiness Day mandate has required significant corporate sponsorship 
and has been largely facilitated by Ted Turner’s UN Foundation. These partner-
ships entrench a twenty-first century neoliberal political order that prefers 
marketplace solutions when addressing civic issues. Where the raw measurement 
of wealth and production gives way to delicate assessments of individual and 
                                                           
3  See, for example, economist Arno Tausch’s article “In Praise of Inequality? ‘Happy 
Planet’ Performance and its Determinants,” and the economists quoted by Katherine 
Yester in Foreign Policy Magazine. 
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collective happiness, one still finds a market logic refining its tools for what 
philosopher Michel Foucault calls “governmentality . . . the way in which one 
conducts the conduct of men” (Birth of Biopolitics 187). Governmentality is an 
exercise of power not through direct applications of force, but by leveraging 
relationships between forces and managing populations by addressing their 
behaviors and dispositions (Foucault, Security 190-98). Gross National Happi-
ness risks intensifying a global governmentality that sustains and obscures 
inequality, exploitation, and oppression. Even if the circulation of global capital 
is absent from an ideal theory of Gross National Happiness, neoliberal structures 
prove adept at incorporating the happiness discourse and infiltrating its material 
expressions. As a producer, songwriter, and performer with his own clothing 
lines and fragrances, Pharrell Williams, who ranked number 78 on Forbes 
Magazine’s 2015 list of the world’s highest paid celebrities, embodies this 
contradiction.   
While Gross National Happiness can be a positive and disruptive force in the 
field of economic and development policy, its implementation inevitably proves 
ambivalent where it becomes attached to the exercise of power via regimes of 
governmentality. Ahmed argues that “happiness is a form of world making” (2) 
and that it “becomes a duty” (7). Where she has warned against the “instrumen-
talization of happiness as a technique” (10), one might view the UN’s Interna-
tional Happiness Day activities with similar suspicion. Here again, the role of the 
Secretary-General as a facilitator of spectatorship comes to the fore. The afore-
mentioned General Assembly resolution 66/281 directs the Secretary-General to 
manage the attentions of states and civil society so that they might observe 
International Happiness Day appropriately. The Secretariat stages events de-
signed to hail spectators into the duty of happiness, but these events also provide 
opportunities to feel otherwise.  
I certainly felt otherwise. Each of the Secretariat’s 2015 Happiness Day ob-
servances prompted my discomfort, but perhaps none so much as the Happy 
Party website Pharrell Williams, Google, and the UN Foundation produced 
(globalhappyparty.com). In this response, I am likely an outlier: judging from 
the endless sea of animated gifs of people dancing that composed the website 
(each uploaded by a visitor), it is clear that many others have enjoyed participat-
ing in the project. The site’s looping music removes Williams’s voice from the 
song to invite participation in performances that affirm the sentiment on offer: 
we are called to fill the space the lyrics have left behind. Without voice and 
lyrics only one index of the performing body remains, the clapping hands which 
refer one back to the song’s missing verbal content: the repeated chorus of 
imperatives commanding the audience to “clap along if you feel like happiness is 
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the truth . . . clap along if you know what happiness is to you . . . clap along if 
you feel like that’s what you wanna do” (Williams). What these orders lack in 
severity they make up for with a presumed social pressure evinced by the parade 
of animated gifs collected for the event. These amplify the uncanny effects of the 
Happy Party: though many of the gifs feature people in groups, suggesting the 
scenes of community Happy Party produced locally, the overwhelming visual 
motif of the page is a uniform grid of squares in which the strobe-like rhythm of 
the shifting frames of each gif unifies globally diffuse dancers. Participants are 
atomized; they participate to be codified and arranged, assimilated uniformly 
under the banner of happiness. Though they seem to be having fun, I recoil from 
this scene of affective administration and refuse to be placed among them.  
The UN Foundation and National Geographic Magazine brought Williams 
into the General Assembly Hall on Happiness Day to participate in an educa-
tional event on climate change. Greeting the cheering crowd of assembled 
youths he observed drily, “[s]o this is fun” (“International Day of Happiness 
Event”). His mild affect and intonation epitomized the wry response engendered 
by institutional efforts to inorganically command fun, from corporate team-
building exercises to high school pep rallies. I also sensed an element of subver-
sive sarcasm in Williams’s presentation, a performance of cool his young 
audience seemed to embrace as their cheering swelled again. Williams’s live 
appearance opened a moment of radical indeterminacy in which performer and 
spectators navigated and negotiated their relationships with one another and with 
the wider world. If I found the UN’s calls for a modest and tightly controlled 
public participation in the International Day of Happiness off-putting, in the 
General Assembly that day other audiences refused to be placed in their own 
ways.  
Maher Nasser, Director of the Outreach Division for the UN’s Department of 
Public Information, opened the event with a call for participation that had clear 
limits: “Please use your cell phones. You can tweet, use social media. You can 
dance, but not on the tables.” The audience broke into warm laughter (“Interna-
tional Day of Happiness Event”). Later, as Nasser attempted to organize the 
presenters for a photograph, the music video of “Happy” began playing in the 
General Assembly hall. The crowd of students left their seats to make their way 
to the General Assembly dais, staying off the tables. On his own initiative, 
Williams descended into the crowd, which now became a sea of smart phones 
pressing forward for a selfie with the celebrity (see fig. 10). The webcast of the 
event cut between images of the music video and the growing chaos in the 
Assembly hall, and after a minute Nasser could be heard again, booming over 
the song to entreat the crowd, “Please don’t push, there are children who might 
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get suffocated” (“International Day of Happiness Event”). The song was cut off 
and security guards pulled Williams and others back to the safety of the stage, 
from which they could exit the disorder.  
 
Fig. 10: Pharrell Williams at the General Assembly during the special event 
on the occasion of the International Day of Happiness.  
 
 Source: Courtesy of UN Photo, Loey Felipe. 
 
Two groups of spectators looked on one another at this event: a group of youths 
who transported the energy and conventions of a pop concert into the Assembly 
hall, and a security apparatus that watched them uneasily. The surging, self-
organized crowd proved inappropriate, perhaps even subversive, in the serious 
diplomatic space of the General Assembly, and the representatives of authority 
on stage recoiled. While the disorder may have posed an immediate safety 
hazard to those present, it also posed an implicit threat to an institution striving 
to bring order to the world. A third spectator was also watching: I laughed a 
mirthless laugh at the ironic chaos streamed to me online, which seemed to 
parody the more consequential forms of crowd control for which the UN is often 
responsible in refugee camps or around demilitarized zones. Scholar, students, 
and security guards—spectators all—we materialized our relationship to an 
international order through the ways we watched.  
According to Christopher Small, “[i]n the concert hall, as at any other kind of 
musical event there is an underlying kinship between the members of the audi-
ence . . . there are certain kinds of behavior they can expect of one another and 
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other kinds that they need not” (41). Small indicates the nexus of space, specta-
torship, and expectation that makes the power of crowds legible, the grounds on 
which heterogeneous and spontaneous responses take on social meaning. The 
General Assembly hall also activates expectations of behavior, whether it is 
playing host to a diplomatic or a musical performance. During its usual sessions, 
one expects dull speeches only occasionally ruptured by scenes of Soviet leader 
Nikita Khrushchev brandishing his shoe at the General Assembly podium in 
1960, Saudi Arabia’s UN Ambassador Jamil Baroody throwing a punch at the 
General Assembly President in 1973, or Israeli President Chaim Herzog tearing 
up a resolution equating Zionism with racism in 1975. All of these constitute 
theatrically excessive performative acts that take their meaning by virtue of their 
departure from the orderly norms of diplomacy.  
Bringing musical performance into the General Assembly intensifies the 
norms governing audience behavior—how one acts and reacts takes on added 
performative force in the space of the Assembly hall. These added forces subvert 
the presumption of “underlying kinship” by rendering it a performative promise 
rather than manifest reality: something to be made that is always at risk of 
failure. The UN is founded on a similar performative promise, also always at risk 
of failure: “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” (UN). UN 
diplomats call on music to establish collective kinship as a desired horizon, 
organizing listeners into a unity reflected again in the concert of instruments or 
voices they watch. When alternative participatory formations emerge, such as 
the self-organized audience threatening to suffocate Pharrell Williams, they 
demonstrate the contingency and instability of the proposition. Deployed to 
generate affects (like happiness) that can foster community bonds, musical 
performance at the UN in fact opens a time and space that puts pressure on the 
processes that construct our social worlds. 
 
 
NEW YEAR’S CONCERT OF THE 67TH SESSION  
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
 
Introducing Serbia’s Viva Vox Choir in January 2013, Ban Ki-moon credited 
former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld with innovating the tradition of 
musical performance at the UN in the 1950s. Ban spoke at a concert organized 
by the Permanent Mission of Serbia to the UN to celebrate Eastern Orthodox 
New Year and explicitly framed as a gesture of peace carried by elements 
intrinsic to the music presented. Turning to the performers, he noted that “to-
night’s performance should give us hope. The Viva Vox choir sings a cappella. 
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This style more than any other showcases the human voice. Voices can be used . 
. . to divide and oppress, or if they are used well, they can be used to heal and 
uplift, and harmonize” (“Viva Vox Choir”). Ban invokes a popular musical 
metaphor in the fields of diplomacy and international affairs, to affirm conceptu-
al links between the harmony of voices or instruments, the harmony of the soul 
or spheres, and the harmony of nations or peoples. While contemporary scholar-
ship has proven adept at deconstructing this metaphor, challenging the assump-
tions of universality that undergird it and the stable community it implies (see 
Ahrendt et al. 3-8, and Bayles in this volume), the concept of “harmonizing” 
remains a potent rhetorical device for policy-makers.  
Speaking next, Vuk Jeremić, Permanent Representative of Serbia to the UN 
and the President of the General Assembly that year, continued Ban’s theme: 
“Great music can cut across every boundary and touch every soul. It transcends 
differences. Irrespective of where we come from, it binds us together as human 
beings” (“Viva Vox Choir”). In their speeches, Ban and Jeremić indicate their 
attachment to an ideal of music that unites communities, performatively enacting 
common kinship among listeners. Yet each diplomat also noted that voices can 
oppress, that music transgresses political boundaries, and that sound penetrates 
the human body. If music forges community, it does so by mobilizing forces 
equally capable of dividing, destabilizing, and degrading the subjects on which 
they act.  
The Viva Vox Concert in the General Assembly made clear the contradic-
tions inherent in the UN’s cosmopolitan promises; when melodies and lyrics 
prove contrapuntal, they imply the abyss separating aspirations towards global 
peace and the reality of competing nationalisms in international institutions. The 
Viva Vox Choir, according to their website, was formed in 2005 by a group of 
high school graduates and their former teacher and conductor, Jasmina Lorin. 
The group achieved international visibility in 2011 when their a cappella rendi-
tion of German industrial-metal band Rammstein’s 1997 hit “Du Hast” went 
viral online (“Choir History”). Though Viva Vox is best known for their inter-
pretations of popular music, for their performance at the UN they added what 
announcer Zoran Baranac described as “a few pieces that represent their national 
heritage” (“Viva Vox Choir”). These included “Tamo Daleko” (There, Far 
Away), a folksong composed during World War I; the nineteenth-century 
folksong “Ajde Jano” (C’mon Jana); and, most controversially, Stanislav Bi-
nički’s “March on the Drina,” written to commemorate the Serbian victory over 
Austria-Hungary in the Battle of Cer during World War I in 1914. The rest of the 
program included pop classics like ABBA’s “Mamma Mia,” novelty songs such 
as Monty Python’s “Always Look on the Bright Side of Life,” and representa-
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tives of a cosmopolitan commercial-cultural order, like Somali-Canadian rapper 
K’naan’s “Wavin’ Flag,” which became popularized when Coca-Cola used it as 
a promotional anthem during the 2010 World Cup.  
Viva Vox’s rendition of John Lennon’s 1971 hit “Imagine” formed the the-
matic heart of the program; Jeremić received resounding applause when he 
quoted it in his opening remarks. But “Imagine” also imported some sentiments 
into the General Assembly hall that rest uneasily with the explicit and implicit 
goals of the organization. The song’s melodic tranquility and conventional 
harmonic structure mask the anarchic thrust of lyrics that implore listeners to 
“imagine there’s no countries,” “imagine there’s no religion,” and “imagine no 
possessions.” Performing nationalist songs to celebrate Eastern Orthodox 
Christian New Year a few miles down the road from Wall Street, Viva Vox 
seemed unlikely to do any of these things. Perhaps this is why several of the 
songs they performed obscured their lyrical content. The concert opened with 
“Ameno,” a song written by new-age group Era in a gibberish designed to sound 
vaguely religious. Later, “Imagine” was followed by “Baba Yetu” (Our Father), 
a 2005 composition by Christopher Tin in which the Lord’s Prayer is sung in 
Swahili. And for the evening’s encore presentation of Stanislav Binički’s 
“March on the Drina,” Viva Vox chose to substitute non-referential vocables for 
lyrics composed in 1964 that celebrate the expulsion of foreign invaders with 
stark images of blood flowing and streaming near the cold waters of the Drina.  
With words absent, the singers emulated the martial instrumentation of 
drums and horns, shifting between fast and slow marching tempos. After three 
minutes the audience began clapping along to the driving rhythm, and the 
official UN webcast of the performance cut to a medium shot of Ban and Jere-
mić seated next to one another, clapping along as well. Here again, the Secre-
tary-General’s role as a highly-placed spectator was foregrounded in official 
records of the event (see fig. 11). After a moment, the cameras returned to the 
performers on stage, the clapping was drowned out by beat-boxing, the song 
ended, and the room erupted in applause. This scene precipitated a minor geopo-
litical incident: the day after the concert, the Congress of North American 
Bosniaks,4 a non-governmental organization representing Bosnian communities 
in the US and Canada, delivered a letter to the Secretary-General condemning 
his participation in the evening’s presentation because it had included the 
“infamous and offensive Serb nationalist song, ‘March on the River Drina’” 
(Alibasic et al.). Two days later, a Bosnian-American reporter, Erol Avdović, 
                                                           
4  The term Bosniak refers to those who identify with the Bosnian Muslim ethnic group, 
regardless of state of citizenship. 
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raised the issue again during the daily noon briefing by the Spokesperson for the 
Secretary-General, this time with specific reference to the fact that Ban was seen 
“applauding there” (“Daily Press Briefing”). On behalf of the Secretary-General, 
the spokesperson responded, “[w]e sincerely regret that people were offended by 
this song, which was not listed in the official programme. The Secretary-General 
obviously was not aware what the song was about or the use that has been made 
of it in the past” (“Daily Press Briefing”).  
 
Fig. 11: Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and General Assembly President 
Vuk Jeremić watch the Viva Vox Choir perform.  
 
 Source: Courtesy of the United Nations. 
 
According to the accounts of victims collected in the US State Department’s 
Seventh Report on War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, “March on the Drina” 
served as a soundtrack to mass sexual violence during the Bosnian War in the 
1990s. In Foča, the report asserts, Muslim “women knew the rapes would begin 
when [‘March on the Drina’] was played over the loudspeaker of the main 
mosque” (US Department of State). It is not difficult to believe that the Secre-
tary-General was indeed ignorant of the song’s traumatic heritage, but this does 
little to ameliorate the inadequacy of the claims made by those who defended the 
song’s inclusion in the event. From Baranac’s introduction, which framed the 
performance as a reorientation of a once martial song to the project of peace, to 
Jeremić’s later contention that offended parties were “twisting the meaning of 
our musical gift” (qtd. in Nichols), organizers of the concert and its participants 
demonstrated their inability to recognize the gestures and sounds that can 
reactivate historical traumas in the present. Where UN diplomats turn to music to 
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sidestep the political pitfalls of words, they prove blind to politics performed and 
meanings carried by the structures those words inhabit. Once again, a live 
encounter on the world stage between spectators and performers disconcerted the 
smooth administration of international relations, undermining the performance of 
unity, agreement, and consensus that lends so much diplomacy its normative 
force. 
Chief among those gestures verbose diplomats cannot account for is perhaps 
the sound of two hands clapping, especially those hands that clap along. This 
may be one reason why the Secretary-General proved much more the locus of 
offense in the incident than either Viva Vox or the Serbian Mission. Literary 
scholar Steven Connor describes clapping as “a form of bodily overflow into 
sound” (72) and hypothesizes its evolutionary origins in “the action of slapping 
and cuffing the body . . . an emblematic display on the body of the aggressor of 
what may be in the offing for his victim” (67-8). Perhaps American and Canadi-
an Bosnian audiences focused on the Secretary-General’s rhythmic clapping in 
their complaint because of a similar sense of implicit menace amplified by the 
song’s historical uses. On the other hand, perhaps the Secretary-General’s 
participatory spectatorship offended for the ways it transgressed hard-won 
political boundaries. In clapping along, an ostensibly benign gesture required by 
his office, Ban acquiesced to the intentional and unintentional meanings ar-
ranged on stage by Serbian diplomats and performers, and he re-transmitted 
those contents and their affective charge through the sounds produced when his 
hands came together to form a rhythm.  
His individual act of clapping may also have unnerved Erol Avdović and 
others for the submission to a controversial collective it implied. Considering the 
acts of audiences to the theatre, performance studies scholar Baz Kershaw notes, 
“Applause is the moment in which the collective aims to assert itself over the 
individual, in which an imagined community is forged. So the pitch of ap-
plause—whether it is a standing ovation or a desultory clap—indicates different 
types of consensual abandon, a giving up of individual judgement: we lose 
something of ourselves in putting our hands together with others in public” 
(135). Insofar as any articulation of community also implies the necessary acts of 
exclusion that produce that community, the clap that claps along acknowledges 
the short distance between an audience unified in applause and the cacophonous 
clapping that might be used to chase away an object of fear. Much like the 
promise of happiness, unison applause becomes a duty and demand that fore-
closes on disagreement or dissensus. Thus an audience and performer—the 
Congress of North American Bosniaks and the Serbian Mission to the United 
Nations—entered into dispute over the contours and contents of an international 
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community; a dispute that centered on the gestures and sounds made by the 
Secretary-General.  
Feminist philosopher Julia Kristeva’s formulation of abjection in Powers of 
Horror can offer much to an understanding of the import of aversive reactions to 
mass diplomatic spectacles. Abjection is both a psychological and a socio-
cultural function; it is a process that stabilizes an individual’s sense of self and 
which polices the borders of a given community. According to Kristeva, “The 
abject and abjection are my safeguards. The primers of my culture” (2). Abjec-
tion is the process of casting off what might otherwise be considered constitutive 
of the subject, “I.” Multiple affects index the scene of abjection: fear, disgust, 
shame, hate, and others. Where these erupt, the subject may be said to be in a 
process of self-stabilization, erecting and maintaining his or her psychological 
boundaries. As Kristeva puts it, “I experience abjection only if an Other has 
settled in place and stead of what will be ‘me’” (10). In abjection, subjectivity 
emerges from a scene of self-alienation, where this Other is cast off and cast out.  
In National Abjection: The Asian American Body Onstage, Karen Shimaka-
wa also asserts “the paradigm of abjection as a national/cultural identity forming 
process” (3). However, Shimakawa engages abjection not as an exclusive 
psychoanalytic explanation for the formation of specific identities, but “as a 
descriptive paradigm in order to posit a way of understanding the relationship 
linking the psychic, symbolic, legal, and aesthetic dimensions of national identi-
ty” (4). Instances of audience aversion to geopolitical spectacle mark operations 
of (inter)national abjection. The offended reaction of Bosnian audiences may be 
located at a nexus where an individual’s sense of psychological identity collides 
with the symbolic structures of public diplomacy in the legal ramifications of 
events staged in international institutions and the aesthetic experience of specta-
torship.  
Audiences that recoil in international institutions exhibit negative reactions 
to the performative production of Small’s “underlying kinship.” Kristeva notes, 
“Abjection . . . is the other facet of religious, moral, and ideological codes on 
which rest the sleep of individuals and the breathing spells of societies” (209). 
Abjection is the constitutive dark side of law, order, peace, and security. Abjec-
tion erupts in the space where the UN works to build or transform a global 
community that may not fit an individual’s pre-existing sense of self. Audiences 
that recoil, become offended, or cringe exhibit necessarily visceral responses to 
cultural and political forces that smudge the boundaries of the subject. In these 
moments, the forces circulating between scenes of diplomatic performance show 
their effects on and in the bodies of spectators.  
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Steven Connor writes, “Clapping one hand on another dramatizes the fact 
that you are a subject and an object simultaneously, a doer and a done to; you 
fold yourself over yourself, you form an interface with yourself, which joins to 
the interface you form with others” (72). To Kershaw’s annihilation of the 
individual by the collective in applause, we may add an individualized terror of 
bodily and psychological boundaries losing their solidity as palm meets palm. In 
clapping, the body ceases to be a discrete, whole, and stable entity. My argument 
that musical presentations in international institutions provide an especially 
potent opportunity for the negotiation and renegotiation of the contours of 
international community rests on recognizing the interrelationship between 
specific bodily configurations, shared or unshared affects and meanings, and the 
legal structures that make nations and states—an interrelationship made explicit 
by abjection. Where Kristeva acknowledges the horror of bodily disintegration 
(“The border has become an object. How can I be without a border?” 4), those 
who theorize clapping recognize its potential to reproduce that horror on a 
broader social scale.  
As interface, the clapping body produces a sonic mesh that unites spectator 
and performer in shared rhythm or returned sentiment. Clapping knits together 
an audience in shared actions, and it even incorporates bystanders (like those 
watching the video online) when the sound reaches our ears. While these effects 
may be inconsequential in most musicking, at the UN they reiterate the vital 
work of the institution (making common cause among peoples divided), expos-
ing the potential failure of that work. Both the spectator who claps and the 
spectator who does not (either at the live event or at mediated distances) intensi-
fy the social function of musicking, prompting confrontations between individu-
als and the forces that bind them together.  
When I watch Ban Ki-moon clap along to “March on the Drina,” I recoil for 
different reasons than Avdović or others who were offended. If abjection may be 
thought of alongside the uncanny, then the abject offers reminders that it was 
once a part of me; it reflects me, even in its difference, like a corpse. Watching 
Ban Ki-moon I find my own gaze doubled, uncannily, teleporting me into the 
scene. We are both spectators, and his acts of spectatorship surrogate my own, 
highlighting differential experiences of power on the world stage. Here I must 
recoil, I must cast off my recognition, I must be unsettled and displaced in order 
to remain psychologically sound. By clapping, the Secretary-General imports 
existential dread into geopolitical spectacle, the terror of identity lost when an 
individual subject becomes an object of collective administration, a constituent 
of a system of global governmentality that operates through spectatorship. 
Watching his consensual abandon, I become aware of the forms of social control 
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that govern my world: I see myself and the power and limits of my own specta-
torship. 
The pressures of performance bear inordinately on the Secretary-General. 
According to the authors of The United Nations and Changing World Politics, 
 
[t]he Secretary-General walks a tightrope, needing to appear independent and not simply a 
pawn of any or all of the [permanent members of the Security Council], but at the same 
time he must maintain the confidence and support of those same states. (Weiss et al. 11) 
 
The Secretary-General performs for audiences at cross purposes, and so be-
comes, as Conor Cruise O’Brien once described Dag Hammarskjöld, “an atten-
tive spectator of his own actions” (121)—self-alienated like the spectator be-
come object in the act of applause. Elsewhere, O’Brien argues on behalf of the 
ritual and theatrical functions of the UN, which he casts as a secular Vatican on 
the East River where the Secretary-General acts as “the high priest of the shrine” 
(134). The papal analogy emphasizes the interstitial nature of the role, between 
great powers and the people as between god and (wo)man. The Secretary-
General is an interface that acts on behalf of the Security Council, the General 
Assembly, and a nebulous international community. The Secretary-General is 
directed by powerful states to stage the surveilling gaze global governmentality 
requires. As a locus for multiple forms of spectatorship on the world stage, he 
generates energies that extend to global spectators, circulate among diplomats at 
the UN, or rebound back upon the Secretariat. 
In his essay “The Standard Modes of Aversion: Fear, Disgust, and Hatred,” 
philosopher Aurel Kolnai lists markers of the morally disgusting:  
 
the shirokaya natura of the Russians […]; inconsistency and irresponsibility; what the 
French call inconscience, overspontaneity, overpersonalness, softness, and sentimental-
ism; above all, what the Germans call Verlogenheit: that is, a character organically 
wedded to, a mental life diffusely steeped in, lying, dissembling, illusion, and self-
deception. (103)  
 
Kolnai’s enumerations capture the many ways in which a diplomat’s magna-
nimity toward cultural participation might prove unsettling: in its broadness, its 
sentimental sincerity, and its suspect theatricality. Kolnai’s implicit emphasis on 
national difference is also remarkable insofar as his theory of disgust investigates 
the affective phenomena at the heart of scenes of abjection that make nations and 
states, racialize communities, and risk exploding into genocidal violence. That 
the Secretary-General’s overgenerous participation in the Viva Vox concert 
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offends Bosnian onlookers is not an example of misplaced outrage or an over-
sensitive response to a frivolous event. It is an integral and material moment in 
which international relations among people of different social and cultural 





In the events investigated throughout this chapter, various audiences performed 
their resistance to the projects of social and political administration at the heart 
of the UN’s work—to the unreflexive harmony it seeks. According to Sara 
Ahmed,  
 
[h]armony would be a demand for accordance. This is why I would argue that the powers-
that-be might want their subjects happy rather than sad […]. The good encounter could be 
read as being how bodies stay in place or acquire a place in which they can stay, by 
agreeing with what they receive. The bad encounter can be read as how bodies refuse to be 
placed by disagreeing with what they receive. (213) 
 
Ahmed accords a radical power to moments like those in which the UN’s 
participatory events misfire and bodies refuse to be placed. Where one encoun-
ters and refuses the demand to be happy or clap along, one invites the rear-
rangement of psychological, physical, spatial, and social coordinates. Though I 
may join Christopher Small in arguing against empathy as the primary mecha-
nism which music may offer diplomacy, I am not arguing against musical 
diplomacy at the UN. Rather, the utility and efficacy of music diplomacy must 
be noted elsewhere: in its counterintuitive effects, precisely when it misfires and 
results in infelicities. 
According to Kolnai, “[i]t is as a disgusted self that I inscribe my quality and 
lineaments into the stuff of the world, and as a hating self that I set the seal of 
my personality on a universe reluctant and vulnerable like myself” (99). Scenes 
of public diplomacy at the UN may take on different meanings for different 
spectators, but all transmit their effects in the moment of encounter between a 
performance and its audiences. In our reactions we do things with even the most 
banal performances. As Ahmed puts it, “[t]o receive an impression is to make an 
impression” (40). In both positive and negative reactions, I become culturally, 
ideologically, and physiologically inscribed in the world, whether I am dancing 
on tables, taking a selfie, or clapping along. Watching others participate I 
become alienated from the processes that organize my social life, be they explic-
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it, like public diplomacy, or implicit, like cultural abjection. A radical constituent 
power thus adheres to crowds assembled for the most scripted spectacles staged 
by the international institutions that administer global governmentality. Deploy-
ing popular music on the world stage, the UN invites audiences to recode the 
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From Sons of Gastarbeita 
to Songs of Gastarbeiter 
Migrant and Post-Migrant Integration  
through Music and German Musical Diplomacy  
from the 1990s to the Present 
Gesa zur Nieden 
 
 
“Rap was communication-music as opposed to reference-music.” This is how 
sociologist of music, Antoine Hennion, describes early US-American and 
European rap in one of his articles on mediators of music. By examining espe-
cially non-human mediators such as “scores, texts, sound, instruments, reper-
toires, staging, concert venues, and media,” Hennion emphasizes the fact that the 
concern of rap “was not with music as a beautiful object or a purveyor of musi-
cal truth in a reconstituted collectivity […]. Instead what counted was the 
individual performance in the present with whatever means at hand and with 
success measured by how that performance is judged relative to the performanc-
es of one’s rivals” (432). 
According to this communication-based description, which highlights the 
dimension of battle and rivalry, rap music and hip-hop culture would not seem to 
be useful media of communication within transnational public diplomacy. Due to 
their centering of individuals and their competitive dimensions, rap and hip-hop 
seemingly oppose the diplomatic purpose of purveying a positive cultural image 
of a certain state based on “reference-music,” even if recent public diplomacy 
scholars have pointed out the importance of direct and individual exchange with 
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a “strong human factor” by focusing on so-called people-to-people exchange.1 
But despite the fact that rap music and lyrics might convey negative cultural 
images and “bad policies” that have to be avoided in public diplomacy (Scott-
Smith 55), rap and hip-hop have been frequently employed in German public 
diplomacy of the last 20 years. This is certainly due to the current purpose of 
distributing the image of a culturally diverse nation in a global context: Since 
1998, the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its connected institutions such 
as the Goethe Institute have utilized rap, hip-hop, and electronic music by 
German musicians with a recent history of migration to promote a modern image 
of Germany in a global age.2 This includes the organization of concerts at 
various branch offices of the Goethe Institute, the preparation of educational 
material on rap songs for German lessons in France and Belgium, as well as the 
release of music collections by the first, second and third immigrant generations, 
remixed and recorded by young DJs under the title Heimatlieder aus Deutsch-
land (Songs of Home from Germany).3 
With regard to aesthetics, it seems as if the employment of rap and hip-hop 
only partly fits the actual definition of art within an “arts diplomacy” described 
by US researcher John Brown. While German rap music probably responds very 
                                                           
1  Cf. the definition of Public Diplomacy by Cross (4). See also Scott-Smith (50-6). The 
immediate communication between people is also stressed in Deis (192-205). 
2  According to the annual reports of the Goethe Institute, their first rap project was 
organized in Cameroun in 1996, with Yaundö and the German lyricist Marcel Beyer. 
The first concert of German rappers with a recent migration history took place at the 
Goethe Institute in Brussels in 1998 with the crew Sons of Gastarbeita from Witten. A 
year later, two international joint programs included rap musicians from Germany: the 
workshops for German teachers “Rap in Deutschland” with rapper Spax and DJ Mirko 
and the exhibition “Migranten und Kulturpolitik” in Rotterdam with the participation 
of Selim Özdogan and Microphone Mafia from Cologne (see Jahrbuch/Annual Report 
1996/1997, 1997/1998 and 1998/1999).  
3  The last years have witnessed a necessary and overdue debate over the terminology 
that is used in order to refer to the descendants of “guest workers” and other first-
generation immigrants. While the terms “second-” and “third-generation immigrants” 
is still commonly used, social activists have advocated for the alternative of “new 
Germans,” thus seeking to counter the process of Othering that is inherent in such 
concepts as second- and third-generation immigrants. Since many of the artists dis-
cussed here refer directly to the generation of “guest workers,” this article uses the 
terms second- and third immigrant generations while being aware that these words do 
not question, in any way, their German citizenships and identities. 
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well to the purpose of personal communication and a demonstration of cultural 
diversity and humanity, it might not match the mental maps of global citizens 
regarding Germany in terms of music history as compared to the US. Indeed, 
following Brown, it is the romantic aesthetics of art that seems to guarantee the 
embeddedness of a nation in a global, humanist culture, since “arts diplomacy 
provides audiences with unique and memorable experiences” that are generated 
by “powerful impressions,” “revelation,” and “illumination.” This kind of 
aesthetic approach seems to fit the repertoire of classical music by German 
composers while contradicting the alignment of German hip-hop with the 
concept of cultural, ethnic, and racial otherness of the Turkish-German popula-
tion (Diessel; Ickstadt). Thus, how can diplomatic and cultural institutions 
integrate (politically motivated) rap and hip-hop into an art diplomacy that 
ensures personal experiences through “the kind of unique moments that make 
our lives worth living” (Brown 59)? 
In what follows I will analyze Hennion’s sociological statement on rap music 
as a medium of individual, mostly locally based communication in relation to the 
central concerns of (West) German public diplomacy between transnational 
information, dialogue, and a successful promotion of a modern image of Germa-
ny.4 As Hennion does in his article, I will contextualize the employment of 
German-language rap music in German public diplomacy with other genres of 
popular music by members of the first, second, and third immigrant generations. 
I will cover the period from the 1980s to the present, looking at perspectives of 
both the musicians and (West) German institutions of foreign policy in the 
cultural realm to detect the principal aesthetics and cultural elements of rap 
music used in (West) German public diplomacy.  
The chosen period of investigation allows me to historically contextualize 
the different intentions connected with German rap and other genres of German 
popular music composed and performed by the second immigrant generation: the 
children of so-called Gastarbeiter (guest workers), immigrants from Southern 
and Southeastern Europe, including Turkey, who responded to the German call 
for manpower between 1955 and 1973. Taking a person-oriented approach and a 
comparative look at the aesthetic values of rap music and its reception in com-
parison to other forms of popular music, I argue that German rap musicians in 
the 1990s with a recent migration history were called upon to underscore the 
democratic, young, and future-oriented image of a modern Germany as long as 
they set aside, or even erased, negative aspects of German history since the 
                                                           
4  For an overview of German public diplomacy see Zöllner (262-69). For an overview 
on concepts and key themes of public diplomacy see Ostrowski (19-36). 
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1930s. At present, the aesthetic value of projects on music by immigrants that 
are relevant to public diplomacy is increasingly based on a conception of music 
as a medium of a common cultural memory and a shared culture of remembrance 
in a post-migrant society, a fact that is paralleled by the mostly German citizen-
ship and identities of the second immigrant generation.5  
 
 
GERMAN RAP BETWEEN IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION  
AND SOCIAL COMMITMENT 
 
The history of German rap is strongly related to immigration, integration, social 
commitment, and cultural transfer in a culturally varied society.6 In the 1980s 
German rap was established in West Berlin, Brunswick, Cologne, Frankfurt, 
Hamburg, Heidelberg, Kiel, and Dortmund, mostly by musicians with a migra-
tion history (Elflein 257, 261). When Germany was shaken by the many racist 
arson attacks on refugee centers during the 1990s, German rap and rock emerged 
as central media of antiracist commitment and the affirmation of Germany’s so-
called “multicultural” identity (Pennay 116-17). As Pablo Dominguez Andersen 
pointed out, the transfer of US-American rap to Germany was a means for 
mostly male members of the second immigrant generation to broach the issue of 
a constant lack of integration. While their English band names symbolized 
acculturation to the Western world, masking their Turkish, Greek, or Italian 
names, their German texts ironically contrasted the flow of German words with 
the language of Turkish Gastarbeiter, as in the song “Ahmet Gündüz” (1992) by 
Fresh Familee: 
 
At work my boss say to me: Kanacke7 how are you? 
I tell him Hastir lan, 8 
but the asshole don’t understand anything. 
My son attend school, now knows how to write, 
but teacher is a bastard, he gives him the lowest scores.9  
                                                           
5  For a critical view on the term “postmigrant” and on its history see Kosnick, (Intro-
duction 7-10; “Ethnic Club Cultures” 199). 
6  For the history of rap music in Germany see Pennay (111-33); Verlan and Loh; Loh 
and Güngör; Bennett (133-50); Androutsopoulos; Saied; Kautny (405-19). 
7  Derogatory German slang term for Turkish and Southern European immigrants. 
8  Fuck off in Turkish. 
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In this song from the album Falsche Politik (1993), the German boss’s failure to 
understand the Turkish immigrant’s German language outlines an overt rebellion 
by the Turkish-German rappers of the group against the socially, medially, and 
economically inaccessible structures in German everyday life.10  
While this demand for respect is articulated with curse words that circum-
scribe the immigrant’s presumed authentic experiences, three years later, the 
band Sons of Gastarbeita, a formation of young Lebanese-German and Philip-
pine-German rap musicians in the Ruhr Area,11 one of the biggest metropolitan 
regions in Germany, released a song that shows the same functional elements as 
“Ahmet Gündüz,” including spoken German by Turkish Gastarbeiter and the 
denunciation of a collective lack of integration.  
In contrast to “Ahmet Gündüz,” however, the song points to the generational 
process of cultural rootedness rather than to actual experiences of social, politi-
cal, and medial discrimination as the reason for rebellion.12 First of all, the band 
name Sons of Gastarbeita mixes English and the Ruhr Area’s vernacular to 
circumscribe the second immigrant generation in Germany (qtd. in Loh and 
Güngör 62). In their song “Söhne der Gastarbeita,” the group’s generationality is 
the core theme (Du so). Consisting of the lines “Sons of Guest Workaz / we are 
the sons of guest workers,”13 the song’s hook emphasizes the rappers’ German, 
locally-rooted but culturally open identity (“a son of this region / regardless of 
tradition and religion”).14 The song also calls for the complete and permanent 
integration of the second immigrant generation into German society, a process 
that had been denied to their parents. The second verse, in which the rappers 
mimic the language of “guest workers,” describes the idealized image of Germa-
ny many workers from countries such as Turkey, Greece, and Italy shared before 
their arrival in Germany, and which vanished into thin air once they had arrived. 
This positive but unrealistic image, emphasizing the importance of Germany for 
the second generation, becomes the song’s central message in the second verse: 
                                                           
9  “In Arbeit Chef mir sagen: Kanacke hey wie geht’s? / Ich sage Hastir lan, doch 
Arschloch nix verstehen. / Mein Sohn gehen Schule, kann schreiben jetzt, / doch Leh-
rer ist ein Schwein, er gibt ihm immer Sechs.“ (Kaya 79) All translations are my own 
unless noted otherwise.  
10  For an interpretation pointing to the confrontation of different mentalities in the song 
see Kumpf (210-11). 
11  For an overview of hip-hop culture in the Ruhr Area see Nitzsche (4-8). 
12  For the mixture of German and Turkish in German rap also see Byrd (292-300). 
13  “Sons of Gastarbeita/Wir sind die Söhne der Gastarbeiter.” 
14  “ein Sohn dieser Region/unabhängig von Tradition und Religion.” 
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the struggle of first-generation immigrants is carried on by a progressive second 
generation who are rooted in Germany and who refer to this struggle as “creative 
resistance” (“kreativer Widerstand”) to discrimination.  
The rendering of German integration history via generationality is musically 
contextualized by a more mainstream soul beat and background singing. The 
female voices of the background chorus do not contrast, but rather complement 
the male shouting of the band name in the chorus, an outcry that is reminiscent 
of a political demonstration. With this musical arrangement, the Sons of Gas-
tarbeita helped to popularize German post-migrant rap texts and styles beyond 
communities with a recent migration history and their focus on oriental music 
styles. In the 1990s, such a musical and textual orientation was embedded into 
the rise of German rap and rock as media of antiracist commitment and of what 
was commonly referred to as Germany’s “multicultural” identity after the many 
racist arson attacks on refugee centers in 1991 (Hoyerswerda), 1992 (Rostock-
Lichtenhagen), and 1993 (Solingen) (Sons of Gastarbeita, qtd. in Loh and 
Güngör 63).  
In 2002, the group with its narrative of a new generation was officially hon-
ored by then German President Johannes Rau in the context of an “integration 
competition” that was organized by the Bertelsmann foundation (Bertelsmann-
Stiftung 18). A privately-owned organization closely tied to the Bertelsmann 
media corporation, the Bertelsmann foundation had a special interest in the 
second immigrant generation (Bertelsmann-Stiftung 9). In their list of criteria for 
the choice of the winning projects they pointed to the significance of the musi-
cians’ own initiative and to the importance of direct exchange between local 
citizens from different cultural backgrounds at several times (Bertelsmann-
Stiftung 17, 25). Moreover, the awarded projects embraced most of the central 
fields of public diplomacy, including language promotion, youth work, and 
cultural encounters/rapprochement (Bertelsmann-Stiftung 22). At the same time, 
the criteria covered typical aspects of public diplomacy evaluations such as 
efficient networking, sustainability, and range of influence (Bertelsmann-
Stiftung 15). In the portrait of the band, music is ascribed a very wide range of 
influence in building communities and reaching out across various media 
(Bertelsmann-Stiftung 28). 
Due to this overlap between the musical expression of a young generation 
and local or national public diplomacy, the Goethe Institute invited the Sons of 
Gastarbeita to perform and offer workshops to French students at the institute’s 
branch offices in Brussels, Paris, Nancy, Lille, and Lyon in 1998, 1999, and 
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2008.15 The Goethe Institute also integrated the group into their language courses 
by compiling an educational unit for German lessons in France on the song 
“Sons of Gastarbeita” (Dommel et al.). Those didactic materials not only accen-
tuated the narrative of the young generation by providing an exercise where 
students had to write a story based on fragments of the lyrics; in the handout for 
German teachers, published online by the German language section of the 
Goethe Institute after 1998, the song was also directly linked to a very positive 
image of German Landeskunde (Area Studies): 
 
In this context, the history of immigration in the German Federal Republic can be dis-
cussed (the 60s, the economic miracle, the Berlin Wall—workers from East Berlin could 
not come to West Berlin anymore, the lack of workforce in the highly industrialized Ruhr 
Area, the recruitment of Turkish workers). (Dommel et al., “6. Textarbeit 1”)16 
 
While the Goethe Institute’s educational material narrates the 1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s principally on the basis of the rappers’ biographies, historical background 
information is limited to the 1960s economic boom, thus contradicting the 
original intention of the band who wanted to transfer historical knowledge on the 
contemporary life and structural disintegration of the first generation of Gas-
tarbeiter (Sons of Gastarbeita qtd. in Loh and Güngor 63-5). In summary, the 
educational material used the lyrics to construct strategically suitable personali-
ties while neglecting the performing musicians themselves who claimed to have 
studied the social conditions of first-generation Gastarbeiter in Germany and 
who had accumulated historical knowledge that was never taught at school (Sons 
of Gastarbeita qtd. in Loh and Güngor 63).  
According to the teaching materials, these biographically constructed figures 
and their cultural mobility correspond to a global “reality” of migration (Dom-
mel et al.,“1. Mit Wortkarten Geschichten schreiben”).17 To achieve such an 
understanding, the students are repeatedly asked to compare the statements in the 
song to the situation in France. Interestingly, these comparisons are mostly 
evoked when negative aspects, such as a lack of integration, are concerned: 
                                                           
15  For a brief overview of local promotions of hip-hop in the 1990s see Mager (267). 
16  “Der Anlass ist gegeben, die Geschichte der Immigration in der BRD anzureißen (Die 
60er Jahre, das Wirtschaftswunder, die Berliner Mauer – es kamen keine Arbeiter 
mehr aus Ost- nach West-Berlin, der Mangel an Arbeitskräften im hochindustrialisier-
ten Ruhrgebiet, Anwerbung von türkischen Arbeitern).”  
17  “Ihr werdet den Song anhören. Da geht es um eine Realität, die Menschen überall in 
der Welt betrifft.”  
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[G]o deeper into the difficulties of the “guest worker”: misery in the homeland, the dream 
of paradise, the hostility of Germans, and isolation within the “ghetto” that prevents them 
from properly acquiring good German. In the classroom discussion it becomes clear that 
such a situation is still extremely topical—even in one’s own country. (Dommel et al., “7. 
Textarbeit 2”)18 
 
Thus, the handout constructs the rappers as members of a new generation only 
by constantly hinting to the fact that integration is a current topic in the entire 
world of “our times” (Dommel et al., “9. Textarbeit 4”). The artists’ concert is 
mentioned only in testimonies by the participating schools that document the 
quantitative criteria for success. In one of those testimonies, for instance, a 
French teacher of German seeks to invite the rap group to her school for another 
concert after having attended a performance at the Goethe Institute: 
 
Yesterday evening I attended the concert of the “Sons of Gastarbeita” with the pupils of 
the fifth bilingual English-German class and the presentation with the pupils’ work done 
in two workshops in the morning of the same day at the very beginning; my pupils were 
caught with enthusiasm during the evening by the energy, the warmth, and the generosity 
of the musicians who allowed attendees to get on stage to dance—One of my pupils did a 
hip-hop performance and I found him quite talented! 
We bought the CD and on our way back home my pupils again sang the refrain “Ich will 
mehr!” (“I want more”)!!! 
Thus I would like to know whether and under which conditions the Sons of G could come 
to our school to give comparable workshops and a concert. My colleague who gives music 
lessons has some musical instruments and we have various bigger rooms in the school 
building. How could such a thing be organized??? 
I would like to thank once again the Goethe Institute for this initiative and for the good 
gentle and intercultural spirit of this evening. (Sternberg, slide 22)19 
                                                           
18  “[D]ringt tiefer in die dargestellte Problematik des ‘Gastarbeiters’ ein: die Misere in 
der Heimat, der Traum vom Paradies, die Feindseligkeit der Deutschen, die Isolierung 
im ‘Ghetto,’ die einen guten Spracherwerb verhindert. Man erkennt im Klassenge-
spräch, dass diese Situation auch heute noch—auch im eigenen Land—von höchster 
Aktualität ist.” 
19  “Je suis venue hier après-midi assister avec des élèves de cinquième ‘bilingues 
anglais-allemand’ au concert donné par les ‘Sons of Gastarbeita’ et à la présentation, 
au tout début des productions d'élèves ayant participé le matin-même à 2 ateliers; mes 
élèves ont été enthousiasmés par cet après-midi, par l'énergie, la chaleur et la généro-
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In the didactic material the music of the song is only picked up in a little annota-
tion that emphasizes the particular significance of the musical interpretation. The 
funky soul accompaniment is the reason why the chorus is—wrongly—
interpreted as a complaint and not as a protest:  
 
While working on a song the text should never be analyzed on its own. The interpretation 
confers a special meaning to it. Here we have a hip-hop rhythm that is continuously 
accompanied by instrumental funk and soul, not only in the instrumental passage but also 
in the sung stanzas. Funk and soul are melodious and sentimental. The refrain becomes a 
lament, at the end it is almost cried. . . . The instruments (especially keyboards and guitar) 
underline the lamenting character. Attention should be paid to the guitar solo in the 
interlude. How can the dying drum roll at its end be understood? (Dommel et al., “11. Das 
Lied hören”)20 
 
Characterizing the musicians as “faces of the future [who] refuse to be put down 
as exotic or ‘mixed’ people with personality and psychosomatic disorders” 
(Dommel et al., “5A. Wer sind die Sons of Gastarbeita”).21 Dommel et al. project 
                                                           
sité qui se dégageaient des musiciens- qui acceptaient que les jeunes montent sur la 
scène et y dansent- Un de mes élèves a fait une démonstration de hip-hop et je l'ai 
trouvé plutôt doué!” 
 Nous avons acheté le cd et pendant le trajet du retour mes élèves reprenaient le refrain 
‘ich will mehr!’!!! Jetzt wuerde ich gerne wissen, ob und unter welchen Bedingungen 
die Sons of G in meine Schule kommen koennten, um gleiche Workshops und ein 
Konzert zu planen; meine Musikkollegin verfuegt über ein Paar Instrument, wir haben 
mehrere grosse Räume in der Schule. Wie koennte sich das organisieren lassen??? 
(sic) 
 Ich bedanke mich nochmals für diese Initiative am Goethe-Institut und für den 
freundlich-interkulturellen guten Geist an diesem Nachmittag.”  
20  “Bei der Arbeit an einem Lied/Song sollte nie der Text allein behandelt werden. Die 
Interpretation gibt ihm besondere Bedeutung. Hier haben wir HipHop-Rhythmus, der 
ständig von instrumentalem Funk und Soul begleitet wird, nicht nur in den instrumen-
talen Passagen, sondern auch in den gesungenen Strophen. Funk und Soul sind melo-
diös und gefühlvoll. Der Refrain wird zur Klage, am Schluss fast geheult. . . . Die In-
strumente (besonders Keyboards und Gitarre) unterstreichen den klagenden Aspekt. 
Zu beachten das Gitarrensolo im Zwischenspiel. Wie ist der absterbende Trommel-
wirbel am Schluss zu verstehen?”  
21  “Gesichter der Zukunft . . . [die] sich nicht mehr als Exoten oder ‘Mischlinge’ mit 
Persönlichkeitskonflikten und psychosomatischen Störungen abstempeln.” 
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what they deemed to be the sorrowful cultural identity of the rappers onto the 
music. In doing so, they tend to reduce the musicians to their ethnic identity 
rather than recognizing their artistic achievements.  
Paralleling such an interpretation, a review on the Goethe Institute’s intercul-
tural activities published on the institute’s website problematizes the fact that 
“the bands have not been invited because of their good music or excellent 
performances but because of the fact that they had non-German roots” (Verlan, 
“Breakdance”).22 The review then goes on to list Microphone Mafia, Sons of 
Gastarbeita, Islamic Force, and Asiatic Warriors as examples of such groups 
(Verlan, “Breakdance”). Sons of Gastarbeita confirmed this view themselves, 
criticizing the general lack of interest not only in their historical knowledge, but 
also in the aesthetic dimensions of their music (Loh and Güngür 63-75).  
That the Goethe Institute’s interpretation did not correspond to the rap 
group’s self-determined understanding of their music is obvious if one regards 
the song against the backdrop of the band’s oeuvre. The band’s overall work can 
be characterized as a compromise between post-migratory engaged texts and the 
German middle-class rap music by such crews as Die Fantastischen Vier. For 
this compromise, they were repeatedly criticized by Turkish-German rappers 
who engaged with political themes in their music (Özdoğan 2).  
Nevertheless, one might assume that the political commitment of Sons of 
Gastarbeita did not fit the needs of a German public diplomacy. In their song 
“März-Rap 1920” (“March Rap 1920”) released in 2006, the group recalls the 
bloody workers’ revolt of 1920 in the Ruhr Area to raise historical and political 
awareness. Based on the soul beat sample of “Söhne der Gastarbeiter,” “März-
Rap 1920” poetically retells the workers’ rebellion with the help of historical 
recordings and calls for a collective awareness in order to warn against the one-
sided orientation of political authorities. Awarding the band with the German 
records critics’ prize, commentators praised “März-Rap 1920” as a successful 
analysis of a historical event and a reinvention of the political song genre 
(“Grenzgänger”). By seeking to build historical awareness of the social and class 
inequalities in the Weimar Republic, the Sons of Gastarbeita may have lost some 
of their appeal in the eyes of decision makers in the field of German public 
diplomacy. Instead, the two main band members, Ghandi Chaline and Germain 
Bleich, continued with rap projects in youth work in Germany that discussed 
genuine social issues like mobbing at school, the result of which practically 
contributed to further integration of German youths on various social levels.  
                                                           
22  “Die Bands wurden nicht eingeladen, weil sie gute Musik machten oder tolle Liveauf-
tritte, sondern weil sie offensichtlich nicht-deutsche Wurzeln hatten.” 
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HEIMATLIEDER: FROM ANTIRACIST COMMITMENT  
TO CULTURAL MEMORY 
 
Compared to the Sons’ rap concerts at Western European Goethe Institutes, the 
current official musical projects in the framework of German public diplomacy 
show a very different mixture of music, cultural identity, and political history. 
This is obvious in two contrasting examples: (1) the independent ethnographic 
initiative by the artists and authors Imran Ayata and Bülent Kullukcu, who both 
were born around 1970 in Germany and recently started an independent initiative 
in which they compiled a collection of German migratory music under the title 
Songs of Gastarbeiter (they released a compilation of migratory and post-
migratory music that was distributed in Germany among first-generation immi-
grants) and (2) the project Heimatlieder aus Deutschland, a project piloted by 
the German Foreign Office presenting ensembles of traditional music and 
musicians with a migration background who are now active in Berlin and 
Augsburg. Collaborating with the labels Galileo Music and Karaoke Kalk, three 
albums entitled Heimatlieder aus Deutschland (Songs of Home from Germany, 
2013), New German Ethnic Music (2013), and Heimatlieder aus Deutschland 
Berlin/Augsburg (Songs of Home from Germany Berlin/Augsburg, 2015) were 
released within the project (“CD und Vinyl”). 
Ayata and Kullukcu are popular mostly in academic circles and are currently 
touring to present their collection of songs recorded by first-generation immi-
grants in production studios in Germany and Turkey. On social media platforms, 
the authors post pictures of their hotel rooms, ironically relating them to their 
own artistic mobility, but also to the uncomfortable accommodation of their 
ancestors when they arrived in Germany as “guests.” The photos of Gelsenkir-
chen, one of the poorest post-industrial towns in the Ruhr Area, for instance, 
ironically show off luxury items.23 In this way, the artists comment ironically on 
dominant biographical narratives of and about first- and second-generation 
immigrants.  
Based on political and historical research and on their own socialization, 
Ayata and Kullukcu’s ethnographic project seeks to integrate an important part 
of German popular music history into the official historiography of German 
(popular) music. At the same time, the project might also constitute a material 
basis for an active generational memory of the 1950s and 1960s. The artists’ 
                                                           
23  See Songs of Gastarbeiter, “Weil wir hin und wieder”; “Songs of Gastarbeiter, das ist 
keine Sosyete-Komfor-Zone” (sic); “Geht doch: Luxus in Gelsenkirchen”; “In Wies-
baden wieder zurück auf dem Gastarbeiterniveau”; “Hotel Fortuna, Essen.” 
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ethnographic work is based on a politico-historical reflection of their own 
socialization and on archival research. Outside academic circles, Ayata and 
Kullukcu address both the social experience of the second generation of Gas-
tarbeiter as well as the dominant German historicization of that experience. 
While they define the collected songs as “our songs,” i.e. the songs of guest 
workers’ children, in the booklet, the album cover of Songs of Gastarbeiter 
shows a beautiful view of a mountain landscape evoking the German concept of 
Heimat (homeland) (booklet). Interestingly, the various German-language 
“Anadolu rock” (Anatolian rock) songs contain a large amount of cultural 
allusions and ironies that result not only from the texts but from the music itself 
(Yener Aǧabeyoǧlu 62-3). The album, for instance, includes the song “Es kamen 
Menschen an” (People Arrived) by the Turkish rock musician and composer 
Cem Karaca. This choice is particularly interesting as Karaca was not a guest 
worker, but rather lived in Germany as a political exile in the 1980s.  
Karaca’s work, however, deals with the living conditions of first-generation 
immigrants. “Es kamen Menschen an” comments on Max Frisch’s famous 
statement, “they called for workers, and human beings arrive” (“man hat Ar-
beitskräfte gerufen, und es kommen Menschen”):24  
 
They [guest workers] have been quickly acknowledged in their home country 
as foreign exchange earners,  
but during this export of money and workers  
they became strangers in their new world as in their old. (Songs of Gastarbeiter, booklet)25 
 
Not only does Karaca recast Frisch’s statement from his own perspective, he also 
underlines his musical authority by harking back to the Brechtian genre of the 
Moritat (street or murder ballad). This is most apparent in the deep brass sounds 
that enrich the generic rock music accompaniment with guitar, bass guitar, and 
                                                           
24  As Max Frisch states: “They say that [the guest workers] save one billion each year 
and send it to their homelands. That was not the idea. They save their money. In fact, 
you cannot really resent them that. But they are just there, a foreign infiltration by 
humans, although, as I said, one had merely asked for workers.”  
 “[Die Gastarbeiter] sparen, heißt es, jährlich eine Milliarde und schicken sie heim. 
Das war nicht der Sinn. Sie sparen. Eigentlich kann man ihnen auch das nicht übel-
nehmen. Aber sie sind einfach da, eine Überfremdung durch Menschen, wo man doch, 
wie gesagt, nur Arbeitskräfte wollte.” (Frisch 374). 
25  “[Die Gastarbeiter] wurden in ihrem Heimatland / schnell als Devisenbringer aner-
kannt / doch bei diesem Arbeiter-Geld-Export / wurden sie Fremde hier wie dort.” 
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drums in the intro. This style is combined with Karaca’s voice that seems to 
imitate and ironically comment on the typical sound of German schlager, for 
example by the Austrian singer Udo Jürgens, simultaneously reminding the 
listener of songs like “Griechischer Wein” (Greek Wine) that transport a typical 
image of foreign Greek workers from a German perspective (see Huber 81-101). 
The ironic agglomeration of the German majority culture’s conceptualizations of 
immigration is then contrasted by a second section with a saz-solo. In the solo, 
the saz, which is played double time over the unchanging rock beat, contrasts the 
rock rhythm with its rhythmically free playing; however, the solo also demon-
strates the virtuosity of the musician playing the Turkish instrument, since the 
regular (half time) rock beat retakes its flow within the song only thanks to the 
double time of the saz. In summary, the song reflects not only great knowledge 
and critical awareness of German perspectives on immigration, but a competition 
between the two cultures that ironically emphasizes the simple regularity of the 
rock beat in contrast to the free rhythmic interpretation of the saz. With this 
irony, the musicians not only comment on contemporary German schlager, but 
also create an equitable involvement of two musical cultures.  
Long before compiling songs by first-generation immigrants, Imran Ayata 
had emphasized his critique of a multicultural society. In his view, such a 
society’s focus on ethnicity impedes serious exchange between people with 
different cultural backgrounds by neglecting many social, economic, and gender 
aspects (Ayata 275, 285). The same critique is inherent in the musical-theatrical 
piece Ab in den Orientexpress (Go, Take the Orient Express, 1984) in which 
Karaca participated as a musician and actor (Burkert and Böseke 1-2). This 
theatrical piece illuminates different social aspects and individual voices of 
Turkish and German characters in their social and cultural complexity. This 
complexity is reflected in a linguistic differentiation that also demonstrates the 
mental concepts related to the different characters: Turkish characters who speak 
Turkish, Germans who try to imitate the Turkish language, Turks speaking 
broken German, and Germans speaking a broken German because they think that 
Turks would understand them better. In this example, music is used as a place-
holder for standardized spaces and mentalities that are constantly transcended by 
individual characters: 
 
During the whole day Şahin Kadioǧlu pushes his garbage can through the commercial 
center and tries to keep the ground clean of paper, cigarette butts, and chewing gum. The 
day before yesterday his boss gave him a new task. He has to clean the humidified 
fountain with swinging artificial palms and flowers two times a day. The constant back-
ground music by James Last has a particularly unpleasant effect in this place. At the café 
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in the center of the mall, the loudspeakers seem to be turned up more loudly than in other 
places. The words “Mokka-Mekka” are placed in a brown-yellow writing above the bar, 
where Bernd’s sister Claudia serves her clients.26  
 
The irony of the piece is based on prejudices concerning the implied mental 
associations of immigrants and “natives.” Thus, the musical irony in “Es kamen 
Menschen an” does not refer to a competition of virtuosity, but underlines the 
culturally experienced play with presumed cultural images. In this way, the 
authors and musicians of Ab in den Orientexpress emphasize the everyday life of 
immigrants and locals who belong to the same social reality. Like the historical 
compilation Songs of Gastarbeiter, Ab in den Orientexpress does not seem to 
have been used directly within German public diplomacy programs. 
The current project Heimatlieder aus Deutschland presents a middle ground 
between the historiographically-oriented Sons of Gastarbeita and the musico-
historiographically-oriented Songs of Gastarbeiter. As such, Heimatlieder aus 
Deutschland explicitly works to enlarge the term “home” in cultural and musical 
terms. In doing so, it contrasts the reduction to ethnicity that dominates the 
Goethe Institute’s teaching materials analyzed above. 
The output of the project is twofold: The first CD includes current so-called 
folk music ranging from Fado and Italian choirs to Turkish songs and Dalmatian 
klapa singing by different groups of German immigrants living in Berlin and 
Augsburg, while the second CD presents German DJs’ remixes of those pieces 
under the label “New German ethnic music.” Since the lyrics of the collected 
songs remain in their original languages, German is limited to the project’s title. 
Instead, the DJs remix non-German spoken word samples into their songs and 
create their own beats, rhymes, and melodies from morphemes, syllabi, and word 
fragments. Very often, these fragments are used to accompany the steady beat of 
the remixes that contrasts the varied and complex rhythms of the original songs. 
Moreover, text fragments are used to expand the sound spectrum of musical 
                                                           
26  “Şahin Kadioǧlu schiebt seine Müllkarre den ganzen Tag durch das Einkaufzentrum 
und bemüht sich, den Boden der Ladenstadt von Papier, Zigarettenkippen und Kau-
gummi sauber zu halten. Sein Vorgesetzter hat ihm vorgestern eine zusätzliche Auf-
gabe gegeben. Er muß den luftbefeuchtenden Springbrunnen mit den schwingenden 
Plastikpalmen und den künstlichen Blumen zweimal pro Tag reinigen. Die Musik-
berieselung durch James Last wirkt an dieser Stelle besonders unangenehm. Hier am 
Steh-Café, im Zentrum der Ladenstadt, scheinen die Lautsprecher weiter aufgedreht 
zu sein als anderswo. Mokka-Mekka steht in braun-gelber Schrift über der Theke, an 
der Bernds Schwester Claudia die Kundschaft bedient.” 
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instruments to create smooth transitions from the original versions to the remix-
es.27 With this kind of “musicalization” of language (or hybridization of lan-
guage and music), the remixes are supposed to create a new genre of “New 
German ethnic music,” thus symbolizing the “actual Germany,” as former 
Secretary of State Frank Walter Steinmeier pointed out in a 2014 speech.  
For the organizers of the Heimatlieder project, the remixes constitute a “thick 
description” of musical, linguistic, and cultural traditions that have been neglect-
ed by many Germans until today, simply because they did not understand them 
(Terkessidis and Kühling). According to the project organizers, the key group for 
understanding this kind of music are once again second-generation Germans 
who supposedly grew up with this music and have an emotional relationship to 
it. While the project defines music as a carrier of emotions and memories, it 
relies on elements central to nineteenth-century European musical aesthetics. 
According to the organizers of the project, those musical memories originate in 
the “guest workers’” practice of singing “songs of home” after their immigration 
to Germany. Such practice is said to “heal the fracture within the continuity of 
culture and memory that has been experienced by migrants and to re-
contextualize themselves in the foreign country” (Terkessidis and Kühling).28 At 
the same time, the project seeks to “erase the cultural articulations of the so-
called first generation from the actually pejoratively understood context of 
folklore and puts it into a universal musical environment” (Terkessidis and 
Kühling).29 The ethnomusicological annotations in the booklet accentuate this 
focus on a purely musical rather than a politically motivated cultural identity by 
pointing to the historical hybridization of Andalusian and Moroccan music, 
among other musical cultures.30  
Such a historically wide-ranging agenda of transcultural history, cultural 
transfer, and exchanges is fundamental to the construction of a modern image of 
German culture: according to the organizers, the long-lasting intercultural 
                                                           
27  See “Milho Verde” (Trio Fado) and its remix by Guido Möbius, als well as the piece 
“Adalardan Bir Yar Gelir Bizlere” and its remix by Murat Tepeli (Heimatlieder aus 
Deutschland; New German Ethnic Music). 
28  “[D]en durch die Migration erfahrenen Bruch in der Kontinuität von Kultur und 
Erinnerung zu kitten und sich im fremden Land sozusagen zu rekontextualisieren.” 
29  “entfernt die kulturellen Artikulationen der sogenannten Ersten Generation aus dem in 
Bezug auf Migration derzeit häufig pejorativ verstandenen Kontext von Folklore und 
stellt sie in ein universelles musikalisches Umfeld.” 
30  See the liner notes of “Saadi Bellouali Jani” and “Dini Din Allah” (Heimatlieder aus 
Deutschland). 
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exchange between different musical traditions and genres has the power to 
transform longstanding misunderstandings and stereotypes. In that sense, the 
description of a trip to Italy in the booklet can be read as an attempt to challenge 
existing gender roles:  
 
Let’s go to Italy! In 2005 the choir director Annunziata Matteucci travelled to Sardinia 
with thirty women to attend the famous Easter processions. In the small village Orosèi at 
the beautiful East coast (district Nuoro) she was amazed by a very special song of the 
local community: “Divina Consoladora” (Celestial Comforter). The song is traditionally 
performed at the feast of Saint Mary in September by four singers, the Tenores: “Celestial 
comforter of painful pains, give us a remedy for our sufferings.” The Tenores taught the 
rare polyphonic singing technique to the women. Right after the journey the choir Donni 
Sò (They Are Women) was founded. Today 23 women between the ages of 30 and 60 sing 
in that choir. The music teacher Annunziata Matteucci wants to share the songs of the 
choir with the world and to preserve the particular treasure for future generations. 
(Heimatlieder aus Deutschland, booklet)31 
 
By including this anecdote, the booklet to Heimatlieder emphasizes the fact that 
previously non-German traditions have been included as integral parts of Ger-
man culture by transgressing gender categories and different generations. The 
fact that they are now used to represent Germany abroad not only exemplifies 
the success of a German “welcoming culture,” but also takes on a new function 
as an instrument of German soft power. As Frank Walter Steinmeier has de-
scribed Germany’s new role in the twenty-first century: 
 
                                                           
31  “Auf nach Italien! 2005 reiste Chorleiterin Annunziata Matteucci mit dreißig Frauen 
nach Sardinien, um an den berühmten Osterprozessionen teilzunehmen. Im kleinen 
Ort Orosèi an der wunderschönen Ostküste (Provinz Nuoro) überraschte sie ein ganz 
besonderes Lied aus der dortigen Gemeinde: Divina Consoladora (Himmlische Trös-
terin). Es wird traditionell beim Marienfest im September von vier Sängern, den ‘Te-
nores,’ gesungen: ‘Himmlische Trösterin des schmerzlichen Schmerzes, gib uns eine 
Medizin gegen unser Leiden.’ Die Tenores brachten den Frauen die außergewöhnli-
che, mehrstimmige Gesangstechnik bei. Gleich im Anschluss an die Reise wurde der 
Chor Donni Sò gegründet, ‘Frauen sind’s’: Heute singen hier 23 Frauen im Alter von 
30 bis 60. Mit dem Chor möchte die studierte Musikpädagogin Annunziata Matteucci 
Lieder mit der Welt teilen und diesen ganz besonderen Schatz für künftige Generatio-
nen bewahren.” 
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In the perspective of foreign affairs, we need open doors—and that is an argument that is 
often not considered: Imagine the world being a balance. In the coming decades the 
weight of Germany, Europe and the Western part of the world will be reduced and that of 
new players will increase—in Asia, South America, and also in Africa, and this will be 
true for all categories concerning “Hard Power”: an increase of population, economic 
power, military power, political power. “Soft power” will be all the more important! It 
will be important that the things that we stand for will be attractive for the world: our 
concept of a free and open society, our idea of a social market economy.32 
 
For the former German Minister of Foreign Affairs, the power of art, literature, 
and music lies in their capacity to generate “understanding,” characterized by 
diplomatic collaboration, which he deems to be a basis also for everyday life: 
 
Outside in the world there are indeed many crises. If we Germans want to participate, if 
we want to make a small contribution to peace—and we should follow this aspiration!—
then first of all we have to be able to do the following: to understand the world! Under-
standing and comprehension are the basics for a true diplomatic solution.  
But what is the premise for understanding? 
Recently I visited India, together with a German author with Indian roots, Rajivinder 
Singh. And he told me: “To understand you need a view with six eyes. We should look at 
the world with our own eyes, with the eyes of the other and with a common view. 
Such a view with six eyes starts with ourselves. Here, at home, we have to learn it.33 
                                                           
32  “Wir brauchen offene Türen aber auch aus außenpolitischer Sicht – und das ist ein 
Argument, das weniger oft beleuchtet wird: Stellen Sie sich die Welt als Waage vor. 
In den nächsten Jahrzehnten wird das Gewicht von Deutschland, Europa, dem Westen 
insgesamt abnehmen, und das von neuen Playern zunehmen – in Asien, Lateinameri-
ka, auch in Afrika –, und zwar in allen Kategorien, die man ‘Hard Power’ nennt: Be-
völkerungswachstum, Wirtschaftskraft, militärische Stärke, politisches Gewicht. Um-
so mehr kommt es auf ‘Soft Power’ an! Darauf, dass das, wofür wir stehen, attraktiv 
ist für die Welt: unser Modell einer freien und offenen Gesellschaft, unsere Idee einer 
sozialen Marktwirtschaft.” 
33  “Es gibt da draußen in der Welt wahrlich viele Krisen. Wenn wir Deutsche uns 
einbringen wollen, wenn wir ein kleines Stück beitragen wollen zum Frieden – und 
diesen Anspruch sollten wir haben! –, dann müssen wir zuallererst eines können: die 
Welt verstehen! Verstehen und Verständigung sind die Voraussetzung für jede echte 
diplomatische Lösung.  
 Aber was ist eigentlich die Voraussetzung für Verstehen?  
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The success of the project was documented in press reviews on the project’s 
website, which accentuate the modernization of the terms “folklore” and Heimat 
as well as the power of music to transform laments into dance music (“Presse”). 
 
 
POPULAR MUSIC DIPLOMACY IN GERMANY  
BETWEEN REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION 
 
My analysis of popular music by musicians and groups with a recent migration 
history has illuminated three aspects which have shaped German public diplo-
macy from the late 1990s to today. First, the governmental bodies and private 
institutes responsible for cultural diplomacy, such as the Foreign Office and the 
Goethe Institute, tried to include current trends in popular music. All of the 
projects discussed in this chapter emerged out of a local political and social 
commitment or belonged to a specific current of cultural interest and/or expres-
sion. This is true for both the inclusion of the award-winning rap group Sons of 
Gastarbeita and the Heimatlieder project that contrasts the independent compi-
lation Songs of Gastarbeiter.34  
Second, contemporary German public diplomacy seems to prefer linear his-
torical conceptions without interruption, and even music history to a social 
history of (failed) inclusion. In fact, German public diplomacy’s emphasis on a 
historical intercultural hybridity diminishes the recognition and comprehension 
of irony as a means of participation and involvement within complex constella-
tions of different mentalities. As a central element in the music of second gen-
eration immigrants, and as an important element of modern ethnography in a 
global, mediated age (Lethen 205-31), irony has been mostly erased by the 
political authorities in their public diplomacy strategies. Rather than trying to 
acknowledge irony, the projects that are funded by the Foreign Office have 
sought to integrate the first generation’s nostalgia for their home-countries into 
the German music market via global music categories such as the newly invent-
ed genre of “new German ethnic music.” As the new image of Germany is 
                                                           
 Kürzlich war ich in Indien. Mit mir war ein deutscher Schriftsteller mit indischen 
Wurzeln, Rajivinder Singh. Und er sagte: ‘Zum Verstehen braucht man einen Blick 
der sechs Augen. Wir sollten die Welt mit unseren Augen sehen, mit denen des ande-
ren – und mit einem gemeinsamen Blick.’  
 Dieser Blick der sechs Augen beginnt bei uns selbst. Hier, zu Hause, müssen wir ihn 
lernen.” 
34  In 2013, Imran Ayata was invited by Mark Terkessidis (“Imran Ayata zu Gast”). 
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global, multi-ethnic, and intercultural, German international public diplomacy 
seems to have acquired similar social and cultural policies that already exist in 
Germany.  
Third, the definition of music used in the projects discussed above, differen-
tiating between different genres such as rap, rock, electronic, and folk, generally 
fits the conventional aesthetic definition of “arts diplomacy” given by John 
Brown. Even in recent projects, popular music is supposed to take on the role of 
a language that is understandable for everybody and a carrier of emotions and 
memories. At the same time, its political and social dimensions—traceable in 
German migratory and post-migratory music from the 1980s to 2013—are 
promoted by the accompanying liner notes in booklets and by the musical 
performances themselves that accentuate an overall cultural hybridization. Here, 
processes of cultural transfer are used by agents of German public diplomacy to 
construct a linear and uninterrupted music history in order to balance participa-
tion and representation. Rather than integrating the social reality of immigration 
into the larger narratives of German music history, however, the contextualiza-
tion of the music by first and second immigrant generation highlights the cultur-
ally diverse biographies of individuals for people-to-people exchanges. Thus, 
instead of the above named individual projects centered on ethnographic inquir-
ies and private collections of records that create a distant view of cultural stereo-
types in order to enhance discussion and self-reflection, the projects undertaken 
by German public diplomacy efforts paradoxically accentuate a holistic ethnic 
dimension over an accurate historical reality. This is the main difference be-
tween the grassroots compilation Songs of Gastarbeiter and its use within the 
larger, publicly funded Heimatlieder aus Deutschland. 
Finally, in this context, rap music is a prosperous medium for public diplo-
macy, but only as long as it neglects its traditions and conventions as an Afro-
diasporic cultural practice. German public diplomacy is less interested in the 
actual histories of popular music cultures than in their potential to show future-
oriented, generationally-constructed cultural identities. At the same time, the 
academic interests of crews and bands such as Sons of Gastarbeita has prepared 
the groundwork for official, as well as independent, participatory projects of 
second immigrant generation within the framework of historical anthropology 
and ethnography. With regard to the background of the rich variety of existing 
projects on German migratory and post-migratory popular music, German public 
diplomacy will have to cope with the tension between “understanding” or 
“involvement” as well as between “history” and “memory” when creating 
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representations of German culture through individual exchanges with a “strong 
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Public Diplomacy and Decision-Making  




In the 2013 Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) that was held in Malmö, Sweden, 
the Montenegrin hip-hop duo Who See and singer Nina Žižić performed the 
song “Igranka” (The Party), with Who See appearing on stage dressed as astro-
nauts. It was a symbolic performance in a contest that has historically been used 
in cultural diplomacy to influence how Europeans see each other: as astronauts, 
Who See suggested how Europeans of different nationalities still often perceived 
each other as aliens despite the process of European integration, and even though 
the ESC has reflected how Europeans have commonly experienced fashions in 
popular culture and the development of technologies such as television. The term 
“vision” in the contest’s name refers to the fact that the ESC has been conceived 
as a televisual event from its beginning. However, because entries in the contest 
have always represented states, they have also reflected the cultural diplomacy, 
nation branding, and soft power that shape how states are perceived internation-
ally. The ESC has been especially beneficial for the cultural diplomacy of small 
states like Montenegro: the three-minute time-limit for entries is a relatively long 
opportunity for small states to regularly promote themselves to a worldwide 
audience numbering in the hundreds of millions. 
Who should exactly determine how we see a state in the ESC has, however, 
been a matter of controversy ever since the contest was established in 1956. In 
the case of Who See, the group was internally selected by officials from the 
Montenegrin national broadcasting organization, RTCG (Radio Televizija Crne 
Gore, Radio and Television of Montenegro). The entries of other states in the 
2013 contest were selected either directly by such officials or through a national 
selection process in which juries or the public voted for the winner. The ESC has 
always been a stage upon which political values have been contested through 
cultural diplomacy, be it through the whitewashing of authoritarian govern-
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ments’ international images or the promotion of the rights of sexual minorities. 
However, the extent to which the public has been allowed to participate in the 
national selections has particularly highlighted both the ESC’s democratic 
exceptionalism in relation to other international mega events and a problematic 
relationship between national broadcasting organizations and the larger public 
with regards to democratic participation. While the democratic deficit is most 
obvious in the broadcasting organizations of authoritarian states, the debates 
over the role of public voting in the ESC demonstrate that it is an issue that 
liberal democracies have had to contend with as well. 
This chapter focusses on issues of democracy in the ESC in terms of public 
participation in the national selection processes and the appropriation of the 
contest in the public diplomacy of governments. I herein also underline a distinc-
tion between cultural and public diplomacy. The term “public diplomacy” has 
usually been used to refer to diplomacy which is directed towards an audience—
the “public”—with agents usually being national governments or international 
organizations, and their methods being more varied than just the cultural. In 
cultural diplomacy, however, the emphasis is on the “cultural” means—in other 
words, how artistic products are used to promote a state (Kim 318-9). As entries 
in the ESC are usually not selected by national governments but nonetheless still 
represent states, I consider them to be more an example of cultural rather than 
public diplomacy, although a national government often appropriates the ESC in 
its official public diplomacy policies when its state hosts the contest. However, 
the ESC is a rare case of direct democracy in cultural diplomacy, and this gives 
another spin to the term “public diplomacy,” as the public actually plays a 
decision-making role, whereas in more conventional approaches to public 
diplomacy the public is a subject rather than an agent. While the receptive role of 
the public is usually given more consideration in studies on public diplomacy, I 
am here concerned with the role that the public is allowed to play in the creation 
of cultural diplomacy and the related tensions that the ESC has highlighted 
between decision-makers, including governments, national broadcasting organi-
zations, and the larger public. 
 
 
CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN THE ESC 
 
The ESC has historically been significant for cultural diplomacy because it has 
reached an unusually large audience and, being based on cultural trends and new 
technologies, the contest has been attractive because of its fashionability and 
modernity. Held annually in May, the ESC has included entries from almost 
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every European state and has attracted around two hundred million viewers in 
recent years, making it one of the longest-running and most-watched television 
events worldwide. The ESC is organized by the European Broadcasting Union 
(EBU), which was established in 1950. The organization’s active membership 
comprises national, public service broadcasting organizations from European 
states and the Mediterranean rim that are part of the European Broadcasting 
Area, a technical region defined by the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU), a United Nations agency, for the purpose of allocating broadcasting 
frequencies. During the Cold War, Eastern European states had their equivalent 
international broadcasting organization, the International Organization for Radio 
and Television, but it dissolved in 1993 when the Central and East European 
broadcasting organizations joined the EBU. The EBU promotes cultural and 
technical cooperation between its members, especially through the Eurovision 
Network for program exchange that gives the ESC its name. The EBU has 
always been a technical rather than political grouping: indeed, it has never had 
political criteria for membership, be it for the accession or expulsion of members 
(Eugster 59). 
While the rules of the ESC have undergone changes throughout its history, 
particularly with regards to its voting system, the contest’s basis has remained 
the same: the national broadcasting organizations send artists and songs to 
compete against each other. The artists appear in the contest under the name of 
the states that the broadcasting organizations are from, so there is a direct—
albeit, as we shall see, deceiving—association with the states. Juries from these 
states, and since the late 1990s public audiences as well, have submitted their 
votes to select the winner, whose state consequently earns the right to host the 
contest the following year. The voting results are analyzed in the international 
media, with a good result usually being equated with a positive international 
image for a state. On the other hand, poor results have often been discussed 
within the states themselves as being not only connected to the quality of the 
entry but also to broader issues, such as the international image of a state or any 
political controversies that it might be party to. Voting can also be controversial 
at the stage of the national selection of the ESC entry, the organization of which 
the EBU leaves up to the national broadcasting organizations. The latter some-
times choose to stage the national selection as a televised event based on the vote 
of a jury or the public, but officials from the national broadcasting organizations 
can also make the decision themselves—which can reflect both a desire to make 
participating in the ESC less financially costly as well as an elitist mistrust of the 
public’s tastes. 
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Besides serving as a platform for the promotion of national interests, another 
dimension of the ESC that makes it important for cultural diplomacy is its 
engagement with the cultural, economic, and political concepts of Europe. The 
contest is quintessentially European: almost all parts of Europe have been 
represented in it at some point,1 and states have often used their participation to 
express the Europeanist aspirations or pro-Western orientations of their foreign 
policies.  
The ESC was established in 1956 in order to promote cultural and technical 
cooperation among Western European countries that were then pursuing their 
first steps towards economic and political integration through the European Coal 
and Steel Community, Euratom, the European Economic Community (EEC), 
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The EBU has historically 
been closer to the Council of Europe (CoE) than to the European Union (EU) in 
terms of its symbolism, scope and style, especially with its focus on internation-
alism rather than supranationalism; the CoE and the EBU were also the first 
organizations that, in the mid-1950s, pioneered the use of the circle of twelve 
stars as a European symbol (Fornäs 117-8, 136).  
However, despite the fact that it has functioned as a metaphor for European 
integration, the ESC has never been organized by either the CoE, the EEC or the 
EU, or any other European political organization. Not all of the ESC’s partici-
pants during the Cold War were members of such organizations, either: ESC 
participants then included Israel, communist Yugoslavia, and neutral states such 
as Austria, Switzerland, and Finland. However, what all of these states had in 
common was that they were not part of the Eastern Bloc, even if they were not 
fully part of the Western one. Even Yugoslavia, which was still a one-party 
communist state with restrictions on media freedom, participated in the ESC 
because its alliance with the Soviet Union had been severed in 1948. And it did 
so alongside the anti-communist dictatorships of Franco’s Spain and Salazar’s 
                                                           
1  The exceptions have been Liechtenstein and Vatican City: the former because it has 
not had a national, public service broadcasting organization, and the latter because it 
has likely not considered the contest to be appropriate for its cultural diplomacy. Na-
tional broadcasting organizations from states with limited international recognition, 
such as Kosovo, have also not been allowed to enter the EBU because it only admits 
national broadcasting organizations whose states are members of the ITU. That the 
ESC has been seen as a desirable instrument of cultural diplomacy by states seeking 
wider international recognition was underlined by Kosovo’s Deputy Foreign Minister, 
Petrit Selimi, who said in 2012 that “nothing is more important than the Song Contest 
in nation-building” (qtd. in European Broadcasting Union, “Kosovo”). 
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Portugal, states which subsequently transformed into liberal democracies in the 
mid-1970s (Vuletic 82-4). Since the end of the Cold War, the ESC has continued 
to include national broadcasting organizations from states with authoritarian 
governments where media freedom is heavily restricted, including, for example, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Russia. Belarus is now the only state in Europe that is 
represented in the ESC but is not a member of the CoE.  
For both the preparation of an entry and, if it is victorious, the hosting of the 
contest the following year, the national broadcasting organizations responsible 
for arranging ESC entries have drawn on various experts to determine how to 
present their states, including ones from the music industry, tourism organiza-
tions and advertising firms. There has sometimes even been direct government 
involvement as well. The choices of artists, composers, lyrics, genres, themes, 
choreography, and costumes have thus been loaded with political meanings. For 
example, while an entry not sung in a state’s native language and without folk 
elements may appear non-national or international in style, it can also be sym-
bolic of a desire for European integration or international cooperation in the right 
political context. This was the case when Estonia won the 2001 ESC with the 
English-language pop song “Everybody.” The song was performed by a duo that 
included Dave Benton, a black Dutch resident of Estonia, and its transnational 
character correlated to the final phase of Estonia’s EU accession negotiations 
before the state joined that organization in 2004 (Jordan 77-83).  
Issues of minority rights have furthermore been highlighted at the ESC 
through the performances of the representatives of ethnic, linguistic, racial, 
religious, and sexual minorities. In 1998, the transsexual Israeli singer Dana 
International won with her song “Diva,” which promoted an image of Israel as 
diverse, open-minded, and tolerant. The artist and performance challenged the 
common representations of Israel in the European media as a state at war with its 
neighbors, occupying the Palestinian territories and violating the human rights of 
its Arab citizens. Dana International’s success also prompted the Israeli govern-
ment to develop a new tactic in its international promotion: to present itself as a 
state that is tolerant of sexual minorities, which critics have dubbed “pinkwash-
ing” because they claim that it diverts attention from the human rights situation 
of Israeli Arabs and Palestinians (Gluhovic 203). During its promotional events 
at the 2012 ESC in Baku, the Israel Broadcasting Authority distributed a leaflet 
published by the Israeli Ministry for Public Diplomacy and Diaspora Affairs 
which promoted Israel as a state that is inclusive of its sexual minorities (“The 
True Face of Israel”).  
Other states have also sought to promote an image of themselves as more 
liberal or tolerant by including representatives of different ethnic groups and 
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linguistic traditions in their ESC entries. For example, in 1999 Germany sent a 
group of Turkish German artists to the ESC in Jerusalem where they performed 
the song “Reise nach Jerusalem—Kudüs’e Seyahat” (A Journey to Jerusalem) in 
English, German, Hebrew and Turkish (Bohlman 218). When the German city of 
Düsseldorf hosted the ESC in 2011, each entry was introduced by a postcard that 
featured people from the entry’s state who were visiting or working in Germany. 
These short clips promoted Germany as a state welcoming of migrants at a time 
when its conservative government was criticized for being too dominant in 
determining the EU’s financial policies during the debt crisis that struck the 
continent in 2008. 
While some entries in the ESC have taken international peace as their main 
theme, wars have also been a constant backdrop in the contest, from the Cold 
War to the wars in the former USSR, former Yugoslavia, and the Middle East 
after 1989. The tensions deriving from such wars have also been played out on 
the ESC stage from as early as the mid-1970s, when Greece and Turkey first 
debuted in the contest but protested against each other’s entries in light of the 
political tensions related to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus (see Şahin in this 
volume). Armenia and Azerbaijan have also not given each other points in the 
contest’s voting and have made political gestures concerning their conflict over 
Nagorno-Karabakh, while the Azerbaijani authorities have even questioned 
Azerbaijani citizens who have voted for Armenia in the ESC (Adams, “How 
Armenia”).  
However, cultural diplomacy at the ESC need not only reflect existing politi-
cal tensions, but can even suggest different ways for states to relate to one 
another. For example, despite the political tensions that continue to exist among 
the states of the former Yugoslavia, they still tend to support each other in their 
voting, as studies on bloc voting in the contest have demonstrated (Gatherer 76-
7). This may appear discordant with the recent history of the wars that they 
fought between themselves in the 1990s and the political problems that have 
consequently remained. However, their voting patterns are explained by the 
cultural affinities that these states share, especially through languages and the 
common cultural industries that were developed in Yugoslavia, which still 
transcend national boundaries to define a common market for popular music. 
When Serbia and Montenegro returned to the ESC in 2004, after having been 
excluded from the contest because of international sanctions for their roles in the 
wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, they received twelve points from 
other states of the former Yugoslavia that they had been at war with in the 
1990s. This led Serbia and Montenegro’s former foreign minister, Goran Svila-
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nović, to describe this mutual support at the ESC as a positive development in 
relations between these states (Petruseva). 
 
 
PUBLIC DEMOCRACY IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
 
How the ESC is conceived of as public diplomacy by governments is, however, 
a more complicated question than the aforementioned examples suggest. When I 
write that a state did this or that at the ESC, it might appear that this implies the 
involvement of the respective national government. This is usually not the case, 
however, and it is mostly deceptive to see an ESC entry as somehow representa-
tive of a national government. As described earlier, the EBU is the main organ-
izer of the ESC, and its active membership is comprised of national broadcasting 
organizations that have a public service aim. These organizations, mostly from 
liberal democracies, are meant to function independently of government interfer-
ence. In this case, a government would also not have control over the entry 
chosen to represent its state, for this is a matter for the national broadcasting 
organization to decide. However, the ESC entry appears on stage under the name 
of its state, not that of its national broadcasting organization, so the first associa-
tion is that the entry is, for example, an Austrian, British or Italian one, and not 
from ORF (Österreichischer Rundfunk, the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation), 
the BBC (the British Broadcasting Corporation), or RAI (Radiotelevisione 
Italiana, Italian Radio and Television). Already in the contest’s first decade, the 
EBU decided that the entries should be performed under the names of states 
because it felt that using the names of the national broadcasting organizations 
was too cumbersome and unattractive (European Broadcasting Union, “Planning 
Group Meeting”). As ESC entries are presented under the names of states, they 
are therefore examples of cultural diplomacy even though they are usually not 
produced with interference by national governments. 
How the national broadcasting organizations have organized and selected 
their states’ entries has often been controversial, especially when they have been 
perceived as doing so without a democratic mandate. As the ESC entry repre-
sents a state and the national broadcasting organization is financed by public 
sources, such as licensing fees and taxes, many citizens would like to participate 
in the process of selecting the entry. This procedure is often done through some 
sort of televised national selection process in which viewers determine the 
winner. Such public participation is also invited by the genre: popular music is, 
after all, characterized by a popularity based on commercial success. In this way, 
the ESC entry can be a rare example of cultural diplomacy that is the direct 
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result of a national, democratic process in which the public directly selects a 
state representative. This is indeed an unusual phenomenon, for artists who 
represent their states in international competitions are usually not chosen by the 
public. Conversely, athletes who represent their states in international sports 
competitions like the Olympic Games or the FIFA World Cup do not, for 
example, have to face a public vote, but instead qualify on the basis of their 
talents measured by quantifiable criteria. However, in other international mega 
events in which the national selection is more subjective, such as for the Venice 
Art Biennale, cultural ministries or professional commissions usually conduct 
the selection process. And when it comes to examples of cultural diplomacy that 
are part of a government’s foreign policy strategy, it is the democratically-
mandated representatives of the government rather than the public who decide. 
However, there are also cases in which the national broadcasting organiza-
tion decides to select the entry for the ESC itself, with a technocratic committee 
made up of officials from the national broadcasting organization or experts from 
the popular music industry, and without input from the public. In recent years, 
national broadcasting organizations that have chosen to select their entries in this 
way have usually justified it by claiming that their television stations have 
needed to cut back on costs in light of the Great Recession, and that one of the 
ways to do so has been to cut down on the budget for the ESC. In many states, 
this has usually not been controversial, especially if the ESC has not been so 
domestically popular. National broadcasting organizations might also intervene 
if public tastes are considered too parochial to choose an internationally competi-
tive entry:2 ironically, in order to be successful and celebrated by national pride, 
an ESC entry should never be too national. However, the officials from national 
broadcasting organizations also have their own interests, predilections, and 
preferences. In some cases, public protests against such internal selections have 
compelled national broadcasting organizations to reverse their decisions: in 
                                                           
2  These debates also influenced the EBU’s decision from 2009 to have mixed voting in 
the contest’s semi-finals and final. The national public voting was seen as biased to-
wards geographically neighbouring states and ones with shared cultural and political 
affinities, especially in states of East and Southeast Europe, although this has histori-
cally also been a phenomenon among Nordic states as well. The biggest five financial 
contributors to the contest, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, 
have since 2000 also been given a direct entry into the final, an issue that has prompt-
ed Turkey’s national broadcasting organisation to withdrew from the ESC since 2013, 
considering that Turkey has a larger population than all of these states except Germa-
ny (Vuletic 156-60). 
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Ukraine, for example, the national broadcasting organization accordingly 
changed its internal selection of Vasyl Lazarovych for the 2010 ESC, with 
Alyosha subsequently winning a national selection that was based on jury and 
public voting. In a similar vein, the ARD (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-
rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Consortium of 
Public Broadcasters of the Federal Republic of Germany) had to retract its 
internal selection of Xavier Naidoo for the 2016 ESC since the popular singer 
was widely criticized for his right-wing political views (Lehming). 
There was also criticism in Austria of ORF’s internal selection of the beard-
ed drag queen Conchita Wurst as the state’s ESC representative in 2014 because 
of opposition to Wurst’s gender presentation, with Facebook petitions opposing 
her selection and participation in the contest. In addition to objecting to her 
transvestism, such critics were also indignant that Wurst had not been selected 
by the Austrian public—to which the ORF responded that she had come second 
in a public vote in the national selection two years before and therefore had a 
democratic mandate. In her preparations for the ESC, Wurst was marketed as a 
symbol of diversity and tolerance, which aided Austria’s international image that 
has often been tainted by far-right political figures. As a result, she was signifi-
cant for Austria’s cultural diplomacy even though she was not chosen by the 
government or the public, but rather by a group of liberal television officials who 
sought to present a more progressive national image. In the end, Wurst went on 
to win the ESC and her victory was well-received in Austria, with her domestic 
critics being marginalized: she was even received by the Austrian Chancellor, 
Werner Faymann, and Minister of Arts and Culture, Josef Ostermayer, upon her 
return to Vienna following her ESC win (Austrian Federal Chancellery). This 
was not, however, the first time that ORF internally selected an ESC entry with 
political connotations. Before the election of Kurt Waldheim as Austrian Presi-
dent in 1986, amidst controversy that he had concealed details about his role in 
the German army in the World War II, ORF sent an Austrian-Israeli singer, 
Timna Brauer, to the ESC. And when the far-right and anti-immigrant Austrian 
Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ), led by Jörg Haider, joined 
the national coalition government in 2000, which prompted diplomatic sanctions 
against Austria by other EU member states, the ORF sent the Rounder Girls, a 
multiracial group composed of one white Austrian woman and two black female 
immigrants from the UK and the US, to sing a Motown-inspired song in English 
(Gura 68-70). In this way, the selection of an ESC entry can also play out over a 
domestic political battleground, as different political forces struggle to influence 
how their state—and their political programs—will be portrayed in the interna-
tional arena. 
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The example of Wurst also demonstrated how governments in liberal democ-
racies have tended not to take an interest in appropriating the ESC in their public 
diplomacy until their state has won. In authoritarian states that exercise control 
over the national media, the connection between the ESC and the government’s 
public diplomacy is more direct. In Azerbaijan, for instance, participation in the 
ESC has been part of the government’s broader campaign of public diplomacy in 
Europe, which has also included the “caviar diplomacy” of hosting and gifting 
officials from other European states and organizations. When it came to hosting 
the ESC in Baku in 2012, the First Lady, Mehrabin Aliyeva, was the head of the 
organizing committee while her son-in-law, Emin Agalarov, performed the 
interval act in the final. The 2012 ESC was the most expensive ever staged, after 
the one in Moscow of 2009, which again highlighted the importance that the 
Azerbaijani and Russian governments placed on the ESC for crafting their public 
image to international audiences (Adams, “Selling Azerbaijan”), especially as 
they sought to use it as a springboard for the hosting of other international mega 
events, such as the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup. European politi-
cians urged the government of President Ilham Aliyev to also use Baku’s hosting 
of the ESC to facilitate the state’s democratization and improve its human rights 
record. When she presented Germany’s voting results in the 2012 ESC, the 
German actress and comedian Anke Engelke emphasized that “it is good to be 
able to vote,” thereby implicitly supporting the democratization of Azerbaijan. 
However, the legacy of the ESC has not left a lasting impact in this regard. 
Azerbaijan’s media were still classified as “not free” by the human rights organ-
ization Freedom House in the years immediately following the 2012 ESC, and 
the state’s international ranking regarding press freedom even worsened during 
that time (Freedom House 10). On the other hand, politicians from states that 
have been criticized by west European governments and organizations for their 
authoritarian systems have leveraged the same kind of criticism against the 
organization of the ESC. The president of Belarus, Aleksandar Lukashenko, for 
instance, attacked the voting in the ESC for being rigged and biased against 
Belarus—just as he had been criticized for not allowing free and fair elections in 
Belarus (BelTA). 
The governments of most liberal democratic states represented in the contest, 
however, refrain from criticizing the ESC. In these states, governments are not 
meant to interfere with the operations of the national broadcasting organizations, 
meaning that they usually also stay out of the decision-making process for an 
ESC entry. In states in which the ESC is temporarily less popular, governments 
may also deliberately distance themselves from the contest to show that they are 
in touch with public opinion as well as to demonstrate that they are not wasting 
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attention, funds, and time on such “frivolous” matters. However, governments in 
liberal democratic states usually do get involved in the ESC once their national 
entries have won. The first reason for this is that a victory is usually well-
received in the winning state, even in one that was, until that point, not renowned 
for being enthusiastic about the contest, such as in Austria until Wurst’s win in 
2014. In this way, governments also try to capitalize on public euphoria. The 
second reason is that the hosting of the ESC requires significant financial 
resources that the national broadcasting organizations may not be able to provide 
without assistance from public or private sources. In this case, governments may 
step in to assist with the financial costs, and they would justify this intervention 
by claiming that it is in the national interest of public diplomacy to ensure that 
such a prominent international event is properly staged, as occurred in Estonia 
and Latvia when they hosted the ESC in 2002 and 2003, respectively (Jordan 85-
8). A final reason why governments may get involved in hosting the ESC 
concerns local officials that lobby for their city to host the contest. Different 
cities in the host state usually present bids to stage the contest the following year, 
and it is at this point that local governments vie to promote their cities as poten-





As a unique example of direct democratic involvement in shaping cultural and 
public diplomacy, the ESC has highlighted the tensions that exist between public 
and elite views of how a state should be represented. The national denomination 
of an ESC entry is deceiving, as the decision-makers behind it can lack broader 
political or public legitimacy. On the one hand, the ESC has been seen by 
different types of governments as a way to improve their own international 
images, especially in the case of authoritarian, dictatorial and/or one-party 
regimes, such as in Azerbaijan and Belarus in recent times or Greece, Portugal, 
Spain and Yugoslavia during the Cold War. On the other hand, it has been a way 
for other states to promote themselves as tolerant of ethnic, religious, gender, 
sexual, and migrant minorities. In many cases, the forging of such an image for a 
state has been the work of the national broadcasting organizations charged with 
organizing and selecting entries, although there has been more government 
involvement in states in which the national broadcasting organization has been 
more controlled by the government. 
However, governments have generally become more involved in the ESC 
after their state has won the contest and plans need to be made for hosting the 
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event the following year. Such victories usually appeal to the patriotic pride of 
citizens, even in states in which the contest was supposedly not so popular until 
then, as the recent case of Austria demonstrates. In addition, the hosting of the 
contest is regarded as an opportunity that can bring benefits for the international 
promotion of the state as well as the host city and region. In this regard, the 
ESC’s significance for public diplomacy also involves different segments of a 
state’s political structure, from national to local governments, as well as different 
public and private interests, from the national broadcasting organization to the 
commercial ambitions of the winning artists.  
In the end, though, what is engrained in public opinion is that state X won 
the ESC in year Y because entries in the contest are always presented under the 
names of states. And this is why the significance of the ESC in cultural and 
public diplomacy is paradoxical: because it is always a state that is seen as the 
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